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This PhD thesis explores pro bono practice among large, international law firms in Europe. 
The central question addressed by the thesis is: does “Big Law Pro Bono” contribute to access 
to justice in Europe? The thesis commences with a review of the literature which both 
contextualizes and situates the thesis. This review also identifies gaps in the existing literature 
particularly related to the globalization and localization of law firm pro bono and its practice 
beyond the United States (i.e. its practice in other parts of the world such as Europe, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America). After identifying issues with the current definition of access to 
justice, used throughout much of the existing literature, the thesis proposes a new definition 
which is then used throughout the thesis to evaluate pro bono practice in Europe. Towards this 
end, the thesis first provides historical context to law firm pro bono practice by exploring the 
history of pro bono, legal aid and other models of progressive lawyering across Europe. 
Following this, the thesis closely explores the process by which large firm pro bono practice 
arrived in Europe (i.e. globalization), the contemporary practice and the process by which it 
adapted to the European legal, social and political ecosystem (i.e. localization).  
 
Ultimately, it is suggested that large firm pro bono does not contribute to access to justice in 
Europe insofar as access to justice is defined narrowly - in the way that it has been conceived 
of in much of the existing literature. However, by embracing a broader definition of access to 
justice, it is possible to perceive the actual (and possible) social and political impact of large 
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On the 31st of January 1990, just 11 months before the collapse of the Soviet Union, McDonalds 
opened its very first restaurant in Russia. Located in Moscow, on the famous Pushkin Square, 
when the restaurant opened its doors, there was already a crowd of over 5000 Muscovites – 
and others travelling from further afield – waiting to taste their first Big Mac. The restaurant 
had expected to serve 1000 people that day but ultimately welcomed over thirty thousand 
Soviet Citizens.  
 
Reflecting on this anecdote, it is worth recalling that, between 1990 and the year 2000, the 
period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and during which the Soviet system collapsed, 
but before the rise of China, the United States was, for a short period, the only genuine Super 
Power in the World. In this period, the US economy made up over 40% of the global economic 
growth – over 25% more than either the European Union or Japan and over 30% more than 
China. Expressing the feelings of many in the West at the time, it was in 1992 that Francis 
Fukuyama famously predicted “the end of history”; the emergence of a new world order 
premised on the spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism around the world.  
 
Indeed, this was a period of unprecedented globalization, with intense integration within capital 
and product markets internationally. This was a period during which foreign assets as a 
percentage of world GDP almost doubled and the use of mobile phones and the internet became 
increasingly commonplace. This was a period during which the number of multinationals 
surged and a period that witnessed some of the largest corporate mergers of all time (e.g. Exxon 
and Mobil or America Online and Time Warner).    
 
It is perhaps unsurprising then, that this was also the period during which the world’s largest 
law firms – mainly US firms but also some London firms made up of hundreds of thousands 
of lawyers – rapidly internationalized, opening offices across the globe. Chicago-based Baker 
& McKenzie sought to become the largest law firm in the world, with the most lawyers and 
offices in 32 countries worldwide by 1993. Rival firms dubious of Baker’s “franchise” model, 
dubbed the firm “McLaw”. In the years that followed, these critics would have to eat their 
words as several major law firms followed in the footsteps of Baker & McKenzie.  
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Europe was the first part of the world to see a major influx of American law firms. Why 
Europe? While the countries of Western European experienced a period of virtually 
uninterrupted economic growth between the late 1980s and the early 2000s as they became 
increasingly integrated, for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this was a period of 
rapid privatization, the lowering of trade barriers and a flood of foreign direct investment. No 
less than eight former socialist states were preparing to join the European Union and public 
and private funding was flowing into the region along with new concepts and ideals, such as 
democracy, the rule of law and civil liberties.  
 
The American law firms were simply following their clients and the markets and echoing the 
developments within the broader global economy. However, and crucially for this thesis, as 
they internationalized, they were not only exporting commercial legal services. Like the private 
foundations and development agencies whose attentions were also turning to parts of Europe 
at this time, they were exporting American culture and ideals, amongst which the practice of 
“Big Law Pro Bono”. That is, a model of social change lawyering that can trace its origins to 
the United States and to progressive legal movements of the 1960s and 1970s, a model that 
involves the provision of legal services at no cost, and for the public good (but typically for the 
benefit of low-income individuals), by lawyers working at large commercial law firms.  This 
practice, and particularly its European variant, is the central concern of this PhD thesis.  
 
Like the Big Mac then, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Big Law Pro Bono became available in 
parts of the world where it had not previously existed. However, unlike the Big Mac, there 
were no long queues of locals waiting for it upon its arrival. To the contrary, very few locals 
had ever heard of it, even fewer were excitedly anticipating its arrival, and sometimes its 
reception would be blatantly hostile. Also, unlike the Big Mac, as the “exporters” and 
“franchisees” of Big Law Pro Bono would discover, it would be necessary to significantly alter 
the product to make it marketable (or sometimes even palatable) in Europe. While the global 
success of McDonalds is often attributed to its consistency, the global success of Big Law Pro 
Bono, as we shall explore, may in fact depend on its adaptability and variability. Herein lies 
the central line of enquiry for this thesis: does Big Law Pro Bono need to take the same shape 
in Europe as it took in the United States in order to succeed? For the purposes of this thesis, 
this central line of inquiry will be framed in the following terms: does “Big Law Pro Bono” 
contribute to access to justice in Europe? As we shall come to see, answering the second 
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question will go a long way to providing the answer to the first. To answer this question, the 
thesis explores a series of related points: 
 
•! What is “access to justice”? 
•! What is “pro bono”? 
•! What is “Big Law Pro Bono” 
•! How did Big Law Pro Bono originally emerge in the US and how and why did it arrive 
in Europe?    
•! To what extent does Big Law Pro Bono in Europe differ from Big Law Pro Bono in the 
US and why?  
•! What are the antecedents of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, how do they relate to access 
to justice and what role have they played in shaping Big Law Pro Bono in Europe?  
 
In a nutshell, the thesis will explore the emergence of a unique variant of large firm pro bono 
(i.e. Big Law Pro Bono) in Europe, one not focused on individual legal assistance to low-
income clients, akin to the model of Big Law Pro Bono that has been institutionalized in the 
United States, but rather, focusing primarily on providing technical and policy assistance to 
European human rights and policy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often working 
transnationally. The thesis will map the contours and institutionalization of this variant of Big 
Law Bro Bono, explain why it has emerged and explore the ways in which it contributes to 
access to justice in Europe. As we shall see, the reasons for the emergence of this unique variant 
of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe are largely structural (related both to the capabilities and 
interests of those who were involved in transplanting and promoting Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe and also to the context in which it was being transplanted), but also cultural (related to 
the unique manner in which European legal systems have developed, in contrast to the US legal 
system). A key empirical claim will be that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not, 
meaningfully, contribute to access to justice as this concept (i.e. access to justice) has broadly 
been understood by the literature to date. However, this is not to say that it does not contribute 
to access to justice at all. Rather, if we take a broader view of what access to justice means, a 
view deriving from more intuitive understandings of that phrase, rather than from the existing 
literature on pro bono, then we can perceive how Big Law Pro Bono is and can contribute, not 
insignificantly, to access to justice in Europe.  
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The thesis is divided into six chapters. In the following pages, I will briefly introduce each of 
the chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 ! Big Law Pro Bono as Social Change Lawyering: A Review of the 
Literature   
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the central objective will be to explore the existing literature 
and situate the thesis within the wider field of study. Four key suggestions will be made. Firstly, 
it will be suggested that the object of study, Big Law Pro Bono (rather than merely “pro bono” 
– meaning lawyers acting outside of the Big Law setting providing free legal services), 
originates from the United States, both factually, as a practice, and conceptually, as subject of 
academic literature. With respect to the factual source, the chapter explores the history of public 
interest lawyering in the United States and, in particular, the public interest law and poverty 
law movements that  gripped progressive legal circles in the Unites States between the 1960s 
and 1970s. Some of very first large law firm pro bono programs will be explored along with 
the reasons for their emergence. With respect to the conceptual source, it will be suggested that 
this can be traced to the American sociological and legal literature that resulted directly from 
the public interest law movement. This body of literature which, at the outset was largely 
policy-oriented work commissioned by the private foundations playing central roles in the 
movement (such as the Ford Foundation) has, over the years, transformed into a significant 
body of scientific, socio-legal literature with several sub-categories, among which a smaller 
body of literature on pro bono. It is necessary to trace these factual and conceptual origins of 
Big Law Pro Bono in order to better understand the specific orientation of the present thesis, 
the key point being that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is but the European manifestation of a 
model of legal practice that was developed during a specific historical and political era in the 
United States. That Big Law Pro Bono has even come to be practiced in Europe is but the 
consequence of the internationalization of very large American law firms (firms with more 
than 500 lawyers) between the 1990s and early 2000s, and through this process, the 
globalization of a uniquely US model of progressive legal practice.  
 
The second claim in Chapter 1 is that the academic enterprise of studying pro bono only 
meaningfully took off after the mid-1990s, at precisely the time when Big Law Pro Bono was 
being institutionalized in the largest of American law firms. Consequently, much of the 
literature on “pro bono” is primarily literature on “Big Law Pro Bono” in America. It was these 
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very same large, elite law firms that rapidly internationalized throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s and so, by studying this phenomenon in Europe, the thesis is only really concerned with 
Big Law Pro Bono (i.e. pro bono practiced in very large international law firms, those with 
more than 500 lawyers).     
 
Thirdly, it will be suggested that the existing body of literature on pro bono which – for the 
reasons alluded to just above is largely American in origin and focus – has been framed around 
several common themes. These include: the causes and origins of pro bono, the internal 
organization and structure of pro bono, law firm rationales for pro bono (or the so-called 
“business case for pro bono”), the actors and roles within the pro bono universe including pro 
bono clients and problems or issues with pro bono as a means of effectively delivering legal 
services to clients. These themes are explored in Chapter 1 and the key findings from the 
literature, along with several open questions, are set out. I will suggest that the central gaps in 
the literature relate to globalization and localization of Big Law Pro Bono and the role played 
by intermediary actors (i.e. clearinghouses connecting law firms with pro bono clients)  in these 
processes.  
 
Finally, it will be suggested that because Big Law Pro Bono emerged in the United States, it is 
contingent and context-bound. To this end, throughout the thesis, I will be aiming to separate 
out which aspects of Big Law Pro Bono are applicable in the European context and which are 
applicable only in the US context. In the first Chapter, I will begin to unpack one of the central 
fault lines between US and European Big Law Pro Bono practice, which, as we shall explore, 
is the empirical and normative orientation of Big Law Pro Bono in the US towards “access to 
justice” (understood narrowly as civil legal aid). That is, the idea, widely held by academics 
and practitioners alike, that Big Law Pro Bono is and should be a solution to the so-called 
(civil) “justice-gap”.  
 
Chapter 2 ! Revisiting Access to Justice and Big Law Pro Bono: Analysis and 
Method 
 
In Chapter 2, the central focus will be on providing definitions for some of the key concepts 
explored throughout the thesis – namely, “access to justice”, “pro bono” and “Big Law Pro 
Bono” – and on setting out the methodological approach that has been employed in researching 
this thesis.  
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A central claim, first made in Chapter 1, and then further developed in Chapter 2, is that the 
definitions of “access to justice” used in the Big Law Pro Bono literature are very narrow, 
typically referring only to access to lawyers or legal services for low-income individuals. 
Often, this definition is narrower still, referring essentially only to civil legal aid. It will be 
suggested that this is a consequence of the historical and political context within which 
conversations on access to justice have emerged in the Unites States in the past 50 years or so. 
The result is that Big Law Pro Bono in the United States has been oriented functionally, both 
empirically and conceptually, towards the provision of civil legal aid.  
 
In this chapter, it will be suggested that, for the purposes of this thesis, a much broader 
definition of access to justice will need to be developed in order to be able to perceive and 
evaluate the potential and actual impact of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. Accordingly, a 
broader definition of access to justice is developed, both by borrowing from the work of John 
Rawls and Scott Cummings and by embracing several “everyday”, commonplace notions of 
what access to justice means by drawing on popular literature and the speeches of public 
figures. This expanded definition incorporates and moves beyond the narrow definition of 
access to justice typically employed in the pro bono literature. It responds to criticisms of such 
narrow conceptions of access to justice by including both procedural and substantive elements. 
Finally, as just alluded to, the definition provides an evaluative framework for Big Law Pro 
Bono in Europe.    
 
Chapter 2 is also used to provide working definitions of “pro bono” and “Big Law Pro Bono” 
which can then be used throughout the remainder of the thesis. The rest of the chapter sets out  
the thesis methodology, which  combines qualitative, quantitative, historical and 
anthropological research tools. Data collection involved  desk-based research, participant 
observation, interviews, surveys and archival research.    
 
Chapter 3 ! Precursors to Big Law Pro Bono: A History of Pro Bono and Social 
Change Lawyering in Europe 
 
In Chapter 3, commencing from the premise established in Chapter 1 that Big Law Pro Bono 
is a historically and politically contingent social institution, I will explore the context into 
which Big Law Pro Bono was transplanted in Europe. In other words, I will explore the 
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precursors to Big Law Pro Bono in Europe in terms of the models of pro bono and social change 
lawyering that have emerged throughout European history.     
 
This chapter pulls together empirical accounts from several important secondary sources, 
shedding light on pro bono lawyering in Europe from Classical times up until the year 2000 
(approximately the point at which Big Law Pro Bono began to be practiced in Europe). The 
chapter also relies on a mixture of archival research, secondary sources and several interviews 
to tell the story of more recent forms of social justice lawyering and pro bono practice in Europe 
that  emerged during the second half of the 20th Century during the European civil liberties, 
human rights and public interest law movements.   
 
The review undertaken in this chapter will be framed by the definition of pro bono articulated 
in Chapter 2, and the practices identified will be evaluated against the definition of access to 
justice also set out in Chapter 2. The chapter will explore how the rationales for pro bono have 
changed throughout the ages, from communal solidarity, civic duty, kinship and patronage and 
aristocratic honor in Ancient Athens and Republican Rome, to charitable and professional duty 
and social contract theory in the Middles Ages, Early Modern Era and 20th Century. It will be 
suggested that, throughout European history, there has been a consistent and growing concern 
with access to justice (defined narrowly as the access of the poor and the needy to legal services 
and to procedures for administering justice) and that access to justice, defined in this way, has 
been the major objective of pro bono practice throughout the ages in Europe. However, with 
the emergence of nation states and then the European social welfare state, the obligation of 
ensuring access to justice gradually shifted from a charitable or professional duty of lawyers 
and the organized bar, towards a constitutionalized civic right, institutionalized in the form of 
state-funded legal aid systems. In this way, parts of the legal professions of Europe increasingly 
specialized in the provision of legal services to low-income and lower-income parts of the 
population on a remunerated basis, freeing other parts of the profession from their historic and 
honorific duty to ensure access to justice.  
 
The chapter will also explore how new models of social justice lawyering emerged in the late 
20th Century, which both embraced and transcended conventional public service norms 
(neutrality, impartiality) that were implicit in much of the pro bono lawyering practice 
throughout European history, and fused them with both human rights frames and political and 
transgressive ideologies that had been cultivated in Soviet-era Central and Eastern Europe. 
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These models of social justice lawyering do not pursue access to justice, defined narrowly, but 
are oriented at norm change and deploy pro bono to this end.  
 
This chapter will provide us with the necessary background context to begin exploring when, 
how and why Big Law Pro Bono was transplanted in Europe. Without understanding this 
background context, it will not be possible to make sense of the manner in which Big Law Pro 
Bono has come to be practiced in Europe today.  
  
Chapter 4 ! The Emergence of Big Law Pro Bono: An Investigation of How Big 
Law Pro Bono has Come to Exist in Europe and the Shape it has Taken 
 
In Chapter 4, we explore the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono1 by investigating how Big 
Law Pro Bono came to exist in Europe and the shape that it has taken in this new context. In 
this chapter, I trace the process by which Big Law Pro Bono travelled from the United States 
to Europe between the 1990s and early 2000s and then sketch the institutional features of Big 
Law Pro Bono in Europe today and discuss to what extent it diverges from its American 
forbearer.  
 
After quickly recapping the story of Big Law Pro Bono in the United States (specifically 
focusing on how it came to be institutionalized and structurally oriented towards the provision 
of civil legal aid to low-income individuals), the chapter will explore the process by which US 
and London-based firms pursued different strategies of internationalization within Europe 
(something that would come to have a bearing on the model of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe). 
The chapter will touch upon the reception of Big Law within the European legal market, which 
was not always positive, and would often be mimicked in the reception of Big Law Pro Bono. 
I will illustrate that the institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono Practice in the United States 
and the internationalization of Big Law created much of the necessary infrastructure for Big 
Law Pro Bono practice in Europe (at least on the supply-side). The chapter will also explore 
how Big Law Pro Bono got started in London, which, as the first European destination for Big 
Law Pro Bono practice, also became somewhat of a base camp for the transplanting of Big 
Law Pro Bono in Continental Europe. We will see that, unlike in the United States, and due to 
                                                
1 Of course, it is important to note that, while this thesis explores the globalization and localization of large 
firm pro bono practice in Europe, the phenomenon is now also taking shape in Latin America, Asia, Africa etc. 
and so this this thesis only represents one part of the puzzle in the study of global Big Law pro bono.   
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resistance largely from the firms themselves, Big Law Pro Bono in London was initially 
developed in a way that largely excluded the provision of legal services to low-income 
individuals. Cuts to state-funded legal aid, rather than resulting in the firms taking on work for 
low-income individuals, resulted instead in the firms lobbying the government to maintain 
legal aid spending. It will be suggested that the orientation of Big Law in London, away from 
direct individual access to justice work and towards work for non-profits would set the tone for 
the development of Big Law Pro Bono across the Continent and was one, among a number of 
reasons, for the distinct model of Big Law Pro Bono that evolved in Europe.  
 
The chapter will then go on to explore the model of Big Law Pro Bono practiced across Europe 
today (i.e. including Western, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia – wherever the 
firms maintain offices). The findings are based on research carried out during my period of 
participant observation and archival research at the global headquarters of the Global Public 
Interest Law Network (“PILnet”) in New York, several interviews with pro bono managers and 
NGO employees throughout Europe and beyond and two surveys carried out among pro bono 
managers with responsibility for the European offices of international law firms and EU-
oriented NGOs based in Brussels. I explore the internal organization and structure of Big Law 
Pro Bono in Europe. I do so by focusing on the law firms themselves and on the key actors 
beyond the firm and their roles including the pro bono clients and the types of work that are 
carried out for these clients and, finally, on the clearinghouses. The objective is to build on the 
existing literature by exploring to what extent the globalized or Europeanized form of Big Law 
Pro Bono differs from the US model. It will be suggested Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is 
characterized by weak institutionalization mimicking many of the features of Big Law Pro 
Bono in the US, however, with at least one major difference being the virtually exclusive non-
profit client base both from the point of view of the firms and the clearinghouses (or 
intermediaries).  
 
Chapter 5 ! Big Law Pro Bono in Search of Demand and Ideology: An 
Investigation of Why Big Law Pro Bono Has Taken a Unique Shape in Europe 
 
Having established, in Chapter 4, that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has a near exclusive 
orientation towards non-profit clients (typically NGOs engaged in human rights and/or 
European policy work), in Chapter 5 we will explore why this is the case.  The chapter begins 
by making several important suggestions based on findings from the previous chapters. Firstly, 
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it is suggested that where Big Law Pro Bono is transplanted to a new region or jurisdiction, the 
prevailing historical and political context and the various local actors/stakeholders are likely to 
play a significant role in determining how the resource is deployed and we should not 
necessarily expect that the results would be the same as in the United States (given that the 
local context will be significantly different). Secondly, it is suggested that, whereas certain 
features of Big Law Pro Bono are likely to be context-transcending and present in any region 
or jurisdiction where Big Law Pro Bono is deployed, others are likely to be more context-
specific and variable depending upon the specific location. I suggest that whether a feature falls 
into the former or the latter category likely depends upon whether that feature flows from the 
logic of Big Law itself (such as the structures, processes and hierarchies of large commercial 
law firms or the preferences of multinational corporate clients) or from the logic of the local 
legal market (such as local Bar regulations or the prevailing system for the provision of legal 
services to the poor).   
 
Following this, the chapter goes on to explore two important and related “why” questions. 
Firstly, why it is that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is focused so single-mindedly on work for 
non-profit organizations. In the second part and secondly, why, given the history of pro bono 
lawyering in Europe (explored in Chapter 3), and the way Big Law Pro Bono has come to be 
understood in the US (explored in Chapters 1, 2 and 4) is there virtually no observable (or no 
significant) focus on direct individual access to justice in the European variant of Big Law Pro 
Bono? Several possible contributing answers to these questions are suggested, including: 
barriers to market access experienced by the initial Big Law Pro Bono exporters/transplanters 
in Europe; the unique profile and networks of those actors who initially developed the market 
for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe; the legacies of the European civil liberties, human rights and 
public interest law movements; the resistance of local bars to Big Law engaging in individual 
client work; the specificities of the type of law firms and lawyers that make up the European 
Corporate Bar; the relative ease of dealing with non-profit clients as opposed to individual 
clients; the functional distribution of labor between the Social Bars of Europe and the rest of 
the legal profession (and the Corporate Bar in particular); and the fact that the problem of 
individual access to justice (in Central and Eastern Europe) had, in the minds of many of the 
relevant stakeholders, already been largely solved by the time the market for Big Law Pro Bono 
was really taking shape on the Continent. 
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Ultimately, what the analysis in this chapter hopes to demonstrate is that while the globalization 
of Big Law Pro Bono is a process of globalizing and transplanting a common institutionalized 
set of law firm features and practices, the process of localization of these institutionalized 
practices must not be overlooked and has the power to transform and re-purpose them, creating 
novel models of Big Law Practice. 
 
Chapter 6 ! Does Big Law Pro Bono contribute to access to justice in Europe? Can 
it? 
 
Having established that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has taken a unique shape, contrasting 
with its US forbearer, and having investigated why that is the case, in the final chapter of the 
thesis, I explore what all this means. In other words, what are the consequences of the way that 
Big Law Pro Bono has developed in Europe vis-à-vis access to justice? If, as is claimed in this 
thesis, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not significantly (or even meaningfully) contribute 
to access to justice (in the way that access to justice has typically been defined), then does it 
perhaps contribute to access to justice more broadly, as defined in Chapter 2? Throughout the 
chapter, we evaluate Big Law Pro Bono and assess its actual and possible contribution to access 
to justice, defined in four ways (as elaborated in Chapter 2), i.e. the definition within the 
existing literature on pro bono, the “narrow definition” and the “wide definition”.  
 
In this chapter, it is suggested that, in relation to the definition of access to justice currently 
embraced by the US pro bono literature, Big Law Pro Bono does not contribute to access to 
justice insofar as possibly less than 15% of Big Law Pro Bono work in Europe involves 
providing legal services directly to low-income individuals. Within the other definitions, it is 
suggested that Big Law Pro Bono does and can make varying levels of contribution to access 
to justice in Europe whether in the form of: expanding access to legal services for non-profit 
organizations and so redistributing valuable resources away from private corporations and 
towards public interest; directly facilitating NGOs to engage in law and policy reform work 
aimed at norm change; or providing moral education to an increasingly elitist portion of the 
European legal profession.  
 
The hope, with this final chapter, is to sketch the possible contribution of Big Law Pro Bono 
to access to justice in Europe and so provide a normative agenda for Big Law Pro Bono on the 




In conclusion, at the core, the key themes to be explored in this thesis may shed light on some 
of the central gaps in the existing literature on pro bono. Many of these gaps in the literature 
concern the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono as an institutionalized set of practice and 
functional roles. For example, what is the relative role played by globalizing and localizing 
forces where Big Law Pro Bono is exported beyond the United States? How might local legal, 
political and social contexts impact the form that pro bono takes? What other factors might 
account for variation in the way in which pro bono is institutionalized and deployed in new 
contexts?  
 
Ultimately, the “McLaw” moniker applied to Baker & McKenzie in the 1990s is deceptive. 
While McDonalds essentially exported the same product across the globe, Baker & McKenzie 
was effectively a network of national law firms each providing legal services within the 
national legal markets, i.e. German lawyers engaged in German law, Spanish lawyers engaged 
in Spanish law and Polish lawyers engaged in Polish law. Even firms that pursued different 
models of internationalization, i.e. sending small numbers of American lawyers to European 
cities, largely to serve US clients, still could not completely avoid interaction with the local 
legal system, particularly if they sought to develop pro bono practice (thus requiring them to 
adapt to the local market place). For Big Law Pro Bono, this distinction is crucial. Any 
interaction with the local legal system has the power to radically alter not only the nature of 
the legal service being provided, but beyond the for-profit context, also the very nature of the 
activity (i.e. the make-up of the primary client base and the central objectives being pursued). 
While it is too early to conclude whether the Big Law Pro Bono transplant has been a success 
in Europe, this thesis suggests that we likely need to closely investigate what “success” means 
before commencing such an analysis. What is clear at present is that Big Law Pro Bono does 
not contribute to access to justice in Europe, if we understand this to mean the provision of pro 
bono legal assistance to low income persons (in the way that this has been understood in the 
US). If this is the criteria by which we measure success, then Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is 
unquestionably failing; a view espoused by some in the pro bono movement (particularly pro 
bono professionals from American and Australia). However, once we become cognizant of the 
legal and political context in Europe (both in terms of the prevailing legal aid systems, the 
structure of the European bars, the prevalent models of progressive legal advocacy and the 
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unique policy and legislative ecosystem) we can begin to perceive the ways in which Big Law 







CHAPTER 1 ! Big Law Pro Bono as Social Change 
Lawyering: A Review of the Literature   
 
As set out in the introduction, the central research question of this PhD thesis is: does “Big 
Law Pro Bono” contribute to access to justice in Europe and if not, could it?  In this first 
chapter, the central objective is to explore the existing literature and situate the present thesis. 
Critically, this chapter aims to establish a number of important points that will help to frame 
the overall thesis.  
 
Firstly, it is crucial to understand that my object of study, Big Law Pro Bono (rather than merely 
“pro bono” – meaning lawyers acting outside of the Big Law setting providing free legal 
services), originates in the United States both factually, as a practice, and conceptually, as a 
subject of academic literature. The factual source can be traced back to the public interest law 
movement that gripped progressive legal circles in the Unites States between the 1960s and 
1970s, which itself emerged from early legal and political activism in the US in the first half 
of the 20th century. Meanwhile, the conceptual source can be traced to the American 
sociological and legal literature that resulted directly from the public interest law movement. 
This body of literature, which started out as a largely policy-oriented stream has, with the 
passage of time, transformed into a deep river with several major tributaries each genuinely 
scientific and sociological in its own right. In this first chapter, it will be important to briefly 
trace these factual and conceptual origins of Big Law Pro Bono in order to better understand 
the specific orientation of the present thesis. What should become apparent is that, what I aim 
to study, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, is but the European manifestation of a model of legal 
practice that was developed during a specific historical and political era in the United States. 
That Big Law Pro Bono has even come to be practiced in Europe is the consequence of the 
internationalization of very large American law firms (more than 500 lawyers), and through 
this process, the globalization of a uniquely US model of progressive legal practice.  
 
Secondly, it is important to understand that the academic enterprise of studying pro bono 
emerged primarily from the very same body of literature on public interest law that got 
underway in the 1970s. Although there were fleeting papers on pro bono in the 80s and 90s, 
the study of pro bono only really got underway between the mid 1990s and the early 2000s, 
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which, not by chance, was the period when pro bono practice was being significantly 
institutionalized in the largest of American law firms. Consequently, much of the literature on 
“pro bono” is primarily literature on “Big Law Pro Bono”. For my purposes, this is key. As 
will be explored in Chapter 3, it was naturally the largest US law firms that internationalized, 
opening offices all across Europe, and so by studying pro bono in Europe, I too am really only 
talking about Big Law Pro Bono (pro bono practiced in very large international law firms, with 
more than 500 lawyers).    
 
Thirdly it should be noted that the existing, and largely American, literature on pro bono has 
been framed around a number of common themes including the causes and origins of pro bono, 
the internal organization and structure of pro bono, law firm rationales for pro bono (or the so-
called “business case for pro bono”), the actors and roles within the pro bono universe including 
pro bono clients and problems or issues with pro bono as a means of effectively delivering 
legal services to clients. These themes were, for the most part, already presented in the early 
studies on pro bono in the 1970s and have given shape to the academic research into pro bono 
in the subsequent years. My own thesis does not depart dramatically from these themes and, 
rather, applies them to the European context. The literature review in this chapter thus seeks to 
identify gaps in the existing literature in the hope of carving out spaces for new research both 
within the confines of this thesis and beyond.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, it must be recognized that, given that the practice of Big Law 
Pro Bono emerged in the United States, it is contingent and context-bound. Consequently, a 
major aim of this chapter, and this thesis, is to separate out which aspects of the practice of Big 
Law Pro Bono are applicable in the European context and which are applicable only in the US 
context. It is hoped that this will be an important contribution to the literature. Toward this end, 
a major theme which this chapter and this thesis will zero in on, is the empirical and normative 
orientation of Big Law Pro Bono in the US towards access to justice (understood narrowly as 
civil legal aid) i.e. the idea that Big Law Pro Bono is and should be a solution to the so-called 
(civil) “justice-gap”. This is an orientation embraced both by practitioners and by academics. 
In exploring whether Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice in Europe, this theme 
will need to be thoroughly interrogated, and specifically, its relevance and applicability in the 
European context.  
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In what follows, I intend to set the scene for my thesis by first establishing my broader research 
territory and highlighting some of the key academic literature to date (section 1) and, thereafter, 
identifying and establishing the importance of my narrower research territory and exploring 
key themes in the existing literature and some of the major findings (section 2). I will then 
explore some biases and gaps in the existing literature related to my narrower research territory 
(section 3).   
 
1! The Context of Social Change Lawyering 
 
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in 
1909 in a context of worsening racial relations in the US following the civil war, including race 
riots, a rise in lynching of African-Americans and the spread of new Jim Crow and voting 
disenfranchisement laws.2 Meanwhile, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was 
founded in 1916 in a context of growing concern around US involvement in the First World 
War and the heavy-handed use of espionage and sedition laws by government to prosecute 
conscientious objectors.3 These organizations did not start out as lawyer's organizations; 
formed by socially or politically influential individuals, they focused instead on lobbying 
government bodies.4 They mobilized against state-sanctioned repression carried out against 
social pariahs (e.g. Blacks, prisoners, dissenters).5 Nevertheless, their advocacy often focused 
on law reform if not exclusively on litigation. Between the 1920s and 1950s, these 
organizations began to more consistently and effectively deploy litigation as an advocacy tool. 
For example, they began to take high profile 'test cases' to the more progressive federal courts 
typically making moral (i.e. not technical) arguments that emphasized the gap between the 
broadly read normative commitments of the constitution and the lived experience of the relative 
end-beneficiary group.6  
 
                                                
2 Carle, “Race, class, and legal ethics,” 103. 
3 Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 210. 
4 See Carle, “Race, class, and legal ethics,” 104; and Clark, “Sincere and Reasonable Men?” 513–37. 
5 Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 222. 
6 For example, Thurgood Marshall, in closing arguments in Brown professed that: “a finding for segregation 
would be an inherent determination that the people who were formerly in slavery, regardless of anything else, 
should be kept as near that stage as is legally possible. And now is the time, we submit, that this Court should 
make it clear that that is not what our Constitution stands for.” See Brown v. Topeka Board of Education 347 U.S. 
483, 74 S.Ct. 686, closing arguments. 
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The aim was to reverse engineer the constitution in order to secure favorable precedents leading 
to rule change (usually the voiding of a statute on the basis of its unconstitutionality) or the 
establishment of new rights that expand the scope of legal protection afforded to the 
beneficiary-group. Class action lawsuits were thus used to bring claims on behalf of groups of 
individuals that may set precedents for the benefit of the broader end-beneficiary group or 
'client community'. Test cases were also used to generate media attention and public sympathy, 
raise funds and boost membership.7 
 
An example of one of the early NAACP test cases may serve to illustrate.8 In 1922 Charles 
Garland, a student at Harvard College (and son of a Wall Street stockbroker), donated $800,000 
(approximately $9 million, today) to establish a private foundation dedicated to radical social 
reform. The foundation, in turn, donated one eighth of that amount, to the NAACP. The money 
was not given with no strings attached, but was to be used for the employment of a special 
counsel to study the legal status of African Americans and to plan a legal campaign aimed at 
improving the social and economic conditions of African Americans. This resulted, four years 
later, in a number of carefully selected test cases challenging the exclusion of Black students 
from American law schools as unconstitutional.9 
 
The first such test case was University v. Murray.10 On January 24, 1935, Donald Murray 
applied to the University of Maryland School of Law. Murray met the standards for admission 
to the law school in all respects; however, his application was declined on the grounds of his 
race. He was informed that, "The University of Maryland does not admit Negro students and 
your application is accordingly rejected." Murray first appealed the rejection decision to the 
board of education. However, having no luck there, Murray with the help of a Black student 
fraternity, Alpha Phi Alpha, initiated a law suit against the University. The NAACP decided to 
get involved, seeing an opportunity to argue the case in such a way as to set a precedent 
exposing the hypocrisy of the 'separate but equal' doctrine that held sway at the time. The iconic 
Black public interest lawyer (and later, Supreme Court Judge) Thurgood Marshall, of the 
NAACP argued that:  
 
                                                
7 Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 215; Carle, “Race, class and legal ethics,” 100; see, for example, 
Endersby and Horner, Lloyd Gaines,” 65–67. 
8 Tushnet, “NAACP's legal strategy against segregated education”, 1 - 21. 
9 Greenberg, “Crusader in the Court,” 217. 
10 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936) (No. 53). 
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"[The] actions of the Respondents violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, in that they amounted to a denial to...a citizen of the 
United States... of the equal protection and benefit of the law, as secured to him by ... 
the laws of the land."11  
 
And he went on to stress that:  
 
"What is at stake here is more than the rights of my client. It is the moral commitment 
stated in our country's creed."12 
 
The case was won and the Court ordered Maryland Law School to admit Murray. The case had 
garnered positive in-depth coverage from the African American press from beginning to end.13 
Following such early tastes of success, throughout the 1940s and 1950s the NAACP went on 
to win several other high profile cases related to segregation in education, the electoral process 
and public transport.14 Such success stories, of course including the iconic decision of Brown 
v. Board of Education,15 litigated by the NAACP legal fund, inspired generations of lawyers 
and also philanthropists who began to believe in law more broadly (rather than just litigation) 
as a tool for positive social change.  
 
The two decades following the success in Brown bore witness to a range of coordinated efforts 
by legal elites to deploy law to bring about progressive social transformation. These included 
not just impact litigation but also a range of other efforts. For example, in the early 1960s, the 
Ford Foundation funded pilot neighborhood law offices in order to demonstrate how civil legal 
aid could operate.16 These offices became a form of prototype for the Organization of 
Economic Opportunities Legal Services Program (OEO). Meanwhile in the 1970s Ralph 
Nader, Human Rights Watch and others, began to deploy legal research, fact-finding and 
lobbying alongside litigation to highlight the unaccountability and Kafkaesque inaccessibility 
                                                
11 University v. Murray, Petition of Mandamus, filed at the Baltimore City Court by Thurgood Marshall, 
April, 18, 1935, paragraphs 141 to 152, accessed December 2, 2013, http://msa. 
maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2200/sc2221/000024/000004/000001/pdf/c174-2.pdf.  
12 Appellant’s Brief, University v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936) (No. 53). 
13 Farrar, Baltimore Afro-American, no. 185, 54. 
14 See, for example, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); or Brown v. Board of 
Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15 Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
16 Menkel-Meadow, “Legal Aid,” 38. 
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of various US administrative agencies or to "address violations of the laws of war" and 
"influenc[e] the conduct of American foreign policy".17 
 
Reflecting on this period, commentators have suggested that between the 1960s and 1970s the 
US bore witness to a “public interest law movement”. That is, a "court-centered and litigation-
based" liberal legal advocacy movement.18 The original aim, inspired by the NAACP victories, 
was to leverage the US federal courts, prepared to use broad powers of judicial review 
(especially to protect vulnerable minorities), to outmaneuver rouge and non-compliant state 
and local lawmakers and enforcers who practiced an institutionalized politics of organized 
racial violence.19 Later, as the movement spread to environmental and consumer law and 
international human rights, it began to leverage the power of federal bureaucracies (e.g. the 
Environmental Protection Agency) to sanction various market actors or leverage political 
influence with the US state department to apply pressure on foreign governments abusing 
human rights .20 
 
It has been well documented that the movement was largely spearheaded and constructed by a 
group of private foundations (especially the Ford Foundation, which played a very important 
role) and elite lawyers.21 Louise Trubek, for example, discussing the role of the Ford 
Foundation, as one of the key founders of the movement notes that, in the effort to tackle 
economic and social inequality, a strategic choice was made to place "public interest law as a 
cornerstone in state-society relationships... The imagination of the founders, combined with 
the amount of monies expended, created a well-thought out vision of how to create a major set 
of institutions that could expand the roles of lawyers and place them in central positions in the 
dynamic changes taking place in American society."22 Foundations chiefly operated by 
                                                
17 Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 225; Neier, International Human Rights Movement,” 204–05. 
18 Trubek, “Public Interest Law,” 418; Trubek, “Crossing boundaries,” 457–60. 
19 Cover, “Origins of judicial activism,” 1303–08. 
20 Cummings and Trubek, “Globalizing public interest law,” 1–53. 
21 See Council for Public Interest Law, Scales of Justice, 81–82; Weisbrod, Handler, and Komesar, Public 
Interest Law; Trubek, “Public Interest Law,” 418; Trubek, “Crossing boundaries,” 457–60. 
22 Trubek, “Public Interest Law,” 418. 
 25 
allocating grants to purpose-built or sometimes pre-existing NGOs whose task would be to 
carry out public interest law advocacy in relation to a narrowly defined set of issues.23  
 
In turn, this period of unprecedented legal activism, inspired a great deal of scholarly attention 
and reflection. Indeed, there is by now a very large literature on what might be broadly termed 
social change lawyering.24 Such literature is largely, but not exclusively, US-oriented and 
straddles the legal and sociological disciplines. This literature is centrally concerned with 
studying the deployment of law as a positive force for social change and the lawyers engaged 
in this practice.  
 
At the outset, when this literature first emerged in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, it 
was chiefly concerned with defining what exactly the practice of “public interest law” (the term 
originally preferred to describe what I refer to as social change lawyering) was, theoretically, 
organizationally and practically, and with making the normative case for its existence in the 
US legal and political landscape.25 Early definitions of public interest law included:  
 
“[…] efforts to provide legal representation to interests that historically have been 
unrepresented and underrepresented in the legal process. These include not only the 
poor and the disadvantaged but ordinary citizens who, because they cannot afford 
lawyers to represent them, have lacked access to courts, administrative agencies, and 
other legal forums in which basic policy decisions affecting their interests are made. 
Public interest lawyers have tried to provide systematic representation to these excluded 
                                                
23 Foundations were involved in sponsoring or setting up all of the following: Center for National Policy 
Review; Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Legal Action Center; Mexican-American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund; NAACP/LDEF; National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing; Native 
American Rights Fund; Puerto Rican LDEF; Women’s Law Fund; Women’s Rights Project; Natural Resources 
Defense Council; Center for Law and Social Policy; Center for Law in the Public Interest; Citizen’s 
Communications Center; Education Law Center; Environmental Defense Fund; Institute for Public Interest 
Representation; International Project; League of Women Voters Education Fund; Legal Action Center; Public 
Advocates; Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund; (Bogota, Colombia) Research Center for the Defense of Public 
Interests. See Roelofs, “Foundations and Collaboration,” 487. 
24 Understood broadly here to include both the literature on “public interest law” and on “cause lawyering.” 
See, for example, (re: public interest law) Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 207–61; Weisbrod, Handler, and 
Komesar, Public Interest Law; Cooper and Dhavan, Public Interest Law; Cummings and Trubek, “Globalizing 
public interest law”; Rekosh, “Constructing Public Interest Law”; Trubek, “Public Interest Law”; Cummings, 
“Pursuit of Legal Rights”; Albiston and Nielsen, “Funding the Cause.” See also (re: cause lawyering) Sarat and 
Scheingold, Cause Lawyering; Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the State. 
25 See Berlin, Roisman, and Kessler, “Public interest law,” 674; Halpern and Cunningham, “New Public 
Interest Law,” 1095; Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 207–61; Weisbrod, Handler, and Komesar, Public 
Interest Law. 
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individuals and groups in order to assure that their interests are understood and 
acknowledged by decision-makers.”26 
 
“[S]ubsidized attorney services […] afforded in the absence of market demand - 
undertaken primarily to promote either substantive or procedural systemic goals.”27 
 
“[Activity] (1) undertaken by an organization in the voluntary sector, (2) that primarily 
involves the use of legal tools such as litigation, and (3) that produces significant 
external benefits if it is successful in bringing about change.”28 
 
Such definitions were largely rooted in notions of market failure with respect to the provision 
of legal services and the resulting limits on access to legal and administrate fora. These 
definitions were also notably broad in that they sought to capture a very large range of: 
 
1.! institutionalized organizational practices, (including legal aid, pro bono among the 
private bar, clinical legal education at law schools and full-time social change 
lawyering practiced within both the for-profit sector – so-called “Public Interest Law 
Firms” – and the voluntary and non-profit sector – e.g. the Center for Law and Social 
Policy or the Natural Resources Defense Council);  
2.! substantive issues (from equal protection of the poor and marginalized groups, to the 
promotion of diffuse interests such as consumer and environmental protection); and  
3.! legal tools/strategies/services (from impact litigation, law reform and lobbying to 
direct individual legal representation, legal advice and community organizing).  
 
Ultimately, such definitions, and the entire scholarly enterprise of studying “public interest 
law” as a theoretically coherent, institutionalized set of legal practices, collapsed29 (although it 
has been recently revived)30 due to criticisms from the left and the right in relation to the 
meaning and practice of public interest law.31 Conservative critics questioned whether the 
                                                
26 Council for Public Interest Law, Scales of Justice.  
27 Rabin, “Lawyers for social change,” 227. 
28 Weisbrod, Handler, and Komesar, Public Interest Law, 42. 
29 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 521.  
30 See, for example, Cummings and Eagly, “After Public Interest Law,” 1251; Cummings and Trubek, 
“Globalizing public interest law”; Cummings, “Future of public interest law,” 355; Trubek, “Public Interest 
Law”; Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights”; Albiston and Nielsen, “Funding the Cause.” 
31 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 519, 520. 
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procedural and systemic change brought about by public interest lawyering could genuinely be 
claimed to be in the interests of the public at large: “environmental regulation could have the 
effect of reducing jobs, or consumer regulation could increase prices”.32 They also questioned 
what qualified as an “unrepresented” or “underrepresented” group (small business owners? 
Poor whites? Crime victims?) and what qualified as an underrepresented cause (what about 
conservative causes such as the right to life?).33  Meanwhile, on the left, critics questioned, 
sometimes devastatingly, whether public interest lawyering was ultimately effective in 
achieving the sought-after social change and to what extent the practice further marginalized 
the marginalized groups it sought to benefit (e.g. was it elitist? Was it led by the lawyers or by 
the community?).34  
 
Consequently, from the mid 1990s, in the place once occupied by “public interest law”, 
scholarly attention moved towards a new research agenda with a new label: “cause lawyering”, 
which focused foremost on the motivations, ideology and politics and cultural contexts of 
lawyers pursuing social change and only secondarily, on the practice and organization of such 
efforts.35 Rather than being rooted in notions of market failure and inequality in access to legal 
and administrative processes, cause lawyering was defined in contrast to conventional 
lawyering: 
 
“The objective of the attorneys that we characterize as cause lawyers is to deploy their 
legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, and/or 
legal values and resources. Cause lawyers choose clients and cases in order to pursue 
their own ideological and redistributive projects. And they do so, not as a matter of 
technical competence, but as a matter of personal engagement […] They have no 
qualms about embracing the values and goals of those whom they represent. Indeed, 
they take pride in thus challenging traditional concepts of professionalism. At least in 
principle, then, cause lawyering stands in sharp and self-conscious contrast to 
traditional conceptions of lawyering, according to which attorneys are expected to 
provide case-by-case and transaction-by-transaction service to particular clients 
                                                
32 Ibid., 519. 
33 Ibid. See also Southworth, “Conservative lawyers,” 1223. 
34 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 520; see also Bell, “Serving two masters,” 470; Scheingold, 
Politics of Rights; Rosenberg, Hollow Hope. 
35 See Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering; Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the State; 
Scheingold and Sarat, Something to Believe In; Sarat, Worlds Cause Lawyers Make; Sarat and Scheingold, 
Cause Lawyers and Social Movements. 
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without reference to either their own or to their clients’ values, policy preferences and 
political and social commitments”.36  
 
Unlike its predecessor, cause lawyering was politically neutral (liberals and conservatives 
could be cause lawyers),37 it could be practiced all over the globe and was thus stripped of its 
US orientation and institutional and cultural contexts.38 It was less prescriptive and more 
ambiguous about both the beneficiaries and the ultimate objectives of the practice.  However, 
in time, cause lawyering attracted its own critics; the “big tent” approach raised questions about 
where to draw the line. Could corporate attorneys who believed that their legal practice 
“advanced a beneficial version of market capitalism—or of legal professionalism” also be 
characterized as cause lawyers, and more problematically, could/should lawyers pursuing 
illiberal causes (e.g. so-called “traditional marriage” i.e. one man, one woman) be considered 
as morally equivalent to lawyers pursuing liberal and progressive causes?39 
 
More recently, since the mid 2000s, and on the basis of dissatisfaction with the amorphous and 
slippery nature of the cause lawyering construct, a rebooted literature on public interest law 
has surfaced led, among others, by Scott Cummings and Louise Trubek.40 Cummings and 
Trubek have sought to revive, restore and update some of the early work on public interest law 
from the 1970s. Benefiting from the passage of time, the authors are able to cast a more 
disinterested eye on the public interest law enterprise. By acknowledging the overtly political 
and liberal nature of the project, accepting its flaws and limitations and abstaining from making 
any universalist normative claims of their own, they manage to subtly sidestep some of the 
previous controversies. From this vantage point, public interest law is conceived of structurally 
and organizationally as a set of significantly institutionalized and networked legal practices, 
including, inter alia, “foundation-supported nonprofit organizations, bar-sponsored groups, 
federally funded legal services organizations, public defender offices, law school clinics, pro 
bono departments within large corporate firms, and smaller scale for-profit legal offices 
engaged in public interest work”.41 Such institutionalized practices are understood to have 
                                                
36 Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the State, 13. 
37 Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, 25, n. 13. 
38 See, for example, Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the State. 
39 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 521, 522. 
40 See Cummings and Eagly, “After Public Interest Law,” 1251; Cummings and Trubek, “Globalizing public 
interest law”; Cummings, “Future of public interest law,” 355; Trubek, “Public Interest Law”; Cummings, 
“Pursuit of Legal Rights”; Albiston and Nielsen, “Funding the Cause.” 
41 Cummings and Eagly, “After Public Interest Law,” 1252. 
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clearly originated from distinct US liberal legal, cultural and political moments and their 
associated ideologies (e.g. the civil rights movement, the public interest law and poverty law 
movements, the human rights movement and the rule of law movement).42 Moreover, such 
institutionalized practices are understood as being deliberately constructed, typically by elite 
architects often with the support of private philanthropy or political institutions.43   
 
Distinct from the previous scholarly conceptions of public interest law, in the 21st century, such 
institutionalized practices can and have been deployed globally as but one strand in the 
diffusion of American legal practices and ideologies and the significant American penetration 
of international and global legal and political institutions, processes and modes of governance. 
Ultimately, the central argument of Cummings and Trubek is that public interest law (as the 
globalized form of a distinct set of uniquely American legal practices), is taking shape as a 
global institution with a common set of understandings and practices which take root in diverse 
national political and economic environments thus introducing an element of novelty in each 
context. Public interest law thus becomes a mechanism of global governance.44  
 
In terms of the shape of this globalized form of public interest law, the authors suggest that it 
involves a number of key legal practices or models of progressive lawyering (including the use 
of impact litigation, pro bono and legal clinics), is often transnational and legally pluralistic 
(taking place across borders, within multiple jurisdictions and both domestic and international 
advocacy venues) and tactically flexible (involving not only litigation but also, education, 
policy lobbying, media and communications).   
 
Ultimately, the authors conclude that more needs to be known about the process by which 
public interest law is being globalized. Specifically, the authors ask, “how do legal reform 
projects strike a balance between importing outside exemplars of public interest law and 
promoting indigenous traditions”, and suggest that “we still know little about the ideology of 
lawyers who operate in the transnational arena, the strategic calculations and political values 
that shape their advocacy”.45  
 
                                                
42 Ibid., 1252, 1253; see also Cummings and Trubek, “Globalizing public interest law,” 8.  
43 Trubek, “Public Interest Law,” 1, 2; Cummings and Trubek, “Globalizing public interest law,” 3, 4; 
Rekosh, “Constructing Public Interest Law.” 
44 Ibid., 27. 
45 Ibid., 53. 
 30 
The present thesis emerges out of this new literature on the globalization of public interest law 
and tackles many of the core questions arising from this literature such as those referred to just 
above. However, the present thesis takes a deep dive into just one of the legal practices referred 
to by Cummings and Trubek, namely, Big Law Pro Bono.  
 
From within the broad and  diverse literature on social change lawyering discussed above, a 
specific literature on “pro bono” has emerged, significantly taking shape in just the past 15 
years.  The pro bono literature straddles all major branches of the literature on social change 
lawyering, borrowing equally from each. It is to this body of literature that my thesis primarily 
seeks to contribute.  
 
In the following section, I will explore the meaning and significance of pro bono and some of 
the key themes and findings from this body of literature.  
 
2! From US Pro Bono to Globalizing Pro Bono  
 
What is “pro bono”? In common parlance, “pro bono” has become something of a term of art, 
implying the provision of professional services (typically legal services) by the private bar, at 
no cost (and typically for no remuneration) to clients of low income (who may not be able to 
afford such services otherwise). In practice, pro bono is typically defined along the lines of the 
American Bar Association definition under ABA Model Rule 6.1 (i.e.): 
 
“legal services [provided] without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited 
means or (2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational 
organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons 
of limited means” 46  
 
                                                
46 See ABA Model Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service, https://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/probono_public_service/policy/aba_model_rule_6_1. The definition also includes: “(1) delivery of 
legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or 
protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and 
educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of 
standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise 
inappropriate; (2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or (3) 
participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.” 
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In his seminal 2004 paper “The Politics of Pro Bono”, Scott Cummings suggests that, 
throughout most of American history, pro bono legal services were provided in a sporadic and 
ad hoc fashion, typically on an individual basis out of a sense of professional charity. However, 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s, pro bono, particularly as practiced by large elite US 
corporate law firms (Big Law), has been rationalized and significantly institutionalized. 
Cummings suggests that “[p]ro bono has thus emerged as the dominant means of dispensing 
free representation to poor and underserved clients, eclipsing state-sponsored legal services 
and other nongovernmental mechanisms in importance.”47 Cummings pointed out that 
organized pro bono programs accounted for nearly one half of the staff available to provide 
free services to the poor, as compared with federally funded programs, which accounted for 
approximately one-quarter.48 Subsequent studies suggested that it is more likely that pro bono 
accounts for between one third and one quarter of the full-time lawyer equivalent staff within 
the US civil legal aid system.49 In any event, this is a significant contribution certainly worthy 
of scholarly attention, particularly given the public policy implications. As Richard Abel has 
noted, “[t]here is something very strange about having privileged lawyers - who earn huge 
incomes by acting for large corporations and wealthy individuals - constitute a major source of 
legal representation for the poor and subordinated.”50 
 
Moreover, since the early 2000s, as US (and increasingly also London-based) commercial law 
firms have globalized, so too has the practice of pro bono. Already in his 2004 article 
Cummings noted that “[d]riven by the internationalization of law firm practice and the different 
constraints faced by legal services infrastructures in countries around the world, pro bono 
initiatives have recently begun to emerge more vigorously outside of the United States' borders, 
cropping up in places like Paris, China, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.”51 This gave rise 
to the prospect of the global institutionalization of pro bono, something that, the literature 
suggests, is in fact coming to fruition, at least in places like the United Kingdom52 and 
                                                
47 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 1. 
48 Ibid., 104. 
49 Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service,” 80; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2367. 
50 Abel, “Paradoxes of Pro Bono,” 2443. 
51 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 96. 
52 See, for example, Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 169–91. 
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Australia,53 and possibly even, although more slowly, in emerging/emergent economies such 
as Brazil54, Singapore55 and India.56 
 
Given these developments, a flourishing body of literature has emerged to study this 
phenomenon from multiple angles. Chiefly, to date, the literature has sought, at various times,  
(1) to make the normative case for pro bono57 (2) to try and understand pro bono from a 
structural and organizational perspective58 and (3) from a cultural, social and political 
perspective59 and (4) to make recommendations for its improvement as a form of legal service 
provision to the poor.60  
 
In what follows I will discuss some of the major themes and findings emerging from the 
literature under two headings: (1) pro bono as “institution” or “praxis” and (2) pro bono as 
“culture”, “ideology” or “symbol”. In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss another 
major theme emerging from the literature that is of critical important to my thesis, i.e. the 
ultimate function of pro bono/ pro bono as a solution to the access to justice problem, and I 
will then conclude by identifying the contribution that I hope to make.  
 
2.1! Pro bono as “institution” or “praxis” 
 
The idea of studying pro bono as an institution or as praxis, that is to say, as a distinct set of 
organizational practices, policies, protocols, actors/roles, rationales, objectives, functions and 
outcomes, first emerged from the early literature on public interest law in the 1970s.61 Joel 
Handler and his colleagues were the first academics to attempt to systematically investigate 
pro bono among the American private bar in general and among large, elite law firms in 
                                                
53 See Bartlett and Taylor, “Pro bono lawyering,” 273; Twomey and Corker, “Pro bono at work,” 255–60. 
54 De Sa e Silva, “Doing well and doing good.” 
55 Whalen-Bridge, “Pro Bono in Singapore,” 97–143; Maguire, Shearer, and Field, “Reconsidering pro 
bono,” 1164. 
56 Gupta, “Pro Bono,” 275. 
57 See, for example, Katzmann, Law Firm and Public Good; Rhode, “Pro bono in principle,” 413–64; Justus, 
“Using Business Strategies,” 365; or Glazer, “Revisiting the Business Case,” 563. 
58 See, for example, Handler, Hollingsworth, and Erlanger, Pursuit of Legal Rights; Spaulding, “Prophet and 
Bureaucrat,” 1395–434; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2357; or Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 
543–64. 
59 See, for example, Rhode, “Cultures of Commitment,” 2415; Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1689; 
Dinovitzer and Garth, “Pro bono as elite strategy”; Boutcher, “Rethinking Culture,” 108; or Boutcher, 
“Lawyering for social change,” 179–96. 
60 See, for example, Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2357; Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono 
Service,” 79–112; and Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 543–64. 
61 See, for example, Handler, Hollingsworth, and Erlanger, Pursuit of Legal Rights. 
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particular. Handler studied pro bono empirically, using surveys and interviews to identify the 
percentage of private bar lawyers doing pro bono work, how many hours they did per year, the 
types of clients they were representing, the types of legal matters they were engaging with, the 
percentage of work done during billable vs. non-billable hours, major areas of practice by 
reference to city size, percentage of time spent with low-income clients, the amount and type 
of pro bono relative to the size of the firm, the types of pro bono work and the wealth of clients 
relative to the wealth of the pro bono lawyers.62 In relation to large firms, Handler and his 
colleagues studied the extent to which they had formalized pro bono policies in place, the 
degree to which pro bono practice was coordinated, how programs were structured and the 
types of clients that were represented.63 Already in the 1970s, Handler and his colleagues 
discovered that, among lawyers in the private bar, large US law firm lawyers were carrying out 
the greatest amount of pro bono work during their non-billable hours.64 Handler further 
identified at least 24 large firms that had formalized pro bono programs.65 These consisted of 
institutionalized organizational features that were geared towards engaging the firms’ lawyers, 
on a voluntary basis, with public interest work. The most common features of such programs 
were: i) a “pro bono committee”, i.e. a group of lawyers tasked with identifying and reviewing 
potential pro bono cases; ii) a system for assigning individual lawyers to pro bono cases; iii) a 
formal commitment from the firm to release lawyers for pro bono work; and/or iv) the firm 
maintained a separate office for pro bono work.66 Interestingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly, pro 
bono programs were found typically in the largest firms and the largest cities where those firms 
maintained offices.67 
 
This first empirical study of pro bono has arguably set the course for how pro bono has been 
studied by academics in the decades that have followed. While the study did not thoroughly 
explore various academically interesting questions about how and why pro bono was being 
practiced, and while they took for granted that normatively, pro bono should exist and was in 
the public interest, they did a thorough job of mapping the terrain and defining empirically 
what pro bono was.  
 
                                                
62 Ibid., 91–110.  
63 Ibid., 123. 
64 Ibid., 105.  
65 Ibid., 123. 
66 Ibid., 123, 124. 
67 Ibid., 123. 
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In the years that have followed, scholars have continued this line of inquiry, updating and 
supplementing the work of Handler and his colleagues. Key themes across this body of 
literature include: the causes and origins of pro bono, the internal organization and structure of 
pro bono, law firm rationales for pro bono (or the so-called “business case for pro bono”), the 
actors and roles within the pro bono universe, including pro bono clients and problems or issues 
with pro bono as a means of effectively delivering legal services to clients. In the following 
paragraphs, I will explore these themes.  
 
2.1.1! Causes and origins 
 
There are many suggestions in the literature as to the causes or origins of pro bono although 
some consensus does emerge. The first wave of pro bono institutionalization, in the 1960s and 
1970s is believed to have been triggered in response to market pressures with respect to 
recruitment.68 As discussed above, the so-called “public interest law” and “poverty law” 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of a range of models of social change 
lawyering. Law firms apparently feared or perceived that graduates from America’s best law 
schools (exactly the kind of graduates that were sought after by elite law firms) were 
increasingly drawn to careers in public interest law rather than careers in commercial law. 
Commentators suggest that, facing stiff competition, large commercial law firms began to 
establish pro bono practices to entice the best graduates to a career in commercial law.69  In the 
words of one commentator:  
 
“There was a widespread perception that elite graduates would not opt for big firms 
unless they developed programs that provided opportunities to engage in pro bono. As 
a result, the number of formalized pro bono programs expanded.”70   
 
The second wave of pro bono institutionalization is said to have occurred between 1980 and 
into the early 2000s. Multiple trigger factors have been identified in the literature including: 
restrictions placed on the activities of federally funded legal aid lawyers in the 1970s (to limit 
law reform work, thus creating a demand/opportunity for such work to be carried out by pro 
bono lawyers);71 the large decline in federal funding on civil legal aid throughout the 1980s 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 123; Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 33–35; Boutcher, “Lawyering for social change,” 181. 
70 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 35. 
71 Ibid., 21. 
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and 1990s;72 the activities of the ABA to promote pro bono throughout the 80s and 90s,73 
(including the introduction of  a rule on pro bono in 1983 and an aspirational pro bono target 
of 50 hours for every lawyer in 1993); internal and external criticisms to the profession 
(particularly from government) on the basis that it had become too business-oriented and lost 
its professional norms;74 the emergence of a strong voluntarist agenda from the first Bush 
administration in the late 80s and subsequently a growing interest in volunteerism and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) among large US and British corporations (i.e. law firm 
clients, who in turn placed pressure on the firms to establish their own CSR programs);75 the 
use of rankings systems by legal journals to comparatively (and publicly) rate the pro bono 
commitment of elite firms (again, placing pressure on law firms to improve their pro bono 
performance in order to effectively recruit);76 rapid expansion in firm size (leading to 
challenges in: managing potential conflicts of interest with respect to informal pro bono work; 
keeping lawyers busy during down periods; and finding suitable training opportunities for 
young lawyers – all of which creating pressures towards the rationalization of law firm pro 
bono programs);77 and threats to the profession caused by deregulation of the legal services 
market and the potential entrance into the market of non-lawyers providing traditional legal 
services (e.g. wills and estates planning, corporate legal services, etc.), arguably placing 
pressure on the profession to curry favor with regulators.78  
 
Despite this multitude of internal and external trigger factors suggested by the literature, recent 
large empirical studies based on significant comparative data suggest that some factors may be 
more important than others in motivating law firms to embrace and institutionalize pro bono. 
The most significant factors appear to relate more to perceived and actual internal and external 
threats to the firms’ business (individually or collectively) and business incentives, rather than, 
for example, to internal organizational dynamics related to law firm growth or the activities of 
                                                
72 Ibid., 19–21; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2367–68; Boutcher, “Lawyering for social 
change,” 181; Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service,” 103; Abel, “Paradoxes of Pro Bono,” 2444. 
73 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 7, 18; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2368–70. For an 
opposing position, suggesting that Bar activities have a weak impact on firm pro bono activity, see Sandefur, 
“Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service,” 102.  
74 See, generally, Katzmann, Law Firm and Public Good; Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 180, 
181.  
75 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 28; Boutcher, “Rethinking Culture,” 124; Boutcher, “Private Law 
Firms,” 549–58; Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 186, 187. 
76 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 40; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2370–72; Boutcher, 
“Rethinking Culture,” 127. 
77 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2364–67, 2409–19; Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 555–
59. 
78 See, generally, Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service,” 79–112. 
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bar organizations. For example, in her 2007 study Rebecca Sandefur identified that perceived 
threats to lawyers from non-lawyer competitors in the provision of legal services correlated 
with higher rates of pro bono participation whereas the recruitment and promotional activities 
of state bar organizations did not.79 Meanwhile, in two articles published in 2010 and 2017, 
Steven Boutcher found that “the desire to recruit effectively, the pressure to attract clients, and 
the rise of external ranking systems” acted as strong influences on law firm behavior, 
encouraging firms to further institutionalize their pro bono practices and increase their 
participation rates.80  Boutcher further suggests, on the basis of his findings, that “many large 
firms may rationalize pro bono as an important signal of their professional status and legitimacy 
within the profession rather than as oriented toward internal organizational goals”.81  
 
Among these factors, i.e. competition from non-lawyers, pressure to recruit the best students, 
pressure to attract clients and external ranking systems, at least two appear to be significantly 
context-bound. We cannot expect, without further investigation that elite students in other parts 
of the world would select law firms based on available pro bono opportunities. Equally, we 
cannot necessarily anticipate that lawyers faced with competition from non-lawyers in other 
parts of the world would turn to pro bono as a way to raise their professional status vis-à-vis 
regulators, rather than some other strategy. While we could anticipate that if rankings systems 
were effective in the US, they might be effective elsewhere, that would also depend on an 
understanding of why rankings systems matter to law firms, something about which the 
literature has revealed very little to date. In terms of law firm clients though, given that clients 
across the largest law firms globally are remarkably similar (in so far as they are mainly large 
multinational corporations spanning a range of sectors) we could anticipate that trends in the 
US would be repeated elsewhere in the world, and indeed there are some early indications in 
the literature that pressure from clients to engage in pro bono has arisen beyond the US, for 
example in Brazil and the UK..82 Perhaps, as pro bono globalizes, pressure from clients to 
engage in CSR will prove to be one of the major external drivers of global pro bono 
institutionalization.    
 
                                                
79 Ibid., 102. 
80 Boutcher, “Rethinking Culture,” 124–27; Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 549–58. 
81 Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 544. 
82 Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 187; de Sa e Silva, “Doing well and doing good,” 16. 
 37 
One remarkable gap in the literature is any thorough interrogation of the idea, put forward by 
many,83 that increased pro bono institutionalization is directly linked to declines in the 
provision of government legal aid. There is remarkably little evidence in the literature of any 
causal relationship to this effect. It is perhaps more likely that, rather than there being any 
significant causal relationship between the supply of legal aid and the supply of, or demand 
for, pro bono, legal aid cuts and the legal and political debates and narratives that surround 
such cuts, create a background context against which pro bono – which I will argue in this 
thesis is inherently ideologically empty and functionally adaptable – takes shape. Such a 
hypothesis would predict that, in the absence of legal aid cuts and the political and legal context 
created by such cuts, pro bono might take on a different ideological and functional form. It is 
hoped that by interrogating this idea in this thesis, although indirectly, and related to Europe, 
some further light might be shed on this theme.  
 
2.1.2! Internal organization and structure 
 
With respect to the internal organization and structure of pro bono, the literature revolves 
around two sub-themes: the process of institutionalization and the features and models of 
institutionalization. Regarding the process, this has been a gradual development occurring in 
waves (as noted above) moving from the drawing up of pro bono policies and the establishment 
of pro bono committees (made up of volunteer fee-earners), through to the appointment of full-
time pro bono roles, the setting of internal targets, specialization on specific areas of law and 
monitoring and evaluation of growth and impact.84 What is also clear is that institutionalization 
is not possible without buy-in from the leadership of the firm (meaning both the senior partners 
in key managerial positions but also the rank and file partners across the various practice 
groups), the setting of goals with some form of accountability and oversight, and allocation of 
sufficient staffing to the management of the pro bono practice.85     
 
In terms of the features of institutionalization, the most reliable and compelling findings come 
from a large survey of around sixty firms carried out by Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhode, 
                                                
83 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 19–21; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2367–68; 
Boutcher, “Lawyering for social change,” 181; Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service,” 103; Abel, “Paradoxes 
of Pro Bono,” 2444. 
84 See, for example, Handler, Hollingsworth, and Erlanger, Pursuit of Legal Rights, 123; Justus, “Using 
Business Strategies,” 365; Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 57–86; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro 
bono,” 2372; Granfield, “Meaning of pro bono,” 113–14. 
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the results of which were published in 2009.86 This survey updated and expanded upon the 
survey carried out by Handler and his colleagues in 1973. Cummings and Rhode identified that 
the most common features of institutionalized pro bono included a pro bono policy (96% of 
firms); a pro bono committee (93%); the inclusion of pro bono contribution into the 
performance reviews of lawyers (82%); the inclusion of pro bono hours towards the 
determination of bonuses (76%); centralized channels for the distribution of pro bono matters 
(69%); a firm-wide pro bono hours target (66%); approval of all pro bono matters by the pro 
bono committee (62%); and a full-time pro bono role (61% of firms) which could be either a 
pro bono partner, a pro bono counsel or a pro bono coordinator (lawyer or non-lawyer).87 What 
is clear is that the number of full-time pro bono roles (whether lawyer or non-lawyer) are on 
the rise. There were fewer than 20 pro bono roles identified in the US in 1998, more than 70 in 
the US in 2008 and more than 200 (globally) by 2018.88 
 
When it comes to models of institutionalization, while the 1973 study by Handler showed quite 
some variation between more informal models, where lawyers largely managed their own pro 
bono practices, and more structured programs such as pro bono branch offices in low-income 
neighborhoods, or specialized in-house pro bono departments dealing exclusively with certain 
types of law such as housing law or welfare law, today there seems to be remarkable 
consistency across models of pro bono practice. One key area of divergence relates to budget, 
with Cummings and Rhode reporting that just 30% of surveyed firms had a fixed pro bono 
budget.89 Another key area of divergence is around specialization, where firms adopt varying 
practices to deepen their expertise in particular areas. For example, firms might set up 
“signature projects” that “focus firm resources on a particular issue, client group, or geographic 
area [and] are designed to coordinate firm resources around a well-defined goal, create 
synergies between different practice groups, and build institutional knowledge and resource.”90 
Or they might make use of externship or secondment programs, rotating lawyers into positions 
with key non-profit clients for several months.91  But even here, there seems to be remarkable 
convergence. Steven Boutcher, in studying the relationship between pro bono and social 
movements, found that a very large amount of pro bono work (as a proportion of the total 
                                                
86 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2380. 
87 Ibid., 2380–94. 
88 Ibid., 2373, 2374; see also https://www.apbco.org/ stating that the Association of Pro Bono Counsel 
(which requires its members to be in full-time pro bono roles) now has over 200 members globally.   
89 Ibid., 2390. 
90 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 72–74. 
91 Ibid., 77. 
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amount of work) is done for a relatively small number of non-profit organizations and a 
relatively small number of causes.92 Meaning that although there is diversity in the types of 
issues firms engage with, the bulk of work relates to just a few issues (including children’s 
rights, civil rights and civil liberties and women’s rights).93 Meanwhile Cummings and Rhode 
in their 2009 study found that immigration and children’s rights were the most popular focuses 
among signature projects.94 What is as yet unclear from the literature is how specialization and 
the selection of focus issues interact with the fee-earning work of the firm, with political and 
social developments or with the processes of globalization and localization. For example, 
Cummings has noted that “the high concentration of impact-oriented feeder organizations, 
combined with the historic connection between elite firm lawyers and government service, 
makes Washington, DC's pro bono culture quite different than that of Los Angeles”.95 To what 
extent can we anticipate that such trends might be repeated in other parts of the world, such as 
Brussels, Geneva or Brasilia, for instance? Or might pro bono in Italy and Greece (or Europe 
broadly) be more focused on migration related work than in other parts of the world? 
Conversely, as pro bono is globalized, to what extent would specializations and focus issues 
developed in New York or DC be expected to be equally embraced by local offices in Warsaw 
or Sao Paulo? Particularly given that most full-time pro bono roles are based in only a handful 
of cities (such as New York and DC). Moreover, can we expect firms with very large banking 
and finance practices to specialize in areas of pro bono work that relate to finance and 
transactional skills, and can we expect firms with large litigation practices to specialize around 
strategic and impact litigation?  
 
Ultimately, while we know a great deal about the core features and processes of 
institutionalization, there remains much to learn about how and why, beyond these core 
commonalties, firms may differ in their pro bono practices both within the US and globally and 
how such differences are ultimately manifested. It is hoped that this thesis might make a small 




                                                
92 Boutcher, “Lawyering for social change,” 188. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2385. 
95 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 90. 
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2.1.3! Law firm rationales 
 
Moving now to briefly discuss the literature on law firm rationales for pro bono, or the so-
called “business case”, the literature identifies several, including: enlightened self-interest in 
maintaining the reputation of the legal profession (the idea that pro bono work can help to 
dispel negative narratives about lawyers among the general public);96 productivity and 
organizational slack (the idea that higher revenues and profitability are linked, causally, to 
higher pro bono hours in so far as keeping lawyers active when they have no fee-earning work 
may maintain productivity and boost revenues overall);97 client development (the idea that not 
only do corporate clients increasingly demand law firms to engage in pro bono, but also that 
pro bono can be a good way for firm lawyers to collaborate with and network with corporate 
clients);98 marketing (the idea that pro bono will bring recognition, awards and positive media 
attention to the firm vis-à-vis the general public but also potential future employees and 
clients);99 recruitment (as mentioned above, the belief that the best law students may select 
firms on the basis of pro bono opportunities);100 retention (the idea that pro bono will help to 
keep lawyers happier and more content in their roles and thus contribute to increased work-
satisfaction and ultimately, employee retention);101 professional development and training (the 
idea that pro bono can be used as a good way to provide junior lawyers with training 
opportunities and new professional experiences allowing for greater, autonomy and 
responsibility);102 and firm integration (the idea that pro bono can help to create a sense of firm 
culture by allowing lawyers in different practice groups and different offices to collaborate for 
a good cause).103 Note that here I am not discussing the individual motivations of lawyers, 
which might include a sense of professional or moral duty, but rather the internal economic or 
organizational rationales of law firms for doing pro bono. 
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Cummings and Rhode in their 2009 article, work hard to try and understand the important 
question of how such economic, organizational and business rationales interact with the 
delivery of pro bono services for the poor. Cummings had already noted in 2004 that “economic 
arguments are often used by well-meaning pro bono advocates in order to convince more 
bottom-line oriented colleagues to embrace pro bono programs” and that in this way such 
arguments might be viewed pragmatically.104 However, Cummings and Rhode reveal that such 
considerations can and do play a significant role in determining how pro bono programs are 
structured and in how priorities are set (e.g. to maximize on publicity or training benefits) and, 
as such, if pro bono is to be taken seriously as a dependable public good, then much more 
scrutiny of this dynamic is required so that accountability to the beneficiaries of pro bono can 
be assured. Although Cummings and Rhode do note that firms have many in-built quality 
control mechanisms that may go some way to counteract business related pressures on pro 
bono (essentially the same quality-control mechanism they apply to fee generating work).105 
Another very interesting finding from the 2009 study was that, up to a point, the global 
recession had a significant positive impact on institutionalizing pro bono.106 As law firms had 
increased organizational slack, lawyers with no fee-earning work to do were kept busy with 
pro bono work, often through externship and fellowship programs at non-profit organizations. 
Equally, Boutcher found that firm revenues and pro bono hours were inversely related, 
“suggesting that firm leaders channel lawyers into pro bono during lulls in fee-generating 
work”. 107 Altogether, this suggests a subtle and complex relationship between the business 
pressures on pro bono and the nature of pro bono as a legal service. Much more research is 
required to more effectively understand this relationship. For example, to what extent and in 
which circumstances do business imperatives and service imperatives overlap? In which 
circumstances, do they dramatically diverge? Moreover, how do such rationales play out 
beyond the US? Will certain rationales be more or less prevalent across different jurisdictions?           
 
2.1.4! Actors and roles 
 
With respect to the actors and roles in the pro bono universe and the structure and organization 
of pro bono networks, what is clear is that the institutionalization of pro bono is something that 
has taken place both within and beyond the law firm, such that institutionalized pro bono 
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consists of a dense, highly coordinated and collaborative network of actors.108 This includes 
“non-profit pro bono intermediaries, bar-sponsored coordinating groups, philanthropic 
foundations, law schools, monitoring organizations, and referral web sites”.109 
 
Key themes in this area of the literature relate to who the actors in pro bono networks are, their 
roles and their relationship to one another and also who pro bono clients are and how and why 
law firms select their clients (although I will deal with the question of conflicts of interest 
further below).   
 
The central actors in pro bono networks are the fee-earning lawyers who actually carry out the 
work, the full-time pro bono staff who coordinate pro bono programs from inside the law firms, 
so-called “referral organizations” or “clearinghouses” (essentially non-profit organizations 
whose primary objective is to connect law firms either with other non-profits or with individual 
clients), so-called “strategic organizations” (i.e. non-profit organizations with separate 
advocacy goals for whom law firms perform pro bono services) and of course the individual 
beneficiaries themselves (i.e. poor and marginalized individuals who otherwise would not be 
able to pay for legal services).  
 
One key finding related to the lawyers themselves is that that it is very often the younger 
lawyers in the firm, particularly those with higher test scores (GPAs),  who are most engaged 
in the actual pro bono work, and that both women and minority lawyers are significantly more 
likely to support pro bono work, and in fact do more pro bono work,  than men and whites, 
respectively.110 Other likely persons to get involved in pro bono work have been found to be 
people who are insulated from vulnerability in firm hierarchy, people with a low stake in the 
firm, lawyers with a high capacity to work for long hours and lawyers with troughs in work 
flow.111 Cummings and Rhode also found that as the global downturn deepened in 2009, those 
lawyers who had initially gotten heavily involved in pro bono to keep busy were some of the 
first to lose their jobs. Consequently, some lawyers began to see engaging in pro bono work as 
risky and preferred to stay available for billable work.112 It is likely that this kind of dynamic 
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(i.e. fear of engaging in pro bono in so far as it might mark one out as not a “team player”) 
persists in other contexts, for example in firms or jurisdictions where pro bono is less 
institutionalized. Certainly, it appears that there are perceived and actual risks to engaging in 
pro bono for lawyers, and how this plays out in any given case likely depends on the firm’s 
culture, macro and micro economic or business context and the social capital of the relevant 
lawyer .113    
 
In terms of the full-time pro bono staff, as already noted, they can be lawyers or non-lawyers 
and they can be differently situated in the firm hierarchy, from pro bono partners, with equity 
in the firm, to pro bono counsel, pro bono associates (both formally lawyers in the firm 
structure), pro bono directors, pro bono managers, pro bono coordinators (formally non-
lawyers in the firm structure, although they may still be qualified lawyers) and pro bono 
assistants or CSR managers (formally non-lawyers, typically with no legal background). A key 
factor in the emergence of such roles, was the establishment of pro bono rankings systems. As 
it became increasingly important for firms to monitor and report on their pro bono activities, it 
was necessary to have a full-time person to coordinate such efforts. Cummings and Rhode 
suggest that following the introduction of rankings by the American Lawyer magazine, “[p]ro 
bono participation became a positional good: reputation and recruitment partly depended on 
how firms stacked up against their competitors [once] some firms began hiring pro bono 
counsel, others felt pressure to do the same, both to maintain their position and to signal their 
commitment to public service.”114 In terms of the job descriptions, the literature reveals that 
the role generally involves a combination of internal coordination of pro bono files 
(establishing processes, finding and supervising volunteers, internal communications about pro 
bono), carrying out case work themselves (working on pro bono files related to their areas of 
expertise), external outreach and client relationship management (working with referral 
organizations and other non-profits to source pro bono matters for the fee-earners) and external 
communications (PR, reporting).115 As noted above, there are possibly more than 200 full-time 
pro bono roles globally today. We do not presently have a complete picture of who these people 
are (i.e. their CVs,) although Cummings and Rhode surveyed nearly 60 full-time pro bono staff 
for their 2009 study, finding that most come from within the firm and were previously fee-
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earners, while others come from non-profit organizations, where they held legal roles, or from 
law school legal clinics.116 There are now also many of these roles in London and Australia 
and a handful in Continental Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. It remains to be seen 
whether the profiles of such persons (internationally) are similar to their US counterparts. One 
would expect to find persons who have social capital that resonates within Anglo-American 
legal circles but also some legitimacy vis-à-vis the local legal and public interest context. 
Although, thanks to Cummings and Rhode, we do understand a bit about how and why such 
roles are created, we still understand little about variation in the way the function is carried out, 
particularly across different jurisdictions. Moreover, given that most of these roles are likely 
to be based in major cities in the US or capital cities elsewhere in the world, what impact does 
this have on pro bono practice in other locations, and how, why and when might such persons 
exert more or less power to influence the pro bono practice of an office where they are not 
based, particularly if it is in a jurisdiction where they are not qualified? Hopefully, this thesis 
will shed  some light on such questions by exploring the few pro bono roles that exist across 
the UK and Continental Europe.    
 
Surprisingly little research has been done into the referral organizations, which is odd given 
how critical they are to the pro bono system as a whole. We understand very little about how 
and why they are formed. Hopefully, the present thesis will do something to rectify this 
discrepancy. What is known about them, is that in the US they are typically subsidized by local 
bar organizations and are primarily focused on connecting law firm volunteers to low-income 
clients.117 They may get involved to a greater or lesser degree in educating clients about the 
availability of pro bono services, screening pro bono requests from individual clients, liaising 
directly with full-time pro bono staff, training law firm lawyers and helping to troubleshoot 
where issues arise in lawyer-client relationships.118 They can be small one-person operations 
or large complex organizations and they exist across every US state.119 However, many 
questions remain unanswered: how closely do they work with law firms, to what extent do they 
have power to set the agenda of law firm pro bono, to what extent do they engage in advocacy 
vis-à-vis the law firms or the law firm clients, how involved do they get in the matchmaking 
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process, to what extent do they specialize as law firms are specializing?120  Through a close 
case study of one such organization this thesis hopes to shed some light on these questions.  
 
We move on now to look at the pro bono clients, including “strategic organizations”, as they 
have been referred to in the literature and low-income individuals. In terms of strategic 
organizations, or simply NGOs, some research has been carried out to identify which 
organizations and which types of issues law firms are engaging with. Cummings defines them 
as “independent nonprofit groups that have a substantive mandate to pursue a specified 
advocacy agenda”.121 Cummings includes within this definition firstly so-called “legal services 
organizations” (including, for example, legal aid and public defender organizations), whose 
primary mission is the provision of direct legal services. Secondly, the other type of strategic 
organization is the “traditional public interest organization” (elsewhere referred to as change-
oriented organizations or cause-oriented organizations122) - organizations such as the NAACP 
or the ACLU (referred to at the top of this chapter).123 The former type of organization (legal 
services organizations) typically engages with law firms to build up a network of legal 
volunteers who can take on pro bono matters directly for low-income individuals within the 
constituency of the relevant organization, be that simply a geographic area or comprised of 
members of certain groups (e.g. as with faith-based legal services organizations).124 
Meanwhile, for traditional public interest groups, the objective is to engage pro bono lawyers 
to “strategically use an array of pro bono relationships - from active co-counseling to more 
passive pro bono placement - to lessen the burden of large-scale litigation”.125 Staff attorneys 
at such organizations typically act as an intermediate between the pro bono lawyers and the 
rest of the organization which may be distrusting of commercial lawyers. Larger organizations, 
like the ACLU may even have in place formal processes for engaging with pro bono lawyers 
and a range of standardized models for collaborating with them.126 A final type of 
organizational client identified in the literature is the “traditional community organization”.127 
These include churches, local social groups such as sporting clubs, music clubs and the like. 
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For these types of groups, typically, so-called “transactional” or “corporate” pro bono work 
will be carried out, e.g. incorporation and governance, contracts, intellectual property, 
employment.  
 
In the 1970s, Handler and his colleague sought to identify how much pro bono work was being 
done for each type of organization, and in 2013 Steven Boutcher published a paper updating 
this research.128 Excluding the category of individual clients, Boutcher notes that between the 
1970 and the present day, the make-up of pro bono clients among large law firms has shifted. 
While traditional community organizations have reduced from 21% to 14%, change-oriented 
organizations (i.e. traditional public interest groups like the ACLA or NAACP) have gone up 
from 36% to 59% and legal services organizations have gone up from 16% to 27%.129 Boutcher 
hypothesizes that as social movements and activism have become an ever-present feature of 
contemporary Western society, such movements have increasingly professionalized and pursue 
institutional strategies such as litigation. As such, they gradually penetrate and become 
embedded in all forms of modern institutional life. Consequently, professionalized cause-
oriented organizations are increasingly calling upon pro bono services to more effectively 
pursue institutional strategies.130 As noted above, Boutcher also finds that certain causes and 
certain organizations dominate the pro bono work carried out by large law firms (typically 
large, well-established organizations pursuing largely uncontroversial causes). Boutcher 
hypothesizes that firms may be choosing to act with more institutionalized and established 
actors and that “it may be that established movements are more likely to have made the 
important professional connections to key actors within law firms, helping to sustain a constant 
flow of resources. These relationships themselves become an institutionalized network that 
channels resources to a small set of actors and thereby crowd out many more organizations that 
also seek out assistance.”131 Abel suggests that such established public interest organizations 
exist in a “symbiotic relationship” with the pro bono practices of large commercial law firms 
creating a “mutual dependence” which “privileges public interest entities in the few major 
cities where large firms are concentrated, at the expense of those in smaller cities and rural 
areas.”132 Indeed, Cummings and Rhode found that 75% of the lawyers they surveyed 
“indicated that they consulted public interest or legal services groups in defining legal needs 
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and training lawyers to meet them [and] over half consulted nonprofit partners in identifying 
special firm wide projects.” This suggests very close relationships perhaps more characteristic 
of partnership rather than traditional lawyer-client relationships. In spite of such interesting 
findings and hypotheses, little is known about how such large, institutionalized relationships 
work in practice, and what the incentives for such relationship are on both sides and how they 
are sustained. This thesis will hopefully, shed some further light on this.   
 
By far the largest group of pro bono clients in the US are individuals. This group represented 
more than 50% of the pro bono clientele of large law firms in the 1970s and possibly even more 
than that today.133 A 2016 survey revealed that 85% of pro bono lawyers had provided services 
directly to individuals as compared to 35.5% who had provided assistance to organizations.134 
Meanwhile, a 2012 survey revealed that 70% of lawyers at large firms (i.e. firms with more 
than 100 lawyers) provided free legal services to persons of limited means in the last year 
(including advice, representation and mediation) whereas just 42% of such lawyers had 
provided advice to organizations in the same period.135 Moreover, as compared to lawyers at 
smaller firms, sole practitioners and corporate counsel, lawyers at large firms provided the 
greatest amount of pro bono legal services to persons of limited means (averaging 77.7 hours 
per lawyer per year).136 Given this status quo, it is remarkable that the literature sheds very 
little light on the individual pro bono clients of large commercial law firms. We do know a 
great deal about the kinds of legal services they receive, but virtually nothing about the 
relationship dynamics (including power dynamics) between commercial lawyers and such 
individuals, their experience of pro bono legal services, expectations and outcomes and how 
they interact with referral organizations.  
 
2.1.5! Problems and issues 
 
Looking now at the problems and issues with pro bono as a means of delivering legal services 
to clients, the literature identifies several significant challenges for pro bono. These challenges 
are all viewed from the perspective of deploying pro bono as a legal service for low-income 
individuals or progressive social change. That is to say, they relate to problems and issues with 
relying on pro bono as a public good. The most common issues identified in the literature relate 
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to: conflicts of interest (the extent to which commercial conflicts prevent firms from engaging 
in certain kinds of pro bono work);137 the broad range of other business imperatives that might 
take precedence over the public interest or client interests in pro bono work (e.g. recruitment, 
marketing, business development, training);138 the limited expertise of pro bono lawyers 
engaging in what are sometimes quite complex areas of law;139 lack of quality control and 
concerns around the quality of pro bono work in general;140 the limited commitment of lawyers 
to engaging in pro bono work over the long run (i.e. the question of whether pro bono work 
really is treated in the same manner as fee-earning work);141 unequal power dynamics between 
pro bono clients and pro bono lawyers;142 and the question of the real impact or public benefit 
of pro bono work and the lack of monitoring and evaluation vis-a-vis such impact.143    
 
The literature presents a fairly complex understanding of conflicts of interest in the context of 
pro bono work, which have been said to range from so-called “traditional conflicts” (which 
arise where a firm seeks to represent a new client whose interests are directly adverse to a 
current or former client, in a matter against the current or former client); to “direct positional 
conflicts” (which arise where a firm seeks to represent a new client whose interests are directly 
adverse to a current or former client, but not in a matter against the current or former client); 
to “indirect positional conflicts” (which arise where a firm seeks to represent a new client 
whose interests are broadly or generally adverse to the interests of a current or former client); 
to “ideological conflicts” (which arise where a firm seeks to represent a new client which a 
current or former client may find personally or politically objectionable).144 In relation to pro 
bono work, it is the positional and ideological conflicts that commentators find the most 
problematic. Whereas traditional conflicts are quite uncommon in pro bono work, and, in any 
event, a firm could simply refer a conflicted pro bono client on to another firm, positional and 
ideological conflicts appear to be somewhat more of a pervasive, systemic issue with pro bono. 
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To the extent that, as noted above, certain clients and causes may systematically struggle to 
attract pro bono support (e.g. related to employment law, labor law and environmental law).145 
The literature suggests that most firms have no written policy on conflicts of interest in relation 
to pro bono matters (beyond the conflicts policy that exists to identify traditional conflicts in 
relation to fee-earning work).146 Consequently, beyond traditional conflicts, the worry is that 
pro bono conflicts decisions essentially boil down to “a fear that [if you take on certain pro 
bono clients or pro bono causes] your paying clients won't like you, that you will create 
animosity and lose business."147 Cummings notes that “big firms are more likely to support pro 
bono in areas where the potential for positional conflicts is slim and where the firm can expect 
positive public relations”.148 As noted above, such safe, popular subject matters apparently 
include family law, children’s rights and immigration and asylum. This suggestion appears to 
have been further confirmed by subsequent research carried out by Boutcher, discussed above, 
demonstrating that the range of causes and the range of clients represented by large law firms 
on a pro bono basis are relatively narrow (e.g. civil rights, women’s rights children’s rights, 
etc.).149  
 
While we do know a fair amount, at a general level, about conflicts of interest and how they 
interact with law firm decisions regarding the types of pro bono clients and causes to take on, 
we know relatively little about how these decisions are made in practice, on a micro level. To 
what extent are full-time pro bono lawyers free to make such decisions of their own accord and 
how involved are fee-earning lawyers and the firm’s partners in such decisions. To what extent 
would the outcome of any given decision vary depending on the particular lawyers and law 
firms involved (e.g. would the outcome change dramatically if you addressed the request for 
approval to two different partners in the same practice group in the same firm, or the same 
practice group, with more or less the same clientele, although at different firms?). In other 
words, how contingent are such decisions, how predictable are they? It seems likely that 
conflicts outcomes, beyond traditional conflicts, are significantly context-specific. Meaning 
that outcomes depend on a range of local factors such as: the clientele of the relevant firm; the 
leadership and culture of the firm; how high up the hierarchy decisions about pro bono matters 
are made; the legal practice area implicated; the degree of discretion full-time pro bono lawyers 
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have to make such decisions; the nature of the pro bono matter and the identity of the pro bono 
client, etc. It would, therefore, perhaps be interesting to find out how such decisions are made 
and how outcomes might differ beyond the US, in other legal cultures. How, if at all, might 
conflicts outcomes differ between New York and Paris, Brussels and Prague, London and 
Sheffield? It might also be interesting to explore whether conflicts outcomes might differ in 
relation to the sectors of the implicated corporate clients. Would there be fewer concerns 
around positional and ideological conflicts where the corporate clients concerned are in the 
tech or retail sectors as compared to extractives and real estate (on the basis that the former 
types of clients are likely more progressive than the later)? It is also important to note that 
positional (and ideological) conflicts arise not only in the context of litigation but in relation to 
all forms of pro bono work, from lobbying and law reform, to transactional work related to, for 
example, the governance, intellectual property and human resources of non-profits.150  
Consequently, given the importance of conflicts as a funnel through which all pro bono matters 
must be filtered, more research into this area is definitely warranted.   
 
With respect to the array of other business interests that may have a bearing on pro bono 
decision-making within large law firms (e.g. recruitment, training and marketing), as this has 
been dealt with above (in the section on law firm rationales), it will not be explored again here. 
However, one interesting point made in the literature is worth briefly noting. Cummings points 
out that pro bono, as an institutionalized model of public service delivery, is not unique in this 
respect. That is to say that, the fact that economic concerns, unrelated to the public interest, 
may impact pro bono decision-making, should not be surprising if we consider that, for 
example, the interests of donor-organizations have long been recognized to have a 
disproportionate impact on the mandates and activities of NGOs and, similarly, legal aid 
priorities may be dependent on the political leanings of prevailing governments, “[i]n each 
context, the economic logic is clear: Patronage shapes case selection”.151 From this point of 
view, Cummings encourages us to view pro bono pragmatically as an incomplete substitute for 
the government-funded legal services program that it eclipses. It should not be viewed as a 
complete solution, but as a partial solution, forming one key component in a patchwork of legal 
service options open to low-income individuals and not-for-profit organizations. This insight 
opens interesting avenues for potential further research, particularly beyond the US. As pro 
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bono takes shape in various legal cultures, how is this division of labor (with respect to public 
interest legal service provision) distributed, how do varying political, economic and legal 
cultures impact this division of labor? I hope that this thesis can indirectly provide some insight 
into this by exploring pro bono in Europe.       
 
The literature raises several concerns broadly related to the quality and impact of pro bono 
legal work. A survey carried out by Rhode among leading public interest organizations 
revealed that “almost half reported extensive or moderate problems with quality in the pro bono 
work they obtained from outside firms… [t]he more specialized the work, the more difficulties 
arose in finding or equipping volunteer lawyers with the relevant skill sets”.152 The lack of 
expertise of pro bono lawyers in relation to certain kinds of work is only amplified where the 
work is predominantly carried out by junior lawyers, where there is limited or no supervision 
of such lawyers and where minimal or no effort is made to gain feedback from clients or to 
monitor and evaluate results and impacts. These are major concerns for an aspirational public 
legal service, as they would be for any service (public or private). However, such concerns are 
especially disconcerting in the pro bono context because, as one interviewed lawyer pointed 
out: “while paying clients may be able to vote with their feet, it is ‘harder for a pro bono client 
to find a replacement than it is for a paying client.’”153 Cummings and Rhode note that one of 
the problems is that while law firms are incentivized to increase the quantity and visibility of 
their pro bono work (e.g. through rankings systems and for recruitment and business 
development purposes), there are not similar incentives to increase the quality and impact of 
such work.154 On the other hand, they also note that there are several institutional features of 
large law firms and large law firm pro bono that mitigate against a complete absence of concern 
(at least for quality, if not impact). These include “[i]nternalized professional norms, the 
oversight of referring organizations, […] the risks of ethical sanctions or malpractice liability 
[…], annual performance evaluations, partner and pro bono counsel supervision, and case-
tracking systems”.155 It is likely that such issues around the quality and impact of pro bono 
work will present equally, if not more so, in less developed pro bono cultures, with less 
institutionalized support and structure. This thesis will investigate this. What would also be 
interesting to further explore, is how such concerns around quality and impact might differ 
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depending on the area of law (it being of course likely that in an area like asylum law which is 
both fairly complex and beyond the expertise of corporate lawyers, the problems may be 
exacerbated), or the type of client. (One would expect large well-established non-profits like 
the NAACP or the ACLU to have much more power to “vote with their feet” than smaller non-
profits, community groups or individual clients.)    
 
2.1.6! The Globalization of Pro Bono  
 
The final theme which I wish to discuss, emerging from the literature on pro bono as praxis or 
institution, is the globalization of pro bono. As mentioned above, from the early 2000s, as US 
and British law firms have globalized, their pro bono practices have also begun to globalize. 
However, limited research has been to done to date to explore how exactly this process unfolds. 
There is a smattering of literature156 variously exploring the globalization of pro bono and pro 
bono beyond the United States. To date, such literature has explored pro bono in countries 
including the United Kingdom,157 Australia,158 Brazil,159 Singapore,160 India,161 Sweden and 
China.162 Key findings and themes within this relatively small body of literature relate to: the 
causes or origins of pro bono in these new contexts;163 the process of diffusion (from the US 
outwards);164 the process of localization (how pro bono is being adapted to the local context);165 
and more typical institutionalist themes such as organization, structure and roles.166  
 
Before looking at these findings in more detail, it should be emphasized that significant 
research has been undertaken, over the course of the past two or three decades, into the 
globalization and internationalization of law. This voluminous body of research essentially 
explores two aspects; firstly, the way in which international, transnational and global processes 
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transform national law and practice, and secondly, the emergence of international laws, 
jurisdictions and institutions.  One of the most significant early contributions to this literature 
came from Trubek, Dezalay, Buchanan, and Davis, in 1994.167 The authors sought to 
demonstrate how emerging political and economic forces (e.g. changing production patterns, 
the linking of financial markets, the proliferation of multinational business, increasing 
privatization and regional trade patterns) were reshaping the nature and practice of law in both 
the professional and academic arenas. The authors noted both vertical and horizontal aspects 
of globalization and internationalization, the former stemming from the emergence of 
supranational and international jurisdictions penetrating the national sphere and the latter from 
the growing rate of interaction between formally national legal systems, actors, arenas and 
practice/knowledge sites.168 The authors also explored the role that large US corporate law 
firms played in transforming legal practice beyond the Unites States (notably in Europe) and 
demonstrate the complexity of such processes in which there is a subtle interplay between 
external (i.e. US) and internal (i.e. European) legal traditions and norms resulting in hybrid 
forms of legal practice.  
 
In subsequent years, two broad bodies of socio-legal literature have emerged exploring the 
globalization of law which, at the risk of oversimplification, might be categorized as 
approaches with a top-down lens versus approaches with a bottom-up lens. In the former 
category is the research on law and economic development.169 In broad terms this research 
explores the how powerful, typically Western or Western-dominated, actors including major 
financial powers (such at the United States and the United Kingdom), international financial 
institutions, private banks, commercial law firms and political, business and legal elites use 
law and capital to build new markets in developing and transitional countries in the Global 
South or at the peripheries of the West. Certain countries are viewed as dominant, being the 
suppliers of law and capital, while others are recipients.170 Of particular relevance, within this 
body of literature, are how certain legal models (e.g. laws, legal concepts and legal institutions), 
are “transplanted” from Western templates into new legal systems within the Global South, 
and the factors that influence the success or failure of such transplants.171 Also of relevance is 
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the role played by international and national elites (by reference e.g. to wealth, education, 
familial ties), in importing and exporting legal norms and building new legal practice sites and 
institutions.172 Such elites use the process of importing and exporting legal norms to elevate 
and maintain their elite status in national and international hierarchies.173     
 
Within the second basket of socio-legal literature exploring the globalization of law are those 
embracing a bottom-up, post-colonial lens.174 From this vantage point, formerly colonial 
powers, which used law to control colonies, have replaced the colonial system of law with 
hegemonic global systems masquerading under universalist concepts such as the rule of law.175 
Supranational governments, hegemonic states (i.e. the United States), international governance 
systems, financial institutions, UN agencies and organs and private foundations are merely the 
“successors to the colonial state”.176 From this perspective however, greater agency and 
attention is accorded to local actors who resist and contest global dynamics and transplants and 
force compromises and modifications.177   
 
From both vantage points however, what appears as globalization, is often actually what Santos 
has called “globalized localism”, meaning “the process by which local phenomena are 
successfully globalized”.178 This often turns out to be “Americanization” rather than 
globalization insofar as American models of law and legal practice are exported, along with a 
certain model of capitalism, to other parts of the world by businesses, law firms, foundations, 
development agencies etc.179 However, this is often a “thin globalization” insofar as there is a 
difference between form (the law on the books and the shape of legal institutions) and substance 
(law in practice or the lived experience of legal institutions) and imported norms and practices 
remain hybrid or contested below the veneer of global uniformity.    
 
There has also emerged, from this body of literature, a specific focus on the globalization of 
Big Law and the role played by large law firms in the processes of globalization and 
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internationalization.180 This body of literature aims at charting and modelling the growth and 
internationalization of large law firms and exploring the impact they have on national legal 
systems, actors, norms and practices.   
 
All the above described literature on the globalization and internationalization of law is 
relevant in different ways to the current thesis and will be drawn on, from time to time, 
throughout the remainder of the thesis.  In the following paragraphs, however, we will return 
to the much smaller body of literature on the globalization of pro bono, which in various parts, 
also draws upon and builds upon the above described larger body of literature.  
 
Within literature on the globalization of pro bono, focus has been placed on explorations of the 
causes and origins of pro bono in various national settings. A large focus, as in the US, has 
been on declining legal aid spending. Cummings noted already in 2004 that “as in the United 
States, countries have focused increased attention on pro bono as state-sponsored legal aid 
schemes have been cut back under the banner of fiscal austerity.”181 The literature suggests 
that, at least in Australia, Sweden and Singapore, this may well be the case, although the 
evidence for a causal link is quite sparse. For example, discussing Australia, Maguire and 
colleagues argue that, with decreased public sector funding for legal aid, increasing attention 
has been placed on law firm pro bono as a supplement.182 Meanwhile, Whalen-Bridge, 
discussing Singapore, the UK and the US, writes that “[u]sing a wide angle comparative 
perspective suggests a relationship between legal aid and pro bono: the gaps in legal services 
brought about in part by the amount and type of government funded legal aid creates pressure 
on lawyers to provide pro bono legal services in response to the perceived need.”183 Whalen-
Bridge suggests that, unlike in the US and the UK where the focus has been on civil legal aid, 
limited spending on criminal legal aid in Singapore has nonetheless similarly contributed to 
the demand for and development of pro bono legal services.184 In the Swedish context, Regan 
reports similar developments: 
 
                                                
180 See e.g. Galanter, “Mega-law and mega-lawyering”, Flood, "Megalawyering in the global order”; 
Faulconbridge et al., “Global Law Firms”; Beverstock et al., “Long arm of the law”; Bauman, Pioneering a 
Global Vision; Wilkins, Khanna and Trubek, eds. The Indian Legal Profession in the Age of Globalization; and 
Cunha, Gabbay, Ghirardi, Trubek, and Wilkins, eds. The Brazilian Legal Profession in the Age of Globalization. 
181 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 96. 
182 Maguire, Shearer, and Field, “Reconsidering pro bono,” 1197. 
183 Whalen-Bridge, “Pro Bono in Singapore,” 141. 
184 Ibid. 428–430. 
 56 
“Pressure to reduce public expenditure on legal aid in the early 1990s meant that 
substantial reforms were introduced to the scheme at the end of 1997 […] One 
consequence of the 1997 reforms was that the Swedish Bar Association was prompted 
into action. Not only did it lobby the government against the severity of the cuts, the 
profession also underwent a remarkable change of heart toward pro bono legal 
assistance. Instead of continuing to regard pro bono as unnecessary, it established a 
`free first interview' scheme across the country in the middle of 1998.”185 
 
In addition to pressures on legal aid spending, another driver of pro bono institutionalization 
internationally has been the broader globalization of US legal norms and practices, both via the 
internationalization of large law firms but also via legal education. In a well-written article, De 
Sa e Silva meticulously details how lawyers with US legal training and socialization were the 
first to push the corporate bar to consider institutionalizing pro bono in Brazil.186 However, he 
also notes how another key driver of this diffusion was multinational corporations (i.e. law firm 
clients), used to collaborating on pro bono projects with law firms in the US and looking for 
the same types of collaboration in Brazil.187 Yet another driver of the globalization of pro bono 
that both De Sa e Silva and Cummings point to is US-based non-profits (clearinghouses) such 
as PILnet, the Pro Bono Institute, the International Bar Association and the Vance Centre. 
These organizations have worked to connect US lawyers overseas with non-profit 
organizations seeking pro bono assistance, thus constructing pro bono infrastructure 
overseas.188 Based on his finding that there have been multiple drivers of pro bono 
globalization in the Brazilian context, De Sa e Silva encourages researchers to think in terms 
of “globalizations” rather than globalization. However, De Sa e Silva also sheds important light 
on the process of localization. For instance, he explores how, based on resistance from the 
social bar and legal aid advocates, the organized bar intervened to restrict pro bono work 
exclusively to the provision of legal services to NGOs (a regulation which was subsequently 
overturned), and restricted any form of law firm advertising related to pro bono (this based on 
fears from commercial law firms that some firms might use pro bono to secure competitive 
advantages with corporate clients).189 Overall, De Sa e Silva’s study sheds significant light on 
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the global and local dynamics of norm transfer in the context of pro bono. The present thesis 
hopes to do the same in the European context.  
 
A final theme within the literature relates to the architecture of globalized pro bono which, at 
least in some contexts, is remarkably similar to the US pro bono architecture. For instance, in 
Australia, Bartlett and Taylor note that “[p]ro bono coordinators or partners in large law firms 
in Australia are now ubiquitous”190, while Twomey, based on survey data, reveals that “[n]inety 
per cent of multi-office firms indicated having a national system of co-ordination for pro bono 
legal work and 80 per cent of firms with only one office have some system for co-ordination 
of pro bono legal work.”191  
 
Overall, the existing literature on international pro bono or the globalization of pro bono is 
quite limited in several respects. Insufficient attention has been paid to the processes of 
globalization and adaption or localization. There is a lack of exploration of how pro bono 
differs as it expands to new contexts and the reasons for such variation (although the studies 
by De Sa e Silva and Whalen-Bridge are exceptions). There has been only cursory exploration 
of the role of non-profits in diffusing pro bono culture beyond US borders and their influence 
in determining how pro bono is defined and deployed in new contexts. Moreover, law firms 
are globalizing at a phenomenal rate and so one would expect to find pro bono in virtually 
every corner of the world, yet the map of pro bono literature remains remarkably sparse. It is 
hoped that the present thesis can do much to address these gaps in the literature.   
 
2.2! Pro bono as “culture”, “ideology” or “symbol” 
 
As discussed above, with the emergence of the “cause lawyering” literature in the mid 1990s, 
scholarly attention on social change lawyering shifted from questions about defining a practice 
and set of institutions, to questions about the motivations, ideology and politics and cultural 
contexts of lawyers pursuing social change. This shift in focus can also be seen in the literature 
on pro bono where scholars began to explore, on the one hand, lawyer motivations for doing 
pro bono work, pro bono as an expression of lawyers’ identities and pro bono as culture, and, 
on the other hand, pro bono as politics and pro bono as a professional ideology and as a 
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normalizing, legitimizing or justificatory narrative of power. Given that these themes are less 
important in the context of the present thesis, far less space will be dedicated, here, to exploring 
these themes than to the themes discussed just above. However, this does not imply that these 
themes are less well explored in the literature.  
 
2.2.1! Lawyer motivations for doing pro bono work, pro bono as an expression of 
lawyers’ identities and pro bono as culture 
 
The literature reveals many motivations for lawyers engaging in pro bono work including: 
mobilizing events (e.g. 9/11 or the Trump Muslim Ban); charismatic leadership or support and 
encouragement from leadership of the firm; professional benefits such as training 
opportunities, trial experience or network development; a sense of obligation (professional, 
moral or both); personal/intrinsic satisfaction; an opportunity for direct involvement with 
clients; and religious or political commitment.192 It seems likely that among these motivations, 
a sense of intrinsic or personal satisfaction and a sense of moral or professional obligation are 
the strongest motivating factors, followed by employer policies and encouragement and 
personal benefits.193 One might expect such findings (regarding lawyer motivations) to vary 
somewhat from culture to culture, yet findings from an Australian survey also suggest that a 
sense of personal satisfaction and a sense of personal obligation are also major motivating 
factors for Australian lawyers.194 Albeit that these both represent common law, Anglo-Saxon 
legal cultures, this possibly suggests that personal motivations for doing pro bono (certainly 
within large law firms) may not vary that dramatically across legal cultures. It might therefore 
be interesting to explore whether mobilizing events, for example, might play a similar role in 
motivating lawyers to do pro bono in other parts of the world as they have in the US. Indeed, 
some recent findings in the context of clinical legal education suggest that events such as the 
migrant crisis and the financial crisis in Europe have motivated law teachers to pursue models 
of social justice lawyering there.195 It is likely, nevertheless, that cultural variation in the 
motivations of lawyers doing pro bono will emerge as pro bono continues to flourish beyond 
the United States and, hopefully, future research can shed more light on this.   
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As noted above, the literature also suggests that younger lawyers, lawyers with higher law 
school test scores, female and minority lawyers are the most likely to engage in pro bono.196 It 
has further been revealed that lawyers are much more likely to do pro bono work when they 
are socialized with and exposed to other lawyers who do pro bono work.197 Indeed, it has been 
suggested, on the basis of such findings, that there may be a “cultural orientation” to doing pro 
bono and that doing pro bono may be a manner of expressing one’s identity as a lawyer. 
Granfield and Veliz, for example, suggest that “the cultural orientation to do pro bono is, in 
part, class and status-based; that is, graduates of elite law schools working in large law firms 
are more likely to have personal and professional values that facilitate the decision to do pro 
bono work”.198 Meanwhile, Rhode has suggested that for minority lawyers “[w]ork for racial, 
ethnic, or other disadvantaged groups can also be an important form of "giving back" and 
affirming identity”.199 Dinovitzer and Garth found that it was African American lawyers at 
large commercial firms, rather than those at smaller and mid-sized firms, that were doing the 
most pro bono, which perhaps lends further credence to the idea that pro bono may be a form 
of affirming identity and “giving back” for lawyers perhaps uncomfortable with the prestige 
and wealth that comes with Big Law. Again, it would be interesting to explore whether such 
findings, in relation to young lawyers with high test scores and minority and female lawyers, 
also translate beyond the US. It seems unlikely that the findings in relation to women and young 
lawyers would differ dramatically around the world, and indeed, findings from Australia mimic 
the US findings.200 However, it would be interesting to explore whether findings in relation to 
minorities, which seem quite specific to the US context, might also be replicated in other parts 
of the world and whether other demarcations such as class, caste, tribe, political affiliation, etc. 
would equally predict pro bono engagement in other parts of the world.  
 
Another interesting observation from the literature relates to how pro bono may be deployed 
as a strategy in the career of elite lawyers. Dinovitzer and Garth found that elite lawyers (i.e. 
from top ten law schools) were socialized into valuing pro bono already during law school and 
that such lawyers were both more likely to value pro bono opportunities at large law firms, and 
more likely to be able to personally and professionally benefit from such work (for example 
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through professional recognition in the form of awards and honors).201 They also found that 
doing some pro bono work versus none, increased job satisfaction for such lawyers, whereas 
increasing pro bono hours had no effect on, or even decreased, job satisfaction.202 Based on 
these findings, they hypothesized that pro bono provides elite lawyers at large firms with a 
form of symbolic capital along with more tangible forms of capital such as training, court 
opportunities and connections. Meanwhile, Cummings has reflected on how such symbolic 
capital might be traded in, later in the career of such lawyers: 
 
“Some lawyers […] engage in pro bono as a means of enhancing job opportunities, 
building a public service persona that allows them to move back and forth between 
private sector, governmental, academic, and nonprofit posts […] Lawyers also use pro 
bono as a way to maintain contacts with public interest groups while they cycle through 
the private sector for a short stint in order to pay off debt, build skills, or develop 
professional relationships […] Pro bono can also provide firm lawyers with an exit 
strategy to the extent that contacts made with public interest organizations through pro 
bono can develop into full-time jobs.”203  
  
Perhaps we understand less about the extent to which pro bono may contribute to symbolic 
capital, or detract from such capital, within the large law firms themselves. Handler noted 
already in 1970 that lawyers who did pro bono were not necessarily negatively affected by 
having done pro bono in terms of their career path at such firms (simply by noting that many 
such lawyers were still at the relevant firms several years after having been heavily involved 
in pro bono work).204 Similarly, Cummings has suggested that some lawyers use pro bono to 
craft lifelong careers within private law firms that include significant public interest work.205 
This is further supported by the subsequent work of Cummings and Rhode that found that many 
of the full-time pro bono lawyers at large firms actually started as fee-earners within those 
firms and were able to successfully convert their pro bono experience into full-time roles.206 
We also know that doing pro bono may sometimes mark out lawyers as not a “good fit” within 
law firms (particularly during economic downturns) as discussed above. Nevertheless, we still 
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know relatively little about how pro bono may positively or negatively impact the status of 
commercial lawyers within their firms and, perhaps more importantly, the reasons why, in 
either case. Again, one would expect that whether pro bono has symbolic value or, on the 
contrary, may become a form of stigma, may depend on the micro and macro legal culture (i.e. 
the culture of the legal practice group, the culture of the business sector, the culture of the firm, 
the legal professional culture of the city and the culture of the country).207 Hopefully, future 
research will shed more light on such possible patterns of variation. 
 
More recently, and along these lines, some commentators have begun to critique the idea of 
studying pro bono from the point of view of lawyer motivations. Boutcher suggests that “pro 
bono participation is more than simply the aggregation of individual predispositions found 
within the firm”.208 Rather, the pro bono engagement of lawyers must be understood in the 
context of the institutional environment of such lawyers, the culture of that environment and 
the opportunities and constraints it places on pro bono.209 For instance, Boutcher notes that 
factors such as pro bono rankings systems, the pressure to attract commercial clients and the 
desire to recruit the best graduates may all influence the culture of law firms and the broader 
institutional environment, which in turn will create more favorable micro-ecosystems for 
lawyers at large firms wanting to engage in pro bono work.210  
 
Ultimately, the literature now provides a complex understanding of lawyer motivations and 
meanings for engaging in pro bono work and also how such motivations and meanings interact 
with the institutional context in which the lawyer practices law. Perhaps another dynamic that 
we understand less about is what role such motivations and meanings (apart from or in 
combination with the institutional context) play in determining which kind of pro bono work 
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2.2.2! Pro bono as politics, as a professional ideology and as a normalizing, legitimizing 
or justificatory narrative of power  
 
A key theme in the literature is how pro bono interacts with, or is influenced by politics beyond 
the firm. In the context of legal aid reform, or political discussions around legal aid reform, 
this idea is not novel and will be discussed in more detail in section 3 below. However, more 
recently, Boutcher has interestingly explored how social movements are beginning to penetrate 
law firms via public interest organizations (or “cause organizations”) working with pro bono 
lawyers. Boutcher begins by challenging one of the basic tenets of the “cause lawyering” 
literature discussed above, that cause lawyers must be distinguished from conventional lawyers 
on the basis of their use of advocacy as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself.211 To 
the contrary, Boutcher finds that “social movement goals have become widely legitimated 
within the structure of corporate law firms”.212 In line with the above discussion on conflicts, 
Boutcher concedes that “there could still be support for the argument that pro bono is not 
“transgressive” enough to incorporate more recent, and possibly more controversial, issues like 
animal rights, environmental justice, or gay rights”.213 Nevertheless, he argues convincingly 
that as social movements have become more pervasive within American society, their 
strategies have become more professionalized and more institutionalized, and it should 
therefore be unsurprising that they might wish to take advantage of pro bono services offered 
by large commercial law firms to gain access to, and to be more effective within, political and 
legal institutions.214  Consequently, pro bono programs in large law firms have become a site 
of cause lawyering activity. This is perhaps a logical conclusion if it is true, as discussed above, 
and as Boutcher has noted elsewhere, that firms are increasingly developing deeper 
relationships with a narrower range of clients and engaging in fewer causes, and as Abel 
suggests, that established public interest organizations now exist in a “symbiotic relationship” 
with the pro bono practices of large commercial law firms creating a “mutual dependence”.215  
Whatever the case, the nature of law firm relationships with NGO clients and their politics is a 
fascinating area for further study and something which this thesis, indirectly, hopes to further 
explore in the context of Europe.  
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Another important theme in the literature, noted already in the 1995 study by Katzmann and 
colleagues, is that pro bono may be used instrumentally by the profession to overcome 
skepticism within society about lawyers and low regard for the legal profession.216 In the 
subsequent years this position has been restated by multiple authors with more or less cynicism. 
Some have noted that much like the doctors, lawyers have a monopoly on what represents a 
core public service (i.e. legal services) and that such monopoly has been justified by the 
profession by reference to the “prophetic role of the lawyer” or, more specifically, the 
aspiration and duty of pro bono service.217 Others have noted, more cynically, how pro bono 
has been wheeled out by the profession, particularly at times where the profession faces a crisis 
of legitimacy, for example, as noted above, where regulators are threatening to deregulate the 
provision of legal services and open up the provision of legal services to non-lawyers, or where 
politicians have begun to criticize the profession for being too business-oriented and 
insufficiently public-spirited.218 Yet others have suggested that pro bono may be used by the 
profession as a “loss leader” to build new legal markets by sensitizing clients to the value of 
legal services, or by elite segments of the profession seeking to (re)establish their public 
interest credentials or usurp such credentials from other, less influential, parts of the 
profession.219  
 
2.3! Conclusion: Praxis to what end?  
 
The literature review presented above has hopefully established at least three of the points that 
this chapter set out to establish, i.e. firstly that Big Law Pro Bono (rather than merely “pro 
bono” – meaning lawyers acting outside of the Big Law setting providing free legal services), 
emerged as practice and as object of study in the US, secondly that the academic study of Big 
Law Pro Bono flows from US literature on social justice lawyering and straddles both the 
public interest law and cause lawyering strands of that body of literature, and thirdly that there 
are gaps in relation to the key themes explored within the pro bono literature. Notable among 
such gaps, for the purposes of the present thesis, are gaps related to the globalization of Big 
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Law Pro Bono and the institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono and, specifically, the role 
played by intermediary organizations.    
 
Ultimately, the above review provides crucial framing for the material that will be covered in 
the following chapters. In exploring whether Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice 
in Europe, it is essential to understand the way in which Big Law Pro Bono has been studied 
to date. What should hopefully be apparent is that certain attributes of Big Law Pro Bono 
emerge from the structure of large law firms and the commercial environment in which they 
operate, both of which are likely to be fairly consistent globally, across jurisdictions. However, 
other features relating, for example, to the clientele, the nature of the work carried out, the roles 
of intermediaries and the regulatory or cultural obstacles to engaging in pro bono work are 
likely to be highly context-specific. As such, when studying Big Law Pro Bono beyond the 
US, such attributes cannot be taken for granted.  
 
In the following section, I will explore the primary empirical and normative function of Big 
Law Pro Bono as it is understood in the United States, i.e. promoting access to justice in the 
form of civil legal aid. It is my contention, that this objective, understood widely as the raison 
d'être for Big Law Pro Bono is highly context-bound and, as such, should be treated with 
caution when studying Big Law Pro Bono in Europe.   
 
3! Pro Bono as Legal Aid – Historical Contingency in the 
Development of Big Law Pro Bono 
 
In this section, I want to achieve two objectives. The first is to explore and establish the idea 
that, unlike other forms of social justice lawyering, pro bono is better construed as a resource 
rather than a cause and is inherently ideologically and politically empty. The second objective, 
which follows from the first, is to explore another key theme in the literature, which relates to 
the idea of pro bono as a historically and politically contingent social institution, i.e. the idea 
that pro bono, as an institution, has emerged from a specific historical and political context. 
Achieving these objectives is necessary because, as mentioned, if I am to study Big Law Pro 
Bono in Europe, I must first, at least partially, unmoor it from its US origins. To do so requires 
an appreciation of the contingency of Big Law Pro Bono both as practice and object of study. 
In this thesis, I wish to argue that in Europe, a unique variant of Big Law Pro Bono has emerged, 
 65 
distinct from the model that took shape in the United States. To do so, I need to demonstrate 
that Big Law Pro Bono is, at least partially, plastic or contingent and that the local context 
against which the institution takes shape can play a significant role in determining the shape 
that is ultimately taken.  
 
Indeed, it is well established that sociological thought will be influenced by the political and 
social context in which it is formed.220 It is furthermore uncontroversial to suggest that social 
institutions emerge from specific historical, economic and political background contexts, 
which may influence the shape that such institutions take.221    
 
A central underlying premise in this thesis, to be discussed throughout, is that Big Law Pro 
Bono is a resource that is inherently ideologically empty. As such, it is given political or 
ideological direction by the relevant historical and socio-political context in which it is 
deployed. Below and further in Chapters 2 and 4, I will suggest that, as Big Law pro bono 
emerged in the United States, it was significantly institutionalized between two distinct 
historical moments: on the one hand, the War on Poverty and the emergence of the Office of 
Economic Opportunities Legal Services Program and, on the other hand, the subsequent 
decline in federal spending on civil legal aid. The consequence of this, I will suggest, is that 
Big Law pro bono came to be understood functionally as one solution to the “justice gap”, i.e. 
as a resource oriented toward the provision of civil legal aid for low-income individuals.  
 
Again, it is important to emphasize here that, where I talk of pro bono, I am really talking of 
Big Law Pro Bono and also, necessarily, of Big Law Pro Bono in the US. However, a key 
objective is to separate out which parts in the practice and study of Big Law Pro Bono are 
context-bound and which are not. It is crucial to understand this before we begin with the 
exploration of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and address the question of whether it contributes 
to access to justice.   
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3.1! Pro bono is a resource rather than a cause and is inherently ideologically and 
politically empty 
 
As noted above, the “cause lawyering” literature defines cause lawyering in contrast to so-
called “conventional lawyering”:  
 
“The objective of the attorneys that we characterize as cause lawyers is to deploy their 
legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, and/or 
legal values and resources. Cause lawyers choose clients and cases in order to pursue 
their own ideological and redistributive projects. And they do so, not as a matter of 
technical competence, but as a matter of personal engagement […] They have no 
qualms about embracing the values and goals of those whom they represent. Indeed, 
they take pride in thus challenging traditional concepts of professionalism. At least in 
principle, then, cause lawyering stands in sharp and self-conscious contrast to 
traditional conceptions of lawyering, according to which attorneys are expected to 
provide case-by-case and transaction-by-transaction service to particular clients 
without reference to either their own or to their clients’ values, policy preferences and 
political and social commitments”.222  
 
Conventional lawyering, therefore, is defined precisely by the absence of an ideological 
orientation, by the absence of a political, policy or social agenda. It is defined by the provision 
of legal services on a case-by-case, transaction-by-transaction basis, with the only ideological 
commitment being towards the ideology of advocacy, professionalism and technical 
competence.  
 
Based on an empirical study conducted in Seattle, Scheingold and Blom echo this sentiment 
and suggest that conventional lawyering is distinguished from cause lawyering by the absence 
of “transgressiveness”, i.e. the extent to which a lawyer is willing to move beyond conventional 
models of legal representation and to depart, in particular, from the principle of neutrality, to 
embrace the political and social causes of her/his clients.223 While they suggest that pro bono 
may be a form of cause lawyering, they caveat that it is “distinguishable from conventional 
lawyering only because little or no fee is asked for services rendered. Otherwise this is 
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conventional lawyering…”.224 They go on to reveal that in their interview sample, commercial 
pro bono lawyers “show no interest in pushing their cause lawyering beyond the professionally 
respectable and the politically non-controversial.”225    
 
Meanwhile Sarat and Scheingold go so far as to explicitly define pro bono in contrast to cause 
lawyering. They suggest that, in contrast to cause lawyering, which is directed at “altering some 
aspect of the social, economic and political status quo”, conventional public service efforts, 
such as pro bono, are seen, by those carrying out such work as, “ancillary to the central activity 
of the legal profession, which is to provide fee-for-service lawyering.”226 Moreover, they 
suggest such efforts are “for the most part confined to responding to unmet legal need”, which, 
it is implied, is devoid of “political ideology, public policy or moral commitment”.227   
 
Separately, Thomas Hilbink developed a typology of cause lawyers, ranging from: the 
“grassroots” lawyer who views law as just another type of politics, sees the legal system as 
unjust, corrupt and unfair and is led by the cause, movement or clients; to the “elite/vanguard” 
lawyer, who views law as the best form of politics, sees the legal system as a liberating force 
which typically delivers justice, pursues a legal outcome as the goal of advocacy and leads the 
cause, with the clients taking a back-seat; to the “proceduralist”, who sees law and politics as 
distinct and separate, sees the legal system as essentially fair and just, sees the provision of 
representation as the goal, views her/his role as a neutral representative to a client and not a 
cause.228 On this spectrum, scholars would tend to agree that pro bono falls squarely within the 
“proceduralist” category. 229  That is to say that, in pro bono lawyering, representation is the 
end, and not merely a means to an end.  Pro bono is simply a functionally undetermined 
resource; a large pool of “conventional” or “proceduralist” lawyers, available to provide 
technical legal services to clients for no fee. That is to say that, inherently, pro bono is 
ideologically and politically empty. It might be that one or other lawyer providing pro bono 
services, from within a large firm, closely identifies with a particular client or cause and gets 
so involved that she/he effectively transcends conventional lawyering to embrace transgressive 
lawyering. However, this would not render the pro bono resource of the relevant firm, as a 
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whole, cause lawyering. In other words, pro bono is a resource, defined not by any ideology or 
politics, but by a commitment to provide technical expertise, at no cost, to clients who 
otherwise would not have access to such expertise.  
 
This is significant because it means that Big Law Pro Bono, when being deployed in any 
particular context (i.e. in a new jurisdiction/region) will not necessarily be oriented towards 
any particular social cause or policy or political objective. Rather, Big Law Pro Bono simply 
represents a resource; a large pool of technically competent lawyers willing (or instructed) to 
work for free for any number of causes. Although here, we should of course caveat that the 
potential for positional and ideological conflicts of interests (discussed above) may naturally 
limit the likely range of causes to those issues that are socially and politically uncontroversial 
within the relevant commercial context (children’s rights, women’s rights and the like).  
 
3.2! Pro bono as an historically and politically contingent social institution 
 
More than just being politically and ideologically indeterminate, I want to suggest that Big 
Law Pro Bono is also historically and politically contingent. As discussed above, it is evident 
from the literature that pro bono in the US, as practiced by large commercial law firms, 
experienced two periods of institutionalization. The first was in the 1960s and 1970s and the 
second occurred between the 1980s and early 2000s. It is also evident from the literature, that 
pro bono, as a resource, took shape against the political debates, ideas and movements that 
were consuming the legal profession at those times.  
 
As noted above, the first wave of institutionalization was largely triggered as the result of a 
perception among large law firms that public interest law career opportunities were sapping 
their talent pool of elite lawyers. Such public interest law career opportunities had emerged as 
a consequence of the poverty law and public interest law movements, also discussed above. A 
1969 memo from Hogan & Hartson (now Hogan Lovells) read: 
 
“It has become increasingly evident that there is a tendency among younger lawyers, 
particularly those with highest academic qualification, to seek out public service-
oriented careers as an alternative to practice in the larger metropolitan law firm.”230 
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It has been suggested that this feeling was shared by many firms, several of which responded 
by setting up “pro bono programs”.231 Of course, at the time, the idea of a formal, 
institutionalized, pro bono program was novel. There was no precedent to refer to. Moreover, 
as noted above, pro bono is a resource and not a cause. Consequently, there is no political or 
policy agenda to which pro bono should be obviously directed. However, given that the 
objective was to create opportunities for public service within the structure of large firms, 
inspiration was taken from the very public interest law and poverty law movements that had 
created the problems with recruitment to start with. Literature from that period and subsequent 
literature makes clear how the poverty law movement, in particular, became a major source of 
inspiration for the newly established pro bono programs.232 Lawyers explicitly spoke in terms 
of “institutionaliz[ing] poverty law practice” within the structure of their firms.233 It is evident 
that the initial response from private law firms, although clearly linked to the questions around 
recruitment, cannot be clinically separated from the on-going poverty law movement and the 
broader political debate in America at that time around eliminating poverty. A commentator in 
writing in the American Bar Association Journal in 1970, characteristically suggested that: 
“[a]s the demand for equal justice for all becomes more vocal and more militant, private 
law firms are joining in the effort […] and are experimenting with imaginative new 
methods for enlarging their role in providing legal services for all […] Attorneys, and 
particularly young attorneys, who are dissatisfied with traditional law practice caution 
against token pro bono publico efforts by law firms. They call for total commitment to 
the elimination of poverty.”234  
Indeed, legal services organizations were actively lobbying law firms to establish pro bono 
programs focused on providing legal services to low-income clients. For example, at the 1970 
“Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association”, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association conducted a roundtable discussion on the involvement of private firms in poverty 
law. The roundtable was attended by leading firms from across the country and the themes 
included: how to identity clients, how to collaborate with existing legal services organizations, 
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an exploration of the “branch office model” and so on.235   Writing more recently, Boutcher 
notes that, “the 1960s with the advent of President Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” […] shifted 
pro bono from a form of noblesse oblige to a focus on “access to justice”— targeting direct 
legal services for the poor”.236  
Indeed, as will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis, if one observes the pro bono 
programs that law firms were establishing at the time, one notices a distinct and consistent 
focus on access to justice for low-income individuals. The programs that were set up variously 
involved: setting up branch offices in poor neighborhoods to service low-income clients; or 
seconding lawyers to legal service organizations and legal aid offices.237 Of course, it is true 
that there was also some focus on other models of public interest lawyering such as Nader-
inspired lobbying and NAACP/ACLU-inspired law reform work, but by and large there was, 
during this first period of pro bono institutionalization, a strong linking of the pro bono resource 
with the ideology of the poverty law movement and the broader political effort to eradicate 
poverty.238 
 
This linking of the pro bono resource with the political agenda to eradicate poverty - or its legal 
equivalent: to close the justice gap – would be further consolidated during the second period 
of pro bono institutionalization, between the 1980s and early 2000. Again, background political 
developments and debates would play a decisive role in giving political direction and 
ideological form to the pro bono resource.  
 
Cummings, for example, suggests that: 
 
“the story of pro bono's institutionalization is […] bound up in the broader political 
movement away from the state as the locus of large-scale social service programs-a 
trend symbolized in the reaction against the welfare state apparent in President Ronald 
Reagan's commitment to shrinking "big government" in the 1980s and President Bill 
Clinton's sweeping welfare reform in 1996”.239  
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Cummings details how, already in the mid-1970s, under the Nixon administration, steps were 
taken to curb the activities and reduce the funding of the federal legal services program. As 
federal legal services continued to decline both in terms of its funding and its scope of activities 
under the Reagan and Bush administrations, as the politics moved away from the welfare state 
ideal towards increased emphasis on private volunteerism, pro bono gradually began to be seen 
by the legal profession (and most notably the American Bar Association) “as a supplement to 
the beleaguered legal services program”.240 What is interesting, however, is how the ABA and 
the private bar sought to define pro bono and orient this resource in direct contrast to the ideal 
of the public interest lawyer (or the “cause lawyer”, in the way that the term is used in the 
literature).  
 
Cummings details how, in large part, the aggressive stance of Republican lawmakers and 
administrations towards the legal services program was in fact a backlash triggered by the more 
activist and law reform oriented work carried out by some funding recipients under the program 
(in particular, aggressive legal strategies including impact litigation and lobbying targeted at 
government agencies and businesses).241 Cummings further suggests that the “organized bar 
was never completely comfortable with the notion of law reform and the challenge it posed to 
professionalism.”242 Consequently, as pro bono emerged as one possible response to the 
decimation of the legal services program, the ABA seized the chance to define pro bono 
narrowly, in a manner consistent with conventional professional service norms. For the ABA, 
this killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, it allowed the organized bar to put forward pro 
bono as a response to calls for greater private volunteerism, and so, to reassert the public service 
commitment of the legal profession. Secondly, it allowed the organized bar to redefine public 
service away from more “transgressive” models of public interest lawyering, and towards a 
more conservative model, with which it was much more comfortable.243  Pro bono was 
increasingly defined as “a commitment by private-sector attorneys to themselves engage in 
direct representation to discharge their service obligations.”244 Accordingly, throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the organized bar “invested heavily” into institutionalizing a specific model 
of pro bono, a model that construed pro bono functionally as a solution to the justice gap created 
by limited federal spending on civil legal aid. To this end, the ABA introduced a model rule in 
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1993 that established an aspirational target of 50 hours and narrowed the definition of pro bono 
to provide that each lawyer “should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico 
legal services per year," a "substantial majority" of which targeted to "persons of limited 
means" or organizations that advocate on their behalf.245 Moreover, the organized bar became 
involved in funding non-profit legal services organizations and corralling them into 
collaboration with private law firms and promoting volunteerism within those law firms, where 
volunteerism meant providing legal services directly to low-income individuals. This 
discourse, and this vision, set the course for the second major period of institutionalization of 
pro bono within large US law firms. As noted above, even to this day, the large bulk of pro 
bono work carried out by large law firms in the US involves the provision of legal services 
directly to low-income individuals.246 Writing in 2009, Abel reflected that, “[t]he original OEO 
Legal Services Program gave equal emphasis to serving individual clients, law reform (impact 
cases), and community organizing. By contrast, the highest priority of pro bono programs is 
individual legal service.”247 
 
Scholars within the US pro bono literature reinforce point. The literature tends to normatively 
and empirically orient pro bono towards the justice gap. The first significant edited volume on 
pro bono in the mid-1990s “The Law Firm and the Public Good”, is a great example in this 
respect.248 While there was some disagreement amongst the authors about what kinds of 
activities constituted pro bono, there was remarkable agreement that focus should be placed 
primarily on the provision of legal services to those who could not otherwise afford them, a 
proposition that even reviewers of the volume shared.249  Subsequent authors have embraced 
the same normative position. Many scholars, in writing about pro bono, embrace the ABA 
definition, which as noted just above, directed pro bono functionally towards the provision of 
pro bono services to low-income clients or organizations that supported such individuals.250 
Consequently, there is a shared understanding that providing civil legal aid is the raison d'etre 
of pro bono. Justus, writing in 2003 argues: 
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“The compelling need for pro bono legal services from the private bar cannot be 
understated. Studies routinely report that eighty percent of the civil legal needs of the 
poor are not presently met. Furthermore, funding for traditional sources of free legal 
services, including legal aid organizations, is increasingly under attack. As one of the 
largest employers of lawyers in the country, the private bar needs to become fully 
engaged in assuring access to justice for all citizens.”251 
 
Cummings, writing in 2004 suggests that: “[b]y forging new relationships between public and 
private actors, the advent of institutionalized pro bono holds out the promise of a "Third Way" 
solution to the dilemma of equal access to justice.”252 Empirically, Cummings suggests:  
 
“Pro bono has thus emerged as the dominant means of dispensing free representation 
to poor and underserved clients, eclipsing state-sponsored legal services and other 
nongovernmental mechanisms in importance.”253 
 
Rhode, writing in 2008 rues that: 
 
“It is a shameful irony that the country with the world's highest concentration of lawyers 
has done so little to make legal assistance available to low-income individuals who 
need it most […] Lawyers, both individually and collectively, have a responsibility for 
the quality of justice that implies a responsibility for effective pro bono assistance.”254  
 
Mandell, writing in 2010, pleads that: 
 
“In order to serve low-income individuals in large numbers, the bar association must 
work with pro bono law firms to mobilize volunteer attorneys to assist with one-time 
events, such as a legal line or clinic work in addition to ongoing representation. 
Strategies must be deployed to encourage law firms, regardless of size, and 
corporations, regardless of concentration, to give back and assist. If these groups 
participate at a high level, true community change is possible.”255  
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Roberts, writing in 2014, argues that: 
 
“The civil legal assistance system in the United States is inadequate in providing low-
income individuals […] access to representation. As a partial solution to make lawyers 
more accessible to the poor, public and private employers should develop more robust 
pro bono services.”256  
 
While there are a handful of examples of alternative views on the possible utility and 
orientation of law firm pro bono,257 there is clearly a strong normative and empirical linking of 
pro bono with civil legal aid.  
 
What is apparent from all of the above, is the importance of the local context (historical and 
political) in determining how the pro bono resource is oriented. Intermediary organizations, 
recruitment considerations, progressive legal movements, the organized Bar and legal aid 
providers may all influence how Big Law Pro Bono is deployed, to which ends this resource is 
directed. One might expect therefore, that where Big Law Pro Bono is transplanted to a new 
region or jurisdiction, these factors may equally play a role in determining how this resource 
is deployed and we should not necessarily expect that the results would be the same as in the 
United States.  
 
4! Conclusion   
 
As set out in the introduction, the central objective of this thesis is to explore whether “Big 
Law Pro Bono” contributes to access to justice in Europe and whether normatively, it could. 
The core argument is that Big Law Pro Bono, as a practice and institution, has taken a unique 
shape in Europe, that is distinctly different from the shape of its US predecessor. As such, large 
law firm pro bono in Europe does not contribute to access to justice in Europe as this has been 
classically understood in the literature. And to fully perceive the way in which Big Law Pro 
Bono, as a resource, has been deployed in Europe, we need to adopt a much broader and more 
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nuanced definition of access to justice. This argument will be more fully explored in the next 
chapter.  
 
In this chapter, we have established four crucial points. Firstly, we have established that Big 
Law Pro Bono can trace its origins to the United States and to progressive legal movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s. As such, it must be understood as a fundamentally American construct.  
Secondly, we have established that the literature on Big Law Pro Bono arose from the literature 
on the US public interest law movement and the broader literature on public interest law and 
cause lawyering which flowed from that. As a consequence, and due to the fact that Big Law 
Pro Bono has developed in the US, the existing literature on Big Law Pro Bono is primarily 
oriented towards the US context. Commencing from such literature, this thesis sits theoretically 
within the public interest law body of literature (particularly the recent revival of this research 
and its focus on the globalization of public interest law) rather than within the cause lawyering 
literature and consequently, is more concerned with practices, processes, organizational 
relationships and institutions than with questions of subjective meaning, identity and ideology.  
 
Thirdly, we have established that the existing (praxis-oriented) literature on Big Law Pro Bono 
largely revolves around a number of key themes including the causes and origins of pro bono, 
the internal organization and structure of pro bono, law firm rationales for pro bono, the actors 
and roles within the pro bono universe, including pro bono clients and problems or issues with 
pro bono as a means of effectively delivering legal services to clients. The themes to be 
explored in this thesis relate to some of the central gaps in the existing literature on pro bono, 
which have been set out above. One of the most significant gaps in the literature, for the purpose 
of this thesis, relates to the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono as an institutionalized set of 
practice and functional roles (meaning how Big Law Pro Bono is being transported and 
practiced beyond the US). We have suggested that whereas certain features of Big Law Pro 
Bono are likely to be context transcending and present in any region or jurisdiction where Big 
Law Pro Bono is deployed, others are likely to be more context-specific and variable depending 
upon the specific location. Whether a feature falls into the former or the latter category likely 
depends upon whether that feature flows from the logic of Big Law itself (such as the 
preferences of multinational corporate clients) or from the logic of the local legal market (such 
as local Bar regulations or the prevailing system for the provision of legal services to the poor).    
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Finally, we have also argued that Big Law Pro Bono, unlike other forms of progressive 
lawyering is ideologically indeterminate. Moreover, an exploration of how Big Law Pro Bono 
was institutionalized in the US between the 1970s and the early 2000s has revealed that Big 
Law Pro Bono may also be historically and politically contingent. There are a number of 
consequences and implications of these findings. Firstly, just because Big Law Pro Bono took 
a certain shape in the United States and was oriented functionally towards the provision of civil 
legal aid, we cannot take for granted, without further exploration, that it would take the same 
shape when transplanted beyond the United States. Secondly, the shape that Big Law Pro Bono 
has taken in the US, has influenced the orientation of the literature which empirically and 
normatively conceives of Big Law Pro Bono as a solution to the justice gap (meaning civil 
legal aid). This presents further gaps in the existing literature, in terms of exploring how else 
Big Law Pro Bono is and might be constructed, i.e. which ends it might serve, beyond 
providing civil legal aid.  
 
Now a question arises: if Big Law Pro Bono is not conceived of as ideologically oriented 
towards promoting access to justice (construed narrowly), what other ends might it serve? 
However, before we can address this question we must set the parameters for the exploration, 
both analytically and methodologically. Put simply, we need to address two essential questions 
in this thesis: what do I mean by “access to justice” and what do I mean by “Big Law Pro 
Bono”? These questions will be addressed in the following chapter where I will also set out the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 ! Revisiting Access to Justice and Big 
Law Pro Bono: Analysis and Method 
 
In the Introduction and in the previous chapter, I presented the central objective of this thesis, 
which is to explore the emergence of a unique variant of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, not 
focused on individual legal assistance to low income clients, akin to the model of Big Law Pro 
Bono that has been institutionalized in the United States, but rather, on providing technical and 
policy assistance to transnational human rights and European policy NGOs. The thesis must 
now map the contours and institutionalization of this variant of Big Law Pro Bono, explain 
why it has emerged and investigate the extent to which it contributes to access to justice in 
Europe. However, before I do so, I must first briefly explore the meanings of access to justice 
and Big Law Pro Bono that will be embraced in this thesis.  
 
The objective in this second chapter, therefore, is to further prepare the ground before I can 
begin in earnest with an empirical investigation of the European variant of Big Law Pro Bono. 
Precisely, this will involve three separate tasks. Firstly, I must develop a new definition of 
“access to justice” (Section 1). The definitions of access to justice in the pro bono literature are 
often quite narrow, typically referring only to access to lawyers or legal services for low income 
individuals. For the purpose of this thesis, I would like to embrace a much broader definition, 
which will provide an analytical framework to facilitate the analysis and evaluation of atypical 
models of Big Law Pro Bono that have been less well explored in the literature. Secondly, I 
must develop a broader definition of “pro bono” in general, and “Big Law Pro Bono” in 
particular, so that we can more effectively locate and identify various atypical and less well 
explored kinds of Big Law Pro Bono work that are currently being conducted in Europe 
(Section 2). Finally, I must briefly set out the methodological approach to research in this thesis 
(Section 3). 
 
All that follows, then, will help to further prepare the ground and enable me, in the following 
chapter, to begin exploring the antecedents to Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, i.e. pre-existing 
models of social justice lawyering and the broader historical and legal background context into 
which Big Law Pro Bono was transplanted, and against which it is taking shape in Europe.   
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1! What is Access to Justice?  
 
Before I begin with the task at hand however, it is important to recall a few key points that 
were established in the first chapter. Firstly, it is important to remind ourselves of the fact that 
Big Law Pro Bono (rather than merely “pro bono” – meaning lawyers acting outside of the Big 
Law setting providing free legal services), traces its origins to the United States and to 
progressive legal movements of the 1960s and 1970s and as such, must be understood as a 
fundamentally American construct. Secondly, and most crucially for this chapter, we must 
recall that the literature on Big Law Pro Bono has emerged from the literature on the US public 
interest law movement and the broader literature on public interest law and cause lawyering 
which flowed from that. The consequence of this is that the existing literature on Big Law Pro 
Bono is primarily oriented towards the US context, which presents some limitations when 
seeking to build on this literature to explore Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. In what follows 
then, the objective is to identify the limitations with the US literature on Big Law Pro Bono, 
specifically in terms of how this literature conceives of “access to justice”.  
 
Typically, when US lawyers and legal academics talk of access to justice, they are talking about 
ensuring that individuals (regardless of financial status) can effectively and meaningfully 
access and participate in the legal system.258 In the literature on pro bono, as explored in the 
previous chapter, “access to justice” has been understood quite narrowly, along these lines. 
Justus, for instance, in a characteristic example, writes:  
 
“The compelling need for pro bono legal services from the private bar cannot be 
understated. Studies routinely report that eighty percent of the civil legal needs of the 
poor are not presently met. Furthermore, funding for traditional sources of free legal 
services, including legal aid organizations, is increasingly under attack. As one of the 
largest employers of lawyers in the country, the private bar needs to become fully 
engaged in assuring access to justice for all citizens. Law firms are in a unique position 
that allows them to draw on their expertise and extensive resources to help meet the 
legal needs of the indigent.”259  
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In this passage, Justus essentially conflates access to justice with civil legal aid (and the legal 
needs of the poor more broadly), something not uncommon in the pro bono literature.260 
Indeed, access to justice is typically understood to be an objective that can be measured in 
terms of “more lawyers for poor and underrepresented groups.”261 Even where scholars imply, 
by access to justice, not merely the access of the poor to greater numbers of lawyers, they refer 
to the access of the poor to the legal processes and legal remedies. For example, Burke and 
colleagues write: 
 
“Other opponents of mandatory pro bono suggest that instead of merely increasing the 
indigent population's access to attorneys, perhaps efforts should concentrate on 
increasing their access to justice. Reforms which streamline matrimonial and housing 
courts, thus allowing indigents to appear pro se effectively, which provide more options 
for alternative dispute resolution, and which allow paralegals to assume a more active 
role in the provision of legal services, might be a more effective means for achieving 
the goal of equal access to justice.”262  
 
The underlying assumption is that “social justice is available through procedural justice”.263 
As explored in Chapter 1, the linking of access to justice with legal aid for the poor and 
underserved (civil legal aid in particular) in the US literature on pro bono is a consequence of 
the broader political and legal context within which discussions on pro bono and legal aid have 
taken place in the US. Boutcher, for example writes: 
 
“President Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” […] shifted pro bono from a form of noblesse 
oblige to a focus on “access to justice”— targeting direct legal services for the poor 
through the mobilization of government and legal services lawyers.”264  
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Indeed, access to justice (understood as the provision of legal aid to the poor) emerged as a 
topic of discourse among the American legal profession between the 1960s and the 1990s 
during the rise and fall of the US civil legal aid system.  In 1965, the US Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) established the Legal Services Program. This expanded annual civil legal 
aid spending from under $5 million to more than $300 million within a fifteen-year period.265 
Meanwhile, decisions of the US Supreme Court in 1963 and 1972 provided indigent persons 
accused of crimes a right to free representation.266 The mandate of the OEO Legal Services 
program was originally much broader than simply securing access to justice, construed 
narrowly as access to lawyers, legal services and legal processes and remedies. The founders 
of the program construed the objectives as securing substantive antipoverty goals (i.e. a justice 
through law and beyond law in the way that social and economic goods were distributed in 
American society).267 The first President of the OEO Legal Services Program, Clinton 
Bamberger, described the objective as "contribut[ing] to the War on Poverty" and 
"marshall[ing] the forces of law and the strength of lawyers to combat the causes and effect of 
poverty [and to] remodel the system which generates the cycle of poverty and design new 
social, legal and political tools and vehicles to move poor people from deprivation, depression 
and despair to opportunity, hope and ambition."268 It was hoped that this could be achieved 
through law reform work such as impact litigation, and grantees under the program were 
evaluated on the basis of such work.269 Nevertheless, a great deal of the spending also went to 
more conventional legal aid work which, by the time of the Carter administration, had 
succeeded the law reform objectives to become the primary mandate of the, by then renamed, 
Legal Services Corporation.270 However, in subsequent years, there has been virtually a 
complete rollback of civil legal aid spending in the United States. This, as a consequence of 
conservative political backlash against the early activist law reform work.271 By the mid-1990s, 
successive Republic administrations and the US Congress had effectively wiped out the civil 
legal aid program, reducing funding to the lowest levels in the history of the program. Rhode, 
writing in 2004, lamented:  
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“Unlike most industrialized nations, the United States recognizes no right to legal 
assistance for civil matters […] The federal government, which provides about two-
thirds of the funding for civil legal aid, now spends only about $8 per year for those 
living in poverty. Less than 1 percent of the nation’s total expenditure on lawyers goes 
to help the seventh of the population that is poor enough to qualify.”272  
 
The decimation of civil legal aid between the mid 1970s and the 1990s gave rise to a broader 
conversation on the legal left about access to justice and even a “right-to-counsel movement” 
among those promoting access to justice.273 As touched upon in Chapter 1, among access to 
justice advocates and the organized bar, pro bono increasingly began to be viewed as a 
replacement for the emaciated civil legal aid system and today represents around a third or a 
quarter of the civil legal aid available in the United States.274 Against this backdrop, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that access to justice has been defined narrowly, as the provision of free 
(civil) legal services to low income individuals in the pro bono literature (which, not by 
coincidence, only emerged in earnest in the mid 1990s, just as the civil legal aid system had 
been virtually wiped out).   
 
However, if we look to the cause lawyering strand of the literature and the broader literature 
on access to justice, we can find criticisms of such procedurally oriented definitions of access 
to justice. For example, Sarat warns of exaggerated focus on, “ease of entry to legal institutions, 
rather than the nature of the justice they provide”.275 This would suggest the inclusion of 
substantive as well as procedural goals into any definition of access to justice. If we look 
beyond the US literature, to comparative literature on legal aid, for example, we can find 
slightly broader definitions along these lines (i.e. incorporating substantive as well as 
procedural goals). For example, Cappelletti and Garth define access to justice in the following 
terms: 
 
“First, the system must be equally accessible to all; second, it must lead to results that 
are individually and socially just.”276  
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This implies a justice not just in access, but also in outcomes. However, for some critics, even 
this might not be sufficient. From this vantage point, access to justice efforts must look beyond 
the legal system and the outcomes that it can produce and must have the aim to “reduce the 
unequal distribution of advantages in society.”277 This suggests a redistributive agenda that 
would require looking beyond the legal system to the reallocation of resources in society more 
broadly.  
 
Ultimately, such criticisms present a significant challenge for US pro bono scholars and pro 
bono advocates. The US pro bono project (both the professional project and the academic 
project) has been closely bound up with the access to justice movement. This has been a 
consequence of the historical and political background context against which the pro bono 
project has taken shape (as explored in the previous Chapter and above). In doing so, it has 
embraced a narrow definition of access to justice. As Boutcher suggests, the consequences of 
this are that much of the literature (and pro bono advocates) “imagines a functionalist world in 
which inequality in the legal system can be alleviated if only pro bono resources are increased 
or better channeled to the right places.”278 He continues, “[a]ccordingly, much of the research 
on pro bono tends to focus on how much time is donated to pro bono by individual lawyers and 
law firms, or the “supply” side of the pro bono system.”279 There are certainly limitations to 
embracing this narrow definition of access to justice. For example, it means that the literature 
to date does not evaluate pro bono empirically or normatively beyond the provision of civil 
legal aid. 
 
It would be useful here to return briefly to the discussion, in Chapter 1, on the pro bono 
literature and the cause lawyering literature. The objectives of cause lawyering have been 
variously described as “to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, 
and/or legal values and resources”280 and “altering some aspect of the social, economic and 
political status quo”281. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1, cause lawyering has been explicitly 
defined in contrast to so-called “conventional lawyering” (of which pro bono is said to be an 
                                                
277 Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, “Emergence and Transformation of Disputes,” 637. 
278 Boutcher, “Lawyering for social change,” 191. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the State, 13. 
281 Sarat and Scheingold, Cause Lawyering, 4. 
 83 
example).282 Meanwhile, the objectives of public interest law have been described as “to 
provide legal representation to interests that historically have been unrepresented and 
underrepresented in the legal process”283, “to promote either substantive or procedural systemic 
goals”284 and, more recently, to “advance the interests and causes of constituencies that are 
disadvantaged in the private market or the political process relative to more powerful social 
actors”.285  While it is worth noting that public interest law, as both a scholarly and practical 
enterprise, has often been criticized for being overly concerned with procedural justice,286 over 
time, the broad objectives that have been attributed to public interest law have included both 
procedural (related to accessing the legal system) and substantive elements (related to the 
nature of justice provided by the legal system). In this vein, Cummings has distinguished 
helpfully between the “access” dimension of public interest law and the “policy” dimension.287 
The access dimension relates to market-based inequality in the access of legal services and 
orients public interest law towards “providing no-cost or low-cost services to expand the entry 
of the poor into the legal system on an individual, case-by-case basis”.288 This is essentially 
equivalent to the definition of access to justice embraced within the pro bono literature, 
although not limited to civil justice. Meanwhile, the policy dimension relates to political 
inequality or “structural disadvantage” and obstacles or hindrances that prevent certain groups 
from “advancing collective interests through political channels”.289 The policy dimension 
orients public interest law towards impact litigation and law reform work.290 Indeed, the early 
legal practices from which the public interest law and poverty law movements originally 
emerged (in particular the legal campaigns of the NAACP and the likes of Charles Hamilton 
Houston and Thurgood Marshall) clearly had a strong orientation to towards what Cummings 
has framed as the policy dimension of public interest law i.e. systemic change, norm change, 
altering the status quo. Hamilton Houston described his objectives in terms of using the law 
“to force reforms where they could have no chance through politics” and “to use …the law as 
an instrument available to [the] minority unable to adopt direct action to achieve its place in 
the community and the nation”.291  Clearly such aspirations go well beyond merely providing 
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access to the legal system and seem to anticipate social and political reform, perhaps even a 
reorganization of the social fabric and a redistribution of resources such as power and social 
and political capital.  Similarly, as noted just above, the early objectives of the poverty law 
movement, as expressed by Clinton Bamberger, also went well beyond merely providing for a 
procedural justice and called for systemic change, using law to tackle the root causes of 
poverty.  
 
When viewed in light of the broader literature and the ideological framing of public interest 
law or cause lawyering, the normative agenda established by academics and practitioners for 
pro bono appears limited. For my purposes in this thesis, I believe it would be more productive 
to tap into the broader public interest law literature and literature on the meaning of justice and 
fashion a richer definition of access to justice that responds to some of the criticisms and 
limitations identified above and allows me to make a wider assessment of the (possible) 
contribution of large firm pro bono to access to justice in Europe, perhaps capturing some of 
the subtler contributions and possibilities that would be missed if I were to rely on the narrow 
definition employed throughout much of the pro bono literature. This broader definition will 
ultimately provide me with an analytical framework to explore and evaluate the model of Big 
Law Pro Bono that has developed in Europe which, as previously indicated, varies somewhat 
from the US model.    
 
Before we examine the definition, I would like to set out some of my working assumptions in 
all that follows. To recap, one of my core research questions is, “to what extent could Big Law 
Pro Bono contribute towards access to justice in Europe?”. Given the focus on Europe and the 
fact that most of the countries in which Big Law Pro Bono has been deployed in Europe to date 
have broadly (at least at the normative level) aspired towards liberal constitutional 
democracies, I am relying on an underlying notion of ‘justice’ (i.e. the norm to which people 
ought to have access) that is compatible with such political systems and the various norms that 
underpin them. As such, in all that follows, it should be noted that I take for granted a broadly 
distributive, relational and ideal notion of ‘justice’. On the one hand, I perceive justice as an 
on-going requirement for fairness and equality between individuals relative to one another in 
the processes constitutive of the administration of justice and the outcomes of those processes. 
On the other hand, I also take for granted that beyond the administration of justice, the norm 
‘justice’ also implies fairness in the distribution of economic resources and social and cultural 
capital. Moreover, I take for granted that, as Rawls put it, justice is “the first virtue of social 
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institutions”.292 Accordingly, I take for granted that justice is a matter of obligation for the 
institutions involved in the administration of justice.  
 
In elaborating my definitions, I make heavy, virtually exclusive, reliance on the American 
political philosopher, John Rawls. Given my objective of getting away from the US-oriented 
definition of access to justice that has been embraced in the pro bono literature,  this may seem 
an odd choice and needs some explaining. Primarily, I have chosen to rely on Rawls for three 
reasons. Firstly, because I believe that the philosophy of Rawls provides a comprehensive 
understanding of justice that incorporates the definitions embraced in the pro bono literature 
while also being broad enough to respond to the criticisms of such definitions discussed above. 
Secondly, because I believe that Rawls’ conception of justice also neatly captures many 
intuitive notions of justice that can be found in public and popular discourse (from the US and 
beyond) and I wish to develop a definition that builds out from such intuitive notions of justice. 
This because I believe that if Big Law Pro Bono is ultimately to be sustainable in Europe (or 
elsewhere), it must be judged in terms that are not overly technical or legalistic, but in terms 
that an average citizen can understand. Thirdly, Rawls’ conception of justice is incredibly rich 
and sophisticated, beyond what is necessary for my purposes, and consequently I believe that 
to rely exclusively on Rawls will be entirely sufficient and avoid unnecessary further 
complication in developing my analytical framework.  
 
To begin with this task - defining access to justice - we might start by exploring the basic 
meanings of some of the key terms:293 
 
•! Access: a way of entering or reaching a place; permission, liberty, or ability to enter, 
approach, or pass to and from a place or to approach or communicate with a person or 
thing; freedom or ability to obtain or make use of something; a chance or right to have 
something; permission (legal or official) to have something. 
•! Justice:  the fair treatment of people; the quality of being fair or reasonable; the quality 
of being just, impartial, or fair; the quality of conforming to law; the law and the way 
it is used or the administration of law; the maintenance or administration of what is just, 
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especially by the impartial adjustment of conflicting claims or the assignment of 
merited rewards or punishments. 
•! Law: an official rule of a country or state that says what people may or may not do; a 
binding custom or practice of a community; a rule of conduct or action prescribed or 
formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority; the whole body 
of such customs, practices or rules; all the laws in a country or state.  
 
Justice may refer either to a norm which is an abstract quality or a standard of treatment (with 
notions of fairness, impartiality, consistency, predictability and reasonableness) or to the 
socially constructed processes for resolving disputes, determining the customs, practices or 
rules within a given defined community (by reference to such a norm) and enforcing such 
customs. Meanwhile access refers to the freedom, ability or rights of people to make use of 
something.  
 
Access to justice then, can be understood as the freedom, ability or right of people to: a) make 
use of the socially constructed processes in a given community for defining and enforcing the 
rules and resolving disputes and conflicting claims; and b) be treated in a way that conforms to 
a norm of fairness, impartiality, reasonableness, in the context of the aforementioned processes.  
 
That is to say that access to justice refers to both the accessibility of the processes (for 
rulemaking, rule enforcement and conflict resolution) and the accessibility of the norm itself 
(both within the context of the aforementioned processes and within society more broadly).    
 
From this interpretive exercise, we can identify a “narrow” definition of access to justice and 
a “wide” definition.  
 
The narrow definition, which is the closest to how the term has been defined in the pro bono 
literature to-date, revolves simply around the formal and substantive accessibility of the 
processes for administering justice (rulemaking, rule enforcement and conflict resolution) to 
persons who are subject to that justice. Here we might think of the access of individuals to the 
courts and other more or less institutionalized forms of conflict resolution (and to legal advice 
and representation by extension), to the legislative process (also by proxy through the electoral 
process) and to the systems of law enforcement (and the negative and positive protections 
afforded to individuals through those systems). This definition ties in with what Cummings has 
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described as the “access” dimension of public interest law insofar as it is concerned chiefly 
with addressing inequalities in the access to the legal system and legal services.  
 
Meanwhile the wide definition implies not only access to these processes but that the treatment 
of individuals having accessed these processes and the outcomes they receive must conform to 
a certain normative standard (fairness, impartiality, consistency, predictability and 
reasonableness). Here we refer to access to the norm, within the context of the processes for 
administering justice. This definition embrace what Cummings has referred to as the “policy” 
dimension of public interest law, insofar as it is concerned with structural and systemic 
disadvantages that result in injustice.  
 
Before we probe these definitions, a further point to note is that when I discuss ‘outcomes that 
may tend to increase access to justice’ below, I am anticipating that such outcomes may be 
instigated or provoked by any members of a relevant political community who are subject to 
the administration of justice in that community. However, due to the overall focus of this 
research, I have in mind primarily outcomes that can be provoked by actors directly and 
indirectly involved in the administration of justice and in particular, rule makers, law enforcers, 
decision takers, and especially, the legal profession and civil society. 
 
Finally, it should also be clear that the definitions explored below are overlapping and are not 
to be construed as entirely severable from one another. We can now explore, in a little more 
detail, these definitions of access to justice in turn.  
 
1.1! The narrow and “PBL” definitions of access to justice: no access, no justice 
 
"Curia pauperibus clausa est" [The courts are closed to the poor] 
  
– Ovid (Roman poet)294 
 
"Si la justice ne se vend pas, elle coûte cher, et il faut être bien riche pour obtenir 
gain de cause."  
 
                                                
294 Quoted in: Cappelletti, “Legal Aid,” 347. 
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– Stanisław Leszczyński (King of Poland)295   
 
 “There never will be complete equality until women themselves help to make laws 
and elect lawmakers.”  
 
 – Susan B. Anthony (Social reformer, suffragette and women’s rights 
campaigner)296 
 
These quotes illustrate the intuitive sense of access to justice (or rather the lack thereof) I refer 
to with the ‘narrow definition’. In the manner in which I understand it, the narrow definition 
of access to justice is purely about formal and substantive accessibility in a structural sense 
(relative to given procedures). The definition merely describes a structural position inhabited 
by a relevant individual (or individuals) or a legal entity, relative to certain procedures. Here, 
the norm ‘justice’ (fairness, impartiality, reasonableness) is implicated only insofar as it relates 
directly to the question of the formal or substantive accessibility of the processes (i.e. can 
individuals fairly and impartially access the conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule 
enforcement processes?). The quotes above all suggest that, where there is no equal access to 
the processes of justice, there can be no justice. On this definition, the central question is not: 
are the processes just? And by extension: what is justice (fairness, impartiality, 
reasonableness)? Rather, the central question is: what structural impediments exist that render 
it difficult or impossible for individuals to access the conflict resolution, rulemaking or rule 
enforcement processes? Of course, the two questions are not hermetically sealed off from one 
another. But one is primarily focused on access to certain processes and the other on access to 
a norm (justice) as manifest in various processes and the outcomes thereof. See a depiction of 
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Barriers to access to justice, defined in this way, would include any structural impediment that 
renders it difficult or impossible for an individual within a relevant political community to 
formally or substantively access the conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule enforcement 
processes in that community. This could be anything from laws prohibiting certain segments 
of a community to pursue legal remedy, retain a lawyer or to vote, to the prohibitive cost of 
retaining a lawyer or going to court or the lack of accommodations made for persons with 
disabilities, migrants or children in accessing legal institutions. Importantly though, a 
contribution towards improving access to justice, defined in this way, is focused primarily on 
the structural barrier and not on an individual’s treatment having accessed and made use of the 
relevant processes or her experience in participating in the administration of justice (i.e. the 
process, beyond accessibility, and the outcomes). That is to say that it is focused primarily on 
removing formal and substantive barriers to the processes of justice (making the process more 
accessible).  
 
Concrete examples of outcomes that may tend to increase access to justice (defined narrowly) 
would include:  
 
•! The provision of information, advice or representation to individuals who would 
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•! The provision of resources (information/education or funds) to individuals (e.g. 
migrants) that would better equip them to understand their rights and obligations with 
respect to the processes for administering justice. 
•! The introduction of a law requiring that all individuals have access to legal 
representation in criminal or civil proceedings; 
•! The removal of a legal prohibition on certain groups of individuals from voting in 
elections; or 
•! The introduction of a requirement for reasonable accommodations for physically or 
intellectually disabled persons wishing to take advantage of their right to vote (e.g. 
online voting, assisted voting or wheelchair accessible polling stations). 
 
In terms of actions that can be taken to provoke such outcomes, these might be divided into 
actions for individuals (e.g. directly assisting an individual client by providing her with legal 
advice), and actions on behalf of individuals or groups (e.g. advocating for a law that would 
require the provision of legal advice to low-income individuals).      
 
They might also be divided into direct actions (that remove the relevant barrier itself) e.g. 
providing legal information, advice or representation to an individual who otherwise would not 
be able to effectively participate in the judicial process, or removing a law prohibiting certain 
individuals from voting. Or, such actions might be indirect (contributing or likely to contribute 
to the removal of the barrier) e.g. advocating or lobbying for a law that would require that all 
individuals have access to legal representation in criminal or civil proceedings. 
 
We might further categorize them by saying that all such actions are internal to the processes 
of justice rather than external. This is to say that they all work within, and accept the legitimacy 
of, the existing processes and the norms that underpin them. Such actions may change rules 
and practices but will not immediately change the underlying norms upon which such rules and 
practices are based.  
 
The most truncated definition of access to justice, and the way in which the term is typically 
construed in the pro bono literature, is direct and internal actions for individual clients. That is 
to say, providing individual clients with assistance that directly enables them to participate in 
the existing processes that constitute the administration of justice. I will refer to this as the 
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“PBL Definition” (or pro bono literature definition) of access to justice, as a subset of the 
narrow definition. Insofar as pro bono (and Big Law Pro Bono, in particular) contributes to 
access to justice in the US by constituting a “significant part of [America’s] civil legal aid 
structure, accounting for between one-quarter and one-third of full-time equivalent lawyer 
staff”,297 it does so within the PBL definition and the narrow definition. This also implies, as 
discussed above, that insofar as the existing pro bono literature has explored the extent to which 
Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice, it has done so mainly with respect to the 
PBL definition and the narrow definition.  
 
1.2!  The wide definition of access to justice: whose justice? 
 
“Kleine Diebe hängt man, große läßt man laufen.” 
 
  – German Proverb298 
 
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” 
 
 – Anatole France (French poet, journalist, and novelist)299 
 
“Is there no danger that an African accused may regard the courts not as impartial 
tribunals, dispensing justice without fear or favour, but as instruments used by the white 
man to punish those amongst us who clamour for deliverance from the fiery furnace of 
white rule. I have grave fears that this system of justice may enable the guilty to drag 
the innocent before the courts. It enables the unjust to prosecute and demand vengeance 
against the just. It may tend to lower the standards of fairness and justice applied in 
the country's courts by white judicial officers to black litigants. This is the first ground 
for this application: that I will not receive a fair and proper trial.” 
 
– Nelson Mandela (South African anti-apartheid activist and political leader)300 
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"If one really wishes to know how justice is administered in a country, one does not 
question the policemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of the middle 
class. One goes to the unprotected--those, precisely, who need the law's protection 
most! --and listens to their testimony.”      
 
– James Baldwin (American novelist and social activist)301 
 
The wide definition of access to justice, illustrated by the above quotes (which all beg the 
question: whose justice?), goes beyond the question of formal and substantive access to the 
processes that define the administration of justice, to look at the standard of treatment that an 
individual (or individuals) receive/s having accessed and participated in those processes. Like 
the narrow definition, this definition also describes a structural position of an individual (or 
group of individuals), but here, the structural position is relative to the norm in the given 
context. Here we are talking about access to the norm (‘justice’: fairness, impartiality, 
reasonableness) within the context of the conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule enforcement 
processes as discerned from the fairness of those processes (beyond the question of 
accessibility) and the fairness of the outcomes of those processes. Consequently, this requires 
us to look not just at access to the processes, but at the processes themselves and the norm 
‘justice’ for the sake of which they operate. The central question is: is the administration of 
justice fair, consistent, impartial, reasonable (and by extension: what is justice: fairness, 
impartiality, reasonableness)? Put another way, “Does it make sense to talk about access to 
justice if the justice that is made accessible is not worth obtaining?”.302  
 
Barriers to access to justice, defined in this way, will be systemic or structural defects inherent 
in the norm (justice) for the sake of which the institutionalized rulemaking, rule enforcement 
and conflict resolution processes operate. Any defects in the norm will manifest also in the 
processes. Such defects will structurally prevent these processes from delivering justice to 
individuals (or groups of individuals) who engage with them. Such barriers could include, for 
example, systemic racism, sexism, classism, political bias, authoritarianism or corruption in 
the rulemaking, rule enforcement or conflict resolution processes. Such barriers would, for 
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example, systematically prevent (certain) individuals from being treated fairly, impartially and 
reasonably within the institutionalized processes for the administration of justice.  
 
Crucially, any contribution towards access to justice, defined in this way, requires more than 
increasing access to the rules and practices related to the administration of justice; it requires 
the transformation of those processes and, by extension, the transformation of the norm itself 
(as it operates in the institutionalized rulemaking, rule enforcement and conflict resolution 
processes). Norm change may happen in tandem with changes to rules and practices; it may be 
anticipated by changes to rules and practices or may require such changes. However, changes 
to the norm and changes to the processes, although heavily intertwined, are separable. (N.B. I 
am taking for granted here that, in reality, the processes of the administration of justice cannot 
guarantee what Rawls would call a ‘perfect procedural justice’, i.e. procedures such that, if 
perfectly followed, would guarantee a just outcome.)303 An example may suffice to clarify all 
of the above. Let us imagine that community X is made of two groups: the monied elites and 
the underprivileged poor. Let us further imagine that the rulemaking process in community X 
is beset with systemic corruption such that the process is effectively captive to the interests of 
the monied elites. To improve access to justice in community X it will not be sufficient to 
increase the formal or even substantive access of the underprivileged poor to the rulemaking 
process (e.g. by introducing a requirement for the legislature to consult with the 
underprivileged poor, or their representatives). This would improve their access to the process 
which may help significantly, at least in improving and equalizing flows of information to the 
legislature, but so long as the process remains corrupt (e.g. rule makers continue to take bribes), 
it will continue, at least some of the time, to produce corrupted outcomes that favor the monied 
elites. Even where the underprivileged and the elites have both formal and substantive parity 
in access to the rulemaking process, or where the underprivileged have greater access, so long 
as the practice adhered to by rule makers (e.g. kept in place by a system of bribery and 
malfeasance) is to prioritize the interests of the elites, the outcomes will continue to be 
corrupted. This is because the process remains corrupted. However, even if we were to a) 
perfect the process by eliminating all corruption in the process (e.g. by prohibiting bribery and 
malfeasance and punishing all private actors and public officials found to have engaged in such 
practices) and b) perfect access to the process by ensuring full parity in access to the legislature 
(for both the monied elites and underprivileged poor), we still could not guarantee a just 
                                                
303 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 74. 
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outcome. This is for a host of possible reasons. Most importantly, the normative standard for 
the sake of which the process exists, may itself still be corrupted (unjust: unfair, biased, 
unreasonable). I.e. even if the rule makers refrain from taking any bribes and fully consult with 
both the monied elites and the underprivileged poor, they may still unwittingly or willfully 
prioritize the interests of the monied elites when deliberating and generating legislative 
outcomes. In this way, the norm, ‘justice’, continues to be defined for the sake of the monied 
elites, and so the processes will continue, at least some of the time, to produce outcomes which, 
although procedurally just, are substantively just only from the vantage point of the elites.  
 
In the above example, to achieve the systemic or structural change necessary to expand access 
to justice, two deeply interdependent outcomes need to be achieved: a) systemic changes need 
to be made to the processes to make them fairer, more impartial, more reasoned and so on 
(making the process more just); and/or b) there needs to be a redefinition of what justice, 
fairness and reasonableness actually mean in the context of the relevant processes (making the 
norm (outcomes) more just).  
 
In both cases this requires going beyond the structural position of individuals relative to the 
processes vis-à-vis accessibility and changing the structural position of individuals relative to 
the norm as it manifests in the given context. This, in all likelihood, will require some degree 
of norm change (i.e. a redefinition or reinterpretation of what justice means).304 Consequently, 
before I delve into the kind of outcomes and actions that might promote access to justice (in 
the wide definition), it is important to first understand clearly what is meant by ‘norm change’. 
How can this be achieved? 
 
To understand this more clearly, we must first note that implicit within the norm, justice, is a 
self-referential assumption of authority for the benefit of a hidden supra-subject. The norm 
speaks and listens, for and to, an undisclosed supra-subject. This hidden supra-subject of the 
norm is manifest in the form of an always assumed, hidden and all-inclusive first-person plural. 
A hidden ‘We’ that is the subject for the sake of which the norm (justice) is and, by extension, 
for the sake of which the processes defining the administration of justice exist. Put another 
way, the processes for conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule enforcement are mechanisms 
                                                
304 Other than in the purely theoretical case where there is universal agreement on the meaning of justice and 
the standard of fairness but this is not reflected in the processes mandated to administer justice. 
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by which we articulate, interpret and apply the norms we have given ourselves. It is precisely 
through this fictitious suspension of the ‘I’s’ and the ‘you’s’ and the assumption of authority 
by the all-inclusive ‘we’, that the norm, ‘justice’, can be deemed legitimate. 305 As Rawls has 
posited, a constitution can only be said to be legitimate when it is a constitution ‘which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse’. In the aspirational 
impossibility of the ‘may reasonably be expected to’ lies both the assumption of authority by 
the ‘we’ and the source of legitimacy of the norm. It is, therefore, not his justice or my justice, 
it is our justice.306 It follows then, that norm change requires that this legitimacy be questioned 
or suspended. It requires that the ‘I’s’ and the ‘you’s’ withdraw the authoritative force of the 
‘we’ or that this is done on their behalf and with their consent (actual or implied). The ‘we’ 
must then be reconstituted, its authority restored.  
 
Returning to the example above, the monied elites which have captured the rulemaking process 
in community X are the supra-subject for the sake of which the norm, justice, is. They are the 
‘we’ and any justice is their justice. Improving access of the underprivileged poor to the 
rulemaking processes will, in all likelihood, only increase access to the justice of the elite. To 
meaningfully increase access to justice for the poor in community X requires that the 
legitimacy of this justice be questioned and that the norm be suspended and reconstituted such 
that the poor are (more fully and equally) included within the ‘we’.  
 
Norm change, so defined, is unstructured and happens gradually (over years, decades or even 
centuries) throughout the whole body of the institutionalized rulemaking, rule enforcement and 
conflict resolution processes (from top down and bottom up). There may be catalysts or 
defining moments but it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to pinpoint a concrete instance of 
norm change. Returning to the example, even a revolution in community X such that the 
monied elites are overthrown and their grasp on the rulemaking process is eliminated, of itself, 
is only a fact constituting evidence of possible norm change. So long as the norm adhered to 
by rule makers is to prioritize the interests of those with money, the outcomes will continue to 
                                                
305 Christodoulidis, “Objection that cannot be heard,” 186. 
306 Of course, there is nothing new in this. For Lyotard, “[t]he republican regimen’s principle of legitimacy is 
that the addressor of the norm, y, and the addressee of the obligation, x, are the same.”!Lyotard, Le Différend, 
98. For Habermas “[j]ust those norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants 
in rational discourse.” Christodoulidis, “Objection that cannot be heard,” 189. And for Rawls, a constitution can 
only be said to be legitimate when it is a constitution “which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse”.!Rawls, Political Liberalism, 137. 
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be corrupted. Norm change itself can only be evidenced on an ongoing basis by the treatment 
of individuals relative to one another and having accessed and made use of the processes related 
to the administration of justice and the outcomes of those processes over time.  
 
Having reviewed what is meant by norm change and how it takes place and how to identify it, 
we can now return to the question of what would be concrete examples of contributions to 
access to justice (defined more widely). As discussed above, to contribute towards access to 
justice, defined in this way, is to either: a) contribute to systemic changes to the institutionalized 
processes of conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule enforcement to make them fairer, more 
impartial, more reasoned and so on (making the process more just); and/or b) contribute 
towards a redefinition of what justice, fairness, reasonableness actually mean in the context of 
the relevant processes (making the norm (outcomes) more just).  
 
These two sets of outcomes are so deeply interrelated that it does not make sense to separate 
them when providing concrete practical examples. However, conceptually they are separable 
insofar as the former is geared towards improving the processes themselves vis-à-vis the norm 
(i.e. procedural justice) and the latter is geared towards improving the outcomes of those 
processes vis-à-vis the norm (i.e. substantive justice). Examples of outcomes that might 
enhance access to justice, as defined here, include: 
 
•! The introduction of wide-ranging legislative and/or policy reforms seeking to render 
particular aspects of the conflict resolution, rulemaking and rule enforcement processes 
more just (e.g. the introduction of a rule requiring all legislative proposals to be 
submitted to an impact assessment in relation to the rights of children);  
•! Constitutional reform or reinterpretation rendering either the processes or the (likely 
and possible) outcomes more just (fairer, more equal, more impartial, more consistent, 
more reasonable, etc.) (e.g. a change to the constitution adding sexual orientation as a 
status to be protected under the guarantee of equal treatment under the law);  
•! The reallocation of resources distributed by the institutions engaged in the 
administration of justice to render such allocation more just, e.g. in respect of 
marginalized interests (such as, racial, linguistic, cultural or gender minorities) or 
diffuse interests (such as environmental or consumer protection) (e.g. a commitment to 
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increase the allocation of resources for law enforcement in disadvantaged and 
underserviced communities by 50%);  
•! The consistent removal and punishment by the institutions engaged in law enforcement 
of public officials engaged in unjust practices (e.g. in terms of corruption or bias); or 
•! A culture shift among officials engaged in the administration of justice, bringing about 
more equitable views and practices.      
 
By their very nature such outcomes transcend individual clients and aim at systemic change. 
Consequently, the actions that provoke such actions are not actually carried out directly for 
individual clients. However, the types of actions that might provoke such outcomes can be 
subdivided into internal actions (tacitly accepting and working within the existing 
processes/norms) and external actions (rejecting and working beyond the existing 
processes/norms). An example of an internal action might be impact litigation or lobbying 
aimed at bringing about constitutional reform. An example of an external action would be civil 
disobedience or armed conflict aimed at redistributing public resources in a more just fashion.  
 
Importantly, as should be evident from the above, the existence of such actions is not by itself 
probative of their contribution towards norm change and consequently also not probative of 
their contribution towards access to justice. Consequently, all such actions are indirect. 
However, such actions, taken together with any number of potential contributing factors to 
norm change may indeed be strong evidence that such actions have contributed towards access 
to justice. For example, where impact litigation, lobbying or advocacy aimed at the reallocation 
of public resources in favor of marginalized interests is accompanied by a legal or political 
commitment from the institutions mandated to administer justice to, in fact, shift public 
resources away from discriminatory forms of public service provision, and where there is also 
follow-up, in terms of the actual redistribution of resources, this would be strong evidence of 
norm change and an expansion of access to justice (although still not conclusively probative).  
 
1.3! Conclusion: Access to Justice Beyond Civil Legal Aid  
 
In articulating an expanded definition of access to justice in this section, the aim, as set out 
above, has been to move beyond the rather narrow definition embraced in the pro bono 
literature which essentially equates access to justice with civil legal aid. The three-part 
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definition set out above allows us to explore and appreciate the contribution of Big Law Pro 
Bono to access to justice beyond civil legal aid. Indeed, although it has not been extensively 
explored in the pro bono literature, clearly there are other ends which Big Law Pro Bono 
pursues beyond filling the “justice gap” (through the provision of civil legal aid) and the 
business imperatives explored in Chapter 1 (such as training, recruitment, marketing, client 
development and so on).307 For example, impact litigation oriented towards norm change (as 
discussed under the “wide definition” above) has also been a significant objective within Big 
Law Pro Bono Practice. In a 2007 survey of over 50 of the leading US public interest legal 
organizations, Deborah Rhode found that “almost all of the large national organizations relied 
heavily on pro bono counsel for impact litigation, and involved them in at least half of their 
major cases”.308 Yet, such pro bono collaboration between pro bono lawyers and cause 
organizations has not been significantly explored in the literature, possibly because pro bono 
has largely been understood functionally as a solution to the “justice gap”. Similarly, promoting 
rule of law in developing countries through providing training to lawyers and judges or law 
reform efforts also pursues norm change and has been the objective of pro bono efforts by large 
law firms and, yet again, is not significantly explored in the literature.309   
 
As we shall see in Chapter 4, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not contribute to access to 
justice if we construe access to justice in terms of civil legal aid. Only if we adopt a broader 
definition, as set out above, can we begin to comprehend which purposes (beyond business 
imperatives) Big Law Pro Bono in Europe might be pursuing.  
  
                                                
307 For alternative perspectives on the possible orientations of Big Law Pro Bono, see, for example, Epstein, 
“Stricture and structure,” 1689; Montgomery, “Transactional Pro Bono Work,” 42; Daase, “Making the Client’s 
Peace,” 423–52. 
308 See e.g. Rhode, "Public interest law: The movement at midlife," 2070. 
309 See Daase, “Making the Client’s Peace,” 423–52. 
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2! What is Pro Bono?  
 
In the previous Chapter, I noted that “pro bono” had become something of a term of art in the 
literature. Moreover, I noted the role played by the ABA in defining pro bono in contrast to the 
figure of the more activist “public interest lawyer” or “cause lawyer” (as the term has been 
used in the literature). That is to say, the ABA sought to define pro bono is such a way as to 
re-draw the lines of public service around more conventional professional norms rooted in the 
principle of neutrality. They sought to fashion institutionalized pro bono as a replacement for 
the decimated civil legal aid system. The definition embraced by the ABA definition – which 
essentially implies the provision of professional legal services, by the private bar, at no cost 
and for no remuneration to low income clients – has been largely embraced in the pro bono 
literature (if not explicitly, then by implication, insofar as pro bono is discussed both 
normatively and empirically in terms of the provision of civil legal aid – as discussed in Chapter 
1).  
 
For this thesis, I want to articulate a basic broad definition which will then be further 
substantiated by reference to structure, organization and rationale of pro bono in practice. I 
have decided to do this for a few reasons. Firstly, because unlike the US, there is no 
supranationally (federally) agreed upon definition of pro bono, relevant across all European 
jurisdictions, and consequently, I require a loosely fitting definition that can capture the various 
types of pro bono work being carried out by large law firms. Secondly, as discussed, I believe 
that the definition that has been implicitly embraced in the literature on pro bono is too narrow 
and limits the extent to which pro bono can be analyzed and evaluated both empirically and 
normatively. Accordingly, in line with my objectives in this thesis, a broader definition would 
be preferable.  
 
First to articulate my basic definition, we might begin by looking at the basic meanings of the 
component parts. We can see a couple of possible meanings emerging:310 
 
•! Pro [Latin]: on behalf of; for; about; according to; as, like. 
 
                                                
310 Definitions taken from the University of Notre Dame: Latin–English dictionary, by William Whitaker 
(2010), the Oxford Student’s Dictionary (2002) and the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (2017). 
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•! Bono [Latin]: good; moral; honest; brave. 
 
•! Pro Bono [contemporary English usage]: being, involving, or doing professional and 
especially legal work donated especially for the public good; work undertaken without 
charge, especially legal work for a client on low income. 
 
One the one hand, if we take the Latin definition seriously, then “pro bono” literally means, for 
good. The contemporary equivalent of this first definition might be professional work donated 
(i.e. at no cost) for the public good.  
 
A second definition, which perhaps reflects the most common understanding of the term in 
Western legal circles today, takes into account the position of the beneficiary of the work more 
than the objective, i.e. work undertaken without charge for low income clients (with no 
specification as to whether the work is undertaken for the public good, although perhaps this 
is implied).  
 
The definition that I would like to use in this thesis will borrow from both of the above. I would 
like to define pro bono as: 
 
Legal work undertaken for the public good, at below market rates, for recipients who: 
a)! cannot afford to pay;  
b)! due to the scarcity of financial resources or the limited value placed on the 
relevant legal services relative to other goods and services, would not pay; or  
c)! would otherwise not be able to source such services elsewhere on the open 
market.  
 
A first point to note about this definition is that the legal work must be for the “public good”. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, what the “public good” or the “public interest” actually means has 
been contended for decades.311 In this paper I have no intention of resolving that debate. I will 
understand legal work undertaken for “the public good” subjectively as any legal work that is 
carried out: a) for a recipient that is reasonably perceived (by the person carrying out the work) 
as in need of legal help but without the resources or sophistication to directly source such help; 
                                                
311 For a thorough review of such debates, see Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 516–25. 
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or b) in the interest of a cause, whether political, social, religious or otherwise; and  c) where 
the possibility of benefiting such recipient, or contributing to such cause is one of the primary 
reasons for carrying out the work.  A second point to note about the above definition is that it 
uses the word “recipient” rather than the word “client” or “individual”. This is because across 
the range of practices that I wish to capture with the term “pro bono”, there are a range of 
possible recipients, and the relationship cannot always be characterized straightforwardly as 
“lawyer-client”. These include: individuals; actual and imagined groups (whether marginalized 
or minority groups based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, etc. or diffuse groups such as 
consumers, refugees, the aged, children, Dutch citizens, animals, EU citizens or even citizens 
of the world); nonprofit entities and associations including, charitable organizations, civil 
society groups, membership clubs and professional organizations; private sector entities such 
as corporate foundations, social investment funds, small and medium-sized social enterprises; 
academic actors such as students, academics and academic institutions; public benefit 
institutions (e.g. UN agencies and international organizations); and countries and government 
departments (typically developing and transitional countries). All of these categories of 
recipients can benefit from pro bono legal services in the way I wish to define it.   
 
The third point to note about the above definition is that, except for requiring that the services 
rendered are provided at below market rates, it leaves open the question of whether the legal 
services are undertaken with or without charge and the question of whether the lawyers 
providing the services are remunerated in any way for such services. These are, of course, two 
separate points. For example, lawyers may provide services free of charge and still be 
remunerated (e.g. by the state) or they may provide the services at no charge and receive no 
remuneration. For the various models of pro bono I wish to explore in this thesis, charge and 
remuneration exist on a continuum (see below) from: 1) no charge/no remuneration; to 2) no 
charge, but remuneration; and 3) reduced charge and remuneration.  
 













The final point to note about the above definition, is that it includes not only work carried out 
for recipients who cannot afford to pay, but also work carried out where the recipient would 
not pay (due to the scarcity of financial resources or the limited value placed on the relevant 
legal services relative to other goods and services) or where the recipient would otherwise not 
be able to source such services elsewhere on the open market. The point here is to better capture 
pro bono work undertaken for clients with varying amounts of financial resources and reasons 
for relying on pro bono legal services.   
 
2.1! What types of work? 
 
Now that we understand broadly what is meant by pro bono, a series of other questions 
naturally arise beginning with: what types of work can be carried out and what types of services 
can be rendered? The easy answer is that any work that could be carried out for paying clients 
and any services that could be rendered for them, can equally be carried out for pro bono clients. 
As explored in Chapter 1, the focus of much of the existing pro bono literature has been on 
work carried out for low income clients. However, the literature does explore some other kinds 
of pro bono work including: advocacy and law reform work undertaken for cause 
organizations;312 transactional work undertaken for non-profits, social enterprises and small 
business;313 and rule of law oriented work (such as drafting legal documents, research and 
education) in developing and transitional countries.314 In what follows, I will set out some 
examples of the types of work I wish to include under the definition of pro bono in this thesis, 
including those types identified in the literature and some others.  
 
A first type of pro bono work relates to information, advice and representation. Recipients of 
pro bono may benefit from advice and information (i.e. the provision by lawyers of guidance 
on legal or quasi-legal questions and issues to their clients, whether individuals or legal entities) 
and representation (i.e. the representation of clients, whether individuals or legal entities, in 
formal or informal legal proceedings, before administrative or political bodies and in 
transactions and negotiations). A second type of pro bono work might be categorized broadly 
as corporate support.  Legal entities that are recipients of pro bono may require a great deal of 
                                                
312 See, for example, Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 45–49; and Boutcher, “Lawyering for social 
change,” 179–96. 
313 See, for example, Baillie, “Fulfilling the Promise,” 1543; Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1689; 
Morsch, “Discovering Transactional Pro Bono,” 423; and Montgomery, “Transactional Pro Bono Work,” 42. 
314 See, for example, Daase, “Making the Client’s Peace,” 423–52. 
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legal support as incorporated legal entities, relating to their legal structure and governance, 
employment practices, tax obligations, financing, intellectual and real property rights, 
commercial transactions and so on. Thirdly, lobbying and legal and policy advocacy can also 
be done on a pro bono basis by large firms. Pro bono work may involve engagement in the 
policy process and the promotion of policy and legal reform. Practically speaking, this might 
involve preparing position papers, submitting Freedom of Information requests and engaging 
in other administrative law proceedings, writing to public officials, reviewing existing 
legislation or drafting new legislation and legislative proposals, or engaging in strategic 
litigation and other forms of judicial engagement. Yet another broad category of pro bono work 
includes research and drafting. To some extent, legal research and legal drafting will be 
required in relation to most forms of legal work. However, in the context of pro bono, research 
or drafting might often be stand-alone tasks resulting in short memos, extensive reports or 
submissions to e.g. human rights bodies.  
 
Evidence gathering, fact-finding and monitoring form another type of pro bono work.  Pro 
bono work might involve researching the practical and lived experience of the law e.g. the 
gathering of evidence in relation to human rights violations, or monitoring the implementation 
of specified legislation. Finally, pro bono lawyers also engage in training and legal 
empowerment. Recipients of pro bono might benefit from training on legal issues. Such 
training may be fairly basic and focus on legal writing and research or basic constitutional 
rights, or might be more advanced and focus on data protection or the right to asylum.  
 
2.2! Who provides pro bono? 
 
The next question to arise is, who provides pro bono? The focus of much of the literature (and 
this thesis) is on large law firms (Big Law). However, before narrowing down our focus to Big 
Law Pro Bono I would like to at first embrace a broader definition. Attention has been variously 
paid in the literature to other providers of pro bono (beyond Big Law) including sole 
practitioners and small law firms315 and law schools.316 Possible providers of pro bono (in the 
way that I have defined it here) include: sole practitioners (individual lawyers running their 
                                                
315 See, for example, Granfield, “Meaning of pro bono,” 113–46; and Levin, “Pro Bono Publico,” 699. 
316 See, for example, Deinard et al., “Providing legal services,” 463; Barry, “Accessing Justice,” 1879; 
Chambers and Adcock, “Learning and Serving,” 1056; Davis, “Social Justice and Legal Education,” 85; and 
Bowman, “Engaging First-Year Law Students,” 586–99. 
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own practices); small and medium sized law firms (local, regional and national law firms of 
between 2 and 500 lawyers); Big Law (national and international law firms of between 500 
and several thousand lawyers);  the organized Bar (local, regional, national and international 
Bar associations); law schools and academia (law students acting independently, law clinics, 
junior researchers and law professors); professionalized civil society (human rights 
organizations, women’s groups and other non-profits and civil society groups with a strong 
legal orientation); state institutions (municipal governments and state funded legal aid 
organizations); the Church (various institutionalized, quasi-institutionalized and informal 
religious organizations); and membership organizations (e.g. trade unions and other 
professional organizations). 
 
2.3! What is the rationale for pro bono? 
 
As explored in detail in Chapter 1, there can be several law firm rationales for undertaking pro 
bono work, which have been identified in the literature. These include: enlightened self-interest 
in maintaining the reputation of the legal profession (the idea that pro bono work can help to 
dispel negative narratives about lawyers among the general public),317 productivity and 
organizational slack (the idea that higher revenues and profitability are linked, causally, to 
higher pro bono hours insofar as keeping lawyers active when they have no fee-earning work 
may maintain productivity and boost revenues overall),318 client development (the idea that not 
only do corporate clients increasingly demand law firms to engage in pro bono, but also that 
pro bono can be a good way for firm lawyers to collaborate with and network with corporate 
clients),319 marketing (the idea that pro bono will bring recognition, awards and positive media 
attention to the firm vis-à-vis the general public but also potential future employees and 
clients),320 recruitment (as mentioned above, the belief that the best law students may select 
firms on the basis of pro bono opportunities),321 retention (the idea that pro bono will help to 
keep lawyers happier and more content in their roles and thus contribute to increased work-
                                                
317 Katzmann, Law Firm and Public Good, 174. 
318 Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1692–94; Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 366; Cummings and 
Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2409–19; Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 555–58. 
319 Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 367; Boutcher, “Rethinking Culture,” 124; Boutcher, “Private Law 
Firms,” 549–58; Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 186, 187; de Sa e Silva, “Doing well and doing 
good,” 16. 
320 Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1692–94; Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 369; Cummings, 
“Politics of pro bono,” 125; Boutcher, “Private Law Firms,” 544. 
321 Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1692–94; Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 370; Cummings and 
Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2386. 
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satisfaction and ultimately, employee retention)322 professional development and training (the 
idea that pro bono can be used as a good way to provide junior lawyers with training 
opportunities and new professional experiences allowing for greater, autonomy and 
responsibility),323 and firm integration (the idea that pro bono can help to create a sense of firm 
culture by allowing lawyers in different practice groups and different offices to collaborate for 
a good cause).324 In what follows, I zoom out from law firm rationales to provide some broader 
ideological justifications that can cover the broader range of activities that I am defining under 
the term pro bono. 
 
One rationale for pro bono historically has been religious duty, i.e. the sense that as (e.g.) a 
good Christian and as a lawyer, it is your duty to help the poor and the weak to secure access 
to justice or that there is an obligation on the Church itself to provide legal services to its 
congregation where they cannot afford to pay. Another possible rationale, perhaps the closest 
secular counterpart to religious duty, is a sense of charity. That is, a sense that one, due to one’s 
social position, or due to the disadvantaged position of others, has an obligation, typically of a 
moral nature, to donate one’s skills and expertise. Another rationale is a sense of professional 
duty or professional obligation. Lawyers, in belonging to a profession, have historically viewed 
pro bono as incumbent upon them, as lawyers, particularly before the emergence of state-
sponsored legal aid in the mid 20th century. From this perspective, the legal profession as 
manifest in the local, regional or national Bar, is viewed as having a monopoly on legal 
expertise. Given that such expertise is crucial for the conducting of every-day social relations, 
lawyers have a duty to donate that expertise to those who would otherwise be unable to pay for 
it. Another rationale, prevalent in Ancient Greece, is a sense of civic duty, i.e. a sense that as a 
member of a (political) community, with the requisite skill-set, it is your honor and your duty 
to come to the service of your fellow citizens/ community members when they are in need of 
such service. Kinship ties and patronage may form yet further rationales. Pro bono by lawyers 
for members of their immediate and extended families is, of course, as old as the legal 
profession itself and will likely persist for as long as lawyers do. However, historically, with a 
more simplified legal profession and stronger family ties, kinship may have created more of a 
hard obligation to undertake pro bono work rather than the softer obligation that it likely forms 
                                                
322 Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 370–71; Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2386. 
323 Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1692–94; Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 371; Cummings and 
Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2386. 
324 Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 372. 
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today. Similarly, historically, particularly in Republican Rome, patrons also took it upon 
themselves to provide legal advice and representation (perhaps more akin to political 
protection) to those persons under their patronage.  
 
Professional or social esteem, status or honor may also be a rationale for pro bono service 
provision. Linked to the ideas of professional duty or professional obligation and patronage, 
but separable, is the sense of honor, noblesse oblige or social esteem. At certain points in 
history and among certain lawyers there has pervaded the notion that to undertake pro bono 
work (particularly, but not exclusively, where this is for clients perceived as prestigious, such 
as leading global charities or international organizations) is an honorable duty that invests the 
relevant lawyer with professional status and signifies his/her belonging to an elite group of 
lawyers. Another rationale, common among trade unions, professionals’ associations, women’s 
groups, organized immigrant groups and other membership organizations is a sense of 
communal solidarity. Such groups take it upon themselves to identify/appoint lawyers (who 
are sometimes also members of the relevant group) who are responsible for providing legal 
services on a pro bono basis to any group member who finds themselves in need of lawyer.   
 
A final rationale for the provision of pro bono services (in the way I have defined it here) is 
social contract theory. That is, the idea emerging from political philosophers such as Locke, 
Rousseau and Hobbes, that members of a political community, in giving up their natural rights 
to settle disputes by force, have contracted with the sovereign to provide for a peaceful 
alternative. To make that bargain meaningful, so the argument goes, the sovereign is under a 
duty to guarantee an equal chance to all (rich and poor) to pursue their rights in law. Implied 
in such guarantee, is the right to legal advice and representation in criminal and civil matters 
(i.e. the right to legal aid).325 
 
Of course, as we shall explore in the next chapter, these rationales are not mutually exclusive 





                                                
325 For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Johnson, “Will Gideon’s Trumpet,” 201. 
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2.4! What is the objective of pro bono? 
 
By “objective”, I mean to pose the question, ‘to what end is pro bono work carried out’? In the 
literature on pro bono, there has not been much discussion about the objectives of pro bono. 
This is likely a result of the fact that, as discussed, the assumed objective has been, virtually 
from the beginning of the modern pro bono movement in the 1970s, the promotion of access 
to justice (defined primarily in terms of civil legal aid). The literature does variously concede 
some other possible objectives, although these typically revolve around the various commercial 
incentives for carrying out pro bono work, such as professional gains (i.e. building esteem for 
the profession, as discussed in Chapter 1);326 legal training;327 business development328 and so 
on. In what follows, I briefly set out a list of possible objectives I would like to include within 
my definition, including those from the existing literature and others.    
 
Of course, the first set of objectives comes directly from my three-part definition of access to 
justice set out above and equates to the what Cummings refers to as the “access” dimension of 
public interest law.329 On the narrow definition, as is extensively explored in the existing pro 
bono literature, pro bono may be oriented towards promoting formal and substantive access to 
the processes for administering justice (rulemaking, rule enforcement and conflict resolution) 
for persons who are subject to that justice. In terms of the types of work that might contribute 
to this end, while the provision of information, advice and legal representation directly to 
individuals (or non-profits, for that matter) with the aim of facilitating their access to the legal 
process would be the most obvious example, other examples would include any other type of 
pro bono legal work that has the primary objective of promoting formal and substantive access 
processes for administering justice, whether directly or indirectly (e.g. advocating for a law 
that would require the provision of legal advice to low-income individuals).  
 
                                                
326 See, for example, Katzmann, Law Firm and Public Good; Spaulding, “Prophet and Bureaucrat,” 1398; 
Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 115; Dinovitzer and Garth, “Pro bono as elite strategy,” 115; Granfield, 
“Meaning of pro bono,” 115, 139; Rhode, “Lawyers’ Public Service,” 1441; and Sandefur, “Lawyers’ Pro Bono 
Service,” 79–112. 
327 Epstein, “Stricture and structure,” 1692–94; Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 371; Cummings and 
Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2386. 
328 Justus, “Using Business Strategies,” 367; Boutcher, “Rethinking Culture,” 124; Boutcher, “Private Law 
Firms,” 549–58; Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 186, 187; de Sa e Silva, “Doing well and doing 
good,” 16. 
329 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 523. 
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In the wide definition, pro bono might be directed at ensuring that the administration of justice 
is fair, consistent, impartial, reasonable, i.e. at removing systemic or structural defects inherent 
in the norm (justice) for the sake of which the institutionalized rulemaking, rule enforcement 
and conflict resolution processes operate. This is what Cummings refers to as the “policy” 
dimension of public interest law.330 Such pro bono work would be less likely to consist of the 
provision of legal advice and information to individuals or case-by-case individual 
representation (as this is unlikely to result in norm change). Such pro bono work would likely 
be targeted at promoting significant law reform, constitutional change, achieving resource 
redistribution through the judicial process and effecting culture shift within the judicial 
institutions. Such outcomes might be pursued by way of lobbying and legal and policy 
advocacy undertaken collaboratively with non-profits (NGOs, civil society organizations etc.), 
through the provision of legal training to public officials (including judges, magistrates and 
prosecutors) e.g. to promote transparency and the rule of law or fact-finding and evidence 
gathering to establish systemic or structural bias in the administration of justice.  
 
There are, however, other interesting objectives of pro bono worth noting. One might be 
conceived of as moral education. That is, providing an answer to the question “Why should I 
care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person whose habits I find disgusting?”331 
Pro bono has at times been used as a strategy for encouraging lawyers to step into the shoes of 
the working class, the poor and the marginalized and to learn to identify with them or, through 
working with certain non-profits, to learn to sympathize with and relate to certain causes such 
as LGBTI rights, the rights of ethnic minorities or the eradication of poverty in the developing 
world. Any legal work that brings lawyers into contact with different kinds of people and 
unfamiliar causes could serve the purpose of promoting better awareness of systemic bias or 
the responsibility of elites toward non-elites. Yet another objective as discussed in Chapter 1, 
that remains as relevant today as it was in the 19th century, is legal training. Pro bono is often 
used to provide junior lawyers with experience of working with clients and managing client 
relationships and case files. Younger lawyers would not be entrusted with such responsibilities 
in relation to clients paying fees at market rates and so pro bono work can be a training ground 
for them, where they have more freedom to make mistakes. Another important objective 
historically is professional gain. By professional gain, what is implied here is the respect and 
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esteem of one’s peers, possibly also promotions or valued professional titles and positions. As 
we shall see in Chapter 3, pro bono has at times, notably in Republican Rome, been deployed 
as a means to an end, investing lawyers with honor and winning them respect.  One further 
important objective worth mentioning is the use of pro bono as a business development tool. 
This is particularly relevant in the Big Law model of pro bono where commercial clients have 
been known to include a firms’ pro bono commitment as one factor, among others, affecting 
their decisions about which firms to appoint. Although, note that where discounted services are 
offered to clients solely in the hope of winning future business, this would not qualify as pro 
bono in the way it has been defined here, as it would not pass the “public good” test set out 
above.   
 
2.5! What is “Big Law Pro Bono”?  
 
A final definition, crucial for this thesis, is a definition of Big Law Pro Bono. The focus of this 
thesis and much of the pro bono literature to-date has been on pro bono as practiced by large 
commercial law firms. As set out in Chapter 1, Big Law Pro Bono traces its origins to the 
United States and to progressive legal movements of the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, 
the largest and most elite of US law firms (certainly the top 20 or so) felt that in order to recruit 
the most elite of law students, they needed to develop public service programs.332 
Subsequently, between the 1980s and the 2000s, the largest of US law firms (N.B. by 2001 the 
top 50 US law firms had an average of over 621 lawyers)333 were institutionalizing pro bono 
programs throughout their offices (and these programs began to span the globe from 1980 
onwards).334 As we shall see in Chapter 4, it is primarily as a consequence of this process that 
Big Law Pro Bono came to exist in Europe at all. The implication is that, when we are talking 
about “Big Law Pro Bono” in Europe, we are (for the most part) necessarily talking about firms 
with at least 500 lawyers and typically a great deal more. Therefore, in this thesis, where I 
speak of “Big Law Pro Bono”, I am referring to those firms with more than 500 lawyers 
(exclusive of Partners). That would be, approximately, the largest 100 law firms in the US, the 
largest 30 law firms in the UK and the top three or so law firms in Spain, the Netherlands, 
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France, Germany and Italy. Big Law Pro Bono thus refers to the structured and institutionalized 
pro bono practices established by these firms to engage their lawyers in pro bono work, as this 
has been defined above i.e.: 
 
Legal work undertaken for the public good, at below market rates, for recipients who: 
a)! cannot afford to pay;  
b)! due to the scarcity of financial resources or the limited value placed on the 
relevant legal services relative to other goods and services, would not pay; or  
c)! would otherwise not be able to source such services elsewhere on the open 
market.  
 
3! Methodological Approach  
 
The final objective of this chapter is to set out my methodological approach in undertaking the 
research for this thesis. The research initially started out with a much broader focus - on public 
interest lawyering in Europe in general. Over a period of time, I gradually narrowed the focus, 
although after having first done significant research in relation to the broader research topic. 
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, as I began to dig into my original research topic, 
the scale of the undertaking became increasingly apparent. It dawned on me that it would take 
significantly more time than I had at my disposal to cover all the aspects of public interest 
lawyering in Europe that I had set out to cover (including legal aid, pro bono, clinical legal 
education and civil society legal advocacy). Secondly, as time went on, I became especially 
interested in two of these topics, clinical legal education and pro bono. This was primarily for 
professional, career development reasons. I knew, from well before commencing my PhD, that 
I wanted to pursue a career outside of academia (or alongside academia) and clinical legal 
education and pro bono presented  interesting and suitable career paths for me given my CV at 
that point in time (having spent much time engaged in policy oriented academic legal research 
and having qualified as a lawyer with a large commercial law firm in London). As 
happenstance would have it, I secured a job as a clinic teacher at NYU Paris in 2015 and so my 
interest in clinical legal education deepened. Through that opportunity I became involved in a 
project to create an edited volume on clinical legal education.335 This edited volume ultimately 
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became the primary outlet for the research that I had carried out on clinical legal education up 
until that point. Thereafter, as I became more knowledgeable about the field of pro bono and 
having secured a job working as a full-time pro bono lawyer, I decided to focus my thesis 
exclusively on pro bono, as a topic deserving of more in-depth investigation within the broader 
area of public interest lawyering.   
 
In line with best practice, once I had settled upon my research topic and research question 
(essentially to empirically explore public interest lawyering in Europe), I needed to identify the 
most appropriate research methodologies for my purposes.336  Given that the project was 
largely exploratory, I knew that my first step would involve desk-based research. Moreover, 
given that it related to organizational practices and the experiences of individual actors 
(lawyers, advocates, activists, etc.) I knew that interviews would be a necessity. However, as 
is natural in the inductive nature of qualitative research, my methodology unfolded over time 
as I found out more and became more engaged in my field of study.337 For example, the 
participant observation opportunities and archival research only emerged organically many 
months into the research process.   
 
Overall, the study has combined qualitative, quantitative, historical and anthropological 
research elements. These will be explored below under several thematic headings.  
 
3.1! Timeline and geography  
 
The research was carried out between 2014 and 2016: 
 




EUI, Florence, Italy Desk-based research  
November 
2014 
PILnet European Pro Bono Forum, London, 
UK 
Participant observation  
                                                
336 Webley, “Qualitative approaches,” 931. 








PILnet, New York, USA Participant observation, 




Ford Foundation Archives, New York, 
USA 










EUI, Florence, Italy Skype interviews and surveys 
May 2016 DLA Piper, London, UK Participant observation and 
interviews 
July 2016 Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary Archival research and interviews 
 
3.2! Desk-based research  
 
When I first started my research, having no contacts in my field of study, I knew that an initial 
mapping exercise conducted through desk-based research was going to be crucial. Indeed, it 
was one particular article I found ("Constructing public interest law: Transnational 
collaboration and exchange in Central and Eastern Europe") written by Ed Rekosh (Founder 
and Director of PILnet) in 2008, that actually opened the door on my research field, and 
allowed me, for the first time, to perceive my research terrain.338 It was thanks to this discovery 
that I decided to attend the PILnet annual Pro Bono Forum in 2014, which then opened many 
doors in terms of my research process. After discovering this article I engaged in further desk-
based research including checking whatever historical documents about PILnet and pro bono 
in Europe I could find online, and reading law firm and clearinghouse websites.   
 
                                                




My interviews did not start in earnest until I was well into my participant observation stint at 
PILnet’s global headquarters in New York. Once there, I began to embrace a snowball 
sampling technique, whereby I would begin with low priority interview subjects and ask them 
who they thought were the key persons I should talk to in order to get real insight into the Big 
Law Pro Bono in Europe. (I did this with each person I interviewed until my list of targets built 
up.)339 PILnet staff were then incredibly helpful in terms of connecting me via email to the 
relevant individuals. Ultimately, I carried out 56 interviews with pro bono mangers and NGO 
and clearinghouse employees.  
 
Another methodological issue that I prepared for was interviewing elites. Most of my interview 
subjects were, broadly speaking, legal elites. This insofar as they were largely educated at elite 
law schools, had qualified as lawyers and practiced at elite firms or leading NGOs. Some of 
them had had distinguished careers and they were all significantly older than I was. They were 
the kind of people who placed a premium on professionalism and precision in their 
communication, and they were the kind of people who were incredibly busy and would not be 
able to spare much time. Accordingly, significant advance planning was necessary.  
 
In line with the literature on interviewing elites, I did a great deal of biographical research in 
advance of my interviews and began my interviews by asking biographic questions and about 
their involvement in major achievements in the field. This was intended to build rapport, 
establish my credentials as someone knowledgeable of the terrain and to get my subjects into 
a reflective mood.340 My advance preparation and use of a similar thematic structure throughout 
each interview allowed me to make efficient use of time. Aware that building trust with elites 
is hard and invaluable, I would also capitalize on the trust I built up with each interview subject 
to gain access to further individuals in their network (i.e. snowball sampling).341 I found that, 
with each passing interview, I became more knowledgeable in the subject matter, was able to 
build rapport faster, was able to ask better questions, and was able to solicit better quality 
answers.  
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I carried out two surveys, both in partnership with non-profit organizations. The surveys 
focused on two of the major actors within the pro bono field; pro bono managers at law firms 
and NGOs (clearinghouses, being the third key actor, were covered via several in-depth 
interviews). Although the surveys were carried out with other organizations, they were both 
designed and led by myself with support from volunteers. The idea behind using survey data 
was as follows: 
 
1.! With respect to NGOs: to reach out to a large population of actors indirectly relevant 
to my research who I did not have time to carry out mass interviews with in order to 
establish some broader trends for the population group. Also, due to the anonymous 
nature, I hoped to find out information that might be revealed during an in-person 
interview.342 
 
2.! With respect to pro bono managers, again, I hoped to identify some trends which I had 
suspected, based on prior exploratory interviews, and which could then be followed up 
on again through further in-depth interviews (effectively carrying out a “quant 
switch”).343 
 
3.4.1! NGO survey 
 
The objective of the NGO survey was to identify how EU-oriented NGOs based in Brussels 
were making use of pro bono legal services. The survey was targeted at Brussels-based NGOs 
as it was assumed that: a) these would be the most sophisticated NGOs in the use of legal 
strategies and so the most familiar with pro bono legal services; b) given that Brussels is home 
to EU institutions and several Pan-European (umbrella) civil society organizations, it would 
provide a good cross-section of types of organizations (in terms of substantive causes); and c) 
Brussels has one of the highest concentrations of international law firms, and it was believed 
that such firms would be engaged in the provision of pro bono legal services.  The limitations 
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of the survey are, of course, that Brussels is a very unique political, legal and advocacy context 
and so the results cannot be generalized across the whole of Europe.   
 
The survey was designed by myself both in my capacity as a PhD researcher and in my capacity 
as co-founder of The Good Lobby, a skill-sharing platform connecting academics and lawyers 
to non-profit organizations in need of advocacy advice. It was carried out in cooperation with 
PILnet (the Global Network for Public Interest Law), the European Foundation Centre, the 
Cyrus R. Vance Center, international law firm, DLA Piper, and the International Associations 
Centre. This survey was written and prepared by myself and carried out with the support of a 
broader team of The Good Lobby staff and volunteers including Alberto Alemanno (Co-
Founder and Director of The Good Lobby) and Erik Uszkiewicz, Leire Larracoechea San 
Sebastian, Zane Rasnaca, Alvaro Oleart, Idil Kart, Benjamin Bodson, Athziri Gonzalez, 
Pauline Weller, Virginia Passalacqua. 
 
On the basis of the EU Transparency Register listings, I calculated that the total population of 
NGOs with an office in Brussels whose primary interests were listed as either at the "European" 
or "Global" level (i.e. excluding organizations focused purely on national Belgian affairs) was 
approximately 600. Of those 600, working with a team of volunteers from The Good Lobby, 
we emailed 416 NGOs, and 100 of them completed the survey. That is a response rate of just 
under 25%. 
 
The survey of 100 NGOs is representative of the entire given population of 600 with a margin 
of error of +/- 9% at a confidence level of 95%. This implies, for example, that if 54% of the 
100 surveyed NGOs say they have made use of pro bono before, then I can say with 95% 
confidence that somewhere between 45% and 66% of the 600 total population of NGOs will 
have made use of pro bono before.  
 
3.4.2! Pro bono manager survey 
 
Based on discussion with PILnet staff, I calculated that there were approximately 50 full-time 
pro bono managers globally with a mandate for Europe. Of those, only approximately 30 were 
actually likely to be based in Europe and just a handful of those would be based in Continental 
Europe. It was therefore hard to determine what the relevant population was. Nevertheless, 
with support from PILnet staff, the survey was circulated among 30 full-time pro bono 
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managers within PILnet’s network, of which, 21 completed the survey. Assuming a population 
size of 50, and my sample size of 21, the survey has a margin of error of +/- 16% at a confidence 
level of 95%. This means that if 80% of the pro bono managers I surveyed say they do not do 
any pro bono work directly for low income individuals in Europe, then I can conclude, with 
95% confidence, that somewhere between 64% (i.e. 32 firms) and 96% (i.e. 48 firms) of the 
total population (i.e. 50 firms) do not do any pro bono work directly for low income individuals 
in Europe. 
 
3.5! Archival research  
 
It has been said that, “the intuitional fabric of modern societies captures traces of individuals, 
organizations and social movements in a variety of complex ways, including physical traces 
collected in cultural monuments such as libraries, museums and formal archives”.344 From this 
vantage point, archives can be immensely valuable in historical research insofar as they act as 
a collective human memory, recalling fact pattern that no one person could independently piece 
together. Particularly in the study of public interest law, where foundations play such an 
important role through the disbursement of grants and (arguably) setting an agenda for civil 
society, archives can help the researcher to “follow the money” and get behind individual 
decisions that would not make sense without financial and economic context. It has further 
been said that: 
 
“Documents, as the sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and 
structure the decisions which people make on a daily and longer-term basis; they also 
constitute particular readings of social events. They tell us about the aspirations and 
intentions of the period to which they refer and describe places and social 
relationships at a time when we may not have been born, or were simply not 
present.”345 (emphasis added) 
 
In this manner, I found archival research incredibly useful in terms tracking and mapping key 
players and understanding the real motivations (at the time) behind certain policies and funding 
programs. 
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However, archival research is notoriously time-consuming, often described along the lines of 
‘looking for a needle in a haystack’.346 Archives – and the Ford Foundation and Open Society 
archives are no exception – contain thousands of documents, and key documents (for the 
purposes of a given research project) can be buried away in obscurely named files that are not 
at all intuitive to browse. Accordingly, the best practice is to plan well in advance and develop 
a strategy for approaching archival research.347 To this end, I browsed the websites of both 
archives in advance of my trips and liaised with the archive staff to prepare key grant files for 
my arrival. My strategy did not involve any thorough review of the files and documents on-
site in the archive. Rather, I simply identified the files that were useful for my purposes and 
photographed the relevant pages on my iPhone (as permitted by the archives).  
 
Unfortunately, the Open Society Archives did not turn up much useful information as they 
were not very well structured.  However, the Ford Foundation archives were immensely useful. 
I was able to carefully piece together a collaborative funding initiative amongst several funding 
organizations, aimed at developing a public interest law field in Europe. I was able to track 
down the monies expended, the organizations and individuals involved and the thinking behind 
the strategy and reasons for the eventual termination of the funding program.    
 
3.6! Participant observation  
 
Participant observation can be defined as a research method “in which the observer participates 
in the daily life of the people under study, either openly in the role of researcher or covertly in 
some disguised role, observing things that happen, listening to what is said, and questioning 
people, over some length of time”.348 As noted above, the possibilities to engage in three stints 
of participant observation all emerged rather organically. However, these opportunities 
ultimately were invaluable, both in terms of gaining access to interview subjects and in simply 
observing the practice of Big Law Pro Bono both from the law firm (DLA Piper) and 
clearinghouse (PILnet) perspective. It has been said, that: 
 
                                                
346 Gallo, “Doing Archival Research,” 262. 
347 Ibid., 262, 263. 
348 Becker and Geer, “Participant observation and interviewing,” 28. 
 118 
“[P]articipant observation provides a situation in which the meanings of words can be 
learned with great precision through study of their use in context, exploration through 
continuous interviewing of their implications and nuances, and the use of them oneself 
under the scrutiny of capable speakers of the language.”349 
 
Participant observation afforded me with the opportunity to learn the “language” of Big Law 
Pro Bono and to detect the subtleties of this language, underlying frustrations, tensions and the 
power dynamics at play between various actors.  It also provided me with the opportunity to 
engage directly in both pro bono matchmaking (at PILnet) and pro bono management (at DLA 
Piper). This experience was invaluable in terms of helping me to get to grips with the various 
stakeholders involved, their roles and the reality of their daily relationships.  
 
3.6.1! PILnet European Pro Bono Forum 2014 
 
My first direct exposure to the real life world of pro bono was my attendance at the European 
Pro Bono Forum in London in November 2014. As will be explored in the thesis, the Forum is 
the central event in the European pro bono calendar. It is an event when all relevant 
stakeholders get together (pro bono managers, lawyers who do pro bono work, non-profits, and 
clearinghouses from across Europe) to discuss the recent developments, the latest success 
stories, and primarily to network with one another. It was an eye-opening experience for me 
and gave me an overview of all the relevant actors and who I needed to know in order to pursue 
my interview strategy. Although I did not have much opportunity to talk to the key actors at 
the Forum, attending the working groups and panel sessions provided great insight into the 
“hot topics” within the European pro bono landscape.     
 
3.6.2! PILnet Global Headquarters, New York  
 
On the basis of contacts I had made at the forum and follow-up contact with those individuals 
(mainly Atanas Politov and Ed Rekosh), I managed to arrange a three month stay with PILnet 
during my Fulbright exchange period in New York, although the experience was not ideal as 
Ed Rekosh had just stepped down as CEO of PILnet and so the whole organization was very 
much in transition. However, ultimately, this situation played into my hands insofar as I found 
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employees were very willing to talk to me openly about the organization, its successes and 
failures, and what the future might hold. I was also granted unrestricted and unsupervised 
access to the PILnet archives (a filing room) which turned up incredibly rich primary sources 
(historical emails, grant files, reports, draft documents) that allowed me to closely reconstruct 
the activities of PILnet during key periods relevant to my research. In addition, the opportunity 
to get involved in preparing PILnet’s annual pro bono report for 2013 provided me with access 
to their databases, based on which, with their permission, I was able to explore their historical 
matchmaking data across Europe.   
 
3.6.3! DLA Piper Pro Bono Team, London 
 
My two-week research internship with DLA Piper in London, although brief, was also very 
useful. Had I only spent time with PILnet, my perspective on pro bono in Europe would have 
been significantly skewed. My time at DLA Piper, the interviews I undertook there, and the 
data I was able to secure (e.g. internal pro bono reports) provided me with insight into how law 
firms manage pro bono practices in Europe, which can be very different from how 
clearinghouse employees perceive it. It was during this internship that I began to understand 
more fully the power dynamics between law firms and clearinghouses and their NGO clients 
and problems that arise in these relationships. It also provided me with unrestricted access to 
DLA employees for the purpose of interviews. I found that talking to pro bono managers of 
different age ranges, levels of responsibility and degrees of experience (within the DLA team) 
was particularly helpful insofar as they each provided unique perspectives.     
  
3.7! Qualifications  
 
There are several important qualifications I must make which may or may not have bearing on 
my research outcomes: 
 
1.! On the basis of my research internship at DLA Piper, I was ultimately offered a job 
with this firm as a Pro Bono Associate for Continental Europe, which I accepted and 




2.! The research gathered throughout my research process also went to several other uses: 
a.! A report on the history of Pro Bono in Europe prepared for PILnet.350 
b.! An NGO legal needs survey prepared for The Good Lobby (a clearinghouse 
active in Europe that I co-founded).351 
c.! A collaborative book chapter authored together with Ed Rekosh for an edited 
volume on Global Pro Bono.352 
d.! An edited volume on clinical legal education in Europe co-edited with Professor 
Alberto Alemanno.353 
 
I am of the opinion that my involvement in these other projects greatly enhanced my research 
outcomes insofar as it built my reputation within the European pro bono community, increased 
my legitimacy, opened many doors for me in terms of access to interview subjects and boosted 
my capacity to undertake otherwise time-consuming quantitative research. However, I 
acknowledge that these projects represent significant opportunities for personal development 
and could be said to have compromised my objectivity. To mitigate the risks of compromised 
objectivity, I have done as follows: I have carried out all interviews on the basis of anonymity 
(i.e. the identities of the interview subjects will not be revealed in this thesis unless I have 
explicit approval for this) and I have tried to adopt a critical approach in my research by 
proactively seeking out the most critical perspectives on Big Law Pro Bono that I could find 
and challenging interview subjects to respond to these criticisms.   
 
4! Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have sought to develop a definition of access to justice that serves a handful 
of different purposes. Firstly, it incorporates and moves beyond the narrow definition of access 
to justice typically employed in the pro bono literature which revolves around increasing the 
availability of civil legal aid. Secondly, it responds to criticisms of such narrow conceptions of 
access to justice by including both procedural and substantive elements. Thirdly, it provides an 
evaluative framework for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and will facilitate an assessment of the 
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extent to which this practice contributes to access to justice. Fourthly, it provides an expanded 
normative project for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. The three-part definition should enable to 
us both to: i) explore the ways in which models of progressive lawyering throughout European 
history have contributed to access to justice (Chapter 3); and (ii) interrogate the extent to which 
Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice in Europe today (Chapter 6).   
 
We have also sought to provide a loose and broad definition of pro bono in general, based upon 
the existing literature. On that basis, I have also defined Big Law Pro Bono. Finally, I have 
charted the methodological approach taken to the research in this thesis and set out a few 
important qualifications.    
 
In the following chapter, I will explore the historical background context of pro bono lawyering 
in Europe. This will be done by way of discussing various models of pro bono lawyering (as I 
have defined it here) that have variously been embraced throughout European history. These 
models will be evaluated in terms of their respective approaches towards access to justice. 
However, the objective will be to identify the historical, social and legal background context 
against which Big Law Pro Bono, as an ideologically indeterminate and historically and 





CHAPTER 3 ! Precursors to Big Law Pro Bono: A 
History of Pro Bono and Social Change 
Lawyering in Europe 
 
In the previous chapters, we have explored the existing literature on pro bono and set out the 
analytical and methodological parameters of the thesis. In this chapter, there are three core 
objectives. The overarching objective is to provide historical context to pro bono lawyering 
and social justice lawyering more broadly in Europe. In the first chapter, I suggested that social 
institutions emerge from specific historical, economic and political background contexts, 
which may influence the shape that such institutions take. I further suggested that Big Law Pro 
Bono, certainly in the early stages of institutionalization, could be understood as a resource and 
as such, could be described as ideologically indeterminate. We further explored how Big Law 
Pro Bono, conceived of as a social institution, emerged from a particular historical and political 
background context in the United States and I suggested that Big Law Pro Bono, as a social 
institution, could be described as historically and politically contingent. I further noted that pro 
bono in general and Big Law Pro Bono in particular, in the United States, has come to be 
viewed functionally as a solution to the (civil) access to justice gap and suggested that this 
conception of pro bono has also been largely embraced normatively and empirically in the 
literature on pro bono. In this chapter, we will begin to explore the historical context into which 
(as will be explored further in Chapters 4 and 5) Big Law Pro Bono has been transplanted in 
Europe.   
 
The second and third objectives are secondary to and flow from the overarching objective 
described above. Firstly, we will explore how pro bono has been practiced in Europe 
throughout history (Section 1). This discussion will help to contextualize the development of 
Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and may help us better understand, in subsequent chapters, why 
the institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe took the course that it did.  Furthermore, 
by referring to the definitions of access to justice and pro bono developed in Chapter 2, we will 
be able to evaluate how pro bono has contributed to access to justice over the years, which may 
provide a useful comparative reference point for the discussion on Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
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Secondly, we will explore three contemporary progressive legal advocacy movements in 
Europe (Section 2), i.e. the civil liberties and human rights movements and the public interest 
law movement. In Chapters 1 and 2 we noted how important the poverty law movement and 
public interest law movement, in the United States, were in informing the manner in which pro 
bono (and specifically Big Law Pro Bono) was defined and institutionalized in the United 
States. The hypothesis is that similar progressive movements in Europe may have influenced 
the development of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. However, the purpose in this chapter is not 
to make that argument, but simply to provide an understanding of these movements, which will 
then be explored in relation to the institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe in the 
subsequent chapters. It is worth quickly recapping the core hypothesis of the thesis here, i.e. 
even though Big Law Pro Bono has come to exist in Europe primarily due to the globalization 
of US law firms, a unique variant of Big Law Pro Bono has emerged in Europe, not focused 
on individual legal assistance to low-income clients, akin to the model that has been 
institutionalized in the United States. Rather, the model of Big Law Pro Bono that has come to 
dominate in Europe is oriented primarily towards providing technical, research and policy 
assistance to transnational human rights and European policy non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). In the final part of this chapter, I will begin to provide the necessary context to 
understand why this might be the case.  
 
One of the most important claims of this Chapter and explored further in Chapter 5, relates to 
the emergence of the “Social Bar” in Europe i.e. a subgroup of lawyers who specialize in legal 
aid cases. The thesis will explore how the emergence of the Social Bar, to some extent, led to 
functional separation within European legal professions in relation to the provision legal 
services to the poor by creating a remunerated class of specialist legal aid lawyers and 
displacing the duty, on the profession as a whole, to provide pro bono services to the poor.   
 
Before we proceed, we should clarify a few final points about the parameters of the historical 
review in this chapter. Firstly, this review will conclude around the year 2000, which is the 
period just prior to the emergence of Big Law Pro Bono (in any significantly coordinated 
manner) in Europe. Secondly, in this review, by “Europe”, what is meant is the territory of the 
contemporary Council of Europe Member States. Ultimately, the review aims to provide an 
overview of various types of pro bono lawyering and legal advocacy across Northern, 
Southern, Western and Eastern Europe. However, it will only provide a flavor, as this is 
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ultimately a pan-European research project and so no particular country will take priority or be 
explored in any real detail. Thirdly, the information presented in Section 1 below is based 
largely on a review of several important secondary sources, including, for example: the 1927 
international study conducted by the League of Nations into legal aid for the poor;354 the large 
1970s comparative study of access to justice led by Mauro Cappelletti at the University of 
Florence;355 and a series of studies carried out in the early 2000s by the Public Interest Law 
Initiative, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 
and INTERIGHTS, exploring access to justice in Central and Eastern Europe.356 Meanwhile, 
the information presented in Section 2 is based on a mixture of primary sources (archival 
research and interviews) and secondary sources (from desk-based research). Therefore, much 
of the information presented in Section 2 is novel research.  
 
1! A History of Pro Bono Lawyering in Europe  
 
Below, pro bono practice (as defined in Chapter 2) will be explored, throughout Europe, along 
both historical and thematic axes. The main structure will be provided by a historic analysis 
moving from Ancient Athens through to the late 20th Century. The most recent developments 
in relation to pro bono (and state-funded legal aid) will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The 
discussion below will also proceed thematically by reference to the various more or less 
organized ways (models) of structuring pro bono that have been adopted throughout European 
history. From ad hoc individualized pro bono to systems of organized volunteers and more 
institutionalized models subsidized by the Church or the State. As there are some 
commonalities between certain models, across time periods, and certain models can be found 
throughout European history, the historical structure will not be strictly adhered to. Ultimately, 
it is hoped that this will help us to understand what is really novel about Big Law Pro Bono in 
subsequent chapters and to what extent we can see similarities or divergences between these 




                                                
354 League of Nations, Legal Aid for the Poor, V. Legal 1927. 
355 Cappelletti, Florence Access to Justice Project (Sijthof Giuffre, 1978).  
356 Public Interest Law Initiative et al., Access to Justice. 
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1.1! Ancient Athens and Republican Rome  
 
Throughout this early period of European history, various models of pro bono persisted, from 
ad hoc, individualized pro bono assistance, to semi-organized models of assistance rooted, for 
example, in notions of communal solidarity. The clients were typically individuals of limited 
political influence and financial means and were not generally charged for such legal services. 
Invariably, the assistance provided would involve representation before judicial and political 
fora while the rationales varied: from a sense of civic duty, kinship ties, aristocratic honor, 
patronage to professional esteem.  There is little evidence of lawyers engaging in pro bono as 
a way of pursuing any particular cause or political agenda. Rather, pro bono provision during 
this period appears to have been largely duty-bound and sometimes even self-serving. 
Nevertheless, as legal systems became more complex and with the monetization of legal 
services, we can find evidence of growing concerns, within legal and political discourse, about 
access to justice, defined narrowly, as the access of the poor and politically weak to the conflict 
resolution process. What becomes apparent from the discussion below is how the political and 
social background context plays a decisive role in shaping pro bono as a resource, both by 
creating a demand for that resource, but also by determining its conditions of possibility (e.g. 
vis-à-vis the shape of the legal profession) and its rationale and normative orientation (e.g. as 
a consequence of prevailing power dynamics and political realities).   
 
1.1.1! Ancient Athens 
 
Of course, there will be no need for individuals to retain the skills of a lawyer where there is 
no settled legal system (an established jurisdiction and body of rules and a normalized 
procedure). As such, the need for professional lawyers does not arise in ancient Athens until 
after 600 BC and the emergence of the heliastic courts.357 In these courts, litigants were 
required to face large popular juries and success depended on “carefully prepared and expertly 
delivered argument”.358 As such, the practice of retaining professional assistance in the 
presentation of cases began to replace the prior practice of self-representation. Often these 
services were provided by the synegoros or hyperapologoumenos, persons employed to speak 
in court or write speeches on behalf of a litigant or defendant. In earlier times, these were 
                                                
357 Chroust, “Ancient Athens,” 344. 
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primarily friends, relatives or patrons of the litigant or defendant but in due course, they became 
professional “lawyers”.359 
 
This professionalization of legal representation brought with it the commodification of such 
services (the practice of paying these professionals for services rendered). However, sometime 
around the year 403 BC a law was passed forbidding the paying of professional lawyers in 
private suits. (NB “private” in this context does not correspond to contemporary civil suits but 
rather implies any suit where a private matter was at stake. For example,  homicide was 
considered a private matter for relatives to litigate.)360 It is believed that retaining professional 
lawyers came to be considered an undemocratic practice at this time. This law was likely, in 
no small part, a response to lawyers playing a central role in revolutions overthrowing Athenian 
democracy (in 411/10 BC and 404 BC), resulting in one case in a short-lived  oligarchic state.361  
 
Beyond this, a prominent justification for the belief that paying for legal services was 
undemocratic was the idea that allowing lawyers to be paid would benefit the rich at the 
expense of the poor. The poor, it was felt, would be unable to afford the most talented and thus 
most expensive advocates.362 Another important justification was the idea that Athenian 
democracy should be rooted in mutual solidarity and compassion between citizens and, as such, 
legal advocacy should be an act of civic duty rather than a means to make a profit.363 For 
example, Philosopher Anaximenes, speaking of the provision of legal representation, suggested 
that “in a true democracy every one helps another to the best of his abilities [and] there was 
really no difference between giving a man legal advice and teaching or instructing him”.364 
Meanwhile, famous lawyer, Hyperides questioned: 
 
“What is more democratic than that those who are able to plead a cause should come to 
the aid of those who are themselves unable to do so, particularly if the latter are in dire 
peril?”365  
 
                                                
359 Ibid., 353. 
360 Osborne, “Law in action,” 40. 
361 Chroust, “Ancient Athens,” 353. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid., 359. 
365 Ibid., 372. 
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This idea is further evidenced by the fact that Athenian lawmaker, Solon, enacted legislation 
that enabled any man who had the means, to pursue a public claim in the name of the city on 
behalf of any other man who had been harmed or wronged. The idea was to sensitize citizens 
to the suffering of one another and so increase their sympathies for the citizenry as a whole.366 
However, there is little evidence of citizens actually making use of this legislation, which 
perhaps resulted from the fact that any would-be third party prosecutor would be required to 
pay a fine and face possible disenfranchisement if he failed to win one fifth of the jury’s votes 
or decided to drop the suit.367   
 
Moreover, due to the difficulties inherent in enforcing the prohibition on payment of legal fees, 
this law was apparently often simply ignored. Nevertheless, there were still those lawyers who 
would provide representation for free to their relatives, friends and associates out of a sense of 
civic or personal duty. In this vein, some Athenian townships and clubs (e.g. fraternities) would 
provide legal aid to their inhabitants and members where they had come into legal troubles and 
were otherwise unable to afford legal representation.368 This system, which was apparently 
reasonably common, enabled weaker defendants to obtain assistance, typically from elected 
officials acting on their behalf as synegoros and presenting their case in court.369 However, it 
has also been argued that it is questionable whether this township or club-based legal aid 
practice was extended to ordinary citizens, unconnected in any way to those with influence.370      
 
Beyond this, there were also “state-attorneys”, lawyers employed by the City for very low pay, 
in order to protect the public interest, typically by carrying out important public prosecutions. 
This was considered an honorable and civic duty, which sometimes led to important political 
careers.371 To the contrary, before the middle of the fourth century BC, and in line with the 
prohibition of payment of legal fees, private lawyers acting for those beyond their inner circle 
were typically viewed with suspicion and sometimes even outright derision.372  
 
Pro bono in Ancient Athens then, emerges as a resource, against the backdrop of the 
monetization of legal services and broad concerns with communal solidarity and civic 
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responsibility. The evidence suggests that only semi-organized models of pro bono emerged 
(e.g. as practiced by townships and clubs). Of course, given that the legal system itself was not 
very complex during this period, it is perhaps unsurprising that pro bono practice at the time 
reflects this simplicity. What is interesting during this period is the emergence of concerns, 
reflected in political and legal discourse, with access to justice, as defined narrowly in Chapter 
2. For example, the distinguished professional lawyer, Demosthenes, complained that, “in 
Athens the poor man was at a disadvantage due to his financial inability to retain the services 
of a competent lawyer”.373 Similarly, Plato was concerned that “justice was at the service of 
whomsoever was able and willing to pay for the services of a professional lawyer”.374Laws 
forbidding payment for legal services also arguably (at least partially) reflect such concerns.  
 
1.1.2! Republican Rome 
 
Unlike in Ancient Athens, in the Ancient Roman Republic and early Roman Empire, a legal 
profession was allowed to flourish, becoming sophisticated and well established in the socio-
political order. The legal profession in Ancient Athens had been considered anti-democratic 
and so was never permitted to develop into an authoritative and powerful professional body. 
Not so in the Roman Republic, where the legal profession was revered. This different social 
status given to the legal profession is reflected in  how the pro bono resource took shape.      
 
The Roman legal profession emerged from the body of “state priests”, sacerdotes publici. 
These were men of noble origin, patricians, occupying important social or political positions 
responsible for the interpretation of sacral and secular law.375 These men had in common a 
public-spiritedness stemming from their aristocratic social position and worldview. In these 
early periods, the profession was defined above all by a sense of honor and a commitment to 
public service and the cultivation of the highest standards of personal character. Their motto, 
melius est virtute ius, meant "high above all human virtues stands the law."376 
 
Even in later periods, as the Roman profession transcended its priestly roots and the practice 
of law began to be secularized, the profession was still stocked by aristocratic men 
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(patronus).377 Patricians would take it upon themselves to provide protection (extending to 
legal services such as protection in court) to those within their household and to those who, 
occupying a position of dependency, were accordingly attached to the household of the 
patrician.378 These were the “clients” of the patrician and the arrangement is referred to as the 
clientele system.379 Subsequently, the protection afforded by the patrician became 
professionalized and these aristocratic men, by this point referred to as patronus causarum, 
would also offer legal protection to those unconnected to them.380   
 
Crucially, owing to their social position, these aristocratic Roman lawyers whether state priests, 
patronus or patronus causarum, would not typically take payment for services rendered. This 
was consequent upon the fact that it would have been considered below these noble men of 
independent means to take payment and because it was believed that taking payment would 
degrade the practice of law and reduce it to a “mercenary business”.381  As such, legal services 
were provided in this manner out of a sense of public duty, chivalry, honor and noblesse oblige, 
from the strong to the weak, from the patron to his family, to his vassals and to his neighbors, 
and even to strangers in need of help.382    
 
However, with the increasing professionalization of legal practice, the clientele system evolved 
alongside the legal system and brought about specialization, novel legal roles and the 
intensification of legal practice. All of this would lead to the commodification of legal services 
and ultimately to a decline in the provision of gratuitous services to the poor and needy.383   
 
With the passing of time the legal profession, once purely an occupation of noblemen and 
aristocrats, began to be embraced by men who were not of noble birth, men who could not 
afford to work for no remuneration.384 Moreover, as legal practice became more complex, 
fostered in part by the growing  socio-political and economic complexity of Roman life, the 
job of the lawyer was intensified, requiring more time, more training and specialization.385 In 
turn, this led firstly to the expectation that lawyers would receive some form of remuneration 
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from clients, not as a fee but as a sign of gratitude, and ultimately to the charging of fees. In 
this way, the profession became increasingly profitable.  
 
A central cause of these changes was the emergence of the “forensic orators”. This new breed 
of lawyers, somewhat equivalent to what would be called barristers in modern England, had 
the responsibility for presenting the cases of clients in court. Unlike barristers however, the 
forensic orators typically did not deem it necessary to master the law, prioritizing instead the 
mastery of rhetoric.386 Being masters in the arts of theatrics and persuasion, they increasingly 
began to exercise decisive control over the course and outcome of litigation. Accordingly, they 
could demand top remuneration for their services and, often being of humbler origin than the 
old class of aristocratic jurist-lawyers, they were more inclined to do so.387 With the passing of 
time, they gradually began to displace the aristocratic lawyer and the logic underpinning 
gratuitous legal work.388   
 
Echoing Ancient Athens, as concerns began to grow about the increasing cost of justice, a 
statute was passed in 203 BC forbidding lawyers from taking payment or accepting gifts for 
acting on legal cases.389 When this failed to halt the decline of the noble ethos and the gratuitous 
provision of legal services, another law was introduced - the lex Cinicia - imposing several 
penalties on lawyers accepting payment for their services. It seems that the lex Cincia was not 
entirely successful either - it ultimately became a dead letter - and so it was followed by the 
introduction of a cap on lawyers’ fees.390 Lawyers taking more than the specified cap would be 
liable for prosecution. When this too failed, parties themselves were required to take an oath 
that they had not provided any payment in advance of litigation, although they would be 
permitted to make payment not exceeding the capped amount upon conclusion of the 
litigation.391   
 
Ultimately, it seems to have proved impossible to halt or control the commodification of legal 
practice, such that it became a very lucrative profession enabling many lawyers to become 
                                                
386 Chroust, “Ancient Republican Rome,” 117–23. 
387 Ibid., 117–23, 128, 129, 137. 
388 Ibid., 123, 124. 




exceedingly wealthy.392 No organized system of catering for the legal needs of the poor 
emerged to replace the clientele system or the ethos of noblesse oblige that underpinned it.393  
 
Beyond this, the Digest of Justinian does refer to an intriguing practice. The Digest provides 
that any proconsul (governor of a Roman province) is under a duty to: 
 
“allow the use of counsel by petitioners who are: women, [orphans], those otherwise 
under a disability, or those who are out of their minds, if anyone seeks this for them. 
Even if there be no one to seek it, he ought to give them it anyway. But if someone 
should represent himself as being unable to find an advocate because of his opponent's 
power, it is just as much incumbent on the proconsul to give him one… it is wrong for 
anyone to be oppressed by the sheer power of his opponent…”394 
 
As some have pointed out, it is not clear that this measure sought to address the legal needs of 
the poor and it rather seems to be oriented towards the needs of those who are (politically) 
weak. 395 Indeed it should be no surprise that political power imbalance was a primary concern 
in a world where your social status and thus your political clout determined much of the course 
of your life.396 Nevertheless, if we construe political inequality in the Roman Republic as a 
functional equivalent of economic inequality in the contemporary world, then perhaps the 
passage from the digest demonstrates some concern for the legal needs of those who are 
relatively worse off in society (however that might be measured). Having said that, it is 
questionable how broad an impact such a provision could have, given that it would only impact 
those persons coming up against powerful adversaries in court and leave untouched the many 
other legal needs of poor and weak persons. Moreover, it is arguable that such a provision was 
merely a manifestation of the aristocratic practice of law and that it was honored only to the 
extent that the aristocratic class of lawyers continued to honor it, rather than representing a 
broader commitment of the legal profession as a whole.  
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As with Ancient Athens, we must ultimately conclude that the Roman Republic only produced 
semi-organized models of pro bono. Pro bono predominantly took shape against the system of 
patronage and the political inequality that resulted from this system. We might further note 
that, as the practice of law became professionalized, a demand for pro bono emerged that was 
then conceived in terms of aristocratic duty or honor (a consequence of the socio-political 
profile of legal practitioners during this period). Again, the literature does not reveal any 
obviously cause-oriented pro bono practice, in the pursuit of specific political agendas or policy 
goals. This is not to say that this never occurred in Republican Rome, but this does not seem 
to have been a primary rationale within the clientele system. Pro bono practice in the 
aristocratic tradition seems, to some extent, to have been a consequence of a broader 
(sometimes self-interested)397 commitment to public service. As legal practice evolved and 
ceased to be a “gentleman’s hobby” and became increasingly professionalized and monetized, 
this model of pro bono seems to have been undermined. However, at the same time, as with 
Ancient Athens, against this backdrop, we can see the emergence of growing concerns for 
access to justice (defined narrowly), in the attempt to halt the commodification of legal services 
and institutionalize political protection within the legal system for various categories of 
indigent individuals.    
 
1.2! The Middle Ages 
 
During the Middle Ages, we see the emergence of more institutionalized models of pro bono. 
As the Christian Church became increasingly influential and more organized legal professions 
began taking shape in Europe, there arose a number of practices broadly concerned with 
ensuring access to justice, defined in terms of enabling poor and disadvantaged persons to 
access the legal system and providing them with legal representation. Such legal services were 
provided at first by Church officials and later by the legal profession at no cost or low cost. 
The rationales for such practices included Christian charitable duty and, subsequently, an 
emerging sense of professional duty. Again, what is evident, is how the shape of the legal 
profession and the powerful institutions and defining political and social relations of the day 
determine the shape that pro bono takes.       
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The ascendance of Christianity during the Roman Empire had a very significant impact on 
morality within the Roman world and, in particular, attitudes towards the poor. Scripture 
mandated that the poor, needy and weak should be spared from oppression and judged 
impartially in legal disputes.398 In 451, the Council of Chanceldon took a formal position on 
the appropriate role of Clergy with respect to legal needs of the disadvantaged. The Acts of the 
Council provided that:  
 
“…in future no bishop or cleric or monk is to lease estates or involve himself in the 
secular administration of business, unless he is strictly required by the laws to take on 
the compulsory guardianship of minors or if the bishop of the city entrusts him with 
responsibility, out of the fear of God, for church property or for orphans and destitute 
widows and people who especially need the help of the church.”399 
 
It has been suggested that this represents the first formal position taken by the Church with 
respect to legal aid.400 On the other hand, it might be said that this passage more accurately 
represents the commitment of the Church to place the indigent, the powerless and the neglected 
under the broad philanthropic care of the Church, rather than reflecting a specific policy on 
legal aid. Whatever the case, it is clear that from this period onwards, the Church began to 
produce a range of doctrine and practice concerned with the legal needs of those persons 
coming under the protection of the Church.401  
  
In terms of doctrine, Gratian (jurist and author of the Decretum Gratiani) writing in 1140, 
submitted that bishops might find glory in catering for the legal needs of the poor.402 
Meanwhile Stephen of Tournai (a Roman Catholic Canonist who would later become a bishop) 
writing in 1160, suggested that bishops were obliged to afford legal protection to the 
disadvantaged even where their own resources were limited and, moreover, that catering for 
such legal needs should be prioritized over other, less important, work.403 In many respects, as 
one commentator put it, “Bishops became patrons of the poor”.404 Like the state priests and the 
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patronus of the early Republican Roman period, bishops and other clergy provided broad 
protective services to the poor extending beyond merely legal needs, (although they were 
dissuaded from engaging in business dealings - commerce and trade - on behalf of the poor).405 
However, this obligation arose not from a sense of aristocratic duty, but from the doctrine of 
charitas and Christian duty.406  
 
In terms of practice, initially, Christian men provided free legal services, often referred to as 
pro deo (for God),407 as pious work in spontaneous acts of charity. For example, Saint Yves of 
Brittany ("a lawyer and yet not a thief, to the wonder of the people") provides an iconic example 
and was even canonized for his work for the impoverished.408 However, in time, the Church 
produced more sophisticated and institutionalized forms of pro bono.  
 
A first practice, tolerated by the secular courts of England and France, was to have the Church 
take jurisdiction over litigation involving the indigent and disadvantaged in the ecclesiastical 
courts. Indeed, respected canon law interpreters suggest that the Church had jurisdiction over 
all litigation where the poor and disadvantaged were parties.409 However, the Church’s 
protective net was not infinite in scope. There are examples of thresholds being set. Wealthy 
widows, for instance, who were considered capable of protecting their own interests, were not 
to come under the jurisdiction of the Church.410 Moreover, there were some who felt that the 
Church should not, at least in the first instance, exercise jurisdiction over claims pursued by 
the impoverished for personal monetary gain.411  
 
A second and related practice was the institution of the advocatus pauperum deputatus et 
stipendiatus, an official employed by the Church and paid to represent the poor in ecclesiastical 
courts.412 Ultimately, this model travelled and was documented in both the secular courts of 
France and in the free communes of Italy.413  
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A third practice encouraged by the Church, which also spread to secular courts, was to instruct 
magistrates to waive the court fees of the poor and sometimes to appoint a private lawyer or a 
member of the clergy to represent them free of charge (acting for God) or for a small fee.414 
This practice was documented in France, England, Italy and Germany.415 Great pressure was 
exerted on lawyers to accept instruction and they might even face debarment for refusing 
without a compelling justification (such as a conflict of interest).416 It has been suggested that 
these cases would have typically been offered to new advocates, recently admitted to 
practice.417 However, there is no evidence that these cases were treated with less care or carried 
out at a lower standard of legal diligence.418   
 
It has been said that these practices of the Church (and secular courts) in the 12th , 13th and 14th 
centuries, should not be confused with contemporary legal aid practices.419 It is said that the 
motivation behind these practices, and the society that underpinned them, were vastly different 
to the modern world. The practices were still typically quite sporadic in nature rather than being 
extensive attempts to resolve questions of legal need. Moreover, they grew out of a context of 
“pervasive inequality” and the Lord-Vassal relationship or paternalism of the Church.420 In any 
event, the Church combined the idea of charitas and the duties it imposed with a range of 
organized and institutionalized approaches to providing legal assistance to the needy. On this 
basis one might argue that the Church was able to significantly transcend the ad hoc and semi-
organized approaches of Ancient Athens and Republican Rome and move towards a more 
organized model of “pro bono”.       
 
The influence of the Christian ideology of charity and the practices it spawned, as we have 
already seen, spread to the secular courts and slowly began to be embraced by the legal systems 
and emerging legal professions of Europe. Indeed, from the 13th century, we see the 
materialization of thinking about free legal assistance as a professional duty.421 In Modena, for 
example, while providing free representation to indigent clients had emerged as a duty of the 
clergy, with time, as the legal profession took shape, the responsibility shifted to the city’s legal 
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guild.422 The municipal statutes of Modena stipulated that lawyers must provide for the legal 
needs of the poor, widows and orphans without taking any fees or other compensation.423  
 
This was a period during which several European city-states began taking steps to cater for the 
legal needs of the indigent and disadvantaged. That cities turned to the legal profession to 
provide solutions must be seen in the context of the fact that it was during this period that 
lawyers across Europe began to define themselves as a distinct profession with certain ethical 
standards and professional duties.424 Such pro bono practice was conceived by the profession 
as a charitable duty and perhaps even as a mark of chivalry or honor.425 In the words of one 
commentator, “medieval lawyers regarded it as one mark of their superiority to other craftsmen 
that they furnished their specialized skills to economically and socially disadvantaged persons 
without compensation”.426 For centuries to come this would be the status quo; providing legal 
assistance to the needy and impoverished remained an “honorific duty” of the European legal 
professions, reliant on “the charity and goodwill of the bar”.  
 
1.3! The Early Modern Era  
 
During the Early Modern Era, we see the proliferation of a range of novel models of pro bono 
across Europe, taking shape within a number of different legal practice sites. As law began to 
affect more and more parts of individuals’ lives, and the legal profession became increasingly 
differentiated, not only the Church and the organized bars, but also law schools, municipalities, 
trade unions and civil society increasingly began to develop a range of organized and 
institutionalized models of pro bono. The clients included not only the poor and disadvantaged, 
but also persons who received pro bono primarily as a consequence of their membership within 
social groups (such as trade unions). The services provided included the provision of legal 
information, basic assistance with legal documentation and representation.  The rationales 
included a sense of charity, professional duty and communal solidarity, as seen in earlier eras, 
as well as, increasingly, notions of social contract theory, i.e. the belief that as members of a 
given political community, individuals were granted a number of rights and that for such rights 
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to be meaningful, individuals must have access to the machinery of justice (i.e. access to justice 
defined narrowly). Indeed, throughout the early modern era, we see the beginnings of an 
emerging consensus in Europe around the importance of access to justice, defined in this way, 
as formal and substantive accessibility to legal procedures and processes.     
 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the idea emerged, often in constitutional form, that the state 
should be the protector of the rights of man.427 According to this idea, the state would protect 
the rights of its people (“We, the People”) from being unduly encroached upon either by fellow 
citizens or by the state itself. To guarantee justice in this manner required, at least in theory, 
equal access to justice and the machinery of justice (i.e. the courts and the legal process). 
Crucially, however, such constitutional guarantees of equal access to justice and much of the 
similarly targeted legislation that would emerge in the subsequent years (into the 19th century) 
existed only on paper and in theory. Such laws were not directed at actually creating, funding 
or institutionalizing organized state-run systems for the provision of legal services to those in 
need.428 To the contrary, these were normative declarations, effective only to the extent that 
the legal profession, acting charitably, made them so. This state of affairs would continue into 
the 20th century.   
 
Consequently, while the 19th century saw the emergence of legal aid legislation and even fully 
fledged nationally prescribed “proto-legal aid systems” in Belgium (1810 – amended 1889), 
France (1851), Italy (1865), and Germany (1877), these systems were more akin to a form of 
organized pro bono practice than they were to contemporary state-sponsored legal aid.429 For 
example, in Belgium, the bars were required to establish legal consultation bureaus tasked with 
providing legal advice to the poor.430 Such bureaus were staffed with private lawyers working 
voluntarily, on a rota system. Meanwhile, in France, financial barriers to litigation for the poor 
were removed; unpaid lawyers were appointed to serve at no cost and court fees were 
waived.431 Similarly, in Italy, the legal profession was declared to be under a duty to provide 
legal aid at no cost, which, as in France, was to be accomplished by appointing lawyers to 
work for free and waiving court fees.432 In Germany, the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 
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empowered judges to appoint lawyers and waive costs for litigants who could demonstrate their 
poverty.433 Similar provisions were in place right across Western Europe: Iceland (1907),Spain 
(1881), Luxembourg (1893), San Marino (1884).434 It is perhaps unsurprising that such 
legislation emerged at a time that coincides with the emergence of the modern welfare state. 
The European welfare state is typically traced back to the introduction of social insurance 
programs in Germany, enacted to protect against risks inherent in industrial economies, namely 
the potential loss of income from contingencies such as old age, sickness or unemployment.435 
It should be no surprise that the priority emerged in Bismarck’s Germany, in the context of the 
formative German nation state centered around the booming, industrial metropolis of Berlin, 
replete with increasing social tensions the state sought to mitigate. Germany introduced an 
industrial accident insurance program in 1871, becoming the first social insurance program in 
Europe, followed by the first health insurance and pension programs in the 1880s, and this 
social innovation quickly spread.436 
 
All of the developments above provide clear evidence of the state playing an increasingly 
significant role, at least at a policy level, with respect to the provision of legal services for the 
poor and, indeed, this was to be the general trajectory in the coming decades.  
 
Ultimately, however, in all of these systems, providing legal services to those unable to afford 
them was still, first and foremost, a charitable duty of the profession. All of these arrangements 
relied on “the charity and goodwill of the bar” and legal aid was understood as an “honorific 
duty” of the European legal professions.437 The argument has been made that relying on the 
profession to charitably take responsibility for the provision of free legal services in this 
manner will “quite predictably, [be] ineffective”.438 The basis for such claims being that the 
profession, being naturally inclined to prefer and prioritize remunerative work, would both fail 
to allocate the resources necessary to sincerely tackle the problem of unmet legal needs and 
would erect all manner of barriers to access, thus minimizing the amount of this work they 
would be required to undertake.439 Moreover, such work would, the argument goes, also likely 
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be reserved for young, inexperienced or unsuccessful lawyers.440 While there is likely much 
truth to this, we should not let that blind us to some of the incredibly ambitious and largely 
altruistic initiatives embarked upon by parts of the legal profession in Europe during this era.  
 
For example, in Denmark in 1885, the Danish bar association established the institution of the 
Retshjaelp.441 This was essentially an organization based in Copenhagen and tasked with 
coordinating the provision of legal services to the poor by private lawyers and student clerks, 
both acting voluntarily. The Retshjaelp employed just one paid staff member – a clerk who 
would take preliminary details about clients and their legal queries – and was run on a 
shoestring budget of just over £10,000 per year (at 2005 conversion rates).442 Beyond this, the 
lawyer-student teams would see poor clients and provide advice in relation to their queries 
related, for example, to securing financial support for foster children, debt matters, divorce, 
landlord-tenant disputes and so on. Very often, such advice would be of a common sense or 
practical nature rather than strictly legal advice and would, with a few exceptions, not involve 
legal representation.443  While clearly this was a relatively small operation, having just four 
consultation rooms, the Retshjaelp could receive upwards of 15,000 applications for assistance 
each year and process over 5000 of these.444 Running of the Retshjaelp was, at some stage 
taken over by the Society of Students, based at the University of Copenhagen and, by 1927, 
similar organizations had been established in several provincial towns across Denmark.445 
 
Other, similar institutions have been documented, for example the “Legal Dispensary”, 
founded by a private lawyer at the law school of Edinburgh in Scotland in 1900. 446 The 
Dispensary offered free legal advice to anyone who wanted or needed it (provided their income 
did not exceed £12 per month – approximately £700 per month at 2005 rates) and aimed to 
avoid litigation by resolving disputes early.447 The Dispensary handled around 1500 
consultations per year by 1915 and nearly 4000 by 1939.448 Interestingly, the Dispensary was 
staffed largely by women, with student volunteers passing through and around 30 qualified 
lawyers supervising. This was due to the fact that, although able to study law and obtain law 
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degrees, women were not yet permitted to practice.449 The Dispensary recognized the value of 
these educated and skilled women and actively recruited them to join its ranks.450 A similar 
organization was established at the University of Glasgow.451 
 
Another institution that emerged during this period, at least superficially reminiscent of the 
legal protection systems operated by Ancient Athenian townships (discussed above), was the 
municipally organized legal aid bureau. This institution, documented in Poland, Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Norway and Sweden involved municipalities 
– working with the profession – in maintaining legal aid offices to provide free legal advice to 
the poor.452 For example, in Sweden, commencing in Gothenburg in 1872, followed by 
Stockholm in 1884, a so-called “Poor Man’s Advocate” system was established.453 Each 
municipality effectively appointed a private lawyer, on a part-time basis, to handle the legal 
queries of residents.454 Within a few decades nearly every major Swedish city had adopted the 
system. These offices (i.e. municipally organized legal aid bureaus), at least those in the Nordic 
countries, were apparently initially founded by privately practicing labor lawyers and then 
subsequently taken over by the municipalities.455 They focused largely on family law, labor 
law and housing law.456 The Swedish offices, handling around 15,000 consultations annually 
by 1912, were ultimately taken over by the Swedish state and transformed into a network of 
state-sponsored legal aid bureaus in 1919.457  
 
Meanwhile, in Danzig (modern-day Gdańsk), a “Legal Information Bureau” was established 
by the municipal authorities in 1908.458 The Bureau provided free legal advice and assistance 
in preparing legal documents to “any poor person” domiciled or working in the municipality.459  
In addition, the Bureau provided advice in relation to relevant industrial and social 
legislation.460 The Bureau was run by a Director,  appointed by the municipality, who was 
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supported by various official and unofficial staff (most likely legal volunteers or perhaps 
students).461 Beyond the free state of Danzig, the municipality of Warsaw had also established 
a “legal consultation” bureau in 1915, and the Polish Minister of Interior had even issued a 
circular in 1919 requesting all municipal councils to set aside funds in their budgets to establish 
their own legal consultation bureau, each to be staffed by a private lawyer under contract with 
the bureau.462 
 
Yet another example is provided by Germany where, before the turn of the 20th century, trade 
unions set up legal aid bureaus for workers to provide advice on accident insurance and social 
welfare law.463 Churches were also setting up their own legal aid bureaus and a statistical report 
from 1912 recorded some 916 legal advice bureaus of which around half were maintained by 
trade unions, 145 by church organizations, 119 by local municipalities and 93 by women’s 
legal aid organizations.464 Collectively they provided advice to 1.8 million citizens.465 In a 
similar vein, a report produced by the Austrian Department of Justice for the League of Nations 
revealed that, by 1926, there were nearly 90 unions providing free legal advice to their members 
across Austria, of which around 20 were Christian unions.466 Most of these unions reportedly 
retained lawyers to provide advice to their members and several also established legal aid 
offices for this purpose. The work of these unions included the free provision of both advice 
and representation.  However, advice was only provided relating to conflicts arising in the 
workplace and matters related to social insurance and, moreover, there were requirements 
related to membership duration.467 Similar practices were documented in Czechoslovakia 
(trade unions providing free legal advice to their members), Danzig (trade unions providing 
free legal advice to their members), greater Poland (trade unions providing free legal advice to 
their members), Hungary (trade unions and organizations run by the Church providing free 
legal advice) and Latvia (a tenants association providing free legal advice to its members).468 
No doubt such organizations were pervasive across much of Europe.  
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A final example worth mentioning comes from Romania, where the national bar association 
had developed their own self-organized legal aid system.469 Under the regulating statute of the 
Order of Advocates (the national Romania bar association), each local branch (“Council”) of 
the Romanian bar, was required to organize the provision of free legal assistance in its area by 
setting up a “legal assistance bureau”. Councilors employed by each local Council were given 
this responsibility.470 To help run the bureau, they relied on both voluntary assistance provided 
by private lawyers and the services of salaried lawyers (paid by the Council specifically for 
this purpose). Where a private lawyer was requested to act on a pro bono basis for a client by 
the bureau, compliance was compulsory (including with respect to providing assistance with 
litigation). Meetings among bureau staff and volunteers were to be held daily or at least twice 
a week. Persons winning monetary sums as a consequence of litigation engaged in by the 
bureau would be required to compensate the bureau after the fact. Senior lawyers were to be 
assigned to legal aid matters that were of particular importance and, astonishingly, a sum was 
to be set aside by the Order of Advocates (i.e. the national bar) and distributed as a form of 
bonus to private lawyers “who distinguish[ed] themselves in legal-aid work”.471 Somewhat 
similarly, in France the Order of Advocates (French bar) established its own network of legal 
aid bureaus (outside of the official legal aid legislation passed by the state, mentioned above) 
in Paris and the provinces.472 Similar arrangements were also in place in Latvia, Poland and 
Hungary.473  
 
We can say confidently that during the 19th and early 20th century, organized pro bono practice 
really took root across much of Europe (to be clear, it was not referred to as “pro bono” and 
responded to very different needs and engaged different stakeholders to contemporary “Big 
Law Pro Bono” i.e. the central object of analysis in this thesis). As various social institutions 
began to play increasingly important roles in the lives of citizens, and the law (now 
professionalized and monetized) spread its web across an increasing array of social practices, 
need for legal services emerged. Private lawyers self-organized, often collaborating with 
universities, local municipalities, civil society organizations, trade unions, political parties and 
the Church to address the problem of unmet legal need sometimes in incredibly creative ways. 
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There appears to have emerged a clear and very often acknowledged duty, extending to the 
legal professions across Europe, to take responsibility for the provision of legal services to the 
poor. The professions of Europe responded, right across the continent, such that by the 
beginning of the 20th century the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged had reached 
a new level of sophistication and institutionalization. Moreover, private lawyers, receiving no 
remuneration, had very often led these efforts rather than shirking their responsibilities, as 
some might have expected them to do. The primary objective that unites these efforts is 
promoting access to justice (defined narrowly). However, we can see some other objectives 
creeping in, notably legal training and moral education, as the models become more 
sophisticated.  
 
1.4! The 20th Century  
 
Throughout the early and mid-20th Century, we see the continuation of organized pro bono 
practice and the emergence of what might be broadly termed an “access to justice movement”, 
or perhaps access to justice movements (narrowly defined) within parts of Europe. However, 
we also see the continuation of the gradual constitutionalization of the access to justice norm 
(that had started in the 19th Century) and the institutionalization of that norm in the form of 
state-funded legal aid systems. While new models of organized pro bono continued to 
proliferate, these often functioned as prototypes for, or compliments to, highly organized and 
significantly institutionalized state-funded systems. Consequently, as will be explored more in 
Chapter 5, the structure of the legal profession began to change and in some parts of Europe 
(particularly the North-West), there gradually emerged a “Social Bar”, 474  specialized in the 
provision of legal services to the poor and disadvantaged. Pro bono services provided 
throughout this era continued to focus on the provision of legal information to low-income 
individuals and basic assistance with legal documentation and representation for those 
individuals. The dominant rationales during this era continued to be professional duty, charity 
and social contract theory (as discussed above). However, there is an increasing move away 
from charity and professional duty as the dominant rationales, towards social contract theory. 
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Not by accident, this coincides with the expansion of modern welfare states across parts of 
Europe. Indeed, during this period, as in earlier eras, the political and social developments of 
the era have a significant impact on the models of pro bono that emerge and the manner in 
which pro bono is deployed.  
 
Some of the first European countries to move away from organized models of pro bono based 
primarily on the charity of lawyers, towards more institutionalized models under which lawyers 
were remunerated by the state, were Sweden (1919) and Germany (1923). As noted above, in 
1919, the Swedish government took the step of “nationalizing” the municipal Poor Man’s 
Advocate offices that had been set up independently by private lawyers and municipal 
authorities in various Swedish towns since 1872.475 In 1919 the Law Concerning Free Legal 
Proceedings and the Royal Decree Concerning the Grant of Government Subsidies to Public 
Legal Aid Institutions went into force. These laws provided for both state financing of poor 
persons’ litigation fees and the subsidization of a national network of legal aid bureaus.476 The 
bureaus would qualify for state funding provided that they submitted to various forms of state 
regulation and monitoring (for instance related to governance and statistical information 
sharing).477 The costs of the bureaus were shared between the state and the local municipality 
(approximately a 25/75 split) and the funding would go towards a director, a number of salaried 
lawyers and clerical staff and various office and travel costs.478 Such bureaus could handle tens 
of thousands of queries and thousands of cases each year (significantly more than the Poor 
Man’s Advocate offices that had operated on a voluntary basis and had not generally engaged 
in litigation work).479 This Swedish system of state and municipality funded legal aid bureaus 
was later also introduced in Finland.480 Meanwhile, in Germany, taking a slightly different 
approach, the 1923 Law on the Reimbursement of Lawyer’s Fees in Poverty Cases allowed 
German lawyers acting for the poor to recover their full fees from the state (although the 
amount was subsequently capped and then reduced).481 Lawyers were to be appointed at the 
discretion of the court and, once appointed, obliged to take instructions and permitted to claim 
                                                
475 Egerton, Legal Aid, 45; Cohn, “Legal aid for the poor,” 258, 259. 
476 Johnsen, “Nordic Legal Aid,” 304. 
477 Egerton, Legal Aid, 45, 46; Cohn, “Legal aid for the poor,” 258, 259. 
478 Cohn, “Legal aid for the poor,” 258, 259. 
479 Ibid., 260. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Cappelletti and Gordley, “Legal Aid,” 371. 
 146 
their fees and disbursements from the state up to the capped amount.482      
A second group of countries experimented with their own state-subsidized legal aid systems in 
the post-war period. Britain had taken tentative steps towards establishing a state-sponsored 
legal aid system in 1914 by establishing a state-funded “Poor Person’s Department” that relied 
on the voluntary services of private lawyers for both advisory and investigative work and also 
representation in litigation.483 The system was then placed under the administration of the Law 
Society (a private organization representing the interests of the legal profession) in 1925 and 
ultimately scrapped after the war when, after much intense debate, the Legal Aid and Advice 
Act was passed in 1949. Contrary to the German and Swedish systems, qualifying legal aid 
candidates were able to select for themselves the lawyer they desired from a range of private 
practitioners who had agreed to take on such cases, i.e. allowing for competition between 
lawyers for legal aid cases.484 The selected lawyers would then be compensated by the state. 
Notably, the Law Society was still responsible for administering the scheme.485  
The historical context of the Second World War was critical to the emergence of the modern 
legal aid system in Britain. So-called “Citizen’s advice bureaus” (or “CABs”) first cropped up 
in England shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War and the institution gradually 
spread across the country.486 In the first instance, CABs were not created to address legal 
problems, but rather to assist individuals with all manner of practical and administrative 
problems arising as a consequence of the war and the instability that it created (also consequent 
upon the introduction of emergency legislation). In time, however, local lawyers began 
volunteering their services in CABs across England and thus enabling them to provide legal 
advice and sometimes even pursue litigation.487 In time, the CABs began to provide advice on 
a range of issues relevant to those within their communities, such as housing, employment and 
family matters. These CABs effectively operated as a “proof of concept” for the state-funded 
legal aid system that emerged in the subsequent years. 
Around the same period, following a debate that had been kicked off in the early 50s, the 
Netherlands followed a similar path in 1957 when the Act on Legal Aid for People of No-or of 
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Poor Means was passed. This legislation established a state subsidy for legal aid provided to 
persons of low income.488 Similar to the Swedish system, the legislations also provided for the 
establishment of several legal aid bureaus consisting of appointed local lawyers, although at 
least 7 legal aid bureaus had already been established by municipal authorities and local 
lawyers by as early as 1925, nearly 30 years prior to the legislation.489 However, unlike the old 
network of bureaus, lawyers in the new state-sponsored bureaus would not actually be 
providing advice themselves, rather, they would review the legal queries of citizens and issue 
certificates to those persons who qualified for legal aid (based on the merit of their case and 
their income level).490 The certificates could then be taken to private lawyers who would take 
on the case with a guarantee of government funding.  
Given the developments, described above, in the first half of the 20th Century, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that during this period, the principle of access to justice also came to be reflected 
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. With respect to criminal law, the 
European Convention (adopted in 1950) has always provided an explicit guarantee of the right 
to legal representation, including free legal assistance “when the interests of justice so require,” 
codifying, for all Council of Europe member states, many years of developing national law.491 
Subsequently, the Court also established a right to free legal assistance in civil matters (which 
is not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention). The Court first held in Golder v. 
United Kingdom, that the “right to fair trial” guaranteed in Article 6 of the European 
Convention implies a right to access to a court on civil matters.492 It then expanded on the 
Golder ruling in Airey v. United Kingdom, to find that access to the Court could not be 
meaningful without the implied right to free legal assistance even in civil cases, depending on 
the complexity of the procedure or the type of case.493  The Court made that ruling despite the 
fact that Article 6 of the treaty specifies the right to free legal assistance in criminal matters, 
but says nothing about free legal assistance in civil matters. As a result of the Airey decision, 
and cases that followed it, European human rights guarantees include an inalienable right to 
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free legal assistance in civil cases, at least for complex matters of significance. However, the 
articulation of the right to legal assistance in civil matters emerged from the context, explored 
above, in which there had already been widespread acknowledgment at the national level of 
the government’s obligation to make legal assistance available in both criminal and civil cases 
in appropriate circumstances. 
In fact, the 1970s saw renewed interest in state-sponsored access to justice at the national level 
within Western Europe. During what has been labelled as the “law reform movement”, many 
countries revisited their legal aid legislation or embraced for the first time the example initially 
set by Sweden, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands. Indeed, by some accounts, it was only 
in the 1970s that widespread state-sponsored legal aid was significantly institutionalized across 
the Western part of the continent.494  There were, for instance, key developments in France 
where a new law was introduced in 1972 replacing the charitable system that relied on the pro 
bono services of private lawyers and had been in place since 1851 (although subject to a few 
amendments). 495  The new law introduced a legal aid scheme that was largely modelled after 
the British 1949 law, i.e. extending state subsidies to private practice lawyers.496  However, 
taking a far more modest approach, the French law would only subsidize lawyers for their 
expenses, rather than reimbursing their fees.497 Like the Dutch model, the system also relied 
on a network of legal aid bureaus, consisting mainly of government officials and several 
lawyers and typically attached to municipal or local courts, to vet applicants and clear them for 
legal aid.498 Meanwhile, for successful applicants, the lawyer was to be appointed at the 
discretion of the local bar association and would be able to represent the client in litigation (no 
compensation being provided for advisory work) with the state subsidizing any expenses.  
During this same period, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted legislation to increase state 
compensation to private lawyers providing legal aid under its scheme,499 while Austria, the 
Republic of Ireland (with respect to criminal proceedings), Spain and the Netherlands took 
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similar measures.500  
However, during this same period, other models of organized pro bono practice, not reliant on 
state funding, emerged across the European legal professions. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Europe experienced something of a boom in the development of what have been collectively 
referred to as “neighborhood law centers”. These institutions were established in England, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Norway.501 In England, for example, the law centre movement of 
the 1970s saw an estimated 3,300 lawyers collaborating with community workers to provide 
heavily discounted legal assistance to persons who were not otherwise being serviced by the 
profession (in the model of a family/community doctor).502 In the Netherlands and Belgium, 
during the same time period, there emerged a student led “law shop” (recthswinkel/ 
wetswinkel/ boutique de droit) movement while in Norway there was the “law bus” (juss bus) 
movement (all of which will be discussed further in the next section). 503 The central idea behind 
all of these movements was to involve law students and volunteer lawyers in the provision of 
free legal services to persons in poor communities and rural communities (falling beyond the 
reach of the mainstream legal community). Such developments can probably best be 
understood not as divergent from the move towards institutionalized state-sponsored legal aid, 
but as complementary and as emerging from the zeitgeist.  
  
The following years, up until the end of the 20th Century saw legal aid spending in Western 
Europe spiraling, particularly in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands.504 Notably, however, 
the same period saw countervailing trends in other parts of Europe. In France, the coverage of 
legal aid had declined precipitously between the 1972 reform (discussed above) and 1990, from 
75% of the population to 34%, and the legal aid budget was some four times lower than 
Germany and 14 times lower than England and Wales.505 However, new legal aid legislation 
introduced in 1991 saw great increases in coverage and modest increases in spending 
throughout the 1990s.506 Meanwhile, in the Republic of Ireland, a network of government law 
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centers was established in 1980 employing specialized legal aid lawyers on the public 
payroll.507 Additionally, there were significant increases in spending on civil legal aid 
throughout the 1990s and ultimately also the extension of a government subsidy for private 
lawyers. (An initial call from the Minister of Justice in the early 1990s for the profession to 
make a pro bono contribution to legal aid were rejected.)508 Whatever the case, by the end of 
the 1970s, a consensus had emerged in Western Europe that the state had a role to play in 
sponsoring systems of legal aid for the poor. 
A different path was taken in Central and Eastern Europe. Although, as evidenced above, the 
private bars of CEE countries had been very active in creating organized systems of pro bono 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, this work was largely undone between the 1940s and the 
1980s, during varying periods of socialist rule across the region. Of course, Marxist ideology 
originally anticipated the “withering away” of law under full communism. However, in 
socialism, meaning the practice of communism, law was “reduced to a tool of political 
expediency”.509 Law was understood as a tool for achieving socialist policy and so the legal 
system and the legal professions across CEE lost their independence. Lawyers in socialist 
countries were viewed as public servants carrying out their duties for the benefit of the public 
at large.510 
It has been suggested that it is possible to accurately say, at one and the same time, that “there 
[was] no comprehensive Soviet program of legal aid” and, on the other hand, that “the entire 
Soviet legal system constitute[ed] a system of legal aid”.511 This is because while Soviet law 
did not provide for an extensive legal aid system (i.e. there were no extensive provisions 
governing the position of poor litigants and no provisions related to the establishment or 
funding of legal aid bureaus), it did not have to. Firstly, legal assistance in socialist countries 
was incredibly affordable in any event and any person requiring legal services could go the 
office of a “lawyers collective” where fees, as insignificant as they were, may be forgiven.512 
Secondly, the litigation process was considerably simplified, such that in many cases applicants 
would be able to represent themselves, with the major workload falling to the inquisitorial 
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judge rather than the lawyers.  
A Bulgarian commentator, writing in the late 1970s, summed up the situation as follows:  
“In Bulgaria, as in other socialist countries, there is no need for special procedures or 
mechanisms to reduce the costs of resolving disputes involving small or modest claims. 
This is because the normal judicial machinery is inexpensive and very accessible to the 
people”.513 
Socialist rule had reduced the importance of law and the legal profession by creating a closed 
society and simplified social conditions.514  
The collapse of the Berlin Wall brought about intense political and economic changes to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, of course, did not leave the legal professions 
unaffected. In the five to ten years after 1989, the responsibility for providing legal assistance 
to the poor reverted, at least in form, to the pre-war default. That is to say that, with the 
exception of provisions related to mandatory ex officio representation in criminal proceedings 
and the waiving of administration fees for indigent persons in some civil cases, the onus fell 
on the national bar organizations to provide for legal assistance to the poor on a charitable 
basis.515 Some interesting pro bono models emerged during this period echoing those of earlier 
periods. For example, in the late 1990s, Citizen’s Advice Bureaus (as discussed above) spread 
to several Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland (1996) and the Czech 
Republic (1997).516 The Polish network of CABs (Biuro Porad Obywatelskich, BPO) was 
explicitly inspired by the English model and aimed to assist citizens through the provision of 
information and education facilitating community action.517 The BPO network was established 
at the initiative of a consortium of major NGOs in Poland who obtained initial funding from a 
mixture of US, EU, UK and Polish donors and funding schemes.518 Five CABs were 
established across Poland between 1996 and 1997 and provided assistance to citizens on 
matters such as housing, employment, consumer rights, pensions, addiction, neighborhood and 
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family conflict and more.519 As in Western Europe, half a century earlier, such organized and 
charitable pro bono models often presaged state-funded systems, which in Central and Eastern 
Europe, began to emerge in the early 2000s.  
 
Of course, many of these states had brand new democratic constitutions that were enacted in 
the early and mid-90s, often largely modelled after Western templates. As in the West, these 
constitutions all proudly proclaimed the right of equal access to justice and the right to legal 
representation in judicial and administrative proceedings.520 However, beyond certain 
situations in the context of criminal defense, these rights placed no positive obligations on the 
state to actually fund or institutionalize a broad system of legal aid. Consequently, the national 
bar organizations and various legal volunteers (including law teachers and law students)521 took 
it upon themselves to address the challenge of unmet legal need. This would remain the case 
until the early 21st Century (to be discussed further in Chapter 5).     
 
If we can draw any conclusions at all from the above, it is that across much of Europe (i.e. 
Western Europe), the 20th Century saw charitable models and rationales for pro bono recede 
and the ascendance of models in which lawyers would be compensated by the state. A number 
of European countries began to embrace the idea of state-guaranteed, state-sponsored and 
sometimes, even state-organized legal aid. In these new models of “pro bono”, the primary 
rationale was rooted in social contract theory and the idea that access to justice (defined 
narrowly) was a civic right guaranteed by the state.  
Unsurprisingly, state-funded legal aid echoed the pro bono programs established and run by 
bars, municipalities, churches, trade unions and the like in the middle ages and the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. With the emergence of nation states, it was perhaps inevitable that the 
competence for the provision of pro bono legal services should be transferred upwards. 
However, there are a few key differences. Firstly, as noted above, and largely thanks to the 
ideas of philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, already from the 1600s and 1700s 
the idea of the state as the protector of the rights of man had emerged. These ideas (in the 
context of the right to equal access to the law) began to find constitutional form in the 1800s. 
However, as outlined above, it was not until the mid-20th century, with the emergence of 
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modern welfare states, that the guarantees of legal assistance that these ideas required, began 
to be significantly institutionalized as an integral component of European social states. Social 
contract theory began, over time, to become the dominant rationale for the guarantee of pro 
bono (or low bono) legal services to the poor, largely supplanting prior rationales such as 
charity and professional duty.  
Another key difference between the models emerging in the 20th Century and the earlier 
models, is that with state sponsorship came the expectation, from lawyers providing pro bono 
services, of being reasonably remunerated by the state. As will be explored further in Chapter 
5, this led to the emergence of a specialized “Social Bar” which took it upon itself to work for 
the poor and needy, leaving other lawyers to shirk their historic professional duty to engage in 
pro bono work. What is clear though, is that for those lawyers who did remain involved in pro 
bono work during the emergence of the state-sponsored legal aid systems, access to justice 
(narrowly defined) remained the dominant objective.  
 
2! Beyond Individual Access to Justice: The Ideological 
Foundations of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe   
 
As was noted in Chapter 1, in the United States, between the 1970s and the early 2000s, there 
was a fusion of the pro bono resource (Big Law Pro Bono in particular) with the political 
agenda to eradicate poverty (in the 1970s) and the growing concerns about access to justice 
(defined narrowly as civil legal aid) in light of cuts to the federally funded legal aid program. 
Pressure on Big Law to define the pro bono resource in ways that conceived of it functionally 
and narrowly, as a solution to the justice gap, came from multiple directions: legal service 
providers, the organized bar, elite law graduates and the Republican Party. On the contrary, as 
we shall explore in Chapters 4 and 5, in Europe the situation was altogether different. However, 
before we can begin to analyze how Big Law Pro Bono has developed in Europe, we must first 
gain some understanding of the important legal advocacy movements sweeping Europe in the 
decades prior to the introduction of Big Law Pro Bono, in between the late 1990s and early 
2000s.   
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Accordingly, we shall now take another look at pro bono practice (as defined in Chapter 2) in 
Europe. However, in the below, we shall explore models that emerged in the mid to late 20th 
Century and, contrary to those models discussed above, these models transcend narrow 
concerns with access to justice (defined as the provision of legal assistance to poor individuals, 
thus enabling them to participate in the existing processes for the administration of justice).  
 
While the actors and organizations engaged in the below described practices typically proclaim 
their allegiance to conventional legal professional norms, such as neutrality and impartiality, 
this sometimes appears as somewhat of a ruse, a necessary cover story to earn trust among 
international audiences. Behind the façade of professional duty (and sometimes charity), these 
models of pro bono often appear more cause-oriented, more ideological, than much of the pro 
bono practice that was carried out throughout European history. The recipients and target 
beneficiaries of pro bono, within these models, are often disadvantaged groups and individuals. 
However, those individuals that are served, are not defined primarily by their level of income, 
but by their political affiliation or social status.  
 
The pro bono involves much more law reform oriented research, lobbying and legal and policy 
advocacy, evidence gathering and fact finding and much less providing information, advice 
and direct representation to individuals. Such pro bono work is still carried out by lawyers, but 
often lawyers are not the primary drivers of the work. Moreover, this kind of work is typically 
led from within the organizational setting of professionalized civil society, rather than from the 
organized bar, the state or small firms. In terms of objectives, this kind of work seems oriented 
more toward the wide definition of access to justice (explored in Chapter 2), or what Cummings 
refers to as the “policy” dimension of public interest law.522 This is to say that it is concerned 
primarily with achieving norm change. It is concerned with making the processes and outcomes 
of the legal system more just, fair and equitable. It is concerned with addressing systemic or 
structural defects in the administration of justice that prevent the conflict resolution, 
rulemaking or rule enforcement processes from treating certain individuals or groups fairly and 
from delivering justice to such individuals and/or groups.  
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2.1! The civil liberties and international human rights movements in Europe   
 
Across Europe, during the 20th century, a model of legal activism, which might be referred to 
as the “civil liberties pressure group” (seeking to apply pressure on domestic governments to 
better protect civil liberties) took shape. At least since the abolitionist movement – in which 
lawyers played a very important role – launched in 1787 with the founding of the Society for 
Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, England, in particular, has had a long and rich 
history of organizational legal advocacy of this kind.523  One of the oldest and longest running 
of such advocacy organizations in Europe is the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL, 
subsequently renamed Liberty), based in London. Liberty was founded in 1934 in a context of 
growing concern on the political left in Britain about police brutality towards left-leaning 
political protesters and a rising tide of Fascist activity in Germany and in Britain.524 The work 
of Liberty inspired the founding of other such national civil liberties pressure groups in the 
UK, such as JUSTICE and would ultimately inspire the founding of Amnesty International. 
The work of Amnesty International, with the emergence of the international human rights 
movement in the 1970s, would inspire a second model of legal advocacy, embraced by dozens 
of human rights pressure groups across Europe. In many respects, Amnesty International would 
carry on the tradition of this earlier form of legal activism pioneered by the likes of Liberty.  
 
With the birth of the international human rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s, the thriving 
of organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and the flourishing of 
international and regional human rights jurisdictions, we have witnessed an explosion of NGOs 
globally. Such NGOs are active at both the national and international level and have embraced 
a wide variety of legal advocacy strategies engaging lawyers in interesting and novel ways.   
 
At the national level, watershed moments in Europe came with the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords in 1975 by 35 states (32 of which were European) and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989. The Accords, which incorporated the key UN human rights instruments by reference (i.e. 
the UN Declaration and the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights), required respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief. Accordingly, they were of much significance in Central and Eastern Europe, much of 
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which was under Soviet rule with limited scope for civil and political rights. However, the 
Accords were not a treaty and so not subject to ratification and could not become legally 
binding. Nevertheless, the Accords “recognized and legitimized concern for human rights in 
the signatory states”.525 In so doing, they led to the establishment of many “Helsinki Groups” 
(organizations seeking to monitor signatory states and hold them accountable to international 
human rights standards) and other human rights organizations such as the Moscow Helsinki 
Group (founded in 1976), the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (1976), the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee (1977), the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (1982), the Polish 
Helsinki Committee (1982) and so on, across much of Central and Eastern Europe. Many of 
these organization were inspired into existence by the American Helsinki Watch (founded in 
1978, later Human Rights Watch) following a 1982 meeting it convened in Italy intending to 
encourage European organizations to establish and apply political pressure vis-à-vis human 
rights on the socialist governments of CEE.526  
 
Although ostensibly concerned with human rights, many of the CEE-based organizations were 
formerly dissident groups concerned with national liberation from Soviet rule.527 Following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, they were able to go “above ground”, openly embracing the “Helsinki” 
movement and becoming increasingly legal in orientation. As such, they were primed to take 
advantage of the flood of US funding during the 1990s and early 2000s in particular from the 
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundations (to be discussed below) promoting public 
interest law across the region. Indeed, in addition to the other Helsinki groups across CEE, 
other similar organizations emerged all across CEE throughout the 1990s, organizations such 
as the Slovakian Milan Simecka Foundation (1991), Ecojuris Institute of Environmental Law 
(1991), the Glasnost Defense Foundation (1991), the Polish Women’s Rights Centre (1994), 
the Czech Legal Resources Centre (1996), the Hungarian Human Rights Information and 
Documentation Centre (1997), the Hungarian Legal Defense Bureau for National and Ethnic 
Minorities (1997) and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (1999). The Polish Helsinki 
Committee, being one of the pioneers among this group of NGOs, often worked alongside US 
donors, and played a key role in building the regional human rights movement and getting such 
organizations off the ground. 
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In the following sub-sections, I will explore these various types of advocacy organizations and 
practices both in terms of their rationales and objectives and in terms of the types of work 
carried out and the roles played by lawyers. This is important as this will help us to understand, 
in subsequent chapters, the model of Big Law Pro Bono that has emerged across Europe.   
 
2.1.1! Rationales for and objectives of legal activism during the civil liberties and 
international human rights movements in Europe  
 
As suggested just above, although many of these organizations talk of their work in neutral and 
apolitical terms and proclaim that they are acting out of a sense of professional duty or charity, 
these models of pro bono often appear more cause-oriented, more ideological, than much of 
the pro bono practice that was carried out previously throughout European history. 
 
Indeed, Amnesty was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, an Oxford educated barrister who, 
incidentally, was also the founder of JUSTICE in 1957. On founding JUSTICE, Benenson was 
explicit that he wanted the organization to have nothing to do with the NCCL, which was 
widely perceived to be a communist front organization in the 1950s.528 Amnesty was to follow 
in the footsteps of JUSTICE and was to be nonpolitical. In the words of Benenson in the first 
ever Amnesty newsletter:  
 
"We have not the slightest intention of dabbling in the domestic affairs of other nations. 
We are concerned only with the basic human rights of any man or woman to give visual 
or vocal expression to sincerely held beliefs. But when this right is infringed, we shall 
strive to mobilize world opinion to the point where it can no longer be flouted by the 
abusers of political and religious liberty."529  
 
At its founding, Amnesty's focus was exclusively on the issue of prisoners of conscience. 
Beyond this, the organization was to be internationalist, impartial and objective, bearing 
witness to human suffering. This was of course also a requirement for an organization seeking 
international credibility in the Cold-War context of the 1960s. As Benenson made clear in the 
newsletter quoted above, the key advocacy aim of Amnesty was to mobilize public opinion in 
the support of its campaigns, concerned with the violation by states of civil and political rights, 
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in the hope of achieving a behavioral change on the part of governments (in the form of 
releasing prisoners of conscience) and the public at large (in the form of donations to support 
the families of prisoners). This was achieved in two ways: firstly, members, the world over 
(there being some 550 Amnesty volunteer groups in 18 countries by 1967), were to voice their 
support for particular issues so as to raise awareness and funds (for example by adopting 
political prisoners and writing letters of appeal); and secondly, the attention of the media was 
to be focused on these issues (through articles published by journalists in leading national 
newspapers), i.e. “naming and shaming”.530  
 
Meanwhile, the Polish Helsinki Committee was formed in 1982 as an underground volunteer 
organization under martial law and engaged in the monitoring and documenting of human 
rights abuses under the Jaruzelski regime. Being inspired by Helsinki Watch, it initially 
embraced many of the familiar advocacy strategies adopted by Human Rights Watch, i.e. 
combining law, journalism and political lobbying. The PHC began receiving funding from the 
Ford Foundation (amongst other foundations) in 1991 and was a relatively large organization 
with a budget of over $1 million annually (nearly 2/3 of which received from Ford during some 
years). Its mission, as described in a 1996 donor report to Ford was to: 
 
“[Move] beyond protest...and create a lasting institutional framework for human rights 
protection through constitutional and legislative reform, monitoring state actions to 
ensure compliance with domestic and international commitments and 
[broaden]…public understanding of and commitment to human rights.”531 
 
In terms of rationale then, these human rights organizations and civil liberties organizations 
speak in terms of moving “beyond protest”, in terms of neutrality and impartiality. They talk 
in terms of protecting “basic human rights” and “compliance with domestic and international 
commitments”. Ostensibly, these are apolitical rationales. However, such rationales often have 
leftist, activist and dissident origins. Moreover, the slippage within human rights discourse and 
practice, between claims to universalism, neutrality and impartiality on the one hand and 
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politicization and even Manichaeism, on the other, is well documented.532 The words of a 
former Amnesty International employee, interviewed by Steven Hopgood, are illustrative: 
 
“You can’t be profoundly neutral in issues of life and death. You just can’t. You’ve 
gotta choose life. If you’re gonna save people, you know, be on the side of life or the 
side of death. We used to call it in [country deleted] the area between good and evil. 
You’re either with god or with the devil. And President [name deleted] is the devil. So 
you choose where you are. You can’t stand and say, I don’t choose any side. You’ve 
got to be on a side.”533  
 
From this vantage point, we might suggest that narratives of neutrality and impartiality, are 
either rejected at certain points of time or they are being deployed strategically and selectively, 
for example, to win favor with international donors, journalists and politicians. Domestically 
however, within the national political context in which such organizations are targeting their 
campaigns for norm change, the actions of these actors will often be construed politically, as 
unwanted foreign interference.   
 
In terms of objectives, such organizations are primarily interested in norm change rather than 
access to judicial and administrative processes. Like Nelson Mandela, referred to in Chapter 2 
under the wide definition of access to justice, they worry that certain systems of justice, “enable 
the guilty to drag the innocent before the courts [and] the unjust to prosecute and demand 
vengeance against the just”.534 Accordingly, they seek to render both the process and outcomes 
of such systems, more just. They work both within and beyond the existing processes and 
norms by leveraging the power of international law and international political influence and 
applying that power domestically.  
 
2.1.2! Roles played by lawyers in the civil liberties and international human rights 
movements 
 
As suggested above, the work of these types of advocacy organizations typically involves 
research, lobbying and legal and policy advocacy, evidence gathering and fact finding and is 
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not primarily focused on advice and direct representation as was the case with models of pro 
bono lawyering explored in Section 1, above. 
 
Organizations such as the NCCL, like the ACLU or the NAACP in the US, typically did not 
start out as lawyers’ organizations. Indeed the NCCL was founded by a combination of 
lawyers, journalists, politicians and writers.535 The activities of Liberty were (and are), broadly, 
fourfold: research in tandem with parliamentary lobbying for legislative reform or opposition 
to such reform; use of the media for the mobilization of public opinion against repressive state 
practices; the provision of legal services and information to those in need (especially those at 
the receiving end of repressive state practices); and strategic, test case or impact litigation. 
Despite this considerably law-oriented mandate, the NCCL did not have an in-house legal team 
until the mid-seventies and consequently, collaboration with volunteer barristers and solicitors 
was (and is) central to their legal service work (i.e. “case-work”). In 1969, the NCCL had as 
many as 60 qualified legal volunteers assisting with the organization's case docket.536 Beyond 
this, the NCCL often collaborated with law centers (discussed above) sharing information and 
referring clients.537  
 
As for Amnesty, in order to establish credibility with journalists which was essential to 
Amnesty’s fact-based naming and shaming advocacy model (discussed in more detail below), 
it was crucial that the organization retained as neutral a stance as possible and was as informed 
as possible. This meant that a huge part of Amnesty's advocacy was research (both desk-based 
and in the field). This is where lawyers (both volunteer and on-staff) have played a central role. 
Firstly, volunteer lawyers (alongside volunteer doctors) have played an important part in 
documenting human rights violations by visiting victims of torture and prisoners of 
conscience.538 Secondly, with the maturation of the human rights movement, Amnesty’s work 
has begun to embrace more hard-law techniques, and lawyers, both on-staff and working on a 
pro bono basis, have played a key role in developing and implementing legal advocacy 
strategies, including both law reform work and strategic litigation. Notably, however, litigation 
was not a key component of Amnesty's advocacy strategy in the early days. Certainly, in its 
early decades, Amnesty was never primarily a litigation or even a law reform oriented 
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organization and indeed Peter Benenson (Amnesty’s founder) was explicitly trying to avoid 
creating a lawyer-dominated organization.539 Nevertheless, in spite of this somewhat anti-legal 
orientation, it is undeniable that lawyers have played a key role in the work of Amnesty 
throughout its history and pioneered a model of legal activism that would spread across Europe 
and across the entire globe.  
 
A brief exploration of the Polish Helsinki Committee (PHC) will be illustrative of the types of 
work carried out by the many human rights advocacy organizations founded in CEE between 
the 1980s and 1990s (referred to above) and the roles that lawyers have played in their work.  
A review of early grant files from the Ford Foundation related to the PHC reveals that the 
human rights-oriented mission of the PHC was carried out through a diverse range of activities 
including: providing human rights education (to Polish judges, lawyers, journalists, doctors 
and prison officials); promoting legislative reform and monitoring state compliance; publishing 
reports on human rights issues in Poland; producing journalistic output on the same; 
undertaking public outreach with respect to human rights; and submitting amicus briefs in 
Polish court proceedings.540 The work, in many respects, overlaps with the work of the NCCL 
described above, although strongly flavored by international and European human rights law 
and the new advocacy options and opportunities this introduced at the domestic level. And 
much like the NCCL, in all of its work, the PHC relied extensively on lawyers both on-staff, 
working pro bono, and law students undertaking internships.541  
 
If the objective of “cause lawyering” is described in terms of “challeng[ing] prevailing 
distributions of political, social, economic, and/or legal values and resources”542 or “altering 
some aspect of the social, economic and political status quo”543, whereas “conventional 
lawyering” is defined by the provision of legal services on a case-by-case, transaction-by-
transaction basis, with the only ideological commitment being towards the ideology of 
advocacy, professionalism and technical competence, then we must conclude that lawyers in 
the civil liberties and human rights movement were cause lawyers above all.   
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2.2! The European public interest law movement  
 
Towards the end of the 20th Century, another progressive legal advocacy movement emerged 
in Europe (mainly unfolding in Central and Eastern Europe). This movement was American-
led and inspired directly by the US public interest law movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Given 
how important this movement is to the subsequent development of Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe, I will take quite some time to explore its emergence, rationales, objectives, practices. 
 
Commencing in the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the soviet system, Europe bore 
witness to the construction, largely by US funding organizations and US donor-backed NGOs, 
of a European public interest law field, i.e. a number of organizations, institutions professionals 
and academics, loosely defining themselves as a community, deploying common tools and 
embracing overlapping objectives.  
 
Far from being the disorganized efforts of a few dispersed individuals, this construction project 
was a coordinated and coherent effort to radically alter legal culture in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The explicit goals of this project, in the words of the founders, were to “[bring] about 
a change in legal culture and mentality which [would] encourage citizens to consider the law 
as an instrument to protect their rights and pursue their interests” 544; “to develop public interest 
law as a new field of law work”; and “to promote a regional community of public interest law 
organizations”545. Far from a flash in the pan, this construction project was a broad, 
collaborative and consistent effort to develop and institutionalize a particular set of law-related 
organizations, practices and beliefs that would, the architects hoped, completely change the 
relationship between law and society in CEE. These objectives are strikingly similar to the 
objectives of the US public interest law movement. This should probably not come as a surprise 
given that the Ford Foundation played a central role in both movements. The project targeted 
civil society, the private bar (although not Big Law), academia and the public sector. 
 
The architects carried out the project to construct the public interest law field chiefly by 
funding, promoting and seeking to institutionalize four core forms of legal practice:  
 
                                                
544 COLPI Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 1, June 1998, introduction (on file with author). 
545 McClymont and Golub, Many Roads to Justice, 233. 
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•! Public interest lawyering within civil society (including impact/strategic litigation, 
political lobbying, community and media outreach, all carried out by NGOs); 
•! Clinical legal education within universities (via the establishment of university law 
clinics); and 
•! Legal aid within the public sector (i.e. increased access to justice for the legally needy, 
to be provided by government actors).  
 
To be sure, other practices falling under the public interest law umbrella were promoted. 
However, the three listed above, together, form the central thrust of the effort to institutionalize 
public interest law practice in CEE between the mid 1990s and the dawn of the 21st Century.  
 
2.2.1! Rationales for and objectives of legal activism during the public interest law 
movement in Europe 
 
As noted just above, the movement was a coordinated and systematic effort to radically alter 
legal culture in Central and Eastern Europe. On this basis alone, we can conclude that the 
architects of the movement were interested in achieving norm change. However, more 
important for our purposes is to take note of the model of legal advocacy that was privileged 
and promoted within the movement, which, as we shall see, consisted of a “professionalized 
dissent”. That is to say, it consisted in taking the ideological and dissident activism that had 
existed across the region under Soviet rule and professionalizing and institutionalizing it so 
that it could operate within the new democracies and take advantage of newly minted 
progressive constitutions. the objective being to promote various social and political causes 
within the new framework of institutionalized politics.     
 
It was not until 1995 that US funders began to seriously consider the possibility of significantly 
investing in the construction of a public interest law field in CEE. The relevant organizations 
in 1995 were primarily the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute (or Soros 
Foundations more broadly). Other foundations also played a role, such as the American Bar 
Association Central and European (later Eurasian) Law Initiative (“ABA CEELI”), Mott 




These organizations had been engaged in the promotion of democracy and the rule of law 
(including human rights) in CEE since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Consequent upon 
these pre-existing law reform efforts, both Open Society and ABA had established purpose-
built organizations entrusted with executing their regional law reform projects. In the case of 
the Open Society, that was the Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute (COLPI), which 
had been founded in Budapest by Professor Andras Sajo, a leading constitutional law professor, 
in 1991. George Soros had been traveling a great deal in the wake of the political turmoil of 
1989 and had been getting many requests from political leaders of the new independent states 
to provide support with constitution drafting. Soros accordingly tasked Sajo with setting up an 
organization to serve that purpose.546 Hence, the original aims of COLPI were “to assist the 
CEE/fSU [former Soviet Union] countries with constitution drafting and constitutional 
reforms”.547 Meanwhile, in the case of the ABA, the relevant organization was ABA CEELI. 
ABA CEELI had been founded in 1990 with the aspiration of helping CEE countries to 
establish the rule of law by facilitating constitution drafting. 548  
 
As for the Ford Foundation, it had been funding activities aimed at “improving the US 
understanding of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” and promoting “freedom of expression, 
cultural pluralism and human rights” since the early 1950s, spending around $60 million in the 
period up to 1989 (more than 300 hundred million today).549 From 1989 onwards, the 
Foundation expanded its efforts and embraced a strategy of directly supporting indigenous 
organizations rather than Western intermediaries.550 Subsequently, in 1991, the “Russia and 
Eastern Europe Program” was established and had the stated aims of promoting economic 
reforms, reform of political and legal institutions, promoting “the integration of international 
human rights standards in domestic law and practice” and strengthening institutions of higher 
education.551  
 
As it happened, in 1995, COLPI came under new leadership (Stephen Holmes, a Yale law 
graduate and now a Professor at NYU Law School) and took on a new name and new mission. 
                                                
546 Interview number 46, June 22, 2016. 
547 Email from Zaza Namoradze, Director of Open Society Justice Initiative Budapest Office (on file with 
author, May 10, 2015).  
548 Silkenat, “American Bar Association,” 747. 
549 Ford Foundation Records, Peace and Social Justice Program, Governance and Civil Society, Deputy 
Director Office Files of Urvashi Vaid (FA592), Series IV: Russian and Eastern Europe, Folder: Russia and 
Eastern Europe Program. “Program Priorities and Office Structure” (report) (1994–1996).  
550 Ibid. 
551 Deruga, “Hegemony needs Society,” 33.  
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The Constitutional and Legal (rather than legislative) Policy Institute was now mandated with 
effecting broad scale legal reform (particularly in relation to legal education and human rights) 
in Russia and Eastern Europe, thus bringing its aims in closer alignment with the Ford 
Foundation.552  
 
Crucially, at some point in 1995, Joseph Schull (Ford’s director for the Russia and Eastern 
Europe program at the time) had come to the conclusion that “a focused PIL [public interest 
law] grant-making program was both needed and possible”.553 Schull recalls that, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Ford had funding relationships with a number of human rights 
organizations in Central and Eastern Europe and (Ford) was keen to pursue a bottom-up 
approach to securing societal change in the region. These were organizations that had emerged 
as dissident groups and reinvented themselves as human rights organizations as a result of the 
global human rights movement (discussed just above) and the Helsinki accords.554 Schull 
explains that while these organizations often had persons of high moral integrity, they 
“often…were not very skillful at dealing with public institutions because they had spent most 
of their careers doing battle with them”.555 Schull believed that there must be a “hybrid” 
approach, a form of “professionalized dissent”, that while departing from a civil society 
perspective, recognized that in order to secure societal change, you needed to engage with 
public institutions.556 Public interest law could be a vehicle enabling Ford to work with civil 
society but by channeling their efforts and “principled views” into legal reform work (targeted 
at universities, bar associations, courts and the state) that could secure lasting and sustainable 
institutional change.  
 
So it was that in late 1995, apparently by coincidence, over the same weekend in November, 
COLPI and the Ford Foundation hosted two separate conferences in Budapest and Warsaw 
respectively.557 These conferences brought together various civil society actors from CEE and 
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555 Ibid. 
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557 The Ford Foundation sponsored conference was entitled “An International Symposium on Public Interest 
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Open Society sponsored conference was organized by COLPI in collaboration with the International Helsinki 
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representatives from the funding organizations in order to consider the possibility of using 
public interest law strategies to promote progressive agendas in the region. The conferences 
marked the beginning of a “heavy investment” in public interest law promotion in CEE.558  
 
Initially the funders were still timid, unsure of the terrain and operating with caution. There 
was a concern within the Ford Foundation that public interest law was too foreign an idea to 
take root in CEE.559 Consequently, the Ford Foundation enlisted the Polish Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights to organize the conference and test the idea of public interest 
law among a small group of civil society actors. Schull recalls that: 
 
“There was such a consensus that we did not want to be cultural imperialists... You 
have to be aware that just saying that you don’t want to export models inappropriately 
doesn’t mean you aren’t doing it. The main strategy we adopted for trying to avoid 
inadvertently implanting alien ideals in soil that was not fertile was to focus on funding 
local, indigenous organizations and support them to run their own projects, projects that 
they wanted to run.”   
 
The agendas of both conferences include items such as “strategies for co-operation between 
lawyers and NGOs”, “guidelines for selecting cases” and “lobbying government and 
parliament”, and clearly envisioned and sought to promote the legal mobilization of civil 
society actors within the region.560   
 
Ford Foundation employees left the conference satisfied that public interest law was a “relevant 
framework for advocacy in the region” which thus allowed Ford to move ahead with its 
plans.561 Schull, perceiving the overlapping objectives of the Open Society in the region, 
decided to try and steer the Open Society towards embracing “public interest law” as a shared 
umbrella term to give coherence to the activities of both foundations. Schull recalls: 
 
                                                
Rekosh, “Constructing Public Interest Law,” 75; and OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring, 1996): 41. 
558 Ibid. 




“We wanted more bang for our buck… Foundations chronically set enormous 
objectives for themselves: ‘to end poverty as we know it and support that with a 500,000 
dollar grant program that ends in three years’… We were aware that it was a big 
undertaking [i.e. constructing a public interest law field in CEE]…and would require 
many hands on deck and many sources of funding. We wanted [the Open Society] to 
feel that it was their program rather than our program.”562 
 
Accordingly, Schull reached out to the Open Society and suggested the joint organization 
(between COLPI and the Ford Foundation) of a follow-up conference at Oxford University in 
July 1996. Open Society agreeing to the proposal, this conference was more boldly entitled the 
“Symposium on Public Interest Law in Eastern Europe and Russia”.563 The symposium brought 
together leaders from NGOs in Russia and Eastern Europe in fields such as human rights, 
women’s rights, consumer rights and environmental advocacy, as well as law professors, 
lawyers and judges from the region and American and Western European NGO and donor 
representatives and other legal experts.564  
 




1.! To promote public interest law as an important field of activity and foster future 
networking and other field-building activities; 
2.! To provide an opportunity for the exchange of experience and knowledge across 
national borders among public interest law practitioners; 
3.! To discuss methods and approaches that will enhance the capacity of participating 
organizations; 
4.! To identify obstacles to the development of public interest law in Eastern Europe and 
Russia as well as potential responses.”565 
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The symposium was also to serve as “an occasion to shape future funding agendas in the public 
interest law field” following interaction with local practitioners.566 Schull recalls that the 
funders were trying to educate themselves as to what the best funding strategy would be.  
 
In terms of the objective of bringing Open Society on board, the conference was a success and 
Zaza Namoradze (the Deputy Director of the Open Society Institute’s Constitutional and Legal 
Policy Institute) recalls that the conference was a watershed moment for Open Society, and the 
foundation would go on to be a huge supporter of efforts aimed at promoting clinical legal 
education and state-sponsored legal aid in CEE.567 By 1996 then, both Open Society (via 
COLPI) and the Ford Foundation were explicitly thinking in terms of constructing a public 
interest law field in Russia and Eastern Europe.  
 
All of the actors in the effort to construct the public interest law field in CEE were fully aware 
of the scale and complexity of the task they had undertaken. Dimitrina Petrova, (at the time a 
Bulgarian law Professor who founded the European Roma Rights Centre together with Open 
Society in 1996) writing in a paper for the Oxford symposium, describes the larger project as 
one of “transplanting Western public interest law into Eastern European soil”.568 In her paper, 
entitled “Political and legal limitations to the development of public interest law in post-
Communist societies", Petrova describes a number of significant obstacles to implementing the 
project, including restricted access to the courts, limited direct application by the judiciary of 
state constitutions and international law, limited human resources, poor legal infrastructure, 
limited rights to legal aid and the dominating Soviet-era vision of law as an instrument of the 
state.569 Meanwhile the symposium report records concerns from participants about “a culture 
that is not conducive to public interest law”.570 Undeterred however, the conference 
participants set out a broad agenda for change including: 
 
•! Changing the legal culture via “(1) seminars and workshops, and publications that 
target judges and legal professionals, the police, the media and the public; (2) increasing 
                                                
566 Ibid. 
567 Interview number 46, June 22, 2016. 
568 Petrova, “Political and legal limitations,” 541. 
569 Ibid., 543–62. 
570 Symposium on Public Interest Law in Eastern Europe and Russia, Report (Oxford), 6. 
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media attention to public interest law; and (3) fostering public discussion and debate 
about public interest law”;571 
•! Changing the legal system via “strategic litigation as well as advocacy for legislative 
reform and, in some cases, constitutional reform”;572 and 
•! Growing the role of civil society in public interest law activities via “national and 
international networking of NGOs, fostering closer relationships between NGOs and 
bar associations and developing lawyer networks, as well as by building bridges to the 
state.”573  
 
In June 1997, COLPI and the Ford Foundation held another, larger, follow-up conference, this 
time in Durban, South Africa. The conference was once again entitled “Symposium on Public 
Interest Law In Eastern Europe and Russia”.574 The location was symbolic given the Ford 
Foundation’s experience in building a public interest law field in South Africa in the 1970s and 
1980s (which had also been an inspiration for Schull when launching the PIL funding stream) 
and it was also hoped that the growing Eastern European public interest law community could 
learn from their counterparts in South Africa.575 The goal was to continue expanding the 
Eastern European public interest law field. (The organizers had explicitly sought to invite a 
different range of NGO representatives to those who attended the Oxford symposium.)  
 
While early funding strategies had been reactive, responding to the needs of the emerging 
regional public interest law community (i.e. local NGO actors), by the late 1990s the US 
funders began to feel more confident and started to take a proactive institution-building 
approach.576 For Open Society, this more pro-active approach was launched when, in 1998, 
COLPI changed leadership again, with Arie Bloed (a Dutch international law professor who 
had worked extensively in the field of national minorities), taking over from Stephen Holmes. 
The first official COLPI newsletter from summer 1998 records that with new management 
came new focus; COLPI was now to “strive at supporting infrastructure projects rather than 
one-time events [because there] are too many international conferences and seminars which 
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end without concrete results”.577 Similarly, the Ford Foundation (writing in 2000) described its 
operating philosophy as “a long-term institution-building approach that could support grantee 
organizations as they evolved and became more independent, and could encourage grantee 
sustainability”.578 The two foundations (Open Society and Ford Foundation) were clearly 
collaborating now and viewed the construction project as a dual effort to such an extent that 
they even began to co-fund a number of NGOs.579  
 
Ultimately, this was a sophisticated institution-building effort that involved lobbying of 
European legal elites and government bodies, extensive and collaborative grant making, and 
the building of a large community of individuals spanning much of the European continent and 
all dedicated to the vision of the architects. This vision revolved around embracing the political 
and ideological activism pursued by the growing number of human rights groups in Central 
and Eastern Europe and making it more legalistic, professionalizing it and institutionalizing it, 
to create a hybrid form of “professionalized dissent”.580 Put another way, law was to be 
weaponized as a form of politics, deployed to liberate disadvantaged groups and political and 
social pariahs from the tyranny of oppressive - or simply ‘backwards’ - regimes.  
 
Although the efforts of the European public interest law movement also focused on more 
conservative and conventional models of pro bono and legal activism (i.e. state-funded legal 
aid - as will be explored more in Chapter 5), it was largely oriented towards taking a model of 
social justice lawyering that had been developed in the United States and “transplanting it into 
Eastern European Soil”.581 In this model of legal activism, the rationale is not charity, 
professional duty or even social contract theory. Rather, the rationale is oriented around one or 
other ideological cause (Roma rights, women’s rights, environmental justice, etc.) or simply 
the ideology of international human rights itself.  
 
The objective was not to promote a narrow conception of access to justice, rather it was to 
promote norm change, meaning “a change in legal culture and mentality”,582 such that law 
came to be seen and embraced as a tool for “bringing about progressive change”.583 However, 
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this also implied norm change in terms of progressive “legislative and constitutional 
reform”.584 This was a significant departure from the models of pro bono lawyering that had 
been practiced in Europe historically (explored above, in Section 1). Although some of the 
providers/actors were the same (lawyers, law professors, civil society), the recipients differed 
(disadvantaged and underrepresented groups, political and social pariahs rather than low-
income individuals) and the types of work differed, (strategic litigation, law reform, lobbying, 
monitoring and fact finding, research).    
 
2.2.2! Roles played by pro bono lawyers in the civil liberties and international human 
rights movements 
 
The role played by lawyers within the European public interest law movement is, in various 
ways, to feed into sophisticated transnational law reform efforts pursued by professionalized 
civil society actors, where such law reform is pursued via lobbying and/or litigation. Types of 
work, therefore, might include comparative legal research, preparing policy papers and amicus 
briefs and engaging in strategic litigation campaigns.  
 
With their new objective, of creating a European public interest law field, the foundations 
began to prioritize funding a new model of European non-profit: the “public interest law firm” 
(“PILF”). This was the very same model of non-profit that Ford had been funding in the 1970s, 
during the US public interest law movement. As noted in Chapter 1, the original aims of the 
US public interest law movement had been to leverage the US federal courts, prepared to use 
broad powers of judicial review, to outmaneuver rouge and non-compliant state and local 
lawmakers and enforcers who practiced an institutionalized politics of organized racial 
violence.585 The European PILFs were deploying the very same strategy, although fused with 
models of advocacy from the human rights movement (naming and shaming), using 
international legal norms to apply pressure on non-compliant national administrations.  
 
The NGOs that the foundations were funding were often the very same non-profits that had 
been set up during the human rights movement through the 80s and 90s and with which the 
funders already had longstanding relationships via their democratization efforts during that 
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time (e.g. the Polish Helsinki Foundation), but also included new organizations such as the 
Czech Legal Resources Centre, the Hungarian Human Rights Information and Documentation 
Centre, the Hungarian Legal Defense Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities and the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (all mentioned above). However, now, the funding objectives 
(and as such the activities that were being funded) were much more law reform oriented.  
 
The emergence of the Council of Europe European Convention (ECHR) and Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) had enabled NGOs to leverage on international norms in order to apply 
political and (albeit limited) legal pressure on national governments who were signatories to 
the ECHR. Indeed, by 2011, NGOs were directly involved (either formally or informally) in 
some 21.5% of cases before the ECtHR.586 The possibility to take cases to the ECtHR had thus 
opened up yet further models of legal advocacy in Europe.  
 
In addition to the domestic PILFs, there were also transnational PILFs emerging. They were 
oriented towards what might be called “transnational [human rights] public interest lawyering”. 
Transnational PILFs, such as INTERIGHTS (1982), the Kurdish Human Rights Project (1992), 
the Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (AIRE) Centre (1993), the European Roma Rights 
Centre (1996), Stichting Russian Justice Initiative (2001), Mental Disability Advocacy Centre 
(2002), European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (2003) and the Equal Rights Trust (2007), 
had a significant impact on legal advocacy and on public interest law practice in Europe.587 
These organizations specialized in taking cases to the ECtHR and European Court of Justice 
from different parts of Europe and lobbying the European institutions and member states to 
promote their respective advocacy agendas. Typically, such non-profits worked closely with a 
range of domestic NGOs (domestic PILFs and human rights organizations) who could supply 
them with promising cases and assist them with monitoring the human rights situation on the 
ground in places like Chechnya and Kurdistan. The transnational PILFs then supported the 
domestic NGOs to make powerful and compelling human rights arguments before domestic 
courts and, once cases had exhausted the relevant domestic proceedings, provided extensive 
support (or litigated themselves) in cases before Europe’s higher courts. It has been suggested 
that such NGOs have become "crucial actors that might bridge the gap between local 
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grievances and international legal mechanisms" that would fail, of their own accord, to filter 
down to the local level.588  
 
A very brief look at two iconic European PILFs (both funded by Ford and Open Society) will 
provide insight into how such organizations operate and how they make use of law and lawyers. 
The now defunct INTERIGHTS (or the International Centre for the Protection of Human 
Rights), was founded in London in 1982. Its founder, Barrister Anthony Lester (now Lord 
Lester of Herne Hill QC), was educated at Cambridge University and Harvard Law School. 
Following a period of time working for Amnesty International in the American South in the 
60s, Lester joined the Bar in 1976 where he argued many important human rights cases before 
the English, European and Commonwealth courts, including arguing the first English case 
before the ECtHR.589 Commenting on his founding of INTERIGHTS, Lester notes: 
 
"My vision for INTERIGHTS grew out of my experiences in the 1960s. Thanks to my 
studies at Harvard Law School and the research I carried out for Amnesty International 
on justice in the American South during the long hot summer of 1964, I came to 
understand the valuable role that international and comparative law, and more 
specifically litigation, could play in bringing about progressive change."590 
 
Indeed, deploying comparative law in litigation is crucial to the methodology of European 
PILFs. INTERIGHTS sought to directly engage with domestic and regional legal systems via 
the courts by “assist[ing] human rights advocates to bring cases before national and 
international courts”.591 At its founding, it described itself as "the only law centre concerned 
exclusively with the practical application of international and human rights law in national, 
regional and international courts and tribunals."592 In this effort, undertaking comparative legal 
research to identify how various European and international courts were successfully or poorly 
deploying (or even not deploying) human rights norms was crucial. Comparative legal research 
could help identify best practices in European human rights jurisprudence and, given that  
European law aspires to uniform application, could be very persuasive for courts both 
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domestically and internationally.593 To carry out its mission, INTERIGHTS relied on a small 
team of on-staff lawyers and the support of a broad network of volunteers including law student 
interns, barristers and others lawyers and legal academics across Europe. 
 
Another example, the European Roma Rights Centre, which was founded by the Open Society, 
was dedicated, from its birth in 1997, to investing its resources into tackling, through litigation, 
violence against Roma and discrimination in access to education, and promoting a culture of 
PIL across the region. A decision was apparently taken at some point in 1998 to invest 
significant resources594 on a test case that would secure a judgment from the ECtHR, finding 
that the exclusion of Roma children from regular secondary education, practiced across CEE, 
amounted to unlawful racial discrimination.595 This effort resulted, (albeit some ten years later), 
in the now famous Grand Chamber decision in DH and Others v. the Czech Republic.596 James 
Goldston (now Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative and who was the legal director 
of the ERRC from its founding in 1997 until 2002) points to the significant impact he believes 
public interest law had on the region, pointing towards the fact that, by 2006, 60 per cent of all 
applications to the ECtHR originated from CEE.597  
 
This is the kind of activity the funders were interested in bankrolling and institutionalizing, 
ambitious and pioneering NGOs engaged in social change litigation i.e. “transgressive” 
lawyering, embracing the political and social causes of client communities and seeking to use 
law (in the words of the NAACP’s Charles Hamiliton-Houston) “to force reforms where they 
could have no chance through politics”.598 They wanted to promote law reform activities 
carried out by legally tooled civil society actors who could utilize the international (or regional) 
human rights framework to, potentially, produce radical changes at the domestic level. In the 
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words of Schull, “PIL appeared to be a vehicle for moving the human rights agenda from an 




The central objectives in this chapter were to provide historical context to pro bono lawyering 
and social justice lawyering more broadly in Europe, to explore how pro bono has been 
practiced in Europe throughout history and to explore a number of contemporary progressive 
legal advocacy movements in Europe. All of this was to better understand the historical context 
into which (as will be explored in the next chapter), Big Law Pro Bono has been transplanted.  
 
We have reviewed the different shapes that pro bono, as a social practice, as a resource and as 
a social institution, has taken at various points in European history and we have seen the role 
that broader historic social and political developments have played in determining this shape. 
Whether it be political inequality, the monetization of legal services in Ancient Athens and 
Republican Rome, the growing power of institutionalized religion and European legal 
professions in the Middle Ages or the emergence of social contractarian theories and the 
Welfare state in the Early Modern and Modern eras, insofar as these factors have all played a 
role in shaping and re-shaping the legal profession and the provision of legal services, they 
have also played a role in shaping the practice of pro bono. We have noted how models of pro 
bono have fluctuated throughout the ages, from individualized ad hoc pro bono, which is likely 
a consistent feature wherever you have a professionalized practice of law, to semi-organized, 
highly organized and even institutionalized models of pro bono. The degree of sophistication 
seems to correspond to the degree of complexity of the practice of law, the number of practice 
sites and areas of social life upon which it is applied and consequently the variety of ways in 
which law impacts the average citizen. We have also noted that the rationales for pro bono 
have changed throughout the ages, from communal solidarity, civic duty, kinship and 
patronage and aristocratic honor in Ancient Athens and Republican Rome, to charitable and 
professional duty and social contract theory in the Middles Ages, the Early Modern Era and 
20th Century.  
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We have seen that commencing in Ancient times, with the monetization and 
professionalization of legal services, and through to the 20th Century, there has been a 
consistent and growing concern with access to justice, defined narrowly as the access of the 
poor and the needy to legal services and to procedures for administering justice. Access to 
justice, defined in this way, has been the major objective of pro bono practice throughout the 
ages in Europe.  We further noted that, with the emergence of nation states and then the 
European social state, the obligation of ensuring access to justice gradually shifted from a 
charitable or professional duty of lawyers and the organized bar, towards a constitutionalized 
civic right, institutionalized in the form of state-funded legal aid systems.   
   
Separately, we have explored how novel models of social justice lawyering emerged in the late 
20th Century, which both embraced and transcended conventional public service norms 
(neutrality, impartiality) implicit in much of the pro bono lawyering practice throughout 
European history, and fused them with both human rights frames and political and transgressive 
ideologies that had been cultivated in Soviet-era Central and Eastern Europe. We explored how 
these new models of social justice lawyering sought to recalibrate the American model of 
public interest lawyering for the European legal and political context. We have suggested that, 
broadly, they pursued the wide conception of access to justice (as defined in Chapter 2) insofar 
as they sought norm change, altering both the processes and outcomes of existing judicial 
mechanisms, and so redefining “justice” in favor of marginalized and underrepresented groups 
and social and political pariahs. Ultimately, we have concluded that these new models of social 
justice lawyering represented a significant departure from the models of pro bono lawyering 
that had been practiced throughout much of European history.  
 
In the following chapter, we will commence with the empirical portion of this thesis and we 
will explore how Big Law Pro Bono came to be transplanted in Europe and how the shape that 




CHAPTER 4 ! The Emergence of Big Law Pro 
Bono: An Investigation of How Big Law Pro Bono 
has Come to Exist in Europe and the Shape it has 
Taken 
 
In Chapter 1, we established that one of the most significant gaps in the existing literature on 
Big Law Pro Bono, for the purpose of this thesis, relates to the globalization of Big Law Pro 
Bono as an institutionalized set of practices and functional roles. Separately, in Chapter 1 and 
2, we have defined “access to justice” and suggested that both within the literature on pro bono 
and in the practice of Big Law Pro Bono in the US, access to justice is understood very 
narrowly, i.e. in terms of civil legal aid for low-income individuals.  We have suggested that 
this was largely consequent upon the historical context in which Big Law Pro Bono was 
institutionalized in the US, i.e. between two distinct historical moments: on the one hand, the 
War on Poverty and the emergence of the Office of Economic Opportunities Legal Services 
Program and, on the other hand, the subsequent decline in federal spending on civil legal aid. 
The bottom-line being that Big Law Pro Bono has come to be understood functionally in the 
United States as a solution to the “justice gap”, i.e. as a resource oriented toward the provision 
of civil legal aid for low-income individuals. In Chapter 3, historical context was provided for 
pro bono lawyering and social justice lawyering more broadly in Europe.  
 
In this Chapter, the overriding objective is to explore the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono 
by answering the question: how did Big Law Pro Bono come to exist in Europe and what shape 
has it taken in this new context? In the next Chapter, we will explore why it has taken the shape 
that it has. The overriding objective for this Chapter, (to explore the globalization of Big Law 
Pro Bono) will be achieved by way of three sub-objectives. Firstly, we will briefly refresh our 
understating of Big Law Pro Bono in the United States, note some of its defining features, and 
recall how it came to take the institutional shape and orientation that it did (Section 1.1). 
Secondly, we will explore the process by which Big Law Pro Bono travelled from the United 
States to Europe between the 1990s and early 2000s (Section 1.2). Finally, we will explore the 
institutional features of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe today and discuss to what extent it 
diverges from its American forbearer (Section 2).  
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As explored in Chapter 1, in the United States, low-income individuals make up the largest 
category of pro bono clients while studies have suggested that pro bono accounts for between 
one third and one quarter of the full-time lawyer equivalent staff within the US civil legal aid 
system.600 Indeed, a 2016 survey revealed that 85% of pro bono lawyers had provided services 
directly to individuals as compared to 35.5% who had provided assistance to organizations.601 
Meanwhile, a 2012 survey revealed that 70% of lawyers at large firms (i.e. in this survey 
referring to firms with more than 100 lawyers) provided free legal services to persons of limited 
means in the last year (including advice, representation and mediation) whereas just 42% of 
such lawyers had provided advice to organizations in the same period.602 Just 32% of lawyers 
at such firms indicated that they “typically” served organizations as pro bono clients.603 
Moreover, as compared to lawyers at smaller firms, sole practitioners and corporate counsel, 
lawyers at large firms provided the greatest amount of pro bono legal services to persons of 
limited means (averaging 77.7 hours per lawyer per year).604 It is against such data that we can 
make sense of the claim of Scott Cummings, that in the United States, “[p]ro bono has thus 
emerged as the dominant means of dispensing free representation to poor and underserved 
clients, eclipsing state-sponsored legal services and other nongovernmental mechanisms in 
importance.”605 In this chapter, we will come to see that, in Europe, Big Law Pro Bono does 
not significantly (or even meaningfully) contribute directly to access to justice for the poor. If 
we were to define access to justice in the way that it has been defined in the Pro Bono literature 
and in US Big Law Pro Bono practice, then in Europe, Big Law Pro Bono would seem 
inconsequential and possibly even unworthy of academic attention (if we commence from the 
existing body of pro bono literature). Rather, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has taken a unique 
shape, to be explored below, and is oriented towards providing legal assistance to Europe’s 
large population of NGOs. In the next Chapter, referring to the historical analysis in Chapter 
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1! US Origins and the Emergence of Pro Bono in Europe  
 
In the following, although we will touch upon developments in Continental Europe, significant 
focus will be placed on the US and the UK. This is for two main reasons, firstly, because Big 
Law Pro Bono began to develop in the US between 1970 and the mid-1990s and in the UK, 
already in the early and mid-1990s, whereas it did not significantly reach the Continent until 
the early 2000s. Secondly, the institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom (or, rather, London) was the cause of, and precondition for, Big 
Law Pro Bono development on the Continent.  Consequently, it makes sense to look at what 
happened in the US and the UK before we look more closely at Continental Europe.  
 
In the discussion on the US origins of Big Law Pro Bono, in Section 1.1 below, although much 
of this material has been covered in Chapter 1, the objective here is to provide a quick recap 
but with a focus on how a specific model of pro bono became institutionalized in the US (i.e. 
focused on the provision of civil legal aid). As mentioned, given that Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe is a direct consequence of the globalization of the US model, it is all the more striking 
that the European model should look different from its forbearer. In this Chapter, in exploring 
globalization of Big Law Pro Bono and its institutionalization in Europe, it is thus important to 
first review its institutionalization in the US.   
 
1.1! US Origins: a steadfast commitment to individual access to justice   
 
In the United States, as in Europe, pro bono legal services (broadly defined) were historically 
provided charitably and sporadically by individual lawyers.606 Mimicking the developments in 
Europe (explored in Chapter 3), lawyers organized throughout the 19th and in to the mid 20th 
century to provide pro bono legal services before the state began to subsidize such work in the 
1960s. In the US, private “legal aid societies” were established (very often by European 
immigrants for their own benefit). In contrast to the European models which relied on 
voluntarism or funding from municipalities, Churches and the like, these were typically 
charities funded by private sources and staffed by full-time legal aid lawyers to provide civil 
legal assistance to those who could not otherwise afford a lawyer. Between 1876 and 1946, 
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some 70 legal aid societies were established across the United States.607 However, despite their 
growth, by 1963 it was estimated that only 400 legal aid lawyers were available to assist a pool 
of 50 million potential clients.608   
 
As explored in Chapter 1, things were to change dramatically during the course of the 1960s 
and the 1970s as a result of the US “poverty law movement” and “public interest law 
movement”. These movements saw the emergence of a heavily institutionalized and federally 
funded civil legal aid system. More to the point, for our purposes here, the movements inspired 
elite law students as the new “public interest law firms” began to attract the best students and 
drain the traditional talent pool of large commercial law firms.609 One commentator at the time 
reported young lawyers increasingly “following varied professional paths leading toward 
neighborhood legal service programs, public defender offices and new public interest law 
firms, and away from more traditional employment, including the high-paying "corporate" law 
firms.”610 As was explored in Chapter 1, elite law firms responded by setting up pro bono 
programs.611 However, as mentioned previously, what is noticeable about the programs that 
the law firms set up in this period is their intense orientation towards a narrow definition of 
access to justice, i.e. providing civil legal aid for low-income individuals. The programs that 
were set up variously involved: setting up branch offices in poor neighborhoods to service low-
income clients; or seconding lawyers to legal service organizations and legal aid offices.612 
There was then, from the dawn of Big Law Pro Bono in the US, a linking of the resource with 
the ideology of the poverty law movement and the mission to close the “justice gap”.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, this merger (of pro bono in general and Big Law Pro Bono in particular, 
with the efforts to promote a narrow conception of access to justice) was deepened in the 
subsequent years as the Federal government slashed legal aid funding and placed increasing 
pressure on the private bar to pick up the slack. Against this background context, the organized 
bar began to put forward pro bono as a response to such calls for greater private volunteerism. 
With the same stroke, the bar also sought to redefine public service away from more 
“transgressive” models of public interest lawyering (pioneered during the early days of the 
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poverty and public interest law movements and which had caused backlash among Republicans 
both within the executive and in Congress) and towards a more conservative model, with which 
it was much more comfortable.613  Although the 1980s to early 1990s saw pro bono decline as 
large firms were engaged in rapid economic expansion and growth, limiting their capacity to 
engage in pro bono work,614 it was during this period that the organized bar invested heavily 
into institutionalizing a specific model of pro bono. A model that construed pro bono 
functionally as a solution to the justice gap created by limited federal spending on civil legal 
aid.615 Pro bono was thus increasingly defined as “a commitment by private-sector attorneys to 
themselves engage in direct representation to discharge their service obligations.”616  
 
The ABA introduced a model rule in 1993, which established an aspirational target of 50 hours 
and narrowed the definition of pro bono to provide that each lawyer  “should aspire to render 
at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year," a "substantial majority" of 
which targeted to "persons of limited means" or organizations that advocate on their behalf.617 
To promote this model rule, the organized bar began funding non-profit legal services 
organizations and encouraging collaboration with private law firms and promoting 
volunteerism within those law firms, where volunteerism meant providing legal services 
directly to low-income individuals. As suggested in Chapter 1, this discourse, and this vision, 
would set the course for the second major period of institutionalization within large US law 
firms. The late 1990s into the early 2000s saw a resurrection of Big Law Pro Bono in the United 
States. This resurrection coincided with vast reductions in US Federal funding on civil legal 
aid (in the guise of the Legal Services Corporation). The centralized and state-sponsored civil 
legal aid system was replaced by a “decentralized network of local organizations designed to 
meet the needs of the poor through private-sector volunteerism.”618 The resurrected model of 
Big Law Pro Bono took shape against this background context and partly in response to this 
demand for volunteer legal services, to shore up the depleted civil legal aid system. This, and 
likely a degree of path dependency, ensured that the focus remained squarely on access to 
justice for individuals, as it had done in the 1970s. In this context, a new institution emerged: 
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the “clearinghouse”. These purpose-built civil society organizations (e.g. the Pro Bono Institute 
“PBI” established in 1995) grew naturally in this environment to serve the firms by connecting 
them and their young lawyers with non-profits and individuals in need of pro bono legal 
services.619 From the very beginning, however, clearinghouses were focused largely on 
generating work for their law firm members that would directly support individual access to 
justice. PBI already had 135 law firm members by 1996 and 66.5% of the work generated for 
members through the clearinghouse was focused on securing access to justice for low-income 
individuals.620  
 
During this period in the 1990s, full-time Pro Bono Counsel were appointed and internal pro 
bono committees were set up to manage the firms’ pro bono practices. The total pro bono hours 
at the top 200 US firms shot up from around 1.5 million in 1993 to 4.5 million in 2008 (see 
Figure 2 below). This combination of trends has transformed Big Law Pro Bono in the US into 
a highly organized and sophisticated practice with most top law firms featuring in-house pro 
bono management structures by the early 2000s. The graphs below (Figure 1 and Figure 2) 
chart the growth of pro bono practice among the top US law firms from the 1990s up to 2008.  
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By the early 2000s then, Big Law Pro Bono was thriving in the United States. It was a heavily 
institutionalized de-facto civil legal aid system.  
                                                
621 American Lawyer, as quoted in Boutcher, “Institutionalization of Pro Bono Publico,” 35–36. 





























By 2015 the top 200 firms were carrying out 55 pro bono hours per lawyer per year, up from 
an average of 38 hours in 2001. Meanwhile, between 1993 and 2015, the total number of pro 
bono hours being carried out by the top 200 firms had increased by over 200% from roughly 
1.5 million to roughly 4.75 million.623 
 
1.2! European origins: the emergence of a “global corporate bar” and the dawn 
of Big Law Pro Bono in the UK  
 
Between the 1950s and the 1990s the average size of commercial law firms had expanded 
rapidly. In America, the fifty largest firms in 1950 had an average of only 49 lawyers. By 1979, 
the average was 321 lawyers and by 2001 621.624 As of 2015, there were 23 US law firms with 
over 1000 lawyers and an average of 900 lawyers at the top 100 firms.625 Meanwhile, in 
England, although by 1950 there were already 38 firms with more than 50 lawyers, there was 
a legal restriction in place until 1967 that limited law firms to not more than 20 partners.626 
Consequently, firms stayed smaller for longer. However, once the restriction was removed, 
they expanded relatively quickly and by 1997, there was an average of just under 200 lawyers 
among the top 20 firms. 627  By 2015, the largest firm, Clifford Chance, had 708 lawyers, 
followed by Linklaters with 540, while the tenth (Norton Rose) and twentieth (Berwin 
Leighton) largest, had 310 and 146 lawyers respectively. So, while the top five or so English 
firms rivalled the top 100 US firms by the late 1990s, many English firms remained 
significantly smaller. In any event, the rapid growth among both American and English firms 
between the 1960s and the 1990s, and in to the present day, is clear.  In Continental Europe, 
the pattern is similar to England in that law firms remained smaller for longer. In Germany, 
until 1989, law firms were prohibited from practicing in more than one city, which effectively 
prevented the emergence of large law firms.628 Unlike the UK or France, due to Germany’s 
development as a decentralized federalized state there was no centralized legal market 
organozed around a single major economic center (i.e. as in London or Paris). Consequently, 
when the restriction was lifted, German law firms began to merge and consolidate, connecting 
offices in multiple major economic centers (Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich and 
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Berlin). Similarly, in France, firms were prohibited from having more than one office until 
1989.629 The Netherlands is somewhat of an outlier in that by the mid-1980s it already boasted 
larger law firms than any other Continental European country.630 These were largely formed 
through regional tie-ups of Randstad-based firms, which took place throughout the 1980s. 
Across the rest of Continental Europe, with the exception of a handful of large French firms, 
European firms remained relatively small until a wave of internationalization kicked off in the 
1990s. 
 
Indeed, in addition to the expansion in size, law firms have been internationalizing at an 
astonishing rate. The late 1980s into the early 2000s saw extensive international expansion 
among large American and English law firms. Figure 3 below illustrates the incredible rate of 
internationalization among six leading global law firms. Across the six firms, there was an 




Firm Number of Staff Number of foreign offices 
1987 2002 2016 % Increase – 
1987 to 2016 
1987 2002 2016 % Increase – 




1070 3762 4200 +292 30 68 69 +130 
Clifford 
Chance (UK) 
803 3180 3400 +323 12 33 34 +183 
Jones Day 
(US) 
933 1735 2500 +167 5 29 24 +380 
Freshfields 
(UK) 
351 1604 2460 +600 4 28 26 +550 
Sidley & 
Austin (US) 
689 1278 1779 +158 3 8 10 +233 
Skadden & 
Arps (US) 
852 1680 1700 +99 2 22 14 +600 
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This internationalization has seen a large increase in the number of European offices 
maintained by American and English firms. A 2000 study revealed that of the top twenty cities 
where large law firms maintained offices, 12 were in Europe. 
 
Figure 4632 
Such Anglo-American expansion in Europe was met with 
varying degrees of caution, protectionism or outright hostility 
by the local legal professions633 (reactions that would often be 
mirrored in the local reception of institutionalized Big Law 
Pro Bono practice – to be discussed in Chapter 5). For 
example, in 1984 the Brussels Bar allowed members to enter 
partnerships with foreign lawyers but imposed a quota on 
non-European Community lawyers.634 In France, a 1992 law 
prohibited any foreign law firm established after 1971 from 
practicing French law and prevented any established before 
that date from using their firm name.635 In Spain, foreign law 
firms were prohibited from employing Spanish lawyers while 
Swedish law prohibited cross border mergers.636 This pattern 
was common to much of Continental Europe (perhaps with 
the exception of the Netherlands), and US and UK law firms managed to operate only by 
seeking ad hoc permission from local regulators or by finding ways to circumvent such 
restrictions.637  
 
Ultimately, local Bars would allow foreign law firms in gradually through a series of reforms 
over a period of time, with a key development taking place in 1998. Within the European legal 
market, prior to 1998, transitional mergers between European law firms were pursued 
cautiously and on an ad hoc basis given the varying regulatory environment discussed above. 
The passing of the 1998 “Establishment Directive” (Directive 98/5/EC)638 (to be implemented 
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nationally by 2000) by the EU legislature paved the way for European law firms to establish 
branch offices in other EU member states and to employ lawyers from multiple EU countries 
within the same firm. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Continental European firms, both in 
response to US firms, and consequent upon the passing of the Establishment Directive, pursued 
their own internationalization strategies. Dutch firms were the first to engage in transnational 
mergers in the early 1990s, pursuing tie-ups with firms in Belgium, France and Luxembourg.639 
In Germany, there were a series of mergers between large German and British firms in the year 
2000 (Clifford Chance merged with Pünder Volhard, Weber & Axster; Freshfields united with 
both Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund and Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Löber; Lovells 
with Boesebeck Droste; and Linklaters with Oppenhoff & Rädler).640 Such mergers were not 
only expansions into Germany, but as many of these German firms already had offices in 
Central and Eastern Europe and even in Southern Europe prior to the mergers, these mergers 
represented UK expansion into Continental Europe more broadly.641 
 
It has also been noted that US and Anglo-European firms pursued different internationalization 
strategies during this period.642 While US firms were typically deploying an “export-model” 
whereby US trained and qualified lawyers would be sent to satellite offices typically to serve 
US clients abroad, Anglo-European firms were taking on largely locally trained and qualified 
lawyers in the foreign offices who were serving both local clients and clients from the home 
jurisdictions. Consequently, US firms had minimal penetration of the local legal market and 
minimal engagement with local law and regulation “in so far as they were more likely to 
provide advice on New York or US law to large multinationals than to serve small and medium-
size companies on issues intersecting with the local jurisdictions”.643 
 
This variance in strategy was also reflected in how the firms were managed. While US firms 
were managed largely from their headquarters which controlled and managed the foreign 
offices in accordance with US professional standards and practices, the Anglo-European firms 
were much more horizontal in their management structure and locally trained and qualified 
partners had much more influence in the overall governance of such firms. This would all have 
significant bearing on how pro bono would develop in Europe in the coming years.     
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As already discussed above, at the time that this international expansion was taking place, Big 
Law Pro Bono practice was in the process of being (re)institutionalized in large US firms. 
Around the same time, from around 1996, Big Law Pro Bono was also being institutionalized 
in the largest London firms. In England, however, this was not a bottom-up movement of young 
idealistic lawyers, but rather a process of firms reluctantly and slowly embracing pro bono 
practice under pressure from multiple directions. Ultimately, there were four primary factors 
leading to the emergence of pro bono practice in large London law firms: pressure from the 
British political establishment on London firms to make a greater contribution to society and 
threats of compulsory pro bono; the growth of a corporate volunteering movement led by FTSE 
100 companies (also clients of London law firms) which in turn led to firms becoming 
increasingly aware of the PR benefits of corporate volunteering and identifying, in pro bono, 
the legal sector’s response to the corporate volunteering movement; the fact that the English 
Bar had established a coordinated pro bono program, placing pressure on the solicitors firms 
to do the same; and the fact that US firms began to both promote pro bono practice in their 
London offices and appoint full-time pro bono mangers based in London for their UK and 
European practices.    
 
As you will recall from Chapter 3, in Britain, the pioneering Legal Aid and Advice Act was 
passed in 1949 radically altering how legal services were provided to the poor. From that point 
forward, the government compensated private lawyers who provided free legal assistance.644 
By 1950, the resulting system provided legal aid to 80% of the population, reaching as far as 
the lower middle class.645 However, between the 1950s and the 1980s the system become 
hugely expensive and by 1989, the British government was spending twice as much per capita 
on civil legal aid than its closest rivals in Europe (the Dutch and the Swedish), more than three 
times as much as the Germans and more than ten times as much as the French.646 The system 
had expanded in a number of ways: government spending dramatically increased; the 
percentage of lawyers (both solicitors and barristers) involved in the system soared; the number 
of citizens applying successfully for legal aid had increased; and the types of legal assistance 
being provided through the system has significantly expanded.647 
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This was all due to a range of factors including the growing number of lawyers thanks to the 
increasing accessibility of legal education and also a surge in the number of divorces between 
1950 and 1980 (and legal aid certificates being issues for divorce proceedings).648 Between 
1980 and 1992 alone, government expenditure on legal aid increased by over 600%.649 The 
Conservative government responded between 1992 and 1995 by introducing a series of 
measures which collectively constituted the most significant cuts to the system since it was 
introduced in 1949.650 The cuts chiefly consisted in reducing eligibility (i.e. the percentage of 
the population eligible for legal aid) and reducing fees (i.e. lawyer remuneration). The cuts 
caused significant backlash from the legal profession (both the Bar, representing Barristers and 
the Law Society, representing solicitors) and the Labour opposition.651 The Law Society 
launched a “Save Legal Aid” campaign across the county. The Labour party however, despite 
its opposition to the government measures, could not commit to big increases in the legal aid 
budget.652 Instead, part of their response to the cuts, and the anger these caused within the 
profession and the broader society, consisted in turning the heat up on a certain “section of the 
legal profession” (i.e. Big Law).  In 1994 Labour’s legal affairs spokesman (shadow justice 
minister), Paul Boateng, complained that there was “a section of the legal profession that makes 
no contribution at all, apart from direct taxation, to the traditional duty and responsibility of 
lawyers as a profession to the proper and equitable administration of justice”, and by 1996, he 
was threatening legislation to force the issue (i.e. mandatory pro bono).653  
 
It was against the background context of threats to the legal aid system and the ballooning legal 
aid budget that a Working Party on pro bono was established within the Law Society in 1992. 
The aims of its founder – Andrew Phillips (now Lord Phillips of Sudbury) – however, were 
less focused on the crisis in legal aid and more focused on what he saw as a crisis within 
commercial legal practice. He sought “to combat the impact of ‘intense specialization, giantism 
and decommunalisation on the part of commercial lawyers’ and to bolster professional 
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ideology”.654 At the time Philips was a renowned charity lawyer and was Senior Partner in the 
London-based commercial law firm that he had founded, Bates, Wells & Braithwaite. Not 
incidentally, Philips was also involved, during this period, in the leading corporate social 
responsibility initiative in the UK, Business in the Community (BITC – to be discussed further 
below).655  
 
Phillips chaired a session on pro bono at the Law Society Conference in 1993. Unfortunately, 
Philips initial efforts met with failure; the conference revealed a lack of appetite within the 
profession to engage in pro bono and a shared belief that the profession could better invest into 
lobbying the government for more legal aid.656 Given the broader context of severe government 
cuts to the legal aid system, this is perhaps not surprising. A report prepared by the Working 
Group following the conference unambiguously concluded that the state-sponsored legal aid 
scheme “represented an acknowledgment by the state that primary responsibility for ensuring 
access to justice for all lies with the Government, not with the profession”.657 The report 
suggested that “the profession's acceptance of an ethical responsibility to do pro bono may 
weaken the state's obligation to make adequate provision.”658 It was, the profession felt, the 
role of the Social Bar (i.e. specialized legal aid lawyers), as funded by the government, to 
address questions of access to justice and gone were the days when this concerned the whole 
of the profession.  Indeed, the Working Party suggested that pro bono culture was a remnant 
from times when the practice of law was a “protected monopoly” and that, with increasing 
competition among solicitors, such duty had evaporated.659  
 
Nevertheless, the report conceded that firms might engage in voluntary pro bono services in 
areas of law not covered by legal aid.660 Despite this concession, the report, in the words of 
Phillips “more or less died an instant death”.661 A subsequent attempt by Phillips to introduce 
a rule equivalent to (and inspired by) the ABA pro bono rule in the US also failed, as did a 
proposal (also inspired from the US) by notable civil liberties lawyer Geoffrey Bindman to 
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have large firms contribute interest on client accounts to a pro bono fund.662  
 
The issue was that the Working Party was divided, with major resistance (especially to 
mandatory pro bono) coming from City firms (Big Law) within the group, led chiefly by John 
Kennedy, a senior partner at Allen & Overy.663 Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 
report, likely a result of the internal conflict within the group, was the manner in which it 
defined “pro bono”, well beyond individual access to justice to explicitly to include legal and 
non-legal work (and financial donations) carried out for charities and civil society 
organizations (or in the words of the report “community organizations”).664 Indeed, much of 
the early pro bono work performed by Big Law in London was for charities and local civil 
society and, in particular,  so-called “local enterprise agencies”. Local enterprise agencies 
(what might be called business “incubators” today) were essentially joint ventures between 
large companies and local authorities which sought to help stimulate small business growth by 
providing assistance to start-ups and small businesses, particularly in depressed communities. 
For example, Clifford Chance provided legal assistance to a project in Brixton (a largely Black 
British community in South London, rocked by race riots in the early 1980s) which leased out 
workshops for new businesses and Linklaters provided free legal advice to a community health 
centre.665 Writing in 1996, Bindman complained of such initiatives that: 
 
“[f]or the most part […] they are restricted to acts of pure charity or to commercial 
areas of law in which the firms concerned have particular expertise. No doubt these 
initiatives also have promotional or marketing value, presenting an appealing image 
of unselfishness and social concern. What they lack is any significant impact on the 
daily legal problems of ordinary people in such matters as housing, crime, employment, 
immigration, discrimination, and welfare.”666    
 
However, the focus of Big Law on this model of community oriented pro bono was not by 
accident and related to link between the firms and the leading British Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) initiative, Business in the Community. BITC had been founded in 1981 
following the so-called “Sunningdale conference” which brought together 17 corporate and 
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government officials from the UK and 10 from the US to discuss “Corporate Community 
Involvement”.667 The idea for the conference came from Ministers within the British Ministry 
of Environment (both Labour and subsequently Conservative ministers were involved in the 
planning) who had been inspired by the US CSR and urban renewal movements.668 The 
Ministers invited heads of British business along with a number of American business leaders 
who had played a role in the urban regeneration of Baltimore and Detroit in the 1970s.669 There 
was apparently a feeling, among government and business on both sides of the Atlantic, that 
with the elections of Ronald Regan and Margret Thatcher, there was a need for business to step 
up to respond to the shrinking role of the State in society.670 The British participants blamed 
the welfare state for the UK lagging behind the US in terms of CSR, with one conference 
delegate suggesting: 
 
“Whatever the merits of Britain’s welfare state and its services, and its taxes, it tends 
to encourage the firm impression among many that the well-being of fellow citizens is 
essentially someone else’s business. Hence it is not surprising that industry and 
commerce do not readily accept that they might have a commitment to the welfare not 
only of their employees but also to the community in which they exist”.671 
 
BITC was founded shortly after the conference by ten member companies in 1981 including 
Shell (from which the first two full-time staff members of BITC were seconded), IBM, Marks 
& Spencer, Barclays, Legal and General and BP.672 Indeed, many of the original founders were 
strong supports of the Thatcher government and saw BITC as complementary to the “small 
government” policies she championed. The focus of BITC at the outset was on engaging 
business in helping to regenerate local economies, particularly in urban areas depressed by 
corporate closures.673 This was achieved through cash donations to local businesses, reskilling 
of workers, providing premises, equipment and, crucially for our purposes, employee 
volunteering.674 In 1989, BITC founded a “Professional Firms Group”, the idea being that 
professional firms would “volunteer in crosssectoral teams to provide pro-bono help to 
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community projects”.675 By 1996, over 200 firms had joined the Professional Firms Group, 40 
of which were law firms.676 It was through BITC that Clifford Chance and Linklaters were 
receiving pro bono opportunities linked to Local Enterprise Agencies.677 BITC was “effectively 
running a clearinghouse for accountants and lawyers” at this time.678 It was momentum from 
BITC, along with a few other factors, that would ultimately lead to momentum within the Law 
Society and among the City firms.  
 
In addition to the momentum coming from BITC, the Law Society was coming under pressure 
from a number of directions to make more progress with respect to solicitors pro bono. Indeed, 
as noted above, by 1996 Boateng (Labour’s shadow justice minister) was threatening 
legislation to compel mandatory pro bono.679 He wrote to the head of the Law Society 
indicating that, if progress was not made, he would impose “other alternatives of a statutory 
nature, if necessary”, once Labour came into power (by the time it was clear that Labour were 
likely to win the next general election1997).680 In the same year the Bar, also under pressure, 
set up a “pro bono unit” as an independent charity to coordinate pro bono work amongst 
barristers.681 The legal press urged solicitors to follow in their footsteps suggesting that, 
“[s]urely it is time for the profession either to follow the Bar's lead or seek some form of 
cooperation with it on the matter”.682 Moreover, in his letter to the head of the Law Society, 
Boateng praised the Bar for setting up its own pro bono unit but regretted "the Law Society 
would appear to have done nothing to build on the recommendation of its own pro bono 
working party in 1994."683 Undoubtedly all of this created some pressure on the Law Society 
and its President, trying to explain the lack of progress to the legal press, suggested that, “if the 
Law Society is seen to be actively pushing the profession into pro bono we could ruin the 
goodwill of certain parts of the profession. This may do more harm than good.”684   
 
As pressure mounted, things began to budge. It started with the founding in 1996 of the 
Solicitors Pro Bono Group (SPBG, now “Law Works”) by Phillips and Caroline Knighton, 
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head of BITC Professional Firms Group.685 SPBG was established to unite and centralize the 
pro bono efforts of lawyers across England and Wales. Founding firms included Mishcon de 
Reya, Linklaters & Paines, Clyde & Co, Baker & McKenzie and Clifford Chance. Funding for 
SPBG was provided directly by the firms themselves (which continues to be the case today).686 
At the launch, both the Law Society and the founding law firm members were keen to underline 
that any coordinated pro bono efforts should not undermine the legal aid system.687 
 
Its membership grew rapidly and by 2000, already included 130 firms and 40% of the top 50 
firms.688 A process of institutionalizing pro bono practice commenced at the very top English 
law firms as they began to appoint full-time pro bono managers and directors and implement 
pro bono policies. The first was Lovells (now Hogan Lovells), which appointed Yasim Waljee 
(now OBE) in 1997, followed by Felicity Kirk at Clifford Chance a few months later; 
Linklaters and Allen & Overy followed shortly after this.689 Kirk was an asset finance lawyer 
working at Clifford Chance and had gotten involved in non-legal volunteering through BITC. 
She was considering taking a position with BITC to run the employee volunteering scheme for 
the Professional Firms Group but was persuaded by Tony Willis (Partner at Clifford Chance 
and one of the key founding members of the SPBG) to take a full-time pro bono manager 
position with Clifford Chance instead.690  The impetus to hire Waljee came from the US rather 
than from BITC. Litigation Partner at Lovells, Graham Huntley, had been heavily involved in 
US pro bono Death Row litigation and had appointed Waljee to help him coordinate this 
work.691 Firms also began to donate money and undertake more pro bono work for local law 
centers (providing general legal advice for defined hours, a few times a week, to low income 
clients in local communities). For example, Allen & Overy agreed to donate up to GBP 15,000 
each year to Wandsworth and Merton Law Centre which would include the firm taking on “in-
house pro bono cases” in addition to providing lawyers for the advice sessions.692  
 
Despite such progress, a 1998 survey, conducted by The Lawyer magazine, into the pro bono 
practice of the top 120 British firms concluded that, “the vast majority of firms are at best 
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apathetic, at worst dismissive”.693 Nevertheless, the next 5 to 10 years would see large progress 
being made. Already by 1999 there were six firms that maintained full-time pro bono 
personnel.694 It was also during this period that corporate clients of large law firms began to 
embrace the pro bono spirit; in 1999 the in-house legal team of British Aerospace, part of the 
BITC movement, adopted a policy requiring law firms to undertake pro bono work or face 
being dropped from their panel of legal advisors.695 The evidence suggests that various other 
corporate clients began to follow suit.696 Indeed, Clifford Chance in a 1999 statement provided 
to The Lawyer magazine revealed that, “[w]e recently had a request for information on our 
community policy for a major client. In the US, this is a common practice and our clients 
increasingly expect us to be actively involved in community affairs - as they are."697 The point 
here is that, increasingly, Big Law firms were being asked about their corporate social 
responsibility practices by corporate clients when they were being evaluated in pitches; this 
created a further incentive for firms to take pro bono seriously.  
 
The progress achieved in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the gradual institutionalization 
of pro bono practice in large commercial law firms in England. In 2002, just 15% of lawyers 
at firms with over 81 partners were engaging in pro bono practice. By 2012, that figure had 
soared to 45%.698 Meanwhile, just over 30% of lawyers in firms with 26 or more partners were 
engaged in pro bono work in 2002. That figure jumped to 57% by 2007 (although it dropped 
again to 41% by 2012). Even in 2009, in the midst of the financial crisis, very large City firms 
were reporting growing rates of pro bono. Linklaters reported a 23% increase of pro bono 
activity in their London office between 2007-2008 and 2008-2009.699 Clifford Chance reported 
an 8% increase in the same period and indicated that over half of its lawyers were now involved 
in pro bono work of some kind. Tom Dunn (the Pro Bono Director at Clifford Chance) said at 
the time, "I put the increase in pro bono activity at Clifford Chance down to its steady on-going 
institutionalization".700  
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What is very noticeable about the development of Big Law Pro Bono in the UK, as contrasted 
to the US, is the total hostility of firms, from the very beginning, to defining Big Law Pro Bono 
in a way that would require the firms to undertake work directly for low-income individuals 
(i.e. promoting direct access to justice for individuals).701 This, despite pressures from multiple 
directions to do so. Criticism from the left of the political establishment which, as noted above, 
had been the major catalyst for Big Law Pro Bono in England had been chiefly premised on 
the argument that Big Law should play a greater role in shoring up the legal aid system, either 
in the form of a tax on commercial law firms that would go towards legal aid funding or in the 
form of Big Law lawyers simply doing more pro bono work.702 Meanwhile, Phillips (the 
primary driver of early pro bono efforts) had been heavily involved in the “Law Centre 
Movement” (discussed in Chapter 1) which saw over 3000 lawyers collaborating with 
community workers to provide heavily discounted legal assistance to persons who were not 
otherwise being serviced by the profession (in the model of a family/community doctor) and 
evidently took this as inspiration in his efforts to promote pro bono at the top of the 
profession.703 Similarly, Bindman, the other major advocate for solicitors pro bono from the 
very beginning, as noted above, was deeply concerned that large firms should focus less on 
providing support to community organizations and more on the needs of average people 
(“housing, crime, employment, immigration, discrimination, and welfare).”704  However, as 
described above, Philips’ and Bindman’s initial efforts at promoting this model of pro bono 
within Big Law were met with failure. This opposition of Big Law to engaging in legal aid 
work (for fear of undermining the legal aid system and shifting the duty from the state back 
onto the profession) remained steady over the years as increasingly drastic cuts were made to 
the state-funded legal aid system. In 2006, a group of 28 City firms took the unprecedented 
step of openly lobbying the government to protect the legal aid system.705 Commenting at the 
time, the Law Society chief executive, Des Hudson, said: "Law firms across the country are 
united in the fight to convince the Government that cuts to the legal aid budget will result in 
thousands of people across the country being denied access to justice."706 What Hudson did not 
mention, was that a large motivation of the firms in taking this stance was probably to ward off 
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any suggestion that individual access to justice was the responsibility of Big Law. This attitude 
was also partially reflected in the nature of pro bono work that Big Law got involved in during 
this period. There was a significant focus -  both on the part of the SPBG (which effectively 
became the first clearinghouse in the UK) and on the part of the full-time pro bono managers - 
on working for charities (and other forms of legal work that fell outside the legal aid system).707 
A 2004 survey of the pro bono programs of 40 City firms demonstrated that while firms were 
providing support to individuals through a number of local law centers (one-off advice clinics 
for low income individuals), the bulk of law firm clients were charities, community 
organizations and advocacy organizations. 708 Another reason for this might be the dual nature 
of the English legal profession, i.e. it was only natural that a significant amount of pro bono 
work for individuals (so far as litigation was required) was handled by the Bar and indeed 
SPBG (Law Works) had a policy of referring such matters on to the Bar.709  
 
This orientation of Big Law in London, away from direct individual access to justice (what the 
firms perceived as “legal aid” work) and towards work for non-profits would, in some ways, 
set the tone for the development of Big Law Pro Bono across the continent and was one, among 
a number of reasons, for the distinct model of Big Law Pro Bono that evolved in Europe (to be 
explored below). Indeed, it is worth recalling that, by the mid-2000s, several of the largest 
British firms had merged with major German practices, which had also yielded them practices 
in Central and Eastern Europe amongst other places. Thus, while institutionalized pro bono 
was unheard of within the largest continental European firms at this time, mergers with UK 
and US firms during this period paved the way for pro bono in Continental Europe.710 
Moreover, UK based pro bono clients (non-profits), embedded within transnational civil 
society networks, would ask London firms for support for their affiliates on the Continent.711 
Indeed, in Continental Europe (both West and East), the development of institutionalized Big 
Law Pro Bono culture moved much more slowly and was in some respects an outgrowth from 
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the developments in the UK and the US and the internationalization of Big Law. Although this 
will be explored further below and in the following Chapter, it is worth pointing out that the 
first full-time pro bono position in Continental Europe was established only in 2013 by DLA 
Piper. Ozgur Kahale, an English-qualified Turk, was appointed to be the Pro Bono Director for 
Europe, based in DLA’s Paris office. This was followed in 2016 by the appointment of the 
author as Pro Bono Associate for Europe to DLA’s Amsterdam office. Thereafter came 
somewhat of a trickle of such appointments as Dentons created two such Europe-wide roles 
(based in Budapest and Prague) in 2016 and 2017, Hogan Lovells created a role in Madrid in 
2017 and Freshfields converted a pre-existing CSR role into a pro bono role in Frankfurt, also 
in 2017.  
 
What is important to note for present purposes is that by the end of the first decade of the 2000s, 
pro bono practice had been significantly institutionalized in the top 100 American firms and 
certainly in the top ten or so English firms. Tie-ups between Continental European firms and 
US/UK Mega Firms had created a network of European offices in which pro bono practice 
could potentially be developed. Before we go on to explore what happened next, in the 
following Chapter, we will first explore what Big Law Pro Bono looks like in Europe today 
and how this contrasts with the shape it has taken in the United States.  
   
2! Big Law Pro Bono in Europe: what makes it stand out?   
 
In the remainder of this Chapter, we will explore the contours of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
today. As discussed in Chapter 1, the existing literature on Big Law Pro Bono is significantly 
praxis-oriented and largely revolves around a number of key themes, including the internal 
organization and structure of pro bono and the actors and roles within the pro bono universe 
including pro bono professionals and pro bono clients. To date, this literature has primarily 
focused on Big Law Pro Bono as it has been institutionalized in the United States. Also in 
Chapter 1, several gaps in the literature were identified, specifically in relation to the role 
played by intermediary or referral organizations (i.e. clearinghouses) in the US, and also 
relating to the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono as an institutionalized set of practice and 
functional roles beyond the US, and the role of clearinghouses in this process. It was suggested 
that whereas certain features of Big Law Pro Bono are likely to be context transcending and 
present in any region or jurisdiction where Big Law Pro Bono is deployed, others are likely to 
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be more context specific and variable depending upon the specific location. Whether a feature 
falls into the former or the latter category likely depends upon whether that feature flows from 
the logic of Big Law itself (such as the structures, processes and hierarchies of large 
commercial law firms or the preferences of multinational corporate clients) or from the logic 
of the local legal market (such as local Bar regulations or the prevailing system for the 
provision of legal services to the poor).   
 
In this section I will explore the institutionalized structure of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
today. I will do so by looking at the internal organization and structure of Big Law Pro Bono 
in Europe. Which I will do by focusing on the law firms themselves (Section 2.1) and on the 
key actors beyond the firm and their roles, including the pro bono clients and the types of work 
that are carried out for these clients (Section 2.2) and the clearinghouses (Section 2.3). It is 
hoped that I can build on the existing literature by exploring to what extent the globalized or 
Europeanized form of Big Law Pro Bono differs from the US model. In the following Chapter, 
I will aim to account for the reasons for any differences identified. What stands out is that the 
main differences in the European model relate to the clients (which are almost exclusively non-
profit organizations) and the intermediaries (which are highly varied in origin and nature, but 
cater almost exclusively to non-profit organizations). As we will come to see, one of the most 
striking features of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, in contrast to the US, is how little work is 
done for low-income individuals (perhaps less than 15% of the work). 
 
The findings below stem from research carried out during my period of participant observation 
and archival research at the global headquarters of the Global Public Interest Law Network 
(“PILnet”) in New York, from several interviews with pro bono managers and NGO employees 
throughout Europe and beyond, and from two surveys carried out among pro bono managers 
with responsibility for the European offices of international law firms and EU-oriented NGOs 
based in Brussels.712  
 
2.1! Providers  
 
As already noted, in the Big Law Model of Pro Bono, the service providers are large, multi-
location (typically international) commercial law firms. In Europe, as in the US,  the traditional, 
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commercial, client base of such firms is made up of the largest companies and public 
institutions in the world (both international and national). The traditional practice areas include, 
for example, litigation and regulation, employment, real estate, tax, corporate (governance, 
private equity and capital markets and M&A), intellectual property and technology and finance.  
 
We must notice a few distinctions in terms of the types of firms. As noted above, US firms 
have, historically, tended to internationalize by sending US lawyers overseas to staff foreign 
offices. These firms tend to have relatively few overseas lawyers (as a proportion of their total 
number of lawyers) – perhaps between 10% and 30% around the year 2007 (Skadden Arps, 
Jones Day and Sidley Austin providing good examples here).713 Such lawyers (not being 
qualified domestically) will typically be engaged primarily in transactional practice such as 
acquisitions and finance, rather than litigation (which necessarily requires admittance to the 
local bar), unless we talk of international dispute resolution, such as international arbitration. 
These firms will typically be led from New York or DC and will have significantly 
homogenized (American) firm culture. Meanwhile, as also set out above, the largest UK firms 
pursued internationalization through mergers with large European firms (Freshfields, Clifford 
Chance and Linklaters all providing good examples here) and have had significantly higher 
percentages of the lawyers based overseas (outside the UK) – perhaps between 50% and 
70%.714 Consequently, such firms will have greater penetration of local legal markets and 
greater local autonomy although they will still typically be led from London. The work carried 
out will be varied. A final type of firm worth mentioning, for our purposes, is the “Swiss 
Verein” law firm. These are firms that are effectively more like franchises than consistent 
international firms (DLA Piper, Baker Mackenzie and Dentons provide examples here).715 
These are firms that do not necessarily have a “home” location and have been formed through 
a series of tie-ups in which profits pools are not shared, although the same branding is used. 
They operate more like large referral networks than structurally integrated firms (although they 
become increasingly structurally integrated with time). Consequently, there will be much 
greater local autonomy and significant cultural diversity. Again, the work will be varied.  
 
As in the US, although the pro bono practices of such firms can be structured in many different 
ways, as will be explored further below, they are increasingly structured quite similarly, 
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consisting of firm-wide pro bono polices, full-time pro bono managers or pro bono counsel 
(responsible for generating and facilitating pro bono work), sometimes a pro bono (or 
Responsible Business) Partner, local pro bono coordinators (i.e. full-time fee earners with 
responsibility for allocating pro bono files in their local offices or departments) and pro bono 
committees (made up of groups of coordinators).    
 
2.1.1! Amount and geography 
 
When it comes to the amount of pro bono work being done in Europe, over the past three years, 
around 14 hours per fee earner has been carried out on average (see tables below). If you 
consider that these firms will have at least 300 hundred lawyers based in Europe716 with the 
larger ones, such as DLA Piper, having nearly 1500 lawyers based in Continental Europe (i.e. 
excluding the UK where the majority of large firms will have a substantial presence – DLA 
has 900 UK-based lawyers), this amount is not insignificant. For a firm with 500 European 
lawyers, that is 7000 hours per year (although note that DLA Piper alone carried out 35,000 
pro bono hours in Continental Europe in 2017, so figures could be significantly higher), which 
is equivalent to four full-time lawyers working for about one year (8 hours a day, with 
weekends and holidays). If you then consider that at least 30 firms are doing that level of pro 
bono in Europe (the Trust Law Index, upon which these statistics are based includes around 30 
international firms717), that amounts to a fairly substantial amount of pro bono work, perhaps 
the equivalent of at least 120 full-time lawyers. That is clearly not enormous, if you consider 
that there were nearly 8000 registered legal aid lawyers in the Netherlands alone in 2015 
(representing approximately 44% of all lawyers in the Netherlands, although not necessarily 
all working on legal aid matters full-time).718 However, if you also consider that the European 
Commission Legal Service employs fewer than 400 lawyers,719 it is not insignificant; large 
enough to make one very large pan-European pro bono firm. Moreover, it should be borne in 
                                                
716 Bird & Bird, for instance, is about the fortieth largest firm in the world and the twentieth largest in the 
UK and has 250 lawyers in London alone (just 25% of its total headcount globally), while Loyens & Loeff, the 
seventy-fifth largest firm in the world, has over 400 lawyers in the Netherlands alone. See “The Global 100: The 
world’s top-ranked law firms by revenue, lawyers and partner profits,” Legal Week, 2016, 
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2016/09/26/the-global-100-the-worlds-top-ranked-firms-by-revenue-
lawyers-and-partner-profits/  
717 See Trust Law Index of Pro Bono, 2016, 72, http://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/d31d8b72-0f82-
4241-88e1-71abc90e3d72/file. 
718 Figures for 2014–2015. See the Netherlands, “National Report: Legal Aid in the Netherlands – A broad 
outline – 2016,” Den Haag, 2013, 29. 
719 European Commission HR key figures, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-
commission/organisational-structure/commission-staff_en. 
 202 
mind that participation rates (in pro bono work) can be as high as 70% in some offices (DLA 
Piper had an average participation rate of 56% across all continental Europe offices in 2016 
and 2017) and so the total number of commercial lawyers engaged in pro bono work across 
Europe (at the top 30 law firms) will likely be at least 4500 (based on an average participation 
rate of 30%) but could be as high as 7500 (based on an average participation rate of 50%).       
 
Figure 5720 





                                                
720 Data courtesy of the Trust Law 2014, 2015, and 2016 pro bono indices, http://news.trust.org/ 
spotlight/TrustLaw_Index_of_Pro_Bono/. 




















The European hours, however, are significantly behind the US where the average hours per fee 
earner are 70+ and Australia where the average hours are 40+ but on par with Latin America 
and the Asia Pacific Region.722   
 
What about the geography of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe? Unsurprisingly, it tracks well with 
a map of law firm offices (Europe’s major capital cities). However, the UK and Belgium (more 
accurately London and Brussels) do appear to be emerging as European pro bono hot spots. 
While still not quite rivalling their counterparts in the US, Brussels and London based lawyers 
are undertaking a significant amount of pro bono work (averaging more than 20 hours per 
lawyer per year). The answer to the question ‘why these two cities in particular?’ is not entirely 
clear. In relation to London it is likely because (as discussed above) pro bono culture is older 
in London, having gotten off the ground in the 1990s already. Moreover, the survey carried out 
among 21 firms revealed that London was the second most popular destination globally in 
which the surveyed law firms based their full time pro bono staff (with New York coming first, 
Washington DC joint second with London, followed by Chicago in third and Sydney in fourth 
                                                
721 Data courtesy of the Trust Law 2014, 2015, and 2016 pro bono indices, http://news.trust.org/ 
spotlight/TrustLaw_Index_of_Pro_Bono/. 
722 See Trust Law pro bono indices, http://news.trust.org/spotlight/TrustLaw_Index_of_Pro_Bono/. 















place). It stands to reason that the offices where full-time pro bono staff are based will likely 
be the offices where the highest volume of pro bono work is carried out.723 
 
As for Brussels, it is less clear. There are two possible explanations. One reason might be the 
overlap of Big Law Pro Bono with the pro deo system run by the Belgian bars. This system 
requires young Belgian lawyers to take on pro deo cases for indigent individuals as part of their 
qualification process; it could be that firms are including pro deo hours in the pro bono hours 
totals. Another possible explanation is the very large non-profit population based there. The 
EU Transparency Register, which records all organizations active in influencing EU policy, 
reveals that there are over 500 non-profits with head offices in Belgium. The legal needs survey 
(which I carried out) of 100 of these non-profits revealed that over 50% of these non-profits 




European offices of 21 firms ranked by respective Pro Bono counsel in order of highest average 




                                                
723 This is confirmed by 2018 findings from the UK which demonstrate a positive correlation between the 
number of full-time pro bono staff and the number of pro bono hours carried out across a firm. Collaborative 
plan statistics for 2018 (on file with author). 
724 These results can be extrapolated to the entire population of 500 with a margin of error at +/- 9% at a 
confidence level of 95%. Khadar et al., Good Lobby Legal Needs Survey. 
725 Khadar, PILnet Anonymous European Pro Bono Survey.   
Rank City Weighted Score out of 
21 
1.!  London 15.50 
2.!  Brussels 14.17 
3.!  Budapest 14.00 
4.!  Warsaw 13.25 
5.!  Paris 12.80 
6.!  Amsterdam 12.67 
7.!  Rome 12.25 
8.!  Munich 12.00 
9.!  Moscow 12.00 
10.! Madrid 11.75 
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2.1.2! Architecture  
 
By architecture, I refer to the internal architecture of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. I carried 
out a survey among 21 of the largest international firms in relation to their European pro bono 
practices. The results (see tables directly below – Figure 8 and Figure 9), reveal that the 
architecture of pro bono in Europe is patchy, although it appears to be moving along a similar 
trajectory to the Unites States. Despite the relative youth of pro bono practice in Europe, certain 
indicators do reveal a degree of institutionalization:  
 
i.! Three quarters of the firms have pro bono policy in place that is applicable to Europe 
(although in many cases this is likely to be a firm-wide policy). So perhaps the more 
interesting statistic is that one quarter of the firms has no pro bono policy applicable 
to Europe. For comparison, 96% of firms surveyed by Cummings and Rhode in 
2009 had a pro bono policy applicable to their US pro bono work.726  
 
ii.! Over half of the firms have at least one pro bono committee dedicated specifically 
to Europe. For comparison, 93% of firms surveyed by Cummings and Rhode had a 
pro bono committee applicable to US pro bono work.727  
 
iii.! Just over a third have designated pro bono coordinators in their European offices, 
i.e. not full-time lawyers but fee-earners engaging in voluntary pro bono matter 
coordination. (By contrast 69% of firms surveyed by Cummings and Rhode had 
centralized channels for the distribution of their US pro bono matters.)728  
 
iv.! Most notable is that just four firms have full time pro bono managers in continental 
Europe, while there are roughly 30 in the UK (in London) and over 200 globally as 
of 2018 (although mainly in New York, DC and Chicago).729 For comparison, 61% 
of firms surveyed by Cummings and Rhode had full time pro bono managers to 
manage their US pro bono practices.730  
 
                                                
726 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2386-87. 
727 Ibid. 
728 Ibid. 
729 See https://www.apbco.org/about/membership/ for the latest figures in terms of the total number of full-
time pro bono lawyers in the US. 
730 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2382. 
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v.! One indication of institutionalization is the fact that over half of the surveyed firms 
linked pro bono to performance reviews in their European offices and just under 
half to bonuses. This was 82% and 76% respectively in the US study.  
 
The picture this collectively paints, is of a weak institutionalization of pro bono within 
European offices. What little institutionalization there is mainly seems to stem from global pro 
bono mandates flowing from New York, DC and London. There are a number of reasons why 
firms might have an interest in spreading pro bono culture in their international offices. Firstly, 
firm pro bono policies (like policies on time recording, training and professional development 
or bonuses) are typically global or regional in nature and so demanding lawyers in London to 
do pro bono, but not lawyers in Paris, simply does not make sense within the logic of Big Law. 
Secondly, firms often view pro bono as a tool for firm integration (i.e. brining lawyers in 
different offices into contact with one another or creating a sense of shared values). Thirdly, 
from 2014, American Lawyer magazine began ranking firms for the “international pro bono” 
(beyond the US) which undoubtedly creates and incentive for firms to develop pro bono 
internationally also.731  
 
Ultimately, there does appear to a be trickle-down effect, which means that pro bono culture 
reaches (Continental) Europe in dribs and drabs. Beyond the local pro bono coordinators – who 
are simultaneously full-time fee earners – there does not yet appear to be any significant motive 
power forcefully driving pro bono practice within the Continental European offices themselves, 
although the growing number of full-time pro bono managers in Continental Europe will likely 
change this in coming years. 
 
  
                                                















                                                
732 Khadar, PILnet Anonymous European Pro Bono Survey.   















































2.1.3! Financial model  
 
As in the US, the financial model of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is that pro bono is generally 
underwritten by the firm That is to say, fee-earning lawyers are expected to do pro bono work 
during their regular working hours and as such, they are effectively paid for this time. While 
many firms have aspirational targets (typically of between 10 to 35 pro bono hours per year) it 
does not seem to be the case that many have caps in place (although caps may exist with respect 
to the number of pro bono hours that can be counted towards billable hours targets and 
bonuses).734  
 
In terms of the total overall spending on pro bono, a few things need to be considered. On the 
one hand, as already pointed out, firms have pro bono budgets, portions of which would be 
reserved for Europe. As in the US, there is no transparency around what the budgets are and it 
is possible that, even internally, many firms do not divide up their pro bono budgets by region 
(or even by office). It might also be the case that pro bono spending comes out of a larger CSR 
or responsible business budget. In any case, it has not been possible to get a sense of the average 
size of such budgets for Europe. An estimate, based on anecdotal evidence, would suggest that 
European pro bono budgets could range anywhere from €20,000 (where a firm has no full-time 
pro bono staff) to hundreds of thousands or even millions of Euros (including staff costs, where 
a firm has several Europe-based pro bono staff).   
 
Beyond the actual pro bono budget, we must also take account of the value of lawyer time 
spent on pro bono work. If we assume an average hourly rate of a junior lawyer at a top firm 
of €400 per hour and we take, as above, 7000 pro bono hours per year as the average for a firm 
with 500 European lawyers, then we are in the region of €2.8 million per firm per year. If we 
take just the top 30 firms (as indicated by the Trust Law Pro Bono Index), we are in the region 
of €85 million worth of pro bono work per year. That is likely a very conservative estimate 
considering that DLA Piper alone carried out approximately €7 million worth of pro bono work 
in 2017 in Continental Europe alone (and another €10 million in the UK). A rough estimate 
based on 2016 figures from American Lawyer magazine would suggest that the US figures 
would be three to four times higher than these European figures.735 
                                                
734 Dentons Europe, for example, has a cap of forty hours in this respect.  
735 The top 200 firms carried out over five million hours of global pro bono in 2016. If we assume that at 
least four million of that was domestic pro bono, then the top thirty firms would have carried out around 
600,000 hours, equivalent to 20,000 hours each, compared to 7,000 in Europe.    
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2.1.4! Professionals  
 
Echoing findings from the US, my interviews with lawyers involved in Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe revealed the importance of full-time pro bono roles.736 They form the link between the 
pro bono client base and the firm’s lawyers (the pro bono resource). They generate and 
facilitate all pro bono work and they promote and entrench pro bono culture and practice within 
the firm and beyond.   
 
As already noted, full-time pro bono roles are few and far between in Europe. Compared to the 
150 or so full-time pro bono lawyers in the US, there are approximately 30 full-time pro bono 
lawyers based in the UK (London) and six based in continental Europe (Paris, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Budapest, Frankfurt and Madrid). Interestingly, all of the firms that have full-time 
pro bono managers on the Continent (with the exception of one, being Freshfields) are Swiss 
Verien structure law firms. This might not be a coincident. Such firms are enormous, in terms 
of the sheer number of lawyers and offices, have highly decentralized power structures and are 
deeply multi-cultural (in a mosaic rather than melting-pot fashion). This means several things 
in the pro bono context. Firstly, it means that implementing pro bono programs from afar (New 
York or even London) is near impossible. Building pro bono culture and getting buy-in for pro 
bono from thousands of local lawyers (in scores of offices) who are: a) culturally homogenous 
and thus naturally more conservative; and b) essentially not answerable to Partners and law 
firm managers outside of their local office, is incredibly challenging. Secondly, it means that 
law firm integration (any policies and programs – such as pro bono– that tend to create a sense 
of firm values, culture or identity or that bring lawyers from different offices into contact with 
one another), is highly valued by firm leadership. The former point would create a genuine 
need for full time pro bono managers located in the Continent who are closer to the action, 
understand the local culture and law and can mediate between the UK/US and Europe. The 
second point enhances the business case for pro bono managers in Swiss Verien firms.      
 
As noted, the survey among 21 pro bono counsel revealed that, of those firms that did employ 
full-time pro bono lawyers, the top locations in which those lawyers were based were: New 
York (8 firms); Washington DC and London (6 firms); Chicago (4 firms); Sydney (3 firms); 
San Francisco and Melbourne (2 firms); Paris and Hong Kong (1 firm). Although the survey is 
                                                
736 Cummings and Rhode, “Managing pro bono,” 2376. 
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not fully representative for the global firm population, it is highly likely that this pattern is 
representative of Big Law Pro Bono more broadly in so far as New York, DC and London are 
the global pro bono capitals (where many firms are headquartered) and outside of London, 
Europe hosts only a handful. This pattern is significant in so far as the location of full time pro 
bono staff is likely to impact how effective they can be in promoting pro bono in overseas 
offices. We will explore this further in the next Chapter.   
 
Accordingly, across Continental Europe, those with responsibility for pro bono management 
are typically either full-time fee earners doing pro bono in their spare time or full-time CSR, 
marketing or business development professionals737 mandated to coordinate pro bono as part 
of their duties. Additionally, those firms with full-time pro bono roles in London will typically 
expect those personnel to take responsibility for pro bono practice across the whole of Europe. 
The importance of full-time pro bono roles to the institutionalization of pro bono must be 
emphasized here. Full-time pro bono lawyers have the time to go out and drum up work. Like 
any practice area, work does not just materialize, it needs to be sourced, which requires setting 
up meetings with potential clients or organizations that refer clients to the firm. The interviews 
I carried out with several pro bono counsel underlined this point. Amanda Smith, Pro Bono 
Partner at Morgan Lewis, suggested that: 
 
“Regardless of the underlying forces that led to the institutionalization of pro bono [in 
the US], one key ingredient – and there are very few firms that have been able to achieve 
any success in this area without it – is the professionalization of the pro bono counsel 
role. The presence of a full-time pro bono counsel is the single most important 
contributing factor to success.”738 
 
This is confirmed by 2018 findings from the UK which demonstrate a positive correlation 
between the number of full time pro bono staff and the number of pro bono hours carried out 
across a firm.739   
 
                                                
737 The previous pro bono coordinator for the Austrian firm Schoenherr was also a full-time PR and 
marketing manager. 
738 Interview number 13, Oct. 5, 2015. 
739 Collaborative plan statistics for 2018 (on file with author). 
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This is a process that is already underway in London, as one US Pro Bono Counsel reflected: 
“one of the biggest contributors to the growth of pro bono in countries in Europe is the fact that 
law firms have invested significant resources into full-time pro bono people [in London].”740 
London based pro bono professionals have even begun to get together to organize training 
around pro bono management (the so-called “UKademy”, held annually).741 In the US and 
Australia, while we do not find full-time pro bono roles in every city where law firms maintain 
offices, we find them in those larger cities where law firms are either headquartered or maintain 
a significant presence. If Europe were to follow this trajectory we could perhaps anticipate that 
in the coming years, in addition to London, we might find further full-time pro bono positions 
emerging in Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Moscow or Milan (a strategy already being 
pursued by several firms as discussed above). It seems likely that the institution of full-time 
pro bono lawyers is likely to have a rationalizing impact on pro bono practice in Europe; 
rendering it more systematized and predictable in terms of quality output, as it has done in the 
United States. These “generalist” pro bono managers would likely perform a similar role to 
their counterparts in the US; sourcing opportunities for their lawyers, managing relationships 
with non-profit clients and partners, structuring collaborations and generally being advocates 
for pro bono culture within their respective firms and beyond by seeking further 
institutionalization. 
 
2.2! Recipients and the nature of the work  
 
Who are the pro bono recipients in Europe? Who are the beneficiaries of Big Law Pro Bono? 
There are a wide range of recipients including: individuals, non-profit entities, corporate 
foundations, social investment funds, small and medium sized social enterprises, academic 
institutions and groups, public benefit institutions (e.g. UN agencies and international 
organizations) and even countries and government departments (typically developing and 
transitional countries).   
 
However, it seems that the overwhelming majority of pro bono recipients from Big Law in 
Europe are non-profit organizations. Asked to estimate the approximate distribution of pro 
bono work between non-profit clients and individual clients (most law firms do not record such 
data), surveyed pro bono counsel  (from the 21 firms) revealed an average ratio of 
                                                
740 Interview number 43, June 16, 2016. 
741 Interview number 33, May 17, 2016. 
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approximately 85% of pro bono work carried out for non-profits (including work for social 
enterprises and public benefit institutions) and 15% for individuals (see Figure 10 below).742 
Considering that DLA Piper, (which arguably has the most developed individual client pro 
bono practice in Europe) only carried out 3% of pro bono work for individual clients in 
continental Europe in 2017 (and 15% in the UK), it is likely that the true balance may be even 
more skewed towards non-profit clients.743 Moreover, virtually all of the interview subjects for 
this research shared the view that pro bono clients in Europe were almost exclusively non-
profit organizations. By comparison, in the UK, members of the “Collaborative Plan” (an 
initiative of nearly 40 of the largest City-based firms aimed at improving access to justice 
(defined narrowly) through pro bono in the UK), recorded just 27% of pro bono work for 








                                                
742 This ratio was supported by law firm interviewees, most of whom confirmed that the overwhelming 
majority of their pro bono work was carried out for non-profits. 
743 DLA Piper 2017 Pro Bono Report for Mainland Europe (on file with author).  
744 Collaborative plan statistics for 2018 (on file with author).  
















The reasons for this ratio will be explored in the following chapter. For now it will be sufficient 
simply to note that this is the case.  
 
An exploration of the range of work carried out may help shed further light on the type of 
recipients and the relationships between firms and recipients.  
 
2.2.1! Work for individuals 
 
The pro bono work that is carried out for individuals by Big Law in Europe is fully consistent 
with the models of pro bono that have existed in Europe for centuries. On the one hand, lawyers 
at commercial firms provide, on an ad hoc basis, legal information, advice and representation 
to disadvantaged or needy individual clients. This can include anything from work on issues 
such as family reunification or welfare benefits to education or employment discrimination.746  
On the other hand, some firms employ more organized models. For example, Simmons & 
Simmons employed a qualified social welfare lawyer, to run a “social welfare clinic” for them 
in London. The clinic was set up in 2015 to provide “end-to-end” appeals stage support to 
social welfare claimants.747 Simmons & Simmons were apparently concerned about the 
restrictions on access to justice following the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 and the impact that had vis-à-vis removing areas of law from the scope of 
legal aid. In its first year of operation the clinic took on 47 cases and won £90,000 in backdated 
benefits for clients.  The full-time pro bono lawyer trains and supervises the full-time fee-
earners engaged in the work of the clinic.  
 
Such individual legal support “clinics” are also often run in collaboration with non-profit 
clients. For example, DLA Piper collaborates with the European Citizens’ Action Service 
(ECAS) to provide advice on EU free movement law to EU citizens and their third country 
national family members, and also with the Italian Refugee Council to provide assistance to 
asylum seekers in Milan and Rome. Meanwhile Herbert Smith Freehills collaborates with the 
Asylum Support Housing Advice Centre (ASHA) to provide support with asylum appeals in 
London.748 These clinics work by relying on the partner non-profits to refer cases to the firm 
                                                
746 Interview number 30, Mar. 25, 2016. 
747 Interview number 44, June 17, 2016. 
748 Collaborative Plan Specialist Clinic Fact Sheet (on file with author).  
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and the pro bono managers to distribute the cases to fee-earners who work on them on a 
voluntary basis.   
 
In total, firms run approximately 25 of these specialist individual support clinics in the UK.749 
There are no figures for continental Europe, but the amount is likely far fewer (given that there 
are just four full-time pro bono lawyers across the continent). DLA Piper, which has two full-
time pro bono lawyers in mainland Europe runs just three (in Belgium, Italy and Poland). 
Consequently, the likely contribution of Big Law Pro Bono to individual client support in 
Europe, beyond the UK (and even including the UK), is likely insignificant.   
 
2.2.2! Work for NGOs 
 
Lawyers in Europe, as elsewhere in the world, have likely been privately carrying out legal 
work for local sporting clubs, choirs and animal charities for decades, so Big Law in Europe 
provides legal assistance, on an ad hoc basis, to non-profits across Europe today. However, it 
is on a scale and degree of sophistication that has never been seen in Europe.  
 
Firstly, in terms of the volume, if we take the above conservative estimate of about 200,000 
hours or €85 million worth of pro bono work per year across Europe and we take for granted 
that up to 85% of this will be carried out for non-profits, then we are looking at 170,000 pro 
bono hours and almost €70 million worth of work per year. This is perhaps the equivalent of a 
100-lawyer firm working full-time on pro bono for European non-profits.  
 
Thinking next about the volume of clients served, although no comparable data was retrievable, 
PILnet (one of the largest international non-profits working to refer other non-profits to the pro 
bono departments of Big Law firms) referred matters from over 100 non-profits in 2013, while 
DLA Piper worked with over 200 non-profits across Europe in 2017. Therefore, if we take just 
the top 30 firms (as indicated by the Trust Law Pro Bono Index) and we assume each firm 
works with at least 50 non-profits across all of their European offices in a given year, possibly 
up to 1500 non-profits across Europe are recipients of Big Law Pro Bono in any given year. It 
would not be outlandish to call this a small industry.  
 
                                                
749 Collaborative Plan Specialist Clinic Fact Sheet (on file with author). 
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In terms of the types of work that are carried out for non-profits, this is varied but typically 
falls into two buckets: 
 
1)! Research: research, typically of a comparative nature, forms the large bulk of pro bono 
work carried out by Big Law. Such research may cover any number of topics from 
environmental law or asylum and human rights law to the law related to non-profit 
governance. One non-profit, Advocates for International Development (A4ID) has 
started to maintain an online database to house such resources.750 European non-profits 
with an advocacy orientation will often need to understand what the law in relation to 
X topic is in multiple jurisdictions to effectively engage with European public 
institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of 
Europe). They typically do not have the resources to undertake such research 
themselves or to commission such research, and Big Law pro bono appears to fill a 
legitimate demand.     
 
The interviews undertaken for the purpose of this chapter suggest that legal research - 
the production of research memos, comparative research reports, etc. - forms a very 
large part of the pro bono work that goes on across Europe. Lending support to this 
anecdotal evidence, a survey carried out among 100 non-profits listed in the European 
Transparency Register revealed that just under 80% of them were interested in 
receiving (or had received) pro bono “legal research” assistance.751 This made legal 
research the most popular form of pro bono legal assistance by a margin of over 15% 
(followed by “governance/corporate”).752 Such research may serve multiple purposes 
for non-profit clients; it may help them to make stronger legal arguments in their 
advocacy before national or international public bodies, tribunals, and institutions; it 
may give a non-profit credibility, “show that they are serious about an issue”; it may 
provide an independent and objective review of a legal issue, improving a non-profit’s 
decision making. Says one non-profit employee: “If you are breaking your head with a 
problem, … it has some legal aspects but you do not know how to handle it, you go to 
a law firm and you see how they would handle it.”753  
                                                
750 See http://www.a4id.org/learning/resources/. 
751 Khadar et al., Good Lobby Legal Needs Survey.   
752 Ibid. 
753 Interview numbers 36 (June 13, 2016) and 47 (June 22, 2016). 
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In recent years, pro bono legal research has contributed towards some noteworthy non-
profit advocacy campaigns. For example, law firms worked alongside Georgian civil 
rights non-profit, Identoba, which was involved in litigation and advocacy to remove a 
prohibition on gay men donating blood in Georgia. The law firms undertook extensive 
pro bono legal research into case law from other jurisdictions and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) to supplement the legal argumentation for the litigation and 
provide a comparative perspective. The litigation to which the research gave support 
was successful, resulting in the striking down of the ban by Georgia’s Constitutional 
Court in 2014.754 Another example is the work of Clifford Chance with Fair Trials 
International. Over 250 hours of multi-jurisdictional research carried out by some 28 
lawyers across 18 of Clifford Chance’s European offices into breaches of Articles 5 
and 6 of the ECHR contributed to the development of three EU directives on the right 
to translation and interpretation, the right to information during criminal proceedings, 
and the right to access to a lawyer and communication with a consular official or 
nominated person. The added value of law firms is significant. Although firms may not 
have expertise in the relevant areas of law, when it comes to carrying out discrete, well-
defined research tasks, law firm lawyers are very well trained. The fact that firms can 
do this across multiple jurisdictions and language barriers is significant. Non-profits 
would otherwise need to identify and pay for local consultants. Law firms can also bring 
other resources to bear. For example, Clifford Chance also provides ongoing funding 
to Fair Trials through the Clifford Chance Foundation (and provided funding of 
£90,000 over three years to support this specific advocacy campaign) and became 
involved in follow-up work, including amicus interventions and supporting strategic 
litigation to, amongst other things, ensure that the directives were correctly 
implemented in jurisdictions across the EU.755   
 
                                                
754 Londa Beria, “Constitutional Court in Georgia lifts ban on homosexuals giving blood,” Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, July 19, 2014, http://dfwatch.net/constitutional-court-in-georgia-lifts-ban-on-homosexuals-
giving-blood-10117-26435. 




Some examples taken from a guide prepared by PILnet for NGOs on the use of its 
Global Clearinghouse may illustrate further:756 
 
•! “A group of pro bono lawyers gathered research on laws governing squatting in 
a number of European countries. This information was used to bolster the 
campaign of an arts NGO advocating for a law permitting the use of derelict 
buildings for community arts space in Hungary.” 
•! “In order to strengthen gender equality in Croatia, a human rights NGO 
partnered up with two leading law firms to look into the implementation of the 
E.U. Equal Treatment Directive. By examining the approach of other E.U. 
countries in transposing the directive, the NGO was better equipped to make 
concrete proposals for improving the gender equality framework in Croatia.”  
•! “A disability rights organization received an analysis of Swedish laws on 
guardianship (a model of best practice) from a team of pro bono lawyers. This 
analysis was used to inform proposals for legislative amendments in Hungary, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.” 
•! “When the existing legal framework proved insufficient to protect victims of 
domestic slavery in France, one NGO looked to pro bono lawyers to help draft 
proposals to amend the law. These proposals were ultimately used to strengthen 
the protection available.”  
 
Firms often team up in such research projects, typically to increase their jurisdictional 
reach, but sometimes simply for practical reasons, to ensure proper staffing of a project, 
depending on the lawyers and expertise that are available within firms at a given time 
for the relevant work.  
 
2)! Corporate support: the second large category of Big Law Pro Bono work in Europe 
consists of so-called “corporate support” for non-profits. This includes anything from 
support with contracts (partnership and funding agreements, employment contracts, 
leases, technology and telecommunication supply agreements) to intellectual property 




(brand protection, licensing agreements) and governance (incorporation, board 
structure).  
 
Importantly though, corporate support need not always be mundane and can be quite 
creative, for example, US law firm Orrick, which has worked with a French non-profit 
called Planet Finance (now Positive Planet) to provide microfinance in continental 
Europe, spreading capital to low-income individuals attempting to start small 
businesses.757  Orrick lawyers were involved in crafting innovative financing 
transactions that were entirely new to the French legal system.758 In the words of Rene 
Kathawala, Orrick’s Pro Bono Counsel: 
 
“That is the best kind of pro bono in my view, doing sophisticated pro bono 
work that is delivering real benefits to low-income people, using the skills we 
have for an NGO that without our support couldn’t do it… I am always an 
advocate for meeting the needs of poor people as much as we can but I also 
believe that our law firms are not necessarily in the best position to do [that] … 
if we can be leaders in pro bono matters that benefit tens of thousands or even 
hundreds of thousands of people based on the transactional expertise we have, 
and we do those pro bono matters very efficiently, and we can do them at scale 
and in significant numbers, then we are doing as much if not more than if we 
do the individual [case] for low-income individuals… We have certain expertise 
that we should tap into for our pro bono practice”.759 
  
 
Beyond research and corporate support, there is a range of other forms of pro bono work that 
Big Law carries out for non-profit clients: 
 
•! Training: commercial lawyers frequently run trainings for non-profit clients across 
Europe, for example, in relation to contract drafting and negotiation, lobbying, written 
& oral advocacy, intellectual property rights and even sometimes human rights or UN 
                                                
757 See http://www.positiveplanet.ngo/en/project/entrepreneurship-in-suburban-areas/. 
758 Interview number 43, June 16, 2016. 
759 Ibid. 
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engagement. For example, DLA Piper recently ran a training on intellectual property 
for Transparency International Berlin.760  
 
•! Evidence gathering, fact finding and monitoring: pro bono work for non-profits also 
sometimes involves monitoring (for example monitoring case law databases for new 
jurisprudence or trial monitoring in cases against human rights defenders), and evidence 
gathering or fact finding (for example interviewing asylum seekers to identify practical 
barriers to access to justice in relation to asylum applications).761 
 
•! Drafting: Occasionally, non-profits will have already done all the research for a report 
that they wish to draft and they will simply hand the research over to a commercial law 
firm and have them draft the report.  
 
•! Lobbying and legal and policy advocacy: lobbying and political advocacy are not 
common pro bono assignments for commercial law firms as they typically prefer to 
avoid taking public positions on sensitive political issues. However, in relation to less 
sensitive issues, e.g. child rights, such work can be carried out. Where the nature of the 
advocacy is more legal than political, firms are also much more willing to get involved. 
For example, firms do a large amount of work facilitating non-profits to make 
submissions to UN Treaty Bodies and Human Rights Courts.762   
 
However, my research revealed that relationships between non-profits and law firms are not 
always smooth. In particular, confusion stems from the full-time pro bono role in Europe and 
the nature of the relationship between that role and the (non-profit) clients. Is the pro bono 
professional a gatekeeper, a facilitator or an activist? There seems to be much disagreement 
within the pro bono community about this and much confusion and, sometimes, even 
frustration among clients.  In the words of one non-profit director: 
 
                                                
760 The author attended and participated in trainings on lobbying and legal advocacy for the UN World Food 
Programme in Paris and Inclusion Europe in Brussels.    




762 Discussion with Emily Christie, Senior Pro Bono Associate at DLA Piper.  
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“Law firms have very different ways of doing pro bono, different ways of organizing 
pro bono. This can confound NGOs. In some cases you may have access to the lawyers 
who are actually doing the work, in others the PB managers or coordinators may act as 
a barrier, which can frustrate things. It can be very difficult to work out how to make 
progress with that kind of role... there is a real difficulty where you have teams or 
coordinators that are very corporate and unable to understand the needs of the pro bono 
client.”763 
 
Interviews with non-profits indicate that very often what the non-profits would prefer is a direct 
relationship with a handful of lawyers who know and understand their work. Intermediaries of 
any kind, who do not fully grasp the non-profits, can be perceived as gatekeepers who 
complicate rather than facilitate lawyer-client relationships. Non-profits find it particularly 
frustrating where pro bono managers appear to be screening or interviewing them, looking for 
a particular kind of client or project: 
 
“[P]ro bono coordinators… have an idea of the perfect pro bono project, which often 
does not line up with the needs of the NGO… NGOs feel like they are pitching 
something to them that they need to accept rather than them wanting to know how they 
could assist…”764 
 
This can be concerning when it manifests as an arbitrary preference for certain kinds of work 
and complete disinterest (or worse) in others: 
 
“Law firm pro bono remains at the whim of [pro bono mangers] or the head of CSR... 
Such that each law firm will have a different interest. One may decide we like cats, the 
other migrants, and the next children… Priorities seem random.”765  
 
Indeed, some causes are not popular. Examples were provided to the author, during the course 
of the research, of non-profit workers having conversations with European lawyers during the 
course of which disparaging remarks were made about certain causes (such as Roma rights or 
migrants’ rights).  
                                                
763 Interview number 39, June 14, 2016. 
764 Interview number 48, June 23, 2016. 
765 Interview number 39, June 14, 2016. 
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On the other hand, non-profit clients also see great value in the pro bono manager role, 
especially where the pro bono professionals have some understanding of the work of the non-
profit. In the words of one non-profit director, “quality is key… there is a need for pro bono 
coordinators, but having coordinators that have a human rights or international law background 
and can read through what fee-earners have done and operate as a quality control mechanism, 
is crucial.”766 Indeed, there are those pro bono professionals who intimately understand their 
non-profit clients. In the view of one non-profit employee, some pro bono managers function 
more as “undercover NGO agent[s] [and] many even used to work for NGOs.”767 The non-
profits respond positively to this, often feeling as though they have a fellow activist who 
understands and believes in their work, but with access to significant resources, which can be 
powerfully brought to bear on their advocacy. 
 
Overall, non-profit interviewees did seem to appreciate the central importance of the pro bono 
manager role as a “facilitator” mediating between the non-profit and law firm, despite their 
confusion surrounding the exact nature of the role and where loyalties lie. It seems that non-
profits feel that, in particular, those professionals who see their primary function as CSR, 
centering on the needs of the firm rather than social justice lawyering in the public interest, are 
sometimes difficult to comprehend. 
 
2.2.3! Work for private sector entities and the role of the CSR movement in Europe 
 
In addition to working for individuals and non-profits, a smaller amount of pro bono work is 
increasingly carried out for various kinds of private sector entities including corporate 
foundations (e.g. the NIKE Foundation), social enterprises (i.e. small and medium sized for-
profit companies with a social purpose) and social investment funds (e.g. the Rabobank 
Foundation Rural Fund). Again, the variety of work carried out for such entities can be broad. 
A couple of examples may illustrate.  
 
In Amsterdam, DLA Piper has a collaboration with the Amsterdam Impact Hub, which is a so-
called “incubator” for social-purpose start-ups. For example, one of DLA’s clients, African 
Clean Energy, is a medium-sized social enterprise that produces portable solar biomass cook 
                                                
766 Ibid. 
767 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
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stoves. The cook stoves are sold throughout Africa and South East Asia and reduce 
environmentally harmful smoke emissions that would otherwise be caused by people cooking 
on open fires. Through this program, social enterprises like this, members of the Impact Hub, 
are referred to DLA Piper for legal support. Typically, such support relates to questions of 
governance, contracts, financing and intellectual property.768   
 
In Europe, there is somewhat of a social enterprise movement underway with incubators, like 
the Amsterdam Impact Hub, in most capital cities across the continent and a flourishing of the 
social enterprise business model.769 Big Law Pro Bono is increasingly turning to social 
enterprises as an exciting new client base. In some respects, they make ideal clients in that the 
needs they have are very similar to those of traditional commercial clients, although on a much 
smaller scale. As such, working for these clients makes excellent training for younger lawyers. 
Another driver for engagement with such organizations is building expertise in emerging areas 
of law (e.g. related to new technologies such as blockchain). However, developing new paying 
clients from such relationships is rare. Most social enterprises (there are exceptions) do not 
make for very good paying clients, insofar as they are simply too small and cash poor for it to 
make sense for major international firms to engage with them on a paying basis.  
 
In addition to working for social enterprises, commercial law firms in Europe also sometimes 
work for corporate foundations and social impact funds. Such work might involve, for example, 
reviewing or drafting loan documentation for social impact funds investing in sustainable 
businesses in the developing world.  
 
It is, perhaps, worth briefly reflecting here on the role of the CSR movement on Big Law Pro 
Bono in Europe. Given the significant impact of this movement on Big Law Pro Bono in 
London (as discussed above), one would expect it to have a similar impact on the Continent. 
However, in the opinion of the author, while the impact is beginning to be felt, CSR is not yet 
a primary driver for the development of Big Law Pro Bono in Continental Europe.  
 
The CSR agenda took off in Europe at around the same time that Big Law Pro Bono was getting 
underway in the UK. Between the years 1990 and 2000, CSR organizations and networks (often 
                                                
768 Interview number 30, Mar. 25, 2016. 
769 Toivonen, “Social innovation community,” 49–73; Vandor et al., “What does it take to support a change 
maker?” 
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modeled after Business in the Community) were established all across Europe, beginning in 
the East (Czech Republic and Bulgaria) and then moving gradually towards the West (Germany 
Italy and France).770 The EU announced its intention to develop policies on corporate social 
responsibility with the 2001 publication of a Green Paper “Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility.”771 By the year 2007, virtually every country in Europe 
had a CSR association of some kind, linking large companies to work collaboratively on CSR 
initiatives in the relevant country.772 Beyond this, a number of other global developments have 
bolstered the CSR movement in Europe in ways that have had an impact on Big Law. The 
momentum for information gathering and disclosure about non-financial social impacts as part 
of corporate social responsibility has accelerated in recent years, as reflected in a growing 
number of regulatory and voluntary standard-setting efforts, including  the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (1976), the ILO Tri-partite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), the UN Global Compact (2000), the ISO 
26000 Guidance Standards on Social Responsibility (2002), the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (2011), the EU directive on the disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by large (state owned and publicly listed) corporations (Directive 
2014/95/EU), independent benchmarking systems such as the Global Reporting Initiative and 
(at the domestic level) the UK Anti-Slavery Act (2015) and the French Law on Corporate 
Vigilance (2017).773 All of this has created a regulatory and policy environment in which large 
multinational corporations (especially publicly listed corporations) are required to take 
corporate social responsibility much more seriously.  
 
However, despite such developments, the link between Big Law Pro Bono in Continental 
Europe and the CSR movement (and the growth in CSR and human rights reporting) seems 
tenuous. As has been explored above, and will be explored further in the next Chapter, the 
development of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has been driven by law firm internationalization, 
pro bono institutionalization and, most significantly, a handful of key stakeholders from within 
the global firms themselves and European civil society (organizations linked to the European 
                                                
770 Kinderman, “Re-Embedding or Dis-Embedding the Corporation?,” 27.  
771 COM(2001) 366 final Green Paper Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
772 Kinderman, “Re-Embedding or Dis-Embedding the Corporation?,” 28. 
773 Warhurst, "Future roles of business in society,” 157; Methven O'Brien and Dhanarajan, "The corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights,” 555. 
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public interest law movement explored in Chapter 3). Research undertaken for this thesis has 
not identified any significant links between these key actors and the European CSR movement.  
 
The only identifiable link between the CSR movement and Big Law Pro Bono in Europe relates 
to law firm business development activities. All the above described developments related to 
CSR and CSR reporting have led to corporations gradually seeking to promote corporate social 
responsibility norms throughout their supply chains (largely thanks to the retail, food and 
beverage and extractives sectors which have notoriously been implicated in human rights 
violations in their supply chains),774 inevitably also reaching suppliers of legal services (in a 
generic and untargeted manner).  Increasingly, when corporations publish requests for 
proposals (for legal services, as for any other goods or services) they request information about 
firms’ respect for international human rights standards, environmental sustainability practices, 
transparency and corruption policies, diversity statistics and labor standards (i.e. reflecting the 
emerging norm systems described above). However, it is still very rare (insofar as the author 
is aware) that a company will directly ask about a firm’s European pro bono practice. What 
more frequently happens, is that law firms in Europe respond to such requests (which are 
typically not very well suited to law firms and have been designed with other service providers 
in mind) by providing information on their pro bono practice (sometimes instead of the 
information requested). But this is little more than a marketing sleight of hand and it does not 
seem likely that there is any major direct causal relationship between such requests (which are 
a relatively recent phenomenon in Europe) and the emergence of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe. 
 
The other loose way in which the CSR agenda may have played some role in Big Law Pro 
Bono development in Europe is simply by having created a favorable background context 
against which European commercial lawyers, being asked to engage in pro bono, could 
understand the request. In other words, as lawyers became more aware of CSR through their 
largest corporate clients (who would have been involved in many of the European CSR 
platforms), the idea of Big Law Pro Bono might have seemed less alien to them (as Big Law’s 
response to the CSR movement). However, given the rich history of legal volunteering in 
Europe (described in Chapter 3) and the strong Big Law Pro Bono movements in the US and 
the UK, there are other, perhaps more obvious, frameworks from within which requests do pro 
                                                
774 Baumann-Pauly, Nolan, Van Heerden, and Samway. "Industry-specific multi-stakeholder initiatives that 
govern corporate human rights standards,” 771. 
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bono could be understood by European commercial lawyers.  In any event, future research 
might shed more light on the links between Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and the European 
CSR movement.   
 
2.2.4! Work for academic institutions  
 
Work for academic institutions typically involves engaging lawyers in supervising law students 
at university law clinics. Presently (over the past five or ten years), there is a rapidly expanding 
law clinic movement in Western Europe. Western European universities are turning to “clinical 
legal education” at an astonishing pace. A recent Open Society Justice Initiative survey 
suggests that there are 32 clinics in Germany alone (at separate universities), 5 in France, 4 in 
the Netherlands, 4 in Ireland, 3 in Spain and 21 in the United Kingdom (and there are likely 
many more than this).775 Considering that just ten or even five years ago these figures (certainly 
in continental Europe) would have been at or near zero, this is a significant increase. Moreover, 
networks of law clinics are emerging in France (Réseau Francophone pour l'enseignement 
Clinique du Droit) and Italy (Rete Cliniche legali in Italia), and at the pan-European level 
(European Network for Clinical Legal Education).  
 
Law clinics involve themselves in many types of work, including direct support for individual 
clients, research for non-profit clients and institutional engagement such as the preparation of 
amicus briefs or ombudsman complaints.776 The role of commercial lawyers with  respect to 
the clinics is to supervise the students, alongside their academic instructors, and ensure the 
quality of the end product.  
 
2.2.5! Work for public benefit institutions 
 
Another growing area of work for Big Law Pro Bono is work for public benefit institutions, 
for example, UN agencies such as the UNHCR, OHCHR and UNICEF. The nature of the work 
typically falls into one of the two large buckets mentioned above (comparative) research and 
corporate support. For example, DLA Piper has a commitment to undertake 5% of all pro bono 
work globally for UNICEF each year. In some respects, such institutions, along with very large 
                                                
775 From records kept by the Open Society Justice Initiative. 
776 See Alemanno and Khadar, Reinventing Legal Education, 1–26, 322–48. 
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multinational non-profits, make highly compatible pro bono clients for Big Law. In recent 
years, international law firms have developed “institutional client relationships” with 
multinational corporations. I.e. firms provide legal services across all aspects and all 
geographies of a corporation’s business. Firms have grown to match the geographical presence 
of their multinational clients to be able to effectively service them.777 For a client like UNICEF, 
DLA Piper can provide a similar service to the type of service it would provide for a large bank 
or a large retail company, assisting with everything from contracts to policy research on a 
global basis.  
 
2.2.6! Work for countries and government departments   
 
Another small but growing area of work is work for countries and government departments.  
For example, the non-profit, International Senior Lawyers Project, involved a number of 
lawyers (notably from Hogan Lovells) in supporting the government of Liberia to negotiate or 
renegotiate natural resource concession agreements, mineral development agreements, and 
investment contracts aimed at securing a better deal for Liberia.778 Another good example of 
this kind of work would be Herbert Smith Freehills’ Fair Deal Sierra Leone Programme, which 
has resulted in HSF providing over £1.5 million of pro bono legal advice to the Government 
of Sierra Leone as part of a legal assistance facility accessible to Sierra Leone government 
officials (particularly those involved in attracting and supporting inward investment into the 
country).779 The project was brokered in collaboration with the non-profit, Africa Governance 
Initiative. A final example comes from DLA Piper who have had a full-time pro bono lawyer 
seconded to the governments of Timor-Leste and Vanuatu for several years now. The lawyers 
work in the justice departments of the respective governments and help to review and draft 
legislation along with local employees.780  
  
                                                
777 Interview number 29, Mar. 1, 2016. 




780 Interview number 29, Mar. 1, 2016. 
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2.3! Intermediaries (clearinghouses)  
 
It is important here to mention “clearinghouses” (or referral organizations).781 Clearinghouses 
are non-profit organizations whose core purpose is to connect Big Law with non-profits or 
individuals in need of legal services. They generate and typically scope pro bono matters from 
non-profits and then match those matters with commercial law firms. As noted in Chapter 1 
and above, the existing literature on these organizations is sparse and does not shed an awful 
lot of light on how and why they are formed and how the operate. What is known about them 
is that in the US they are typically subsidized by local bar organizations and are primarily 
focused on connecting law firm volunteers to low-income clients.782 They may get involved to 
a greater or lesser degree in educating clients about the availability of pro bono services, 
screening pro bono requests from individual clients, liaising directly with full-time pro bono 
staff, training law firm lawyers and helping to troubleshoot where issues arise in lawyer-client 
relationships.783 They can be small one-person operations or large complex organizations and 
they exist across every US state.784 However, many questions remain unanswered: how closely 
do they work with law firms, to what extent do they have power to set the agenda of law firm 
pro bono, to what extent do they engage in advocacy vis-à-vis the law firms or the law firm 
clients, how involved do they get in the matchmaking process, to what extent do they specialize 
as law firms are specializing?785   
 
My research into these organizations in Europe revealed that they play a very significant role 
in mediating pro bono relationships between Big Law and non-profit clients in continental 
Europe. The survey among 21 firms revealed that nearly 50% of all pro bono work carried out 
by the firms on the Continent, was being sourced through clearinghouses (see Figure 11, 
below). 
  
                                                
781 Findings in this section stem primarily from several interviews with clearinghouse managers: Interview 
numbers: 2 (Sept. 18, 2015), 4 (Sept. 25, 2015), 8 (Oct. 1, 2015), 11 (Oct. 8, 2015), 14 (Oct. 20, 2015), 15 (Oct. 
20, 2015), 21 (Nov. 24, 2015), 23 (Dec. 2, 2015), 26 (Jan. 26, 2016), 28 (Feb. 8, 2016), 31 (May 12, 2016), 34 
(May 30, 2016), 38 (June 14, 2016), 41 (June 15, 2016), 42 (June 16, 2016), 49 (June 23, 2016) and 50 (June 
24, 2016).  
782 Cummings, “Politics of pro bono,” 42. 
783 Ibid.  
784 Ibid. 









There are now domestic clearinghouses all across Europe. In addition to this there are several 
international clearinghouses based in London and New York (see timeline in Figure 12 below). 
With the exception of the international clearinghouses (e.g. PILnet, TrustLaw, A4ID) most 
clearinghouses only have a handful of staff (between 1 and 4). Although all clearinghouses 
essentially perform the same task, i.e. connecting law firms with pro bono clients and pro bono 
projects, the approaches they take to this task, their funding models and what they consider as 
part of their natural mandate vary considerably. While some clearinghouses will have been 
purpose-built as pro bono organizations (such as Pro Bono Connect in the Netherlands or Law 
Works and A4ID in the UK), more frequently, they will be offshoots from pre-existing 
organizations, taking their character, model and mission from those pre-existing institutions. 
For example, they may have emerged from or been inspired by grant-making foundations or 
resource organizations that cater to civil society (such as PILnet, the Civil Society 
Development Foundation in Romania or Proboneo in Germany), or they might have emerged 
from corporate foundations or foundations catering to university law clinics (such as TrustLaw 
                                                























or Centrum Pro Bono in Poland) or perhaps from broad domestic public interest law 
organizations (such as PILA in Ireland or the Ukrainian Pro Bono Clearinghouse).  
 
Nevertheless, virtually all clearinghouses, almost without exception, spend the first several 
years of their existence investing most of their energy into matchmaking and “market making”. 
In other words, building a market for pro bono by recruiting both law firms and non-profits to 
the cause and then matching firms with non-profits and non-profit projects. I refer exclusively 
to non-profits here not by accident, because, unlike their American cousins (discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3), European clearinghouses cater almost exclusively to non-profit clients. Of 
the nine clearinghouses and quasi-clearinghouses operating in continental Europe (four 
international and five domestic)787 whose staff were interviewed and the several others 
investigated for the purposes of this thesis, virtually all focused primarily or exclusively on 
catering to non-profit clients on the demand side. 
 
When it comes to the type of non-profit work catered for, clearinghouses can take very 
contrasting approaches. For example, while Trust Law focuses largely on the governance and 
other operational legal needs of non-profits, PILnet focuses on more programmatic and human 
rights work for non-profits. At the domestic level, approaches also vary. While clearinghouses 
in Poland, Germany and Romania (i.e. the Civil Society Development Foundation) largely 
prioritized such operational needs, clearinghouses in France and Hungary (PILnet) focused 
overwhelmingly on human rights work. Yet others, such as PILA in Ireland took an incredibly 
varied approach.  
    
  
                                                

































































































































































































































Beyond this, clearinghouses tend to capitalize on the pre-existing networks and skill-sets of 
their founders and host organizations. This “pre-history” and “start-up capital” of 
clearinghouses feeds into their mission and self-identification. For example, while Trust Law 
has been able to exploit the market-making and journalistic powerhouse that is Thomson 
Reuters (producing powerful exposé-like pro bono legal reports shedding light on new issues 
such as sex trafficking or domestic workers), PILnet (as will be discussed further in the 
following Chapter) has been able to take advantage of its large network of civil society 
organizations and public interest law advocates across Central and Eastern Europe (enabling it 
to rapidly scale up a pan-European clearinghouse movement by tapping into civil society across 
the continent). This has been equally true at the domestic level where, for instance, Centrum 
Pro Bono was built on the extensive relationships of its founders with the Polish legal 
establishment (allowing it to establish a highly prestigious annual pro bono award bringing 
together Poland’s legal elites) and AADH (the French domestic clearinghouse) on the 
experience of its founder with international human rights law (aiding it to engage firms in 
cutting-edge human rights work related, for example, to child trafficking). PILA is a project of 
the network of Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC), which emerged during the law reform 
movement in the 1970s. (It was founded in 1969.) FLAC is thus oriented towards the provision 
of free legal services to low-income individuals (promoting access to justice defined both 
narrowly and more widely) and this likely accounts for the fact that PILA is one of the few 
clearinghouses in Europe that caters for individual clients. Similarly, Pro Bono Connect, in the 
Netherlands, is a project of the Dutch Commission of Jurists for Human Rights (NJCM) and 
this likely accounts for the fact that Pro Bono Connect has been largely focused on catering for 
human rights organizations.  
 
Funding models are also varied. While several rely heavily or even exclusively on law firm 
charitable donations (such as PILnet), others charge membership fees to law firms and or NGO 
clients (such as A4ID, AADH and Pro Bono Connect) while others receive foundation grants 
or are even operated as corporate foundations (such as TrustLaw). Based on interviews with 
several clearinghouse managers, a few trends can be noted. Firstly, there seems to be a trend 
towards reliance on the law firms themselves for funding. This has been most likely caused by 
the fact that, as will be discussed below and in the following Chapter, PILnet (and PILnet staff) 
have been instrumental in establishing many of these clearinghouses, and on many occasions, 
have helped conceptualize their operating model, sometimes even directly making the business 
case to law firms for financially supporting such domestic clearinghouses. Another trend, 
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observed by the author, is the saturation of the clearinghouse market. Law firms seem unlikely 
to support more than one clearinghouse in any given European country. Moreover, now that 
they are paying fees for multiple (perhaps up to ten) clearinghouses across Europe (typically 
at least €5000 per year) and are increasing their ability to source pro work themselves, they 
seem unlikely to continue paying for new clearinghouses. 
 
In the following pages, the chapter will focus on some of the work being done by European 
clearinghouses. 
 
2.3.1! Culture building and institutionalization: creating a supportive pro bono 
environment  
 
Many clearinghouses have incorporated into their mission the broader goal of promoting pro 
bono culture within the legal profession and seeking the institutionalization of pro bono in 
various ways. Often this has been a necessary part of their core mandate in so far as it has 
formed a crucial part of the market-making process. For PILnet, this has certainly been the 
case. PILnet has adopted a catalytic approach aimed at sensitizing both non-profits and law 
firms to the potential benefits of pro bono by organizing roundtables and the “European Pro 
Bono Forum” (an annual conference for pro bono lawyers and non-profits in Europe). They 
have identified and nurtured “local pro bono champions” to carry the pro bono torch and spread 
the culture in various countries across Europe.788  
 
They have faced many challenges in this respect, from resistance to the culture of talking about 
“doing good” (many Europeans apparently believe that charitable work should be done but not 
talked about publicly) to resistance to the perception that Big Law Pro Bono is a US 
imposition.789  
 
They have been required to develop narratives and strategies to overcome such cultural 
obstacles. For example, by securing buy-in from the legal establishment (high courts, justice 
ministers, ombudsmen, etc.), by building a sense of pride and prestige around Big Law Pro 
Bono work through the establishment of the European Pro Bono Award, and by identifying 
precursors to pro bono in European legal practice and using them to counteract the idea the pro 
                                                
788 Interview numbers 14 and 15, Oct. 20, 2015. 
789 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
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bono is an American tradition.790 Beyond this, they have also done much to pursue 
institutionalization by negotiating “pro bono declarations” (definitions of and commitments 
towards pro bono) signed by law firms and other key players in the legal establishment of 
relevant jurisdictions and by helping to establish other clearinghouses through knowledge 
sharing (e.g. producing pro bono manuals) and training. As will be explored further in the 
following Chapter, their efforts at institutionalization have also sometimes meant seeking 
compromises with various national Bars and justice ministries, for example vis-à-vis: 
 
•" the exclusion of individual representation from the definition of pro bono (for example 
in the Czech Republic, Italy and Germany); 
•" exemptions for pro bono in relation to the prohibition of lawyers to advertise (for 
example in Poland and Italy);   
•" exemptions for pro bono in relation to the prohibition of lawyers to provide free legal 
services (for example in Germany and Romania); and 
•" exemptions for pro bono from VAT rules related to service provision (for example in 
Hungary and Poland).791 
 
Such culture-building, community building and institutionalization strategies have also been 
embraced by several of the national clearinghouses that PILnet has helped to found. For 
example, Centrum Pro Bono in Poland developed the first pro bono award in Europe.792 A 
leading Polish newspaper sponsors the award, launched in 2003, and its jury members have 
included the ombudsman, the Minister of Justice, the head of the Supreme Court, the head of 
the Constitutional Court and the head of the Polish Bar. Meanwhile, PILA in Ireland has 
successfully advocated for the inclusion of a term in all government procurement contracts that 
any firm who secures such a contract has to give back 5% (of the value of the contract) in pro 
bono and CSR contributions.793 The Civil Society Development Foundation, in Romania, has 
managed to place pro bono in the strategy of the ministry of justice for the development of 
justice in order to exert pressure on the Romanian Bar to take a favorable position on pro bono 
and have also managed to lobby to include pro bono or public interest litigation in some of the 
donor grants they manage for civil society organizations (e.g. they have managed to support 
                                                
790 Interview number 50, June 24, 2016. 
791 Examples taken from interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
792 Interview number 49, June 23, 2016. 
793 Interview number 34, May 30, 2016. 
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around 100 separate legal claims related to human rights and anti-discrimination via an EEA 
grant scheme they manage).794  
 
2.3.2! Automated match-making and “intelligent matchmaking”  
 
Clearinghouses are increasingly making use of technology to upgrade the rather analogue 
system of matchmaking that has been in place for several years. Trust Law was a pioneer in 
this regard, seeking at its founding to inject technology into the pro bono landscape and so 
revolutionize it. Jim Jones, Board Chair of the Pro Bono Institute, assisted Monique Villa, CEO 
of the Thomson Reuters Foundation, to develop the initial idea for Trust Law. He recalls a 
conversation in Minnesota in 2009 that lead to the development of the initial idea:  
 
“What we came up with was the original kernel of the idea which became Trust Law…a 
combination of a very smart application of technology with a matching program to try 
and bring lawyers and law firms together with significant NGOs and social enterprise 
organizations.”795  
 
Ed Rekosh, founder and former CEO of PILnet, was consulted by Villa at the time and recalls 
that Trust Law wanted to be a “virtual operator”:796 
 
“What she was pitching was making a market using [Thomson Reuters] strengths in 
information technology and market making. Her concept was just to be that connection 
point; she had a PowerPoint slide of a switchboard operator…”797 
 
Villa planned to have a very small tech-savvy team based in London that would operate an 
online platform that could automatically connect non-profits and law firms across the globe. 
Ultimately, the dream proved hard to realize. Although the platform was built, non-profits 
needed much more coaching and their requests needed to be carefully scoped by a lawyer 
before a law firm could engage with them.798 As one Trust Law employee later reflected: 
                                                
794 Interview number 38, June 14, 2016. 
795 Interview number 28, Feb. 8, 2016. 
796 Interview number 11, Oct. 8, 2015. 
797 PFC Social Impact Advisors, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, and Thomson Reuters 
Foundation, “Case Study on Trust Law: How the Thomson Reuters Foundation Built the World’s Largest Pro 
Bono Legal Network to Serve the Poor,” 2014, 9. 
798 Ibid., 10–13. 
 236 
 
“At the end of the day, the [online] platform is just a tool for our staff to facilitate the 
service, but it’s our staff, their expertise, that are the key part of the service.”799 
 
Other clearinghouses have also experimented with technology to facilitate their matchmaking. 
For example, Centrum Pro Bono in Poland has also developed an on-line platform. Non-profits 
members can visit their webpage and complete a form with a request. This request is then 
reviewed by the pro bono coordinator of Centrum Pro Bono who, after some back and forth 
and revision, will formally accept the request. Once a request has been accepted, any law firm 
member, by logging in to the member area of the website, can see the request (and browse 
others) and select it to take the project forward.800 Again, the system does not work perfectly 
and law firms do not always login frequently, such that the coordinator must also send the firms 
a weekly newsletter with all accepted matters (i.e. the traditional “analogue” approach to 
matchmaking).  
 
Beyond technology, another approach that is being taken to improve matchmaking, perhaps 
moving in the opposite direction, is what has been labelled as “intelligent matchmaking”.801 
The Good Lobby is an EU law and policy focused clearinghouse that seeks to match the large 
number of typically Brussels based EU advocacy non-profits with the Brussels based 
international legal community and the EU law academic community. The Good Lobby 
leverages on the insight of its founders and a network of academics and legal professionals to 
identify pro bono volunteers with the right expertise for specific non-profit projects. For 
example, in a project related to fracking for Food & Water Europe, The Good Lobby reached 
out to its network to identify a postdoctoral researcher and a PhD student based in Belgium, an 
academic based in France and a lawyer based in London, all with extensive knowledge and 
expertise in relation to EU energy law, to develop a toolkit on EU law for local fracking 
campaigners across Europe.802  
 
                                                
799 Ibid., 13. 
800 Interview number 49, June 23, 2016. 
801 Discussion with Alberto Alemanno and Lamin Khadar, co-founders of The Good Lobby. 
802 See https://www.foodandwatereurope.org/reports/food-water-europes-hydrocarbon-toolkit/.  
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2.3.3! Coalition building, thought leadership and agenda setting: using pro bono to 
connect the dots in the public interest landscape or push boundaries and break 
conventions   
 
A number of clearinghouses across Europe are beginning to take real initiative by questioning 
the received wisdom of what purpose clearinghouses should serve and what pro bono means 
as a form of progressive legal activism.  
 
The international clearinghouses and pro bono organizations such as PILnet, Trust Law, ISLP, 
PBI and A4ID and the Vance Center are all beginning, in different ways, to embrace a thought 
leadership role in relation to pro bono. For instance, A4ID seeks to “increasingly move towards 
being a thought leader” with respect to the role of law in the developing world and the business 
and human rights movement.803 They do so in part via organizing training sessions for the legal 
community around various business and human rights themes as relevant to developing 
economies. Meanwhile, Trust Law seeks to become a “think tank around pro bono”, for 
example, by identifying ways in which law firms can use pro bono to improve the position of 
women around the world, from domestic workers to sex trafficking victims.804  They do so by 
enlisting the help of firms and producing detailed investigative reports exploring issues that 
may not have been legally analyzed before. In addition, they hold trainings on social enterprise 
and impact investment for lawyers in the hope of linking up the pro bono movement with those 
movements. ISLP, for its part, is focusing on sustainable development, and has produced a 
number of reports analyzing issues around the social, humanitarian and environmental impact 
of investment into the developing world.805  
 
Meanwhile at the national level, clearinghouses are also beginning to take leadership roles in 
one way or another. 
 
One method being embraced by clearinghouses is coalition building. Clearinghouses bring 
together various actors (lawyers, academics, students, non-profits, politicians, public officials 
and journalists) to work on particular advocacy campaigns. In many respects this is a natural 
extension of the clearinghouse matchmaking function. However, extending this function 
beyond the traditional lawyer-non-profit dichotomy is an interesting and noteworthy 
                                                
803 Interview number 24, Dec. 14, 2015. 
804 Interview number 23, Dec. 2, 2015. 
805 See http://www.islp.org/content/research-reports.  
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development in Europe. For instance, the EU clearinghouse, The Good Lobby, often brings 
together senior academics, students and legal professionals, both to work on its pro bono 
projects and to deliver joint training sessions for non-profits (e.g. on lobbying and advocacy) 
and also for pro bono matchmaking sessions (or “hackathons”).806 The HEC-NYU EU Public 
Interest Clinic, the sister organization of The Good Lobby, has even brought together 
journalists at Politico Europe to work with law students, a handful of professors and a blogger 
to work on a project aimed at exposing a lack of transparency in the EU judicial system.807  
 
Meanwhile, PILA, the Irish clearinghouse, builds law reform working groups comprised of 
lawyers (solicitors and barristers), several non-profits and academics to promote legislative 
reform in relation to specific issues.808  PILA sets the agenda, frames the issues at stake and 
then drives the process forward when energy is flagging. In this manner, they have worked on 
issues to do with housing policy, victims’ rights and energy efficiency in private homes.809    
 
An interesting question is, at what point do such organizations stop being simply 
clearinghouses and become instead non-profit advocacy groups in their own right, with their 
own mission? There is no simple answer to this question. The research carried out suggests 
that it likely depends upon a range of factors including: the mandate of the organization as 
expressed in its articles of associations (some organizations such as Pro Bono Centrum in 
Poland are prohibited from engaging in “political” activity); the pre-history of the organization 
or the organizational context out of which the clearinghouse has emerged (i.e. the extent to 
which an organization had a separate existence and separate mandate prior to becoming a 
clearinghouse or taking on an additional mandate as a clearinghouse); the qualifications and 
backgrounds of the clearinghouse staff (e.g. whether  they are non-profit advocates, policy 
experts or commercial lawyers); and the profile of the leaders of such organizations (their  
particular expertise and whether they see themselves as advocates of particular causes). 
  
                                                
806 See http://www.thegoodlobby.eu.  
807 Clinic project, 2016 (on file with author).  
808 See, for example, http://www.pila.ie/resources/case-studies/housing-policy-working-group-collective-
complaint/. 




In this Chapter, we have explored the process by which Big Law Pro Bono has begun to emerge 
in Europe, by way of its institutionalization in the US and London and the emergence of a 
global corporate bar and a professional class of pro bono managers with mandates to spread 
pro bono culture across the increasing number of international offices. We have also sketched 
the shape of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, which is one of weak institutionalization, mimicking 
many of the features of pro bono in the US, however, with at least one major difference, the 
virtually exclusive non-profit client base both from the point of view of the firms and the 
clearinghouses.  
 
Taking just the top 30 law firms, the European Big Law Pro Bono industry likely involves 
more than 5000 lawyers (perhaps 120 full time equivalents) doing some €85 million worth of 
pro bono work per year spanning the entire continent from Moscow to London. While some 
1500 non-profit clients may benefit from this work, likely less that 15% of this work (possibly 
much less) is focused on access to justice, as defined in the existing pro bono literature and 
within US pro bono circles (i.e. direct access to justice for individual clients). Moreover, there 
has emerged an entire infrastructure, operating both internationally and nationally, to connect 
Big Law with non-profits spread across the Continent, with virtually no focus on the provision 
of legal services to low-income individuals. At first glance this seems odd, given that, as 
explored in Chapter 2, the singular objective that tied together the various models of pro bono 
engaged in by the European legal professions over the centuries, has been precisely to secure 
access to justice for individuals.  
 
How could this be, that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has developed with such a strong focus 
on servicing non-profit organizations and a very limited focus on promoting direct individual 
access to justice? And if Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is not directly promoting access to justice 
for individuals, is it still contributing towards access to justice? And if so how? The remainder 








CHAPTER 5 ! Big Law Pro Bono in Search of 
Demand and Ideology: An Investigation of Why 
Big Law Pro Bono Has Taken a Unique Shape in 
Europe   
 
In the first chapter of this thesis we noted that Big Law Pro Bono traces its origins to the United 
States and to progressive legal movements of the 1960s and 1970s and suggested that, as such, 
it must be understood as a fundamentally American construct. However, it was suggested that, 
unlike other forms of progressive lawyering (or “cause lawyering”) emerging out of this period, 
Big Law Pro Bono is ideologically indeterminate. That is to say that Big Law Pro Bono can 
best be understood as a resource, defined not by any ideology or politics, but by a commitment 
to provide technical expertise, at no cost, to clients who otherwise would not have access to 
such expertise. This is significant, for the purposes of the present chapter, because it means 
that Big Law Pro Bono, when being deployed in any particular context (i.e. in a new 
jurisdiction/region) will not necessarily be oriented towards any particular social cause or 
policy or political objective.  
 
In Chapter 1, it was further suggested that, more than just being politically and ideologically 
indeterminate, Big Law Pro Bono is also historically and politically contingent. This implies 
that the prevailing historical and political context within which the pro bono resource is 
deployed will play a fundamental role in determining how the pro bono resource is oriented.  
In Chapters 1, 2 and 4, we have explored the influence of the poverty law movement, the 
decline in Federal funding for civil legal aid and the access to justice movement on the 
institutionalization of Big Law Pro Bono in the United States. Against this backdrop, Big Law 
Pro Bono began to be conceived of, by practitioners, advocates and commentators, as a solution 
to the perceived “justice gap” (vis-à-vis civil legal aid). As firms began to institutionalize pro 
bono, the resource was oriented functionally towards the provision of civil legal services to 
low-income individuals. Pressure was placed on firms to construct their pro bono practices in 
this manner by a range of actors including: intermediary organizations, law graduates, the 
organized bar and legal aid providers. This is significant because as will be further explored in 
this chapter, it likely means that where Big Law Pro Bono is transplanted to a new region or 
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jurisdiction, the prevailing historical and political context and the various local actors may 
equally play a role in determining how this resource is deployed and we should not necessarily 
expect that the results would be the same as in the United States. Indeed, in Chapter 1 it was 
suggested that whereas certain features of Big Law Pro Bono are likely to be context-
transcending and present in any region or jurisdiction where Big Law Pro Bono is deployed, 
others are likely to be more context-specific and variable depending upon the specific location. 
Whether a feature falls into the former or the latter category likely depends upon whether that 
feature flows from the logic of Big Law itself (such as the structures, processes and hierarchies 
of large commercial law firms or the preferences of multinational corporate clients) or from 
the logic of the local legal market (such as local Bar regulations or the prevailing system for 
the provision of legal services to the poor).   
 
In Chapter 3, we have noted that throughout European history, there has been a consistent and 
growing concern with access to justice, defined narrowly as the access of the poor and the 
needy to legal services and to procedures for administering justice. Access to justice, defined 
in this way, has been the major objective of pro bono practice throughout the ages in Europe. 
It was further suggested that, with the emergence of nation states and then the European social 
state, the obligation of ensuring access to justice gradually shifted from a charitable or 
professional duty of lawyers and the organized bar, towards a constitutionalized civic right, 
institutionalized in the form of state-funded legal aid systems. We also explored how novel 
models of social justice lawyering emerged in the late 20th Century, which both embraced and 
transcended conventional public service norms (neutrality, impartiality) that were implicit in 
much of the pro bono lawyering practice throughout European history, and fused them with 
both human rights frames and political and transgressive ideologies that had been cultivated in 
Soviet-era Central and Eastern Europe. Such models pursued the wide conception of access to 
justice (as defined in Chapter 2) insofar as they sought norm change, altering both the processes 
and outcomes of existing judicial mechanisms, and so redefining “justice” in favor of 
marginalized and underrepresented groups and social and political pariahs. It is hoped that all 
of this will provide useful context as we try and understand why it is that Big Law Pro Bono 
in Europe has developed in the way that it has.  
 
In Chapter 4, we have explored the globalization of Big Law Pro Bono by tracing this process 
from its US origins through London and into Continental Europe. We explored how the 
emergence of a professional class of full-time pro bono managers and the internationalization 
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of commercial law firms inevitably brought Big Law Pro Bono to Europe in that large firms 
now had European offices and Pro Bono managers and policies that extended to Europe, 
amongst other locations. We also explored the shape of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe today, 
which is defined above all, both from the vantage point of law firms and referral organizations, 
by its almost singular focus on non-profit clients.   
 
Having addressed the “how” and the “what” questions in Chapter 4, in this chapter the central 
objective is to analyze the “why” question through an exploration of the “localization” of Big 
Law Pro Bono. This will be done in two parts. In the first part (Section 1) we will explore why 
it is that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe is focused so single-mindedly on work for non-profit 
organizations. In the second part (Section 2) we will try to understand why, given the history 
of pro bono lawyering in Europe (explored in Chapter 3) and the way Big Law Pro Bono has 
come to be understood in the US (explored in Chapters 1, 2 and 4), there is virtually no 
observable focus on direct individual access to justice in the European variant of Big Law Pro 
Bono?  
 
The analysis in this chapter will point to several possible answers to these questions, including: 
barriers to market access in Europe experienced by the initial Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs 
(i.e. full-time pro bono mangers based in the US and the UK seeking to promote pro bono on 
the Continent); the unique profile and networks of those actors who initially developed the 
market for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe; the legacies of the European civil liberties, human 
rights and public interest law movements; the resistance of local bars to Big Law engaging in 
individual client work; the specificities of the type of law firms and lawyers that make up the 
European Corporate Bar; the relative ease of dealing with non-profit clients as opposed to 
individual clients; the functional distribution of labor between the Social Bars of Europe and 
the rest of the legal profession (and the Corporate Bar in particular); and the fact that the 
problem of individual access to justice (in Central and Eastern Europe) had, in the minds of 
many of the relevant stakeholders, already been largely solved by the time the market for Big 
Law Pro Bono was really taking shape on the Continent.  
 
Among these factors, arguably the most significant are: firstly, the barriers to market access;  
secondly, the existence of a strong Social Bar in many European states (and the linked 
resistance from national Bars to developing Big Law Pro Bono in way that would undermine 
legal aid systems and undercut the market share of the Social Bar); and thirdly, the fact that the 
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key organization (PILnet) which helped to build the market for Big Law Pro Bono in 
Continental Europe, was deeply connected to the European NGO movement and, for 
historically contingent reasons, viewed the problem of access to justice for individuals (narrow 
definition) as a problem for the state to solve.  
 
As was noted in Chapter 1, what appears as “globalization”, is often actually what Santos has 
called “globalized localism”, meaning “the process by which local phenomena are successfully 
globalized”.810 This often turns out to be “Americanization” rather than globalization insofar 
as American models of law and legal practice are exported (and transplanted), along with a 
certain model of capitalism, to other parts of the world by businesses, law firms, foundations, 
development agencies etc.811 However, this is often a “thin globalization” insofar as there is a 
difference between form (the shape of legal institutions and legal models) and substance (the 
lived experience of legal institutions and legal practices) and imported norms and practices 
remain hybrid or contested below the veneer of uniformity.  
 
As we shall see in this Chapter, in Continental Europe, the emergence of Big Law Pro Bono is 
largely a story of the export of an American legal practice (Big Law Pro Bono), but the story 
is not of an unmediated transplant. Preexisting local practice, legal institutions and legal actors 
(as explored in Chapter 3) filter American models such that they take on new meaning. Certain 
parts of the legal transplant may succeed and others may fail. Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 
have suggested that key factors that may render legal transplants more likely to succeed 
include: when they are chosen voluntarily after consideration of alternative solutions; when 
there is affinity between the legal systems of the exporting and importing countries; when there 
is demand from the recipient country; when legal intermediaries are in position that understand 
the law and can adapt it to local conditions; and when institutional infrastructures is already in 
place.812 As we will explore below, understanding how these variables play out in the transplant 
of Big Law Pro Bono in Continental Europe helps to explain why Big Law Pro Bono ended so 
heavily focused on non-profit clients on the Continent. Of particular relevance here, is the role 
played by international and national elites (by reference e.g. to wealth, education, familial ties), 
                                                
810 Snyder, “Economic globalization and the law,” 626; Wilkins, Khanna and Trubek, eds. The Indian Legal 
Profession in the Age of Globalization, 8. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect”; Halliday 
and Osinsky, "Globalization of law", 458. 
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in importing and exporting legal norms and building new legal practice sites and institutions.813 
As noted in Chapter 1, such elites use the process of importing and exporting legal norms to 
elevate and maintain their elite status in national and international hierarchies.814 What is 
crucial to consider in this respect, however, is to consider how such elites are situated and what 
“capital” they can mobilize.815 In other words, what are the incentives, capabilities and 
limitations of relevant elites, in differing social, political and legal contexts, when pursuing a 
transplant? What attributes do they have (networks, skill sets, resources) when pursuing a 
transplant? As we shall see, a consideration of such factors also sheds crucial light on the story 
of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe.  
 
 
1! Market Barriers and Market Formation  
 
In this section I will try to explore why it is that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe came to be so 
singularly focused on non-profit clients and, moreover, on a particular model of progressive 
lawyering that emerged from the European civil liberties, human rights and public interest law 
movements. In this analysis, I will be exploring, in more detail, the process by which Big Law 
Pro Bono has been transplanted on European soil. If Chapter 4 focused on the globalization of 
Big Law Pro, here I will focus on the localization of this resource. In doing so I make use of 
market and business terminology: “market barriers”, “market formation”, “demand and 
supply” and so on. I do so because I believe that unlike in the United States where Big Law 
Pro Bono emerged rather organically from progressive legal movements, in Europe it was 
intentionally transplanted and had to be “branded” and “marketed”. Therefore, I believe that 
the localization of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe can productively be understood in terms of 
market forces. Indeed, when “Big Law” itself arrived in Europe between the late 1980s and 
early 2000s, it brought with it a new and previously unheard-of resource, “Big Law Pro Bono”. 
With thousands of lawyers located in capital cities from London to Moscow and Amsterdam 
to Rome, and full-time Pro Bono Counsel based in the firms’ headquarters in New York, DC 
and, subsequently, London, mandated to spread pro bono culture across the firms’ international 
offices, the potential for this new resource was significant.  
 
                                                
813 See e.g. Dezalay and Garth, The internationalization of palace wars. 
814 Dezalay and Madsen, "The force of law and lawyers", 439. 
815 Ibid. 447. 
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In this light, there is no question that when Big Law arrived in Europe, and US and London-
based Pro Bono Counsel were looking to deploy this new resource, they were embarking upon 
a legal transplant. As noted in Chapter 2, Europe had a rich history of pro bono lawyering but 
no history of deploying lawyers who exclusively practice commercial law (a phenomenon 
almost as new as “Big Law” itself), more used to working for banks and energy companies, to 
that end (i.e. pro bono lawyering). This was a transplant, not of a legal instrument, or legal 
institution, but of a practice, or perhaps rather a service. The issue is that, typically, new 
services respond to new demands. As explored in the previous chapter, in the US, Big Law Pro 
Bono had emerged in response to the demand from junior lawyers to do public interest work 
and against the backdrop of the broader public interest law and poverty law movements. These 
movements had positioned lawyers as a crucial component of a large-scale public service 
project aimed at the creation of a more just and inclusive society, and insofar as pro bono was 
concerned, the promotion of access to justice, defined in terms of civil legal aid. Big Law Pro 
Bono was further institutionalized against a backdrop of declining civil legal aid funding and 
a desire of the organized bar to promote conservative notions of public service framed around 
traditional public service norms (i.e. public service as the provision of free legal services to 
low-income clients rather than as more transgressive strategies such as law reform and impact 
litigation). This had furthermore created a culture of both professionalized and grass roots civil 
society organizations that trusted lawyers, who were often ideologically in-sync with them, and 
were willing to work collectively to secure equal access to justice.  
 
In Continental Europe, however, Big Law Pro Bono arrived as a result of internationalization 
in the global legal market, as but one part of the overall Big Law package. If Big Law Pro Bono 
was exported to Europe, lock, stock and barrel, with the export of Big Law more generally, 
then how could it be that the practice in Europe came to be so disinterested in access to justice 
(defined narrowly)? In contrast to its origins in the US, Big Law Pro Bono arrived in 
Continental Europe without any particular problem to solve, or any particular demand to 
respond to. It was a service in search of demand. Consequently, almost immediately, the Big 
Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs (i.e. the Pro Bono Counsel in the firms’ headquarters) 
encountered an obstacle. These were US commercial lawyers (or UK lawyers with very limited 
experience in pro bono management) looking to generate pro bono work in their Continental 
European offices. They didn’t speak the local languages, they had no links to possible pro bono 
recipients in, for example, Hungary, Spain or the Netherlands. They could not even be sure 
there was a demand for the service they were trying to “sell”. Where would they even begin?   
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1.1! Barriers to market access and the multi-armed bandit problem   
 
One way of defining “barriers to market entry” is “anything that prevents an entrepreneur from 
instantaneously creating a new firm in a market”.816 Meanwhile, the “multi-armed bandit 
problem”, in probability theory, is defined as a problem in which fixed or limited resources 
must be allocated among “several alternative (competing) projects” where the potential value 
of such projects is only partially understood and may become more understood with the passing 
of time or by actually allocating resources to the projects.817 These concepts may be useful, in 
the following passages, to understand the challenges that the European Big Law Pro Bono 
entrepreneurs faced in developing pro bono practices in their continental European offices. 
 
By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, pro bono practice had been significantly 
institutionalized in the top 100 American firms and certainly in the top 10 or so English 
firms.818 Moreover, by the early 2000s, the largest American and English law firms had a 
significant European footprint and an enormous pool of lawyers spread across Europe and 
indeed across the globe. As the Anglo-American law firms expanded globally, they sought to 
take their newly institutionalized pro bono practices with them. In the words of Suzie Turner 
(Partner and Chair of Dechert's firm-wide Pro Bono practice, talking in 2003), "our 
commitment to pro bono is global in nature…one firm, one commitment, one policy."819 
Talking in 2015, she put it another way, “there is legal need in all jurisdictions, so to require 
pro bono in the US but not in Kazakhstan does not hold water.”820 This position is unsurprising 
if you consider the model of internationalization pursued by US firms (as discussed in Chapter 
4), which typically involved sending US-trained and qualified lawyers to staff European offices 
that were managed from the US in accordance with US professional standards. This made it 
relatively easy for US law firms to export pro bono culture overseas (at least insofar as the 
lawyers were concerned – identifying clients would be an altogether separate challenge). In 
any event, as the American firms began to encourage lawyers in their foreign offices to uphold 
the pro bono commitments set in the US, British firms began to respond. Lovells was first to 
                                                
816 Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 110. 
817 Mahajan and Teneketzis, “Multi-armed bandit problems,” 121–51. 
818 This, of course, says nothing about pro bono practice in other segments of the profession, such as sole 
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819 M. Goldhaber, “A World of Good,” American Lawyer 34, no. 7, 2012. 
820 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
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appoint a full-time pro bono manager position in 1997. This was followed by several 
appointments by British firms (Clifford Chance, Linklaters and Allen & Overy) and by 1999, 
six firms maintained full-time pro bono personnel in their London offices.821   
 
However, as the pro bono council from the American and London law firms began to promote 
pro bono practice within their Continental European offices, they encountered several 
significant problems. While, as discussed in Chapter 3, the legal professions of most European 
states had proud traditions of providing legal services to those in need, the idea of widespread 
institutionalized Big Law Pro Bono was novel (as was the emergence of Mega-Law practice 
on the continent), all of which caused some difficulty. These difficulties will be discussed 
throughout this chapter. For the time being, it will be sufficient to note that identifying suitable 
pro bono opportunities was proving incredibly difficult. In contrast to the US, there were no 
civil society organizations operating as “feeder organizations”/ “clearinghouses”, i.e. non-
profits specifically set up to connect law firms with individuals.822 In the words of Suzie Turner, 
“the hurdles were in finding sufficient numbers of pro bono matters for people to handle 
[…there was an] absence of infrastructure and an absence of NGO culture that was looking for 
and trusting pro bono”.823 James Windels (Co-chair of Davis Polk & Wardwell's pro bono 
committee) put it succinctly when he suggested (in 2003) that, “[t]here is no doubt that the [pro 
bono] infrastructure overseas continues to lag behind the infrastructure [in the US]”.824  
 
Unlike the US, Europe had not benefited from public interest law and poverty law movements, 
building connections and trust between Big Law and civil society and rallying them behind a 
common objective and ideology. As discussed in Chapter 3, the introduction of state-sponsored 
legal aid systems across Europe had fostered the emergence of a Social Bar, i.e. those lawyers 
specialized in legal aid work (discussed further in Part 2 below). There was no expectation on 
commercial lawyers to do “legal aid” work (i.e. any legal work for low-income individuals). 
Meanwhile London, where attitudes to engaging Big Law in such access to justice oriented 
work were positively hostile, was serving as the base camp for promoting Big Law Pro Bono 
on the continent. This most probably influenced the framing of the objectives. Turner had 
organized a conference in London, already in 2001, in collaboration with the SPBG under the 
                                                
821 “Who is behind pro bono? As the director of the Solicitor’s Pro Bono Group resigns, Matheu Swallow 
asks where the group goes from here,” Lawyer, September 27, 1999, 14. 
822 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
823 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
824 M. Goldhaber, “A World of Good,” American Lawyer 34, no. 7, 2012. 
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name “Pro Bono across the Channel”.825 Within the next 3 or 4 years, Turner built a coalition 
of pro bono managers, including Felicity Kirk (then Director of Pro Bono at White & Case) 
and Florence Brocklesby (then Pro Bono Manager at Debevoise & Plimpton). The three of 
them (“the European Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs”, also affectionately referred to as “the 
midwives of European Pro Bono” by others in the movement) were single-mindedly 
determined to spread Big Law Pro Bono practice to mainland Europe.  However, to do so, they 
were going to need to make some in-roads with local civil society organizations, with Social 
Bars, and with any potential recipients of Big Law Pro Bono services. Relying exclusively on 
their local lawyers was not realistic. Local lawyers were never going to “send 2000 emails out” 
to local civil society actors.826 In the words of Kirk, “not being on the ground in 25 jurisdictions 
was a big challenge” and “opportunities seemed to arise in an ad hoc manner […] which is 
problematic if you want to develop things a bit more systematically”.827 It is also important to 
remember that they were aiming to promote, all at the same time, pro bono across several 
offices with several hundreds of lawyers spanning diverse jurisdictions and legal cultures. It 
was impossible to know which opportunities to pursue (i.e. which cities/offices and which civil 
society organization or lawyers to talk to, in order to generate pro bono requests). It was easy 
to go down one road, invest time, and discover that it would not generate any fruitful pro bono 
work.828 Moreover, the pro bono entrepreneurs were collectively sensitive to things “not being 
imposed”.829 They wanted Big Law Pro Bono to respond to genuine demands but encountered 
large resistance from local lawyers typically suggesting that “legal aid [in their country] was 
very comprehensive” or, alternatively, that “pro bono could not be done” in their country due 
to legal and regulatory obstacles.  For example, they discovered that in Germany, providing 
free legal advice was prohibited by legal ethics law (although, German lawyers nevertheless 
historically provided charitable legal services on an ad hoc and “don’t ask, don’t tell basis”).830 
 
The Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs were trying to bring a new service (Big Law Pro Bono) 
to a new market (Mainland Europe). However, they were based in the US and London, they 
did not speak local languages or have useful local contacts through which they might generate 
demand for their services. They had limited understanding of the local context and were 
                                                
825 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
826 Ibid. 
827 Interview number 17, Nov. 3, 2015. 
828 Ibid. 
829 Ibid. 
830 Mayer Brown LLP, Pro Bono Update, Spring 2008, 21. 
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cautious of creating a backlash by failing to be sufficiently sensitive to that context. They could 
not even be sure of the best way to market this new service in each location. How should they 
call it? How should they describe its utility? They were not responding to a genuine demand 
and had no clear ideology or objectives (other than to spread Big Law Pro Bono practice across 
their offices). They were already encountering resistance even based on their cautious early 
efforts. Moreover, they wanted to market this service in multiple locations, spanning a 
continent, but had no way, without investing significant resources, of being able to identify 
which gambles would pay off. Bear in mind that Turner was also responsible for the US pro 
bono practice of her firm while Kirk and Brocklesby had mandates for London as well as 
Europe. In essence, they had very finite resources and needed to find a way to both overcome 
the barriers they were facing and improve their ability to identify suitable opportunities for 
developing the practice. From around 2006 to 2008, they would find a solution to these 
problems but it would be a solution that would move the conception of Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe further from the objective of promoting individual access to justice.        
  
1.2! Market formation  
 
Europe had not benefitted from a public interest law or poverty law movement forging ties 
between Big Law and civil society.  However, that is not to say that there was no tradition of 
collaboration among the legal professions more broadly and civil society. As already noticed 
in Chapter 3, the organized and semi-organized models of pro bono have been deployed over 
the centuries to engage lawyers in collaborating with civil society actors to provide pro bono 
services. Whether it was trade unions, citizens’ advice bureaus, women’s groups, tenants’ 
associations, agricultural associations, Christian organizations or organizations for orphaned 
children, illegitimate children and their mothers, European lawyers have collaborated with civil 
society to provide pro bono legal services.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Europe had benefited from civil liberties, human rights 
and public interest law movements, and as such, there was a tradition of collaboration between 
the legal profession and civil society, oriented around civil liberties and, subsequently, human 
rights and public interest lawyering. As will be explored below, the civil liberties, human rights 
and public interest law movements in Europe created a large population of non-profit 
organizations with broadly “law reform” objectives. Such objectives, based on the definitions 
and categorizations developed in Chapter 2, might be described as related to access to justice 
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(wide definition) and rule of law. That is, they aimed at achieving systemic change by making 
domestic judicial processes and outcomes more just. They did so typically by leveraging on 
international law and norms to undermine the legitimacy of domestic political and legal norms, 
forcing national legislatures, executives and judiciaries to redefine such norms, rendering them 
fairer, more inclusive and more equitable. A second and related objective was to guarantee a 
functional, clear and predictable legal system where individual rights are protected in a 
consistent manner and where government is bound by law and held accountable to its citizens. 
To pursue these objectives, the non-profits made heavy reliance on international and 
comparative law, to pursue law reform and policy change. In time, these non-profits and their 
model of legal advocacy would become forged with Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, giving it a 
unique flavor, distinct from its American forbearer. In the following passages, I will explore 
how this model of legal activism emerged.     
 
1.2.1! A clearinghouse in the making? 
 
In 1997, toward the beginning of the Central and Eastern European Public Interest Law 
Movement (explored in Chapter 3), Edwin Rekosh (a consultant for the Ford Foundation and 
Columbia Law School graduate) launched the Public Interest Law Initiative in Transitional 
Societies at Columbia Law School (PILI and subsequently PILnet) with seed funding of 
$400,000 from the Ford Foundation.831 The stated aim in the original grant application to the 
Ford Foundation was “to promote public interest law in Russia and Eastern Europe”.832 More 
specifically, the aims of PILI were to provide published resources and networking services to 
the growing public interest law community in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).833  
 
PILnet was launched into the heart of the European public interest law movement (Rekosh 
being primarily responsible for the organization of the first conference in Oxford in 1996, 
discussed in Chapter 3), and after being set up, quickly established itself as the central resource 
and actor for both domestic and international public interest law actors in the region. It was 
responsible for the organization and coordination of the conference on public interest law in 
CEE in 1997 and several other such conferences, and became a central coordinating body 
between the efforts of various funders to “construct” public interest law in the region (including 
                                                
831 See http://www.pilnet.org/public-interest-law.html.  
832 Public Interest Law Initiative in Russia and Eastern Europe, “A Proposal Submitted to the Ford Foundation 
by Columbia Law School,” July 1997, 1.  
833 McClymont and Golub, Many Roads to Justice, 241. 
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Ford, Open Society, Rockefeller, MacArthur and Mott, all of which had funded PILnet in 
varying degrees during this period).834 In this capacity, PILnet came into contact with many of 
the core grantees and stakeholders in this movement (organizations such as the Polish Helsinki 
Foundation, the Massag Foundation, the Women’s Rights Centre, INTERIGHTS, the 
European Roma Rights Centre, the Czech Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union, the Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities).835 Adopting a “catalytic 
approach”, PILnet sought to accelerate transformative change by providing a supportive 
framework for progressive developments within legal education, the professional bar, the state 
and civil society. The stated philosophy of PILnet was to convene the right people (those that 
could make change), give them a framework for discussion and get them talking. Concretely, 
the organization played a role in: promoting and facilitating the establishment of over 70 
university law clinics;836 initiating a process of legislative reform in relation to legal aid and 
access to justice in multiple jurisdictions;837 and chiefly, in spreading a culture of public interest 
law practice among civil society organizations - this included encouraging the adoption of 
comparative legal approaches, promoting the use of international and regional human rights 
mechanisms and stimulating the use of impact litigation strategies, but essentially involved 
tooling up civil society with respect to legal strategies.  
 
A handful of examples of PILnet’s activities from its 2002-2003 grant report may serve to 
illustrate its role.838 During that period, PILnet: 
 
•" Ran a workshop on administrative remedies for NGOs and public interest lawyers; 
•"  Collaborated with the OSCE to conduct a series of freedom of association advocacy 
trainings for NGOs; 
•" Launched a freedom of association source book with the Council of Europe;  
                                                
834 PILnet grant files, 1998 to 2003 (on file with author).  
835 Irena Grudzinska-Gross, PSJ: Governance and Civil Society, Recommendation for Grant, Re: Support to 
Promote Public Interest Law in Eastern Europe, Grant No. 970-0685, 970-0686 (1998).  
836 PILnet came to play a central convening role in the European clinical legal education movement. See 
Alemanno and Khadar, Reinventing Legal Education, 1–26. 
837 Working with a coalition of organizations and actors including the Open Society, PILnet was able to 
secure big changes to the legal aid regimes of Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Latvia. See Access to Justice in 
Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd European Forum on Access to Justice, organized by the Public Interest Law 
Initiative in collaboration with the Open Society Justice Initiative, Feb. 24–26, 2005, Budapest, Hungary, Forum 
Report, 1, 12, 13. 
838 Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University Budapest Law Centre, Final Narrative Report, Ford 
Foundation Grant No. 970-1586-2 (2003). 
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•" Held a roundtable on anti-discrimination law for a “Roma Participation Program” for the 
benefit of NGO activists, government officials and Roma organizations; 
•" Participated in a retreat in Istanbul for its 100 fellows from its fellowship program (the 
sponsorship, each year, by PILI of several human rights activists from CEE to study at 
Columbia Law School in New York for several months) and human rights fellows from the 
Central European University, American University and the University of Essex; 
•" Organized an annual clinical legal education colloquium in Warsaw; 
•" Helped to establish a Polish Clinical Legal Education Foundation (to support legal clinics 
across Poland);   
•" Ran a teacher training program for clinical teachers in Bucharest; 
•" Held an international conference for non-profit legal clinics in St. Petersburg.  
 
A Ford Foundation internal grantee review file suggests that by 2001, Ford considered that 
PILnet had, “established itself as one of the main resources and actors for public interest law 
in the region in a very short period of time”, and that one of its “main strengths” was that it 
“covers the whole of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia”, enabling it to 
contribute significantly to, “building trans-regional coalitions and networks”.839 By its own 
account, by 2002, PILnet had “reached thousands of lawyers, law professors and law students 
[in CEE] through its public interest law programs”.840  
 
Consequently, and importantly, for our purposes, by the early to mid-2000s, PILnet: had a 
person-to-person network of hundreds of civil society organizations spanning Central and 
Eastern Europe; was fully aware of the legal needs of those organizations (having spent almost 
10 years skilling them up); knew which social and political issues were the most pressing and 
which public interest law strategies were likely to be successful; knew which organizations and 
individuals had the greatest appreciation for “public interest law”; and had connections with 
and a history of working with the legal bars, law schools, judiciaries and justice ministries of 
virtually every Central and Eastern European country. 
 
                                                
839 Mihaela Serban, Ford Foundation, Inter-office Memorandum, Review of the Public Interest Law 
Initiative at Columbia University (2001). 
840 Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University Budapest Law Centre, Final Narrative Report, Ford 
Foundation Grant No. 970-1586-2 (2003), 10. 
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These attributes rendered PILnet, as an organization, wholly sui generis. PILnet was exactly 
the kind of intermediary that the Big Law entrepreneurs needed in order to overcome some of 
the challenges they had been facing. As it happened, however, PILnet had a problem of their 
own to solve. By 2001, many of the US funders who had poured into the region (e.g. Ford 
Foundation, USAID, Mott Foundation, German Marshall Fund, the American Bar Association) 
were beginning to pull out. The Ford Foundation, which had provided PILnet with 40% of its 
funding between 1997 and 2001, had launched an exit strategy and was tying off all of its grants 
(including grants for PILnet).841 There was a belief that, with the accession process well under 
way for many CEE states, the EU should take over as the primary funder of civil society 
organizations in the region, and accordingly both Ford and the Open Society began gradually 
shifting their attention away from CEE.842   
 
Civil society organizations, many of which had received extensive support and mentoring 
through PILnet, were seeing their funding cut and were beginning to worry about their long-
term future.843 Accordingly, PILnet would need to find new ways of channeling resources into 
the promotion and support of public interest law in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
1.2.2! Two roads converge: induced innovation and market formation  
 
“Induced innovation theory” predicts that “a change in the relative abundance of inputs to 
production, or their relative prices, can play an important role in influencing the rate and 
direction of technical change” or put another way, “a change in relative input abundance, […] 
can act as a spur to innovation in an industry.”844 Meanwhile, “markets” can be defined as 
“social spaces where repeated exchanges occur between buyers and sellers under a set of formal 
and informal rules governing relations between competitors, suppliers, and customers”.845 For 
a market to exist, exchange must transcend “unstructured, haphazard, one-shot, anonymous 
social exchange”.846 Finally, business studies literature suggests that global (or international) 
markets will emerge where “there is sufficient convergence in demand conditions across 
                                                
841 Email from Irina Grudzinska-Gross to Ed Rekosh, Mar. 24, 2003 (on file with author); Mihaela Serban, 
Ford Foundation, Inter-office Memorandum, Review of the Public Interest Law Initiative at Columbia 
University (2001). 
842 Irina Grudzinska-Gross, “Reflection Memo” (2002), on file with author re shifting funding priorities of 
donors; interview with Filip Czernicki, June 23, 2016. 
843 Interview number 11, Oct. 7, 2015. 
844 Hanlon, “Necessity is the mother of invention,” 67–100. 
845 Fligstein and Dauter, “Sociology of markets,” 114. 
846 Ibid. 
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countries that firms can sell essentially identical products in different national markets”.847 
These concepts may be useful in comprehending how and why, from around 2003, PILnet 
began to facilitate the establishment of a market for the exchange of Big Law Pro Bono services 
across the continent.    
 
Rekosh had already come into contact with the idea of pro bono as long ago as 1988 during his 
time as an associate at New York law firm, Coudert Brothers. While there, he had engaged in 
pro bono work  himself for organizations like Human Rights Watch, Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights and the International League for Human Rights.848 By 2000, Rekosh, now at the 
helm of PILnet, was again encountering Big Law Pro Bono via his contacts in the New York 
public interest law scene (where he was well-connected and known as the “guy to go to about 
public interest law in Eastern Europe”), such as Joan Vermeulen (the Director of New York 
Lawyers for the Public Interest and later Founding Director of the Vance Centre for 
International Justice).849 Furthermore, in early 2001, Rekosh was invited by Suzie Turner to 
attend the very same conference she had organized with SPBG in London (mentioned above) 
about establishing Big Law Pro Bono Practice in mainland Europe.850 At the time, Rekosh 
recalls noticing that there were virtually no lawyers from continental Europe in attendance. 
During these early interactions around the topic, Rekosh was not persuaded that Big Law Pro 
Bono could be successful in the more conservative Continental European context.851 
Conversations between Turner and Rekosh would continue for the next several years but would 
not materialize into any concrete collaboration until late 2006.  
 
However, with growing concerns around the long-term viability and sustainability both of 
PILnet and the many non-profits in its network, Rekosh remained open to the idea of Big Law 
Pro Bono. By mid-2001, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Ford Foundation was 
considering terminating its funding program for public interest law in CEE (the raison d'être 
for PILnet) and tying off its funding for PILnet. PILnet had received over $1 million from Ford 
between September 1997 and April 2001, with the last payment of $180,000 scheduled under 
                                                
847 Germain, Globalization and its Critics, 176. 
848 Curriculum vitae of Edwin B. Rekosh, 1997. 
849 Interview number 8, Oct. 1, 2015. 
850 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
851 Interview number 11, Oct. 8, 2015. 
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that program for April 2001.852 Internal grantee review files and correspondence from this 
period reveal the pressure that Rekosh must have been under. Ford was apparently concerned 
about the high costs of supporting PILnet due to its maintaining an office in New York and 
felt, moreover, that this “represent[ed] a major obstacle towards achieving its goals”.853 Ford 
felt that, “while focused enough, some of the projects [of PILnet] could be substantially 
improved”.854 “It is not clear”, the memo goes on to say, “to what extent PILI still aims to fulfil 
the goals that justified its founding [and, in any event] changing conditions in the field of public 
interest law in CEE, may require PILI to redefine its priorities and long-term goals, as well as 
to re-assess some of its programs”.855 In an email to the grant manager at Ford, in summer of 
2001, Rekosh queries, “I received today the grant letter from the Ford Foundation for $180,000 
[…] we are grateful for the support […] I had been under the impression, however, that this 
amount of funding was intended to cover just one year […] and that we were welcome to apply 
for some amount of funding beginning 2002 for general support […]”.856 Irena Grudzinska 
Gross (the grant manager) responds: “we were thinking about not supporting anymore the 
office in New York (even though I am sure it is very useful), and funding partially the entity 
in Budapest. I am just not sure how long our support will last, as we are again discussing the 
future of the EE [Eastern Europe] program.”857 It is unquestionable that Rekosh, who was now 
supporting a staff of six at PILnet, would have felt the pressure, during this period, to seek out 
alternative funding sources, or at the very minimum, new opportunities and ways of redefining 
the purpose and justification for PILnet.  
 
Around the same time, Rekosh recalls that, to him, Big Law Pro Bono began to “look like one 
part of the answer for long-term sustainability” of all that PILnet (and the broader public 
interest law movement) had sought to achieve.858 In the words of Rekosh: “I was interested in 
pro bono because I could see some long-term potential to build a sustainable base [for all of 
the work that PILnet had done] over the prior 10 years or so [and moreover] it would add 
resources to meet the legal needs of civil society.”859   
                                                
852 Email from Irina Grudzinska-Gross to Ed Rekosh, Mar. 24, 2003 (on file with author); Mihaela Serban, 
Ford Foundation, Inter-office Memorandum, Review of the Public Interest Law Initiative at Columbia 




856 Email from Ed Rekosh to Irina Grudzinska-Gross, July 6, 2001 (on file with author). 
857 Email from Irina Grudzinska-Gross to Ed Rekosh, July 9, 2001 (on file with author). 




It was, in fact, pressure from below that finally convinced Rekosh to test the water and involve 
PILnet in Big Law Pro Bono. When, an intern at an international law firm based in Budapest 
began pressing the PILnet leadership to take pro bono more seriously, Rekosh decided it might 
be worth at least experimenting.860 Accordingly, in 2002, spotting an opportunity, PILnet 
launched a “Pro Bono Initiative” together with the Legal Clinics Foundation in Warsaw.861 The 
initiative sought to match Polish commercial firms with Polish university law clinics.862 The 
initiative resulted in the organization of a meeting in May 2003 with a number of law firms 
and the Polish bar to explore pro bono in Poland. The meeting, however, was a huge 
disappointment as virtually no law firm representatives turned up. Filip Czernicki (head of the 
Polish Clinics Foundation) recalls that “nobody came, besides me and Ed [Rekosh], there were 
like two people. It was a total disaster.”863 Ultimately, the Polish initiative failed due to limited 
firm buy-in. Nevertheless, it did result in the establishment of the now well-regarded Polish 
Lawyer Pro Bono Award.864  
 
PILnet had simultaneously been pursuing a similar initiative in Hungary, which would achieve 
greater success. Feeling a sense of confidence and optimism that they could learn from the 
Polish experience and that there was merit in the idea, in 2005, PILnet launched the “Central 
and Eastern European Pro Bono Initiative”. The initiative sought to “establish pro bono practice 
on a clear, institutionalized basis in Central Europe”.865 The Initiative, focusing primarily on 
Hungary, sought to do this by: identifying the pro bono needs of non-profits working in 
Hungary (PILnet’s core constituency); establishing a clearinghouse to connect Hungarian 
commercial firms and lawyers with the non-profits and enabling them to do pro bono work; 
organizing discussions with the Budapest bar; and organizing an international conference on 
pro bono in Budapest.866 Preparations for all of these activities were already underway by mid-
2005.    
 
                                                
860 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
861 Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University Budapest Law Center, Final Narrative Report, Ford 
Foundation Grant Report No. 970 1586-2, July (2003).  
862 Ibid; see also interview with Ed Rekosh, Sept. 30, 2015. 
863 Interview number 49, June 23, 2016. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University Budapest Law Center, Central European Pro Bono 
Initiative, June (2005). 
866 Email from Ed Rekosh to Miriam Buhl, Aug. 4, 2005. 
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Rekosh, Tamás Barabás (then a legal officer at PILnet) and Atanas Politov (then the associate 
for legal practice) saw great potential in their new Initiative but had learned from the prior 
failed Polish experiment with pro bono, 867 that for the Initiative to work, they would need 
support from within the law firms themselves. There were around seven or eight large 
international law firms with offices in Hungary at the time (including Clifford Chance, White 
& Case, Linklaters and Allen & Overy). The question was: how could PILnet get them to buy 
into and support the idea? 
  
The answer came through Rekosh’s contacts in New York at the International Senior Lawyers 
Project (ISLP). With the support of Jean Berman (then Executive Director of ISLP), PILnet 
managed to secure some pro bono assistance to help drive things forward.868 Michael 
Cheroutes, a retiring infrastructure finance lawyer from Hogan & Hartson, came to work at 
PILnet’s Budapest offices for several months in early 2005. Cheroutes had 40 years of 
experience behind him and had worked in very senior positions in Hogan’s London, Warsaw 
and Moscow offices. Cheroutes’ objectives were clear; he was to help them open the door to 
some of the large international firms in Budapest and more broadly in the region, help design 
a governance structure and strategy for the Initiative and help them to design and launch a 
Hungarian clearinghouse. 
 
Cheroutes recalls that when he arrived at PILnet’s Budapest office in early 2006, they were 
having “some success with the Initiative but not [receiving] a lot of enthusiasm [from the law 
firms]”.869 Much time was spent strategizing how they could achieve some traction given that 
neither the Hungarian bar nor the lawyers at the international law firms were immediately 
enthusiastic.870 Cheroutes reflects that, what he was able to bring to the project was: “…some 
grey hair, some seniority [which] may have helped more than bringing new ideas into it […] 
just having somebody there who was associated with a successful practice that had dedicated 
                                                
867 Firstly, in 2002–03, spotting an opportunity, PILnet launched a Pro Bono Initiative together with the 
Legal Clinics Foundation in Warsaw. The initiative sought to match Polish firms with Polish university law 
clinics. The initiative resulted in the organization of a number of meetings, one of which was held in May 2003 
with a number of law firms and the Polish bar to explore pro bono in Poland. The meeting was not an enormous 
success as few law firm representatives turned up and ultimately the initiative did not succeed due to limited 
firm buy-in. Nevertheless, it did result in the establishment of the now well-regarded Polish Lawyer Pro Bono 
Award and, several years later, in the establishment of the now very successful Centrum Pro Bono (Polish 
Clearinghouse).  
868 Email from Jean Berman to Ed Rekosh, Oct. 17, 2005. 
869 Interview number 25, Jan. 25, 2016. 
870 Ibid. 
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a lot of time to pro bono activity. That helped get in the door to some of the law firms over 
there and gave some credibility to the whole effort.”871 Rekosh later reflected that: “During 
Mike’s stay with us, we were able to make significant progress in getting a critical mass of 
Hungarian offices of international firms to gel around a commitment to promote pro bono 
practice. Mike’s communication skills and strategic thinking were critically helpful”.872 It was 
however also crucial to have the local insight that the PILnet staff brought to the table; Barabás 
recalls how careful they were to be clear with all local actors that pro bono was not an American 
imposition but a practice rooted in the heritage of the Hungarian legal profession. To this end, 
they had undertaken research at the archives of the Hungarian Bar, which had produced 
evidence of pro bono lawyering (on an ad hoc individual basis) in Hungary as far back as the 
turn of the century (around 1910).873  
 
Working with Cheroutes, PILnet managed to persuade 10 law firms to appoint Budapest-based 
pro bono coordinators from among their legal staff. These coordinators were then constituted 
as a “Pro Bono Coordinator Committee” and meetings were organized between the Committee 
and PILnet every three or four months.874 In April of 2006, they convened the first meeting at 
the PILnet offices in Budapest.875  Cheroutes, like Rekosh, was very keen to use the Initiative 
to attract resources from the law firms to fund PILnet’s activities (e.g. a clearinghouse and an 
international pro bono event). An idea to request a $10,000 annual contribution from each of 
the major firms, as a donation towards the Initiative was further pursued with Cheroutes. By 
summer of 2006, it had come to fruition and they had managed to secure commitments of 
around $10,000 from 4 of the large international firms based in Budapest.876 As confidence in 
PILnet grew over the years, the gross annual donations from law firms would soar to over 
$500,000 by 2014, significantly easing funding pressure caused by the withdrawal of the Ford 
Foundation and others between 2001 and 2004.877 
 
                                                
871 Ibid. 
872 Letter from Ed Rekosh to Jean Berman, June 15, 2006. 
873 Interview number 50, June 24, 2016. 
874 Public Interest Law Institute, “Building CEE/NIS Public Interest Law Networks 2007 Final Report,” 
submitted to Charles Steward Mott Foundation, Reporting Period: Jan. 1, 2007 to Dec. 31, 2007, 21. 
875 Public Interest Law Institute, “Concept Paper for White & Case,” Sept. 21, 2007, 2.  
876 Clifford Chance, Hogan & Hartson, Latham & Watkins, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Public Interest 
Law Initiative, “Proposal for Institutional Support,” submitted to the Ford Foundation, Grant Period: Jan. 1, 
2007 to Dec. 31, 2008 (2006), 8.  
877 For reference, PILnet’s total operating budget was around $2 million in 2002 and over $3 million by 
2010. PILnet, “PILnet Finance and Development Report,” PILnet fundraising history (2015); and PILnet, 
“Business Plan: 2001–2014,” (2011), 6. 
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Also in summer and autumn of 2006, they made another big breakthrough when they managed 
to convince the firms to endorse a “Pro Bono Declaration”. The declaration stipulated that: 
“We firmly believe that all of our colleagues can find an appropriate balance between working 
for their clients who can afford to pay and for those who cannot, since it is our ethical 
responsibility to ensure that all member of the Hungarian society are provided with legal 
services”.878 This was a template they would soon repeat across the rest of Europe.879 By July 
of 2006, they had already secured endorsements from nine firms. The final leap they would 
need to make would be to officially launch a clearinghouse that could connect the Budapest-
based lawyers of  international law firms with Hungarian civil society organizations in need of 
legal assistance.  
 
In anticipation of launching the clearinghouse, PILnet leveraged on the civil society contacts 
that it had built up over the past years to identify suitable legal projects. Meanwhile, Cheroutes 
helped to make the projects attractive for international law firms.880 
 
PILnet needed to ensure that the clearinghouse would secure strong institutional support from 
all the firms they were targeting. It was at this point that Rekosh called on Turner for additional 
support. In the first week of December 2006, with the help of Turner and Miriam Buhl (Pro 
bono Counsel at Weil, Gotshal & Manges), PILnet organized a couple of successful luncheons 
promoting the clearinghouse in New York and DC with the Pro Bono Counsel of 12 large 
firms.881 Finally, PILnet officially launched its first clearinghouse in Hungary on 15 December 
2006. The first projects that flowed through the Hungarian clearinghouse were a Polish 
Constitutional Court Claim for the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, comparative legal 
research on deportation policies for Human Rights Watch, comparative legal research on 
homelessness issues for the National Law Centre on Homelessness and Poverty, and research 
on anti-discrimination and equality law for PILnet itself.882 The early firms to get involved in 
the clearinghouse projects were Dechert, DLA Piper, Sidley Austin, Sullivan & Cromwell and 
O'Melveny & Myers.883 Having identified a model that worked, the success in Hungary was 
followed by the launch of a Global clearinghouse (connecting law firms with NGOs all over 
                                                
878 Public Interest Law Initiative, “Hungarian Lawyers’ Role in Advancing the Public Good (Pro Bono 
Publico),” (2006). 
879 In Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Georgia (to name just a few).  
880 Email from Ed Rekosh to Michael Cheroutes and Suzie Turner, Dec. 19, 2006. 
881 Email from Atanas Politov to international law firm representatives, Nov. 17, 2006. 
882 Email from Ed Rekosh to international law firm representatives, Dec. 15, 2006. 
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Europe and all over the world) later in the same year and, with assistance from USAID, ISLP 
and a few key law firms (notably White & Case), a Russian clearinghouse in 2007.  
 
There has been a rapid rate of growth since the launch of the Central and Eastern European Pro 
Bono Initiative in 2005. The following three tables illustrate over ten years (2005 – 2014): (1) 
the number of “active matters”884 that were engaged in across PILnet’s three main 
clearinghouses catering to the European pro bono market (Global, Hungary and Russia); (2) 
the number of law firms providing services to NGOs through the clearinghouses by reference 
to active matter885; and (3) the number of NGOs served through the three clearinghouses by 







                                                
884 In other words, matters worked on by private sector lawyers for NGOs for any period during a given year 
excluding matters that were subsequently withdrawn. 
885 In other words, by reference to the year(s) during which the relevant matter was active rather than by 
reference to the year in which the law firm was first assigned the matter or the year in which the law firm 
completed the matter. 
886 In other words, by reference to the year(s) during which the relevant matter was active rather than by 
reference to the year the NGO first offered the matter or the year in which the NGO was ultimately assigned a 



















Since 2005, there has been a large increase in: a) the number of matters passing through the 
clearinghouses (from 6 in 2005 to over 300 since 2008); b) the number of law firms 
participating in the clearinghouses (from 4 in 2005 to around 90 since 2010); and c) the number 



































The growth has not only been in terms of the number of actors involved but also geographically. 
The chart below illustrates that the clearinghouses, which were initially focused primarily on 
Central and Eastern Europe, have begun to serve (through the Global clearinghouse) more and 
more Western European NGOs (which represented around 20% of all NGOs across all 3 
clearinghouses in 2014). 
 
Figure 4 - % of NGOs serviced in Europe through PILnet’s Global, Hungarian and Russian 




Ultimately, it is likely that the pressure placed on PILnet and on the public interest law and 
human rights fields more broadly in Central and Eastern Europe, by the decision of US funders 
to withdraw between 2002 and 2004, necessitated innovation to guarantee survival. By 2003, 
for Rekosh and PILnet the opportunity for innovation came in the form of Big Law Pro Bono. 
For PILnet, Big Law Pro Bono simultaneously: provided a source of new income; 
demonstrated to funders like Ford, that PILnet still had a raison d'être  - Ford was persuaded to 
issue another 300K grant to PILnet in 2007 to support its pro bono programming in Russia;888 
                                                
887 NGOs calculated by reference to active matter, i.e., by reference to the year(s) during which the relevant 
matter was active rather than by reference to the year the NGO first offered the matter or the year in which the 
NGO was ultimately assigned a law firm team to handle the matter. 




















and channeled legal assistance into the network of domestic and transnational human rights 
and public interest law organizations that had flourished in Europe since the late 1980s.  
 
Meanwhile, for the Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs, as will be discussed in more detail below, 
PILnet provided a solution to the challenges they were facing. PILnet reduced their barriers to 
entry to the continental European market by operating as an intermediary between the firms 
and a broad network of non-profits in need of pro bono support, typically in the form of 
comparative legal research. PILnet also solved the multi-armed bandit problem by allowing 
the firms to outsource their pro bono client “business development” activities thus reducing the 
time investment required from the firms and removing a degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability by allowing them to work through a known entity that could filter pro bono 
matters in advance. In the words of Kirk, “PILnet was instrumental to developing all the 
relationships with NGOs and PILnet was able to develop that entirely themselves.”889 
 
Quite rapidly, a market for Big Law Pro Bono emerged, with PILnet operating as a market-
maker “buying” up pro bono requests from its network of non-profits and “selling” them on to 
the firms. The domestic Hungarian market very quickly turned into an international market for 
Big Law Pro Bono services, given that firms had offices spanning the continent and non-profits 
needed essentially the same services across the whole region: legal research, typically of a 
comparative nature.    
 
However, the alliance of Big Law with PILnet would have consequences on how European 
(commercial) lawyers and non-profits would come to understand Big Law Pro Bono as a 
resource. In time, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe would come to be defined primarily (almost 
exclusively) in terms of providing research and operational legal assistance to non-profits. The 
following section will explore how this came to be so.  
 
1.3! Big Law Pro Bono" 
 
In marketing studies, “consumer preference formation” refers to the ways in which “consumers 
learn about brands and form preferences for them”, which can create an advantage for pioneers 
in the relevant market (the so-called “pioneering advantage”).890 According to this theory, 
                                                
889 Interview number 17, Nov. 3, 2015. 
890 Carpenter and Nakamoto, “Consumer preference formation,” 286. 
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when new markets are just emerging, consumers may have limited preferences in relation to 
the attributes of goods or services being sold. For example, “100 years ago few people were 
likely to have strong opinions about how sweet or carbonated a cola should be”.891 However, 
successful early entrants on the market can have a “major influence” on how attributes of the 
relevant good or service are valued and how consumers’ preferences evolve during the 
embryonic years of market formation.892 Moreover, “the pioneer can become strongly 
associated with the product category as a whole and, as a result, become the "standard" against 
which all later entrants are judged.”893 Finally, this can lead to the emergence of copycat or 
“me-too” brands which aim to cash-in on the economic opportunity generated by the pioneer.  
 
These concepts may help to shed light on how PILnet, along with the Big Law Pro Bono 
entrepreneurs, participated in creating a market for Big Law Pro Bono that was focused almost 
exclusively around the provision of legal services to non-profits. 
 
1.3.1! Pro bono roundtables, the Pro Bono Forum and the domestic clearinghouse 
movement    
 
In late 2006, while PILnet was launching their Hungarian Clearinghouse, the Big Law Pro 
Bono entrepreneurs (Turner, Kirk and Brocklesby), were piloting another strategy for 
promoting pro bono in Europe: “pro bono roundtables”. Pro bono roundtables essentially 
involved getting several prominent lawyers from leading firms in a relevant jurisdiction to 
literally sit around a table and discuss the viability and desirability of expanding pro bono 
practice in their country. 
 
Turner, an American (Kirk and Brockelsby being both British, although working for US firms), 
had been significantly involved in pro bono work in the US since at least 1987 (when Big Law 
Pro Bono was once again on the rise in the US) and, to her, the idea of organizing pro bono 
roundtables was nothing new; she had been involved in organizing such roundtables in the US 
for many years already. This was “strict community organizing […] you get people to move in 
a certain kind of direction, you try to convene and bring them together”.894 
 




894 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
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Turner, together with Kirk and Brocklesby, started by convening a pro bono roundtable at 
Dechert’s offices in Munich in late 2006. Turner recalls, “it was one of those things where we 
didn’t know if anyone was going to show up, and we were pleasantly surprised that people 
were really engaged”.895 The successful Munich roundtable was followed up by 3 more in 
Paris, Brussels and Frankfurt in 2007.896 Turner and Kirk invited Rekosh to become involved 
from the second roundtable (Paris) in 2007. Arguably the most successful of these early efforts 
were the Munich and Frankfurt roundtables. At the time, providing free legal advice was 
prohibited in Germany by law.897  
 
The roundtables resulted in meetings between international law firms based in Germany and 
the Munich and Frankfurt Bar Associations (although, notably, no non-profits at this point) to 
try and work out a compromise in relation to the provision of free legal advice. Compensation 
of lawyers was regulated by a federal law (the German Act on Legal Counseling, 
“Rechtberatungsgesetz” or “RBerG”), which expressly prohibited the provision of free legal 
advice.898 In December 2006, the RBerG was replaced with the Lawyers Compensation Act 
(Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz - “RVG”), which did little to improve the situation. The new 
regulatory framework was slightly more permissive, enabling lawyers to negotiate fees with 
clients with respect to advisory work, but fees in a litigation context were strictly regulated and 
determined in accordance with the “value of the claim” (e.g., calculated based on the value of 
the underlying transaction or damages claimed).899 Despite the removal of the outright 
prohibition, the permissibility of Big Law Pro Bono under German law remained unclear at 
best (and appeared to be explicitly precluded with respect to litigation). The regulatory 
ambiguity created reluctance among German law offices to engage in pro bono, reinforced by 
the hostility of the German state and federal level bars, which took the position that pro bono 
was prohibited under German law. 900 
 
In the meantime, while waiting for clarification on their ability to act in domestic pro bono 
matters, an agreement was reached that German lawyers might, nevertheless, get involved in 
assisting non-profit clients abroad (as this would not contravene the rules). Interestingly, these 
                                                
895 Ibid. 
896 Mayer Brown LLP, Pro Bono Update, Spring 2008, 21. 
897 Latham & Watkins, “A Survey of Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities,” 85. 
898 Ibid. 
899 Ibid. 82. 
900 Bälz, Moelle, and Zeidler, “Rechtsberatung pro bono publico,” 3383–88. 
 267 
were often individual clients. For example, lawyers at Debevoise & Plimpton became involved 
in representing Holocaust survivors in New York who required German law expertise in the 
context of US proceedings.901    
 
However, the German roundtables, in which PILnet had now become involved as a facilitator,  
finally resulted in the publication, in 2008, of an article, “Rechtsberatung pro bono publico in 
Deutschland – eine Bestandsaufnahme”,902 which engaged in a detailed analysis of the 
provisions of the new legislation, working from the premise that pro bono advice was, by its 
very nature, provided to clients (singling out non-profits in particular) who could not (and 
would not) pay for legal services in the regular marketplace.  Moreover, unlike needy 
individuals, non-profits could not qualify for legal aid and so would therefore go without legal 
services altogether if not for the availability of pro bono. The authors argued that the historical 
prohibition on free legal services (and the regulation of lawyers’ fees under the new regime) 
was intended primarily to tackle anti-competitive price dumping practices, a purpose irrelevant 
to under-resourced non-profits, which would not be in a  position to purchase legal services 
regardless of price. 903  It should be noted that the way that this article framed pro bono was 
clearly as a service for non-profit clients and the article even seems to imply (by noting that 
non-profits do not qualify for legal aid) that the form of pro bono that should be exempted from 
the prohibition would not involve direct individual client service. The authors also noted that 
the new legislation explicitly permitted non-lawyers to provide free advisory legal services 
(provided they were supervised by a professional) and reasoned that professional lawyers 
should be permitted to provide pro bono advisory services by implication, even if they were 
excluded from litigating on a pro bono basis.904 The publication of this article put many firms 
at ease and paved the way for growing pro bono practice among international law firms in 
Germany.905  
 
The roundtables (and the European Pro Bono Forum to be discussed below) eventually led, in 
2011, to the founding of “Pro Bono Deutschland” (an association of around 50 of the major 
law firms with a presence in Germany), which has a mandate to “achieve greater recognition 
and a more widespread implementation of the concept of pro bono legal advice among lawyers” 
                                                
901 Interview number 18, Nov. 6, 2015. 
902 Bälz, Moelle, and Zeidler, “Rechtsberatung pro bono publico,” 3383–88. 
903 Ibid. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Interview number 18, Nov. 6, 2015. 
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in Germany.906 Similarly, the Paris roundtables contributed to the formation in 2008/9 of the 
Alliance des Avocats pour les Droits de l’Homme (AADH – the Lawyers’ Alliance for Human 
Rights). The Alliance was set up in collaboration with the Paris Bar and has a mandate to 
engage lawyers in providing free legal assistance in support of human rights causes (primarily 
for human rights non-profits). 
 
Both Turner and Kirk were very sensitive to the local contexts in which the roundtables were 
taking place and the importance of identifying local pro bono champions to take ownership of 
the processes that they initiated. In the words of Kirk: “We hoped that out of the gatherings 
would come somebody who would take on the local management of that group…it was 
definitely led by the local firm representatives…it never occurred to me that you would do it 
any other way…I was quite sensitive to things not being imposed.”907 Meanwhile, Turner 
simply put it, “when the meetings started taking place in German instead of English, we knew 
we had done our job”.908  
 
PILnet, which, as noted above, had been involved from the second (Paris) roundtable in 2007, 
were quick to see how they could make use of the roundtable format to further spread pro bono 
practice across the continent, and, in time, the roundtables initiated by Turner, Kirk and 
Brocklesby were subsumed into PILnet’s work and mandate. Ultimately, PILnet adopted the 
European roundtable format and applied it, with considerable success, to launch a series of 
domestic “sister” clearinghouses across Europe.  
 
PILnet began by returning to Poland, where they had failed to launch a clearinghouse in 
2004.909 In June 2007, PILnet co-organized (with the Polish Legal Clinic Foundation, the 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and Ashoka) a roundtable discussion at the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal.910 The law firms and their lawyers showed up in large numbers and 
even the President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Head of the Polish Bar 
Association also attended the event.911 The event resulted in the signing of the Polish Pro Bono 
                                                
906 See http://www.pro-bono-deutschland.org/en/. 
907 Interview number 17, Nov. 3, 2015. 
908 Interview number 16, Oct. 21, 2015. 
909 Interview number 49, June 23, 2016. 
910 Public Interest Law Institute, “Building CEE/NIS Public Interest Law Networks 2007 Final Report,” 
submitted to Charles Steward Mott Foundation, Reporting Period: Jan. 1, 2007 to Dec. 31, 2007, 22. 
911 Public Interest Law Institute, “Pro bono legal aid in Poland – challenge or necessity,” June 22, 2007. 
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declaration and directly led to the launch of a Polish clearinghouse (Centrum PRO BONO).912 
This was followed by a Czech pro bono roundtable in March 2008, the signing of a Czech pro 
bono declaration and the launch of a Czech clearinghouse (Pro bono Centrum).913A Slovenian 
clearinghouse was also established in 2008, an Irish clearinghouse in 2009, a Slovakian 
clearinghouse in 2011, a Romanian clearinghouse in 2012 and Dutch and Italian clearinghouses 
in 2015 (see Figure 12 in Chapter 4 for a timeline).914 In 2012, 20 domestic clearinghouse 
representatives took the decision, following a discussion at PILnet’s 2012 European Pro Bono 
forum in Madrid, to form the “European Pro Bono Alliance”. The European Pro Bono Alliance 
is the voice of the clearinghouse movement in Europe. Its goal is to support and promote the 
work of its clearinghouse members and to strengthen, champion and inform the European pro 
bono movement.915 
 
All of these clearinghouses have been largely successful thus far, although in establishing these 
organizations, PILnet was often required to make concessions to national bars. This was often 
overcome, as in Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic, by the firms making commitments to 
exclude individual legal assistance from their pro bono practice and focus exclusively on 
providing assistance to non-profit organizations. (The Czech and Italian pro bono declarations 
explicitly exclude individual client work from their definitions of actionable pro bono work.)916  
There are three ways that one might explain such concessions. Most likely they are all partially 
true. Firstly, we could say that Big Law on the continent, as in London, had no desire to take 
on the responsibility for the provision of individual legal aid. In the words of one European 
clearinghouse employee: 
 
 “The first thing the law firms will tell you is that their biggest fear is to open their doors 
and be overwhelmed by clients, by individual people [who need assistance]. They 
would never do that. They would never open their doors and say ‘come in, free legal 
aid’. They are looking for all [kinds of] buffers, NGOs, clearinghouses, to keep some 
separation, to be able to control. They need to be able to measure the time and money 
they are investing into each project, because their paid clients are waiting for them and 
                                                
912 Public Interest Law Institute, “Building CEE/NIS Public Interest Law Networks 2007 Final Report,” 
submitted to Charles Steward Mott Foundation, Reporting Period: Jan. 1, 2007 to Dec. 31, 2007, 22. 
913 Ibid., 23. 
914 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
915 See http://www.europeanprobonoalliance.org/index.php/2013-08-09-10-13-24/mission. 
916 Interview number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. 
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the deadlines are always yesterday.  The first thing they will tell you is that we don’t 
want to be a legal aid center, we cannot be a legal aid center.”917 
 
Another possible explanation is the fact that European bar associations sometimes fiercely 
resisted Big Law Pro Bono on the basis that it might cut into the earnings of large segments of 
the legal profession (i.e. traditional small and mid-sized law firms). Not unreasonably, there 
seems to have been a fear that the Anglo-American Mega-Firms were using pro bono as a guise 
to break into new sections of domestic legal markets.918 European bar associations sometimes 
fiercely resisted pro bono. A large majority of the members of national bars in continental 
Europe consisted of lawyers working within small local law firms or solo practices, many of 
whom actively participated in the Social Bar, and relatively few of whom work in Big Law. As 
a result, the priorities of Big Law and the organized bar in Europe were not naturally aligned. 
Pro bono was often perceived by the bar leadership as just another competitive advantage for 
the global law firms.  
 
Yet another possible explanation, implied by a former PILnet employee, is that PILnet, 
knowing that there might be some resistance to the idea of Big Law Pro Bono, used direct 
individual client service “strategically”, as a bargaining chip, to trade in at an opportune 
moment in exchange for commitments to support the non-profit model of Big Law Pro Bono.919 
Indeed, PILnet would often reassure local bars and local lawyers by explaining that non-profits 
would not pay for most of the work that went through their clearinghouses. “No one would pay 
5,000 EUR, 10,000 EUR to several law firms across Europe to do comparative research on best 
practice.”920 The German example discussed above is illustrative here.   
 
Whatever the case, PILnet was directly and decisively involved in all of the processes and 
negotiations leading to the launch of the domestic clearinghouses. PILnet facilitated in multiple 
ways: sometimes actively instigating the setting up of a clearinghouse, as with the Civil Society 
Development Foundation in Romania; sometimes ensuring that clearinghouses receive the 
right amount of money from law firm donors, as with Proboneo in Germany and Pro Bono 
Connect in the Netherlands; sometimes helping clearinghouses better connect to law firms via 






the PILnet forums, as with AADH in France; sometimes by helping clearinghouses to build 
support and momentum domestically, as in Poland and the Czech Republic; and sometimes by 
simply sharing the PILnet manuals related to how to develop a clearinghouse and how to 
develop an in-house pro bono program.  
 
Ultimately, in the same manner that the organized bar in the US had promoted a narrow and 
specific model of pro bono based on the ideal of individual access to justice (civil legal aid), 
PILnet played a crucial and catalytic role in pioneering a specific model of Big Law Pro Bono 
in Europe. By brokering the launch of domestic clearinghouses, they managed to spread this 
model with incredible speed. In the words of Rekosh, “we prioritized strategies that would 
promote rapid growth…[our] strategy was not to build anything ourselves but to look for 
connection points and to use an open networking approach rather than a closed networking 
approach. We did not copyright or trademark anything.”921 Clearinghouses in the network were 
all essentially selling the same product. As mentioned in the previous chapter, of the 9 
clearinghouses and quasi-clearinghouses whose staff were interviewed for this research (and 
the several others investigated), virtually all focused primarily or exclusively on catering to 
non-profit clients. This fact no doubt had an impact on the way in which Big Law, and 
commercial lawyers in Europe more generally, came to understand Big Law Pro Bono as a 
practice. Although there is wide variance, law firms are still significantly dependent on 
clearinghouses for their European pro bono practices. Multiple interviewees reported making 
extensive use of clearinghouses to source pro bono matters for their European offices, 
particularly those whose European pro bono practices were managed from the US rather than 
London. “Without a relationship with PILnet it would be very difficult to develop a program 
in [our continental European offices] and get a program off the ground starting from zero”, said 
one Pro Bono Partner.922 In the words of another: 
 
“[t]here are now thanks in part to PILnet, domestic clearinghouses in France, Germany 
Italy, the UK. So, in every country now there is a domestic clearinghouse where lawyers 
can source work. That has been the biggest impact for us to significantly expand pro 
bono internationally.”923  
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Yet another suggested that “PILnet [had been] central within continental Europe for identifying 
opportunities”.924 This anecdotal evidence is supported by the survey conducted among 21 
firms, which, as noted in the previous Chapter, revealed that the surveyed firms relied on 
clearinghouses, on average, for almost half of their pro bono matters. 
 




Apart from the domestic clearinghouses PILnet was helping to launch, PILnet also launched 
an annual European Pro Bono Forum. The forums could be used to supplement the roundtable 
process and the launch of domestic clearinghouses. The idea for the Forum was on PILnet’s 
agenda since early 2006. The idea was pushed heavily not only by the PILnet staff (especially 
Rekosh and Politov) but also by Cheroutes, Turner, Kirk, Buhl, Patricia Brannan (Partner at 
Hogan & Hartson) and Manfred Gabriel (Senior Associate, Latham & Watkins).926 
 
The idea was to organize a first of its kind (in Europe) conference bringing together a large 
number of law firm lawyers and non-profit representatives to explore the possibility of 
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developing law firm pro bono practice in Europe. The conference was to provide both a forum 
for connecting law firms and non-profits throughout Europe and a support network for 
European lawyers trying to set up law firm pro bono programs. Among the central themes of 
the very first forum were: challenges, success stories and models of pro bono in continental 
Europe; law firm pro bono programs; non-profits and their legal needs.927 The very first Pro 
bono Forum took place between 18 and 19 October 2007 at the Novotel hotel in Budapest.  It 
managed to attract some 122 participants from 20 countries including 62 lawyers and 60 non-
profit representatives.928 Among the list of speakers was Andrew Phillips (now Lord Phillips 
of Sudbury) who had set up the Law Society Pro Bono Working Party in England all the way 
back in 1992 (as discussed earlier), and the forum brochure even contained a foreword from 
the then President of Hungary, László Sólyom, noting that it was of “pivotal importance to 
eliminate disparities in accessing the goods of the legal system” and that “even if this task is 
eminently the domain of the state, lawyers in general bear responsibility for promoting justice 
by protecting the rights of the individuals”.929 However, this was in contrast to the primary 
objective of the Forum which, as mentioned, was to connect Big Law with European non-
profits, and not just any non-profits, but primarily human rights and public interest law 
organizations (i.e. rather than organizations involved in the provision of direct individual legal 
services). 
 
The first three Forums (2007, 2008 and 2009) all took place in Budapest and drew increasingly 
large crowds; the 2009 Forum attracted 150 participants from 32 countries.930 Following the 
2009 Forum, Turner, still part of the organizing committee, wanted to pursue the idea, 
borrowed from the US, of having the Forum rotate between different cities.931 Accordingly, the 
2010 forum took place in Paris, attracting 275 participants including the head of the Paris Bar 
as a keynote speaker. The Forum combined with the prior Paris roundtables initiated by Turner, 
Kirk and Brocklesby contributed to the development and growth of the Paris clearinghouse, 
Alliance des Avocats pour les Droits de l’Homme.  The Paris Forum was followed by the 2011 
Berlin Forum, which, together with the German roundtables, played a role in the formation of 
Pro Bono Deutschland. In 2012 the Forum moved to Madrid and then Warsaw in 2013, London 
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in 2014, Rome in 2015 and Amsterdam in 2016. In each case, the flurry of pro bono organizing 
that precedes the Forums was enormously productive and typically resulted in law firms in the 
relevant jurisdiction making concrete commitments to increase their pro bono practice. In the 
words of Kirk, the “traveling model has been hugely successful [and] works on so many levels; 
you can get politicians involved, bar associations, NGOs and law firm coordinators” and get 
them all pulling in the same direction.932  
 
When US and UK Big Law arrived in mainland Europe, and US and London-based pro bono 
managers were looking for opportunities to develop the practice, local actors on the continent 
(lawyers, local Bars, non-profits) had no concept of Big Law Pro Bono and how that resource 
could or should be used. Even the US and UK pro bono managers themselves did not have a 
clear picture of how they wanted to deploy this resource in continental Europe. Perhaps Suzie 
Turner was in a privileged position to understand that there were a range of options, having 
been involved with Big Law Pro Bono in the US since the late 1980s and also having worked 
in Europe as a consultant at INTERIGHTS, in 1999. (Kirk and Brockelsby had both been fee-
earning commercial solicitors before becoming pro bono managers, with no other public 
interest law experience.) Turner must have been familiar with the way in which Big Law Pro 
Bono was being deployed in the US, primarily to directly service low-income individuals. 
Equally, she must have been familiar with the specific model of (trans)national public interest 
lawyering (discussed in Chapter 3) being pioneered in Europe by organizations like 
INTERIGHTS, a model that relied heavily on undertaking comparative legal research to 
identify best and worst practices and placing pressure on domestic courts and administrations 
by leveraging on international legal norms. Perhaps in Turner’s initial engagements with local 
actors across the continent, given her previous experience with INTERIGHTS and given her 
reluctance to play the role of “colonizer”, she did not insist on defining Big Law Pro Bono in 
a way that would include direct individual client service. Whatever the case, once she teamed 
up with, and ultimately handed over to PILnet, the die was cast, and Big Law Pro Bono would 
come to be synonymous with the provision of pro bono legal services to non-profits and not 
individuals.    
 
In Europe, Big Law Pro Bono became associated with non-profits in the same way that Kleenex 
is associated with tissues. The Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs, in collaboration with PILnet, 
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helped to shape the expectations and preferences of commercial lawyers, non-profits, 
clearinghouses, bars, public officials and others around the continent, such that today, there is 
(among most of the relevant stakeholders) no real expectation that Big Law should be providing 
pro bono services to low-income individuals. Interviews undertaken for this research reveal 
that most clearinghouses in Europe (both at the international and national level) exclusively 
cater to NGO clients (with a few exceptions in Romania, the UK and Ireland).  
 
Of course, there are a few other contributing factors to this state of affairs, including, hostility 
from local Bars to the idea of involving Big Law in individual legal assistance work (as 
described above) and perhaps also the fact that, in Europe, NGOs are attractive pro bono clients 
for the European law offices of international law firms. There are a couple of reasons for this, 
both linked to the dynamics of globalization in the European legal market. Firstly, as noted in 
Chapter 4, the internationalization strategies of large US firms involved exporting US lawyers 
for the benefit of US clients and involved very limited penetration of local legal markets. 
Consequently, sourcing pro bono matters that could effectively be carried out by US-trained 
and qualified lawyers based in London, Brussels or Paris would inevitably require the 
identification of matters related to international law rather than domestic law. Working with 
transnational NGOs engaged in advocacy targeted at supranational and international 
institutions therefore makes much more sense than providing local law advice/representation 
to low-income individuals.  Moreover, such transnational NGO clients are much easier to 
engage with for full-time pro bono managers based in New York, DC or London, looking to 
develop pro bono across multiple European offices spanning diverse jurisdictions, languages, 
and legal cultures. Secondly, as Richard Abel noted already in 1993, “any law firm that aspires 
to become transnational […] must emphasize transactional lawyering rather than advocacy”.933 
Consequently, the large bulk of lawyers populating the European offices of large international 
law firms are transactional lawyers who have specialized in transactional law from a relatively 
early stage in their career. To get such lawyers to engage in regulatory or transactional work 
for non-profits is significantly easier, and makes much more sense, than getting them to provide 
legal advice and representation to low-income individuals. Non-profits are much more like 
traditional corporate clients and thus easier to contact and more predictable and with a lower 
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risk profile than individual clients. Crucially, they do not require law firms to “make that leap 
from the corporate world to the community” as one lawyer put it.934    
 
There is one final point to note: in the years following the launch of the PILnet clearinghouses 
and the launch of several of the domestic clearinghouses and the Forum, copycat or “me-too” 
clearinghouses began to emerge at the international level, such as A4ID, TrustLaw and i-Pro 
bono. This is perhaps unsurprising given that PILnet was receiving substantial funding from 
the firms (hundreds of thousands of dollars per year). It would not be accurate to say that they 
were all in it for purely funding-related reasons. TrustLaw, for example, is a corporate 
foundation, although A4ID charges both firms and non-profits substantial membership fees. 
What can be said quite confidently, however, is that most clearinghouses have focused on the 
PILnet model of Big Law Pro Bono, i.e. connecting Big Law with non-profits in need of legal 
assistance. These clearinghouses have not focused so much on European human rights and 
public interest lawyering, in the way that PILnet had, but on other non-profit needs (such as 
corporate support).     
 
 
2! What happened to individual access to justice?   
 
There remains one significant unanswered question in the analysis provided in this chapter so 
far. Given that, as discussed in Chapter 3, the originators of the European public interest law 
movement were explicitly focused on legal aid within the public sector (i.e. increased access 
to justice for the legally needy), as one core strand of that movement, why did this focus not 
get transmitted through PILnet (and other non-profits and legal actors emerging from the 
movement) to Big Law Pro Bono Practice in Europe? One likely answer is that, when 
advocating for individual access to justice in Europe, those involved in the European public 
interest law movement promoted largely European (and not American) models of pro bono 
service provision, models that relied upon the state and the Social Bar to provide legal aid and 
not on private voluntarism (as was the dominant model in the US, from the late 1980s and early 
1990s). Consequently, by the time the Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs were getting organized 
in Europe (between 2005 and 2007), the European pro bono movement had made significant 
gains in institutionalizing the state-funded, Social Bar-oriented model of legal aid provision in 
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Central and Eastern Europe and so there was no thought of deploying Big Law Pro Bono to 
that end. This final section will explore this outstanding question in more detail and the 
hypothesized answer just presented.      
 
2.1! State-funded legal aid and the “Social Bar” 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, throughout the 20th century, a principle had emerged in Western 
Europe (often in constitutional form), that the state is obliged to “affirmatively and effectively 
guarantee the right of all to competent legal assistance”.935 By the beginning of the 21st century, 
most European countries had taken steps to realize this principle and settled on some variant 
of what has been referred to as the “judicare” model of legal aid (i.e. where the state subsidizes 
private lawyers to undertake legal aid work, rather than employing its own state lawyers – as 
was done, to an extent, in the US during the 1960s and 1970s).936 This meant that while the 
private legal profession remained involved in the provision of legal aid to the poor, it was no 
longer doing so on a pro bono basis (as in the 19th and early 20th centuries) and the expectation 
was established, that the state should subsidize private lawyers for this work. It is also important 
to note that very often, of course, it was the private legal professions themselves or the social 
workers and civil society actors with whom they were collaborating that had lobbied the state 
for legal aid in the first place. Each group was pursuing their own interests and vision for state-
sponsored legal aid and all felt overwhelmed by the burden that fell to them (particularly after 
the Second World War).937   
Whatever the case, this shift in the conception of legal aid from an honorific duty of the 
profession to an obligation of the state (at least as financier) is crucial in the history of pro bono 
practice in Europe; this development, to an extent, displaced the pro bono ethic within the 
profession. One commentator on the English legal profession suggested that it was the Second 
World War and the subsequent rollout of state-sponsored legal aid that led to a decline in “the 
profession’s sense of responsibility for “Poor Man’s Law””.938 It is possible, in the words of 
that commentator, that, “legal aid conferred on legal aid practitioners, and on the profession in 
                                                
935 Cappelletti and Gordley, “Legal Aid,” 379. 
936 Commencing in 1965 in the US with the establishment of the Legal Services Program of the Office of 
Economic Opportunity. 
937 See, generally, Abel, “Law without politics,” but especially 499–510; and Cohn, “Legal aid for the poor,” 
250, 256. 
938 Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 175. 
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general, an aura of public service that did not rely on pro bono publico.”939 However, the 
argument could be made that this logic was emerging right across Europe throughout the 20th 
and 21st centuries. As states began to subsidize lawyers to provide legal aid, markets in the 
provision of legal aid services materialized and consequently also specialization within the 
profession and the emergence of a functionally and structurally distinct “Social Bar”, 940  i.e. 
the specific group of specialized private and/or public lawyers, receiving government 
subsidies, to whom the task of providing legal aid is delegated (rather than the profession as a 
whole). Such lawyers develop practices that concentrate around, welfare and benefits, family 
law, immigration law, criminal law, employment and housing.  
Of course, the size of the Social Bar varies dramatically between European countries. In some 
countries, there is a discernible segment of the private profession that has clearly specialized 
in legal aid work, whereas in others there remains broader engagement in legal aid work across 
the profession (see Figure 6 below). Whatever the case, it is clear that specialization has been 
underway across Europe for some time. It has been observed that lawyers will only be able to 
handle legal aid work in a profitable manner “through mass production”.941 Consequently, 
specialization is inevitable. Trends pointing towards the declining proportion of national legal 
professions that engage in legal aid work further hint at specialization over the years. In the 
Netherlands, for example, the percentage of lawyers engaged in the provision of legal aid as a 
proportion of the total legal profession dropped from around 85% in the mid-1980s to 44% in 
2012.942 Meanwhile in Britain, the figure (for solicitors acting in civil legal aid matters) 
dropped from around 60% in the mid-1960s to 24% in 2016.943 
 
  
                                                
939 This was certainly the case in England where the 1949 Legal Aid and Advice Act established a 
significant legal aid system as a pillar of the welfare state. Similar developments can be noted in the Netherlands 
with the passing, in 1957, of the Wet op de rechtsbijstand aan on-en minvermogenden (Legal Aid for Indigent 
Persons Act). See Boon and Whyte, “Charity and Beating,” 175; and Huls, “Pro Deo Practice,” 334. 
940 The Social Bars of Europe have become organized, forming associations for legal aid lawyers, family 
lawyers, children’s rights lawyers, immigration lawyers, and so on. The Social Bars are typically not only 
functionally, but also structurally, differentiated from the remainder of the legal profession, often receiving far 
lower levels of remuneration, being geographically situated in poorer neighborhoods or outside capital cities. 
This was all highlighted by Abel in 1984 but remains true today across Europe. See Abel, “Law without 
politics,” 513–19. 
941 Ibid., 561. 
942 For the 1983 figure see, ibid., 507. 
943 For the 1966 figure see, ibid., 508. 
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England & Wales947 (civil only)  24% 
Belgium948 24% 
Latvia949 (civil only) 10% 
Hungary950 (civil only) 4% 
 
The argument could be made that, over time, two key developments have taken place 
profoundly impacting on pro bono practice in Europe. Firstly, large portions of the European 
legal professions (those lawyers not financed by the state) unburdened themselves of their 
duties to the poor and legally needy (direct individual access to justice). Secondly, those 
lawyers who were engaged in the provision of legal aid work, the Social Bar, came to expect 
that the state should remunerate them for this work.951  
While these developments had taken root in much of Western Europe between the 1920s and 
1970s, it was not until after the fall of the Berlin wall that Central and Eastern Europe began 
to follow suit. As discussed in Chapter 4, socialist rule had flattened the legal professions of 
                                                
944 Figures for 2012–13. See Belgium, “National Report,” ILAG, Den Haag, 2013, 5.2.2. 
945 Figures for 2014–15. See the Netherlands, “National Report: Legal Aid in the Netherlands – a broad 
outline – 2016,” Den Haag, 2013, 29. 
946 Figures for 2014–15. See “A Survey of Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities in 84 Jurisdictions,” 
prepared by Latham & Watkins LLP for the Pro Bono Institute (March 2016), 616. 
947 Figures for July 2016. Based on the number of solicitors’ firms engaged in civil representation work. See 
SRA, Legal Aid Statistics England and Wales, July 2016; SRA, Regulated Population Statistics (Solicitors), 
July 2016. 
948 Figures for 2012–13. See Belgium, “National Report,” ILAG, Den Haag, 2013, 5.2.2. 
949 Figures for 2012–13. See Latvia, “National Report,” ILAG, Den Haag, 2013, 7. 
950 Figures for 2007–08. See Pardavi, “Legal Profession in Hungary,” 16. 
951 Of course, although the emergence of state-sponsored legal aid and the Social Bar was a central trend 
across Europe during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there were exceptions. In Poland and Belgium, 
truly organized state-subsidized systems of legal aid have never fully taken off and the legal aid system remains 
largely dependent on the goodwill and administration of the national and local bars and the courts. See Gibens 
and Hubeau, “Socially responsible legal aid,” 67–86; and Gibens and van Houtte, “More effective legal aid.” 
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Central and Eastern Europe, rendering the legal services so cheap as to make questions of pro 
bono and legal aid almost irrelevant. Priority, during the socialist period, was placed on 
technical professions such as doctors and engineers, and law student numbers plummeted right 
across the region as compared to pre-war figures. (In Hungary there was a five-fold 
decrease.)952  
 
In some countries, as in Czechoslovakia, quotas were introduced on the number of law 
students.953 This meant that by the late 80s the legal professions of CEE were often both smaller 
in size and relatively older than the legal professions of Western Europe. In addition, the legal 
profession, in many cases, was split between, “attorneys”, providing advice to individuals, and 
so-called “legal advisors” working for state companies, meaning that there were many lawyers 
with no experience whatsoever of providing legal advice to individuals.  
 
Following four decades of socialist rule, the overall structure of the legal profession and the 
political and economic environment in which lawyers operated had changed significantly, 
meaning that the extent to which the national bar organizations could effectively carry out what 
had been their honorific duty before socialist rule, was degraded. Firstly, closed societies and 
reliance on the state for social services had created legal professions in which public-
spiritedness and civic engagement were not as highly valued as they once might have been.954 
That the profession was relatively old (in terms of the average age of lawyers) and thus also 
relatively conservative did not help matters. A second factor was that as these states were 
embracing market economies, privatization and the influx of foreign firms brought on new and 
increasingly lucrative opportunities for lawyers opting to practice corporate and commercial 
law.955 Meanwhile, the conditions for public lawyers and general practice private lawyers were 
dire; the governments were poor, resources scarce, the population was poor and legal services 
were not a priority.956 The outcome, in some cases, was that private lawyers had no interest in 
                                                
952 Kühn, Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe, 49–52. 
953 Ibid., 50. 
954 Interview number 50, June 24, 2016, and number 4, Sept. 25, 2015. There were exceptions, of course. In 
Poland, for instance, the period following the Second World War was precisely the moment at which segments 
of the legal profession began to take responsibility for the provision of free legal assistance to certain segments 
of the population (political prisoners and other persons oppressed by institutions of the Communist state, for 
instance). See  “A Survey of Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities in 84 Jurisdictions,” prepared by Latham & 
Watkins LLP for the Pro Bono Institute (March 2016), 513. 
955 Thieroff and Krutina, “Country Report: Czech Republic,” 138–39; Rekosh, Buchko, and Terzieva, “Access 
to Justice,” 10. 
956 Rekosh, Buchko, and Terzieva, “Access to Justice,” 4. 
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and took no pleasure in undertaking pro bono work (or indeed public work in general), 
particularly where there was a mandatory requirement.957 Often pro bono work was reserved 
(sometimes explicitly, as in Romania) for younger and more inexperienced lawyers.958 
Moreover, when the professions were unified again (i.e. combining “attorneys” and “legal 
advisors”), there were many lawyers who, when called upon by the relevant bar organization 
to undertake mandatory pro bono work, simply had no pertinent legal experience and no 
exposure to individual clients.959 All of this created organized pro bono systems that produced 
very low standards of service provision for poor clients.960  
A Romanian commentator writing in the late 1990s put it as follows: 
“[A]ttitudes and practice both discourage the [sic] legal aid work. The “assigned” 
lawyers are seen as less professional, and this is largely true if one bears in mind the 
low quality of their services. No significance at all is given to pro bono work.”961 
It was against this backdrop that foundations, lawyers and non-profits involved in the European 
public interest law movement began to promote and pursue the ideal of individual access to 
justice in Europe. The Ford Foundation, in particular, had been interested in individual access 
to justice outside of the US since the late 1970s when it had funded a global access to justice 
study coordinated by Mauro Cappelletti at the University of Florence, Italy, the results of which 
have been relied upon for parts of this thesis (see Chapter 3).962 As noted above and in Chapter 
3, since 1997, Ford had opened up a funding stream targeted at promoting “public interest law” 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and promoting access to justice was certainly part of this effort. 
Other donors had also taken an interest, including the Open Society Institute (OSI). Speaking 
in 1999, a board member of the OSI noted, “Access to justice is one of the biggest deficiencies 
of the existing criminal justice systems in Central and Eastern Europe".963 Meanwhile, a 
newsletter from OSI’s Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute (COLPI) describes the 
                                                
957 Thieroff and Krutina, “Country Report: Czech Republic,” 145; Bárd and Terzieva, “Indigent Criminal 
Defendants,” 238–39; Macovei, “Country Report: Romania,” 204. 
958 Macovei, “Country Report: Romania,” 199. 
959 See, for example, Bárd and Terzieva, “Indigent Criminal Defendants,” 215; Rekosh, Buchko, and 
Terzieva, “Access to Justice,” 8, 9. Although, note that legal advisors were sometimes called upon to provide 
advice to their fellow employees at socialist state enterprises. See Nevai, “Access to justice in Hungary.” 
960 Thieroff and Krutina, “Country Report: Czech Republic,” 145; Bárd and Terzieva, “Indigent Criminal 
Defendants,” 238–39; Macovei, “Country Report: Romania,” 204. Although, note that Poland seems to have 
been somewhat of an exception here; see Rekosh, Buchko, and Terzieva, “Access to Justice,” 7–9. 
961 Macovei, “Country Report: Romania,” 205. 
962 For an introduction, see Cappelletti and Garth, “Access to justice.” 
963 COLPI Newsletter 2, no. 1, Winter 1999, Access to Justice/Free Legal Aid Workshop. 
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strategy in the following terms: 
“[The] long-term goal is to convince governments to assume the responsibility for 
providing adequate free legal aid... [H]owever, [as] many governments are not yet 
capable of taking on this task […] the national Soros foundations could invest their 
resources in establishing [legal aid] centers which would later become funded by the 
state budget.”964 
In essence, the idea was to promote a model not too dissimilar to the Swedish, Dutch and US 
(during the 60s and 70s) models of organized legal aid that relied on regionally and locally 
situated legal aid bureaus with paid legal staff (referred to as “staff attorney programs” for civil 
law and “public defender offices” for criminal law in the US). It is notable that from the very 
outset, the foundations here looking to the state to solve the problem of individual access to 
justice and not primarily to the private bar. This was likely, partially, down to the reasons just 
explored above, i.e. the withering away of public-spiritedness among the private bar and the 
discrepancy in remuneration available between public and private lawyers.  
The foundations pursued this strategy across the region, often working in collaboration with 
various other local and regional European human rights and public interest law NGOs.  In 
Lithuania, for example, in 1998/1999, OSI co-funded two pilot public attorney offices (based 
on the public defender model) with the Lithuanian government. COLPI and PILnet (then PILI) 
also partnered with the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice to draft and put a bill through parliament 
on legal aid reform (which was later adopted in 2005).965  
In 2002, PILI and the recently launched Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) collaborated 
with the Polish and Bulgarian Helsinki committees and INTERIGHTS to organize a “European 
Forum on Access to Justice” in Budapest.966 The Forum brought representatives from the 
European Parliament, Council of Europe and World Bank together with representatives from 
Ministries of Justice, the judiciary, and civil society from CEE.967 Ultimately, the EU included 
a provision about legal aid into its pre-enlargement checklist.968 
                                                
964 Ibid. 
965 COLPI Newsletter 2, no. 3, Fall 1999, Access to Justice/Free Legal Aid. 
966 Access to Justice in Central and Eastern Europe, European Forum on Access to Justice, organized by the 
Public Interest Law Initiative in collaboration with the Open Society Justice Initiative, Dec. 5–7, 2002, 
Budapest, Hungary. 
967 Ibid., preface. 
968 Rekosh, “Constructing Public Interest Law,” 95. 
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In 2005, a follow-up forum was held bringing together 200 participants from 40 countries. It 
was organized by PILI and OSJI and funded by the EU, the Ford Foundation and Open 
Society.969 In the years following the first forum, the international funding organizations and 
their local partners had managed to procure significant changes to legal aid regimes across 
CEE. Particularly in Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Latvia, big changes were underway in 
the legal aid systems by 2005, which both PILI and OSJI had “been very actively 
encouraging”.970  
In Lithuania, the Semias (parliament) had adopted the legal aid reform law in 2005, which had 
resulted from close cooperation with the OSJI. The law expanded the range of actors entitled 
to provide legal aid beyond private lawyers to include “public institutions”.971 To this end, the 
law provided for the establishment of a network of public legal aid offices (building on the 
public defender pilot offices launched with the support of Open Society) to be administered by 
the Ministry of Justice.972 The law established that legal aid should encompass both “primary” 
services (advisory and out-of-court legal work) and “secondary” services (representation in 
court proceedings).973  
Meanwhile, in Hungary, a 2003 civil legal aid law had been passed that had established a 
national legal aid system largely fashioned after the Dutch and English models. The law 
removed the mandatory requirement for all lawyers to provide legal aid on a voluntary basis 
and created a national legal aid service with national and regional offices.974 The offices were 
to receive requests from legal aid applicants and filter them and determine in advance the 
number of subsidized hours of legal service that would be offered.975 Following this, an 
approved legal aid client could choose between competing private lawyers (and also a few 
NGOs and university law clinics) who had contracted with the Ministry of Justice.976 
In 2006, again following support from the OSJI, Bulgaria had passed a legal aid law 
establishing a system similar to that adopted in Hungary. Again, the OSJI, along with other 
                                                
969 Access to Justice in Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd European Forum on Access to Justice, organized by 
the Public Interest Law Initiative in collaboration with the Open Society Justice Initiative, Feb. 24–26, 2005, 
Budapest, Hungary, Forum Report. 
970 Ibid., 1. 
971 Ibid., 10, 11. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Ibid. 10. 




actors, had helped in advance by producing a report with the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice and 
the Bulgarian Bar setting out “basic principles that should underlie the legal aid system in order 
to conform with the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as with the requirements 
for EU accession, and outlining some options for legal aid reform.”977 In addition OSJI had 
played a significant role in drafting the legal aid law and had been involved in creating a pilot 
legal aid bureau.978 Similar legislative developments unfolded in Slovakia (2005), Latvia 
(2006), Georgia (2007), Moldova (2007) and Ukraine (2011).979  
 
At the moment that the market for Big Law Pro Bono was emerging in continental Europe, and 
the service was being defined (i.e. between 2005 and 2007), the question of how to tackle the 
need for individual access to justice had already been answered by those engaged in the 
European public interest law movement. The foundations, human rights and public interest law 
NGOs, and also PILnet, had decided that securing individual access to justice was the 
responsibility of the state and had already made significant gains in codifying and 
institutionalizing this principle. These gains would lead to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe deploying the same “judicare” model of legal aid that was being deployed across much 
of Western Europe:  a model that relied on the functional separation of responsibilities within 
the legal profession, whereby a Social Bar, compensated by the state, would take responsibility 
for meeting the legal needs of the poor; a model that exempted large portions of the Bar from 
engaging in pro bono work for individuals; a model that saw no role for Big Law in relation to 
individual access to justice.    
 
Taken together with the resistance from the local bars, the unique organizational capital of 
PILnet and the relative ease of working with non-profits for Big Law rather than individual 
clients, this goes some way to explaining why individual access to justice was simply not on 
the agenda of PILnet in the context of its work to develop a market for Big Law Pro Bono in 
the early 2000s. However, there remains one final point to discuss before we conclude this 
chapter, somewhat of a postscript. In recent years, there has of course been a significant roll-
back of legal aid, certainly across North Western Europe. By 2010, the decline in the economies 
                                                
977 Ibid., 12. 
978 Ibid., 12–13. 
979 Slovakia: Act No. 327/2005 on the provision of legal aid to persons in material need (Legal Aid Act); 
Latvia: Act on State Legal Aid, Cabinet Regulation No. 920 of Nov. 6, 2006 on forms of legal aid; Georgia: 
Law of Georgia on Legal Aid No. 4955, July 2, 2007; Moldova: Law No. 198-XVI of July 26, 2007 on state 
guaranteed legal aid; and Ukraine: Law No. 3460-VI of June 2, 2011 on free civil legal aid. 
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of Europe, consequent upon the economic downturn and the climate of austerity, had begun to 
have a negative impact on a number of legal aid systems. Several state-funded legal aid 
schemes came under sustained attack and entered a period of decline in relation to both 
eligibility and budget, resulting in a trend of increasing contributions expected from the legal 
aid clients themselves.980 This has certainly been the case in the Netherlands, Sweden and 
England (not by accident, the European countries that have historically had the highest legal 
aid budgets per capita – see Figures 7 and 8 below) but also, increasingly as a result of austerity, 
in Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Germany.981  All manner of substantive 
areas of law have been removed from the scope of legal aid across Europe, from personal injury 
and employment to immigration, consumer rights and housing.982  
 
Beyond this there were other factors contributing to declining access to justice for persons of 
low income across Europe. For example, in the Netherlands, the early 2000s also saw a 
declining interest among Dutch lawyers in joining the Social Bar, meaning that demand for 
legal aid was often harder to satisfy as there simply were not enough lawyers willing to take 
on legal aid work. This also resulted in a decrease in quality of legal aid services as 
inexperienced lawyers were increasingly carrying out the work.983 Meanwhile, in many 
jurisdictions, including Spain, Portugal and Italy, the cost of justice for individuals has 
increased by way of the introduction of VAT on lawyers’ fees or the raising of court costs.984  
 
  
                                                
980 Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 81. 
981 Fundamental Rights Agency, Annual Report: Challenges and Achievements, 2012, 243; ibid. 2013, 192; 
Council of Europe Commissioner, “Safeguarding human rights in times of economic crisis,” issue paper, 
December 2013, 22, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2130915; “Legal aid cuts: The forgotten pillar of the 
welfare state – a special report,” Guardian, September, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/sep/25/-sp-
legal-aid-forgotten-pillar-welfare-state-special-report-impactcuts; Tamamović, “Crisis on fundamental rights,” 
99, 100.  
982 Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 81. 
983 Van den Biggelaar, “Legal aid in the Netherlands,” 94–95. 
984 Tamamović, “Crisis on fundamental rights,” 105, 106.  
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Figure 8 – Comparative per capita European Legal Aid (criminal + civil) Spending in 
2012/2013 (Euros)986 








The climate of austerity has resulted in increasing calls from European governments (e.g. 
Ireland, Britain, Belgium, Sweden) for the legal profession, beyond the Social Bar, to 
contribute more to the legal aid system either by contributing financially to legal aid resources 
or by actually doing pro bono work.987 However, the Social Bar has reacted indignantly to such 
proposals and to the cuts and spending freezes that have been introduced in recent years. Legal 
aid lawyers have been going on strike in the Netherlands, France and Great Britain while there 
have been complaints about the level of pay virtually across the board in Europe.988 
 
In the UK, severe cuts to civil legal aid were introduced by way of the 2012 Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act. In 2015, Justice Secretary, Michael 
                                                
985 See Cooper, “English Legal Services,” 254. 
986 See Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 5. 
987 Cousins, “Legal Aid Reform,” 144; “Michael Gove: Wealthy lawyers should do more free work for the 
justice system,” Telegraph, June 23, 2015; Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 86; Regan, “Legal aid,” 
391. 
988 Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 84–88. 
 287 
Gove, caused a great deal of commotion by suggesting that lawyers who have “done very well” 
needed to “look into their consciences” and do more work for free to shore up the “less well-
funded areas of law”.989 While Big Law initially responded indignantly by pointing to the pro 
bono work they already do, in the last couple of years, commencing even before such public 
rebukes, they have begun to answer the call by establishing a “Collaborative Plan” (an initiative 
of nearly 40 of the largest City-based firms aimed at improving access to justice (defined 
narrowly) through pro bono in the UK).990 The UK Collaborative Plan for Pro Bono, was 
launched in 2014 following PILnet’s London Pro Bono Forum and saw the firms making a 
collective commitment to “ensur[e] that a proportion of their pro bono work [was] directed to 
promoting access to justice for low income individuals”.991 By working together, the firms 
hope to “more effectively promote access to justice” in the UK. There are a number of core 
strategies articulated within the plan (including information sharing and the setting of a 
voluntary and aspirational pro bono target of 25 hours of pro bono per fee-earner per year). 
However, the most interesting development is probably the commitment (mentioned above) by 
all firms to “ensur[e] that a proportion of their pro bono work is directed to promoting access 
to justice for low income individuals”. This broad commitment includes the following sub-
commitments:  
 
•" Support legal aid and promote the importance of a properly funded legal aid system. 
•" Continue to support advice clinics and seek to develop end-to-end representation in 
appropriate circumstances. 
•" Create Task Forces focusing on subject areas (e.g. immigration) or demographic 
populations (e.g. homelessness) to assess the need for pro bono intervention and to 
share information between firms working on similar issues. 
•" Create handbooks specific to legal clinics by subject area (e.g. housing, immigration, 
welfare). 
•" Improve systems and processes for working more closely with barristers on pro bono 
matters. 
•" Work as a group to learn from experiences, create opportunities for smaller firms to get 
involved and spread the cost of providing training and resources to all participants. 
                                                
989 “Michael Gove: Wealthy lawyers should do more free work for the justice system,” Telegraph, June 23, 
2015. 
990 See http://news.trust.org/spotlight/Collaborative-Plan-for-Pro-Bono-uk/?tab=background. 
991 Ibid. 
 288 
•" Create a ‘trusted referral network’ to pass cases to other law firms (e.g. if one firm 
cannot act due to a conflict). 
•" Promote the Task Forces and opportunities to set up new clinics, encouraging 
involvement from other law firms. 
•" Implement structures and help to build supervisory capacity of external agencies to 
develop end-to-end casework for individuals.992 
 
Through this plan, the firms have managed to increase the percentage of pro bono work carried 
out directly for low-income individuals, as opposed to non-profits, from 14% in 2017 to 27% 
in 2018.993 
 
This is certainly an intriguing development. However, it must be noted that, firstly, the 
Collaborative Plan is limited to the work undertaken by the firms in the UK and does not extend 
to their European offices.  Secondly, despite cuts and restrictions placed on legal aid in several 
other European countries (as discussed above) and the much lower spending on legal aid across 
much of Central and Eastern Europe (and consequently significant gaps in access to justice for 
low-income individuals), there are as yet no similar developments across the rest of Europe 
(either in terms of firm commitments or a compelling call from the government or organized 
bar for firms to make such commitments). However, most recently, in November 2018, the 
Dutch Minister for Legal Protection, Sander Dekker, after threatening legal aid cuts, has openly 
called on commercial law firms do their part to ensure the proper functioning of the legal aid 
system (without specifying precisely what this means).994 However, unlike in the US or the 
UK, I am aware that the local bar in the Netherlands is entirely opposed to any proposal that 
would engage Big Law in “legal aid” work (the bar being mostly controlled by “social lawyers” 
i.e. doing legal aid work). Commercial firms in the Netherlands have reacted as in the UK 
(discussed in Chapter 4), by pushing responsibility for legal aid back on the government.995  
The question thus remains, as to whether developments such as  growing legal aid cuts, the 
appointment of a critical mass of full-time pro bono roles on the Continent and greater 
penetration of the local legal fields could be anticipated across the rest of Europe (as in the 
                                                
992 Ibid. 
993 Collaborative plan statistics for 2018 (on file with author). 
994  See: https://www.mr-online.nl/de-brauw-rechtsbijstand-gaat-alle-advocaten-aan/ 
995 Ibid. 
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UK). Only time will tell; however in light of  the analysis presented in this chapter, I am 
convinced it is  unlikely that Europe will, any time soon,  follow exactly the same path. 
 
3! Conclusion   
 
In this chapter, we had one core aim: to analyze why Big Law Pro Bono in Europe has been 
focused, so single-mindedly, on work for non-profit organizations? And why, given the history 
of pro bono lawyering in Europe and the way Big Law Pro Bono has come to be understood in 
the US (explored in Chapters 1, 2 and 3) there has been virtually no observable focus on direct 
individual access to justice in Europe. In so doing, the hope was to explore the localization of 
Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, to compliment the study of its globalization in the previous 
chapter.  
 
The analysis in this chapter has pointed to several possible answers to these questions, 
including: barriers to market access experienced by the initial Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs 
in Europe; the unique profile and networks of those actors who initially developed the market 
for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe; the legacies of the European civil liberties, human rights and 
public interest law movements; the resistance of local bars to Big Law engaging in individual 
client work; the specificities of the type of law firms and lawyers that make up the European 
Corporate Bar; the relative ease of dealing with non-profit clients as opposed to individual 
clients; the functional distribution of labor between the Social Bars of Europe and the rest of 
the legal profession (and the Corporate Bar in particular); and the fact that the problem of 
individual access to justice (in Central and Eastern Europe) had, in the minds of many of the 
relevant stakeholders, already been largely solved by the time the market for Big Law Pro Bono 
was really taking shape on the Continent. Nevertheless, I have also conceded, while suggesting 
that it was unlikely, that recent developments in the United Kingdom in particular, and across 
the rest of Europe more broadly, related to both legal aid systems and Big Law Pro Bono 
practice, leave open the possibility that the current status quo may be revised in the coming 
years.  
 
Among these factors, arguably the most significant are: firstly, the barriers to market access;  
secondly, the existence of a strong Social Bar in many European states (and the linked 
resistance from national Bars to developing Big Law Pro Bono in way that would undermine 
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legal aid systems and undercut the market share of the Social Bar); and thirdly, the fact that the 
key organization (PILnet) which helped to build the market for Big Law Pro Bono in 
Continental Europe, was deeply connected to the European NGO movement and, for 
historically contingent reasons, viewed the problem of access to justice for individuals (narrow 
definition) as a problem for the state to solve.  
 
As noted above, among the key factors that may render legal transplants more likely to succeed 
are: when they are chosen voluntarily after consideration of alternative solutions; when there 
is affinity between the legal systems of the exporting and importing countries; when there is 
demand from the recipient country; when legal intermediaries are in position that understand 
the law and can adapt it to local conditions; and when institutional infrastructures is already in 
place.996 We also noted above the importance, when studying legal transplants, of considering 
the incentives, attributes, capabilities and limitations of legal elites in differing social, political 
and legal contexts.  
 
Firstly, if we consider the transplant of Big Law Pro Bono, it was not chosen by European 
lawyers from among a range of possible solutions. Indeed, there was no clear problem to solve. 
Of course, there was unmet legal need among both individuals and other consumers of legal 
services right across Europe, but the question was not framed that way. The objective (of the 
pro bono entrepreneurs) was to develop pro bono culture within the international offices of 
major global law firms and the question of legal need (access to justice) was secondary.  
 
If we now consider the affinity between the legal systems of the US and Europe, a major 
difference, relevant here, is how the problem of access to justice (narrow definition) has been 
historically solved. In the US (as explored in previous chapters) there is a much smaller role 
for the state and Big Law Pro Bono in the US has largely expanded to fill that gap. In Europe, 
a Social Bar has emerged, subsidized by the state, to solve this problem. When transplanting 
Big Law Pro Bono into Europe, this has proved to be a crucially significant difference affecting 
how the transplant has unfolded (in the form of resistance from the local Bars to allowing Big 
Law Pro Bono to encroach on local legal aid systems).  
 
                                                
996 Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard, "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect”; Halliday 
and Osinsky, "Globalization of law", 458. 
 291 
If we consider the question of demand for the legal transplant. As just mentioned, of course 
there was unmet legal need among poor individuals across Europe when the transplant was 
taking place. However, there was also enormous demand for pro bono legal services among 
Europe’s national and transnational non-profit population and it was thanks to the unique 
profile of PILnet that the Big Law Pro Bono resource was connected to this demand, subtly 
altering the form of the legal service being transplanted.  
 
If we consider whether the legal intermediaries (the pro bono entrepreneurs, PILnet, the local 
clearinghouses set up by PILnet) were in position to understand Big Law Pro Bono and adapt 
it to local conditions. Certainly, they were in a position to understand Big Law Pro Bono, but 
they were not in a position to successfully orient it towards individual access to justice in the 
local legal systems. The pro bono entrepreneurs simply did not have the networks, local legal 
knowledge or language skills. PILnet had the network (they were connected to local lawyers 
in the legal aid sector across Europe through the OSF funded legal aid project and the broader 
European public interest law movement) but did not prioritize that objective as they did not see 
Big Law Pro Bono as being linked to individual access to justice in a direct manner in Europe. 
Moreover, PILnet had another more pressing objective i.e. to find a way to make the public 
interest law organizations and human rights organizations within their network sustainable. 
The local clearinghouses established by PILnet could have decided to prioritize individual 
access to justice rather than serving non-profit clients. However, they were strongly influenced 
by the model already established (very successfully) by PILnet and so probably had little 
incentive to try and develop another model which, arguably, would have been much harder to 
develop and in relation to which law firms (i.e. clearinghouse funders) were showing little 
interest.   
 
Finally, if we consider the institutional infrastructures that were already in place relevant to the 
transplant. PILnet and the networks that it had in the early 2000s, solved so many problems for 
the Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs. It provided almost all the necessary infrastructure on the 
demand side of the Big Law Pro Bono marketplace in Europe. Meanwhile, the infrastructure 
that existed in relation to access to justice for individuals was also significantly developed by 
the mid-2000s but it had been developed in such a way, that there was no obvious role for Big 
Law to play.       
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What the analysis in this chapter has revealed is that, in spite of the strong orientation of the 
US model of Big Law Pro Bono towards promoting a narrow vision of access to justice, as a 
globalized resource, there is no reason to think that it should necessarily maintain this 
functional orientation when translated into new legal and political contexts.  The process of 
localization has the power to transform and re-purpose Big Law Pro Bono. While the internal 
organization remains broadly the same as in the US (involving the development of pro bono 
policies, the setting of pro bono targets, the establishment of pro bono committees and the 
appointment of full-time pro bono professionals engaging fee-earning lawyers in working for 
free), the end to which the resource is deployed may differ. Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
primarily involves the provision of free legal services (chiefly research and operational 
support) to non-profit organizations that  are broadly pursuing norm change via law reform and 
policy advocacy work. This is an altogether different objective to promoting access to justice 
for low-income individuals. Taken together with the recent changes underway in the UK, we 
must conclude that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe appears to be an ideologically indeterminate 
and historically contingent resource that is taking shape against the evolving political and legal 
landscape. As in the US, the prevailing legal and political context and the key actors in the pro 
bono ecosystem (internal and external to the firm) are playing a decisive role in determining 
how Big Law Pro Bono is being institutionalized in Europe. In particular, intermediary 
organizations, the organized bar (although through resistance rather than support), the legacy 
of the civil liberties, human rights and public interest law movements, the prevailing systems 
of state-funded legal aid and the large population of non-profit organizations engaging in law 
reform and policy advocacy work targeted at the European Union and Council of Europe 
institutions, have all played a role in giving a unique shape to Big Law Pro Bono in Europe.   
 
In the following, and final, chapter of this thesis, there remains the question of what this all 
means. In other words, what are the consequences of the way that Big Law Pro Bono has 
developed in Europe vis-à-vis access to justice? If, as is claimed in this thesis, Big Law Pro 
Bono in Europe does not significantly (or even meaningfully) contribute to access to justice in 
Europe (in the way that access to justice has been defined in the pro bono literature to date), 




CHAPTER 6: Does Big Law Pro Bono contribute to 
access to justice in Europe? Can it? 
 
As a reminder, the central research question of this PhD thesis is: does “Big Law Pro Bono” 
contribute to access to justice in Europe and if not, could it?  
 
In Chapter 1, we noted that Big Law Pro Bono (rather than merely “pro bono” – meaning 
lawyers acting outside of the Big Law setting providing free legal services), both as an 
institutionalized model of social change lawyering and as an object of study, traces its roots 
largely to the progressive US legal movements (the public interest law movement and the 
poverty law movement) of the 1960s and 1970s.  We also established that the literature on Big 
Law Pro Bono arose from the literature on the US public interest law movement and the broader 
literature on public interest law and cause lawyering which flowed from that in the subsequent 
decades. In Chapter 2 it was also suggested that, within this existing body of literature on Big 
Law Pro Bono, there is a broad consensus that the primary objective of Big Law Pro Bono is 
(and should be) to promote access to justice, where this is construed narrowly as the provision 
of civil legal aid to low-income individuals. It was suggested that the conflation of access to 
justice with civil legal aid for the poor and underserved in the US literature on pro bono was a 
consequence of the broader political and legal context within which discussions on pro bono 
and legal aid have taken place in the US. In particular, the decimation of federally funded civil 
legal aid between the mid 1970s and the 1990s gave rise to a broader conversation on the legal 
left about a perceived crisis in access to justice (the “justice gap”). During the 1990s, when pro 
bono was being rapidly institutionalized in large US law firms, there was a concerted effort 
from multiple directions (civil society, the organized bar, pro bono professionals, academia) to 
construct pro bono in general, and Big Law Pro Bono in particular, functionally as a solution 
to the crisis in civil legal aid. This functionalist understanding of Big Law Pro Bono as a 
solution to the “justice gap” (both normatively and empirically) persists into the present day 
within both academic and practitioner circles.  
 
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that there may be limitations in embracing, within literature on 
pro bono/Big Law Pro Bono, such a narrow definition of access to justice. Firstly, we risk 
failing to critically evaluate Big Law Pro Bono and its empirical contributions to access to 
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justice beyond the provision of civil legal aid and secondly, we risk adopting a very limited 
normative agenda for Big Law Pro Bono and we may fail to perceive its possible contributions 
to access to justice (and public interest lawyering in general) beyond the provision of civil legal 
aid. Indeed, a key conclusion from Chapter 4 was that if we define access to justice in the way 
that it has been defined within the existing body of literature on Big Law Pro Bono, then we 
must conclude that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not meaningfully contribute to access to 
justice. We suggested that this was odd given that, as explored in Chapter 3, Europe has a long 
history of pro bono practice within the legal professions, which has primarily been focused on 
access to justice, defined narrowly in terms of providing legal services to low-income 
individuals. Why then, would Big Law Pro Bono in Europe not also be oriented towards 
providing legal aid to low-income individuals? This is even more perplexing given that, as 
explored in Chapter 4, Big Law Pro Bono has primarily come to exist in Europe by way of the 
globalization of large US law firms. Why wouldn’t the European variant copy the US 
blueprint? In Chapter 5, we suggested several possible answers to this question, including: 
barriers to market access experienced by the initial Big Law Pro Bono entrepreneurs in Europe; 
the unique profile and networks of those actors who initially developed the market for Big Law 
Pro Bono in Europe; the legacies of the European civil liberties, human rights and public 
interest law movements; the resistance of local bars to Big Law engaging in individual client 
work; the specificities of the type of law firms and lawyers that make up the European 
Corporate Bar; the relative ease of dealing with non-profit clients as opposed to individual 
clients; the functional distribution of labor between the Social Bars of Europe and the rest of 
the legal profession (and the Corporate Bar in particular); and the fact that the problem of 
individual access to justice (in Central and Eastern Europe) had, in the minds of many of the 
relevant stakeholders, already been largely solved by the time the market for Big Law Pro Bono 
was really taking shape on the Continent. 
 
There now remains one question: if Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not contribute to access 
to justice in the way that this term has been defined within the existing literature on pro bono, 
might it contribute to a broader notion of access to justice? In Chapter 2, we developed a much 
broader definition of access to justice embracing not only procedural notions of justice, but 
also substantive notions of justice both within the legal system and beyond. The objective in 
this final Chapter is to evaluate to what extent Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice 
as this was defined in Chapter 2.  In the following pages we will evaluate Big Law Pro Bono 
against the three definitions of access to justice elaborated in Chapter 2: the definition within 
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the existing literature on pro bono (Section 1); the narrow definition (Section 2); and the wide 
definition (Section 3). I will also explore other possible contributions of Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe, beyond access to justice (Section 4).  
 
1! Pro Bono Literature (PBL) Definition 
 
To recap, the PBL definition, as set out in the first chapter of this thesis, construed access to 
justice as concerning the accessibility of the processes constituting the administration of justice 
(rulemaking, rule enforcement and conflict resolution) by individuals. This is perhaps what 
Cummings has in mind when talks about the “access” dimension of public interest law insofar 
as it relates to market-based inequality in the access of legal services and orients public interest 
law towards “providing no-cost or low-cost services to expand the entry of the poor into the 
legal system on an individual, case-by-case basis”.997  Barriers to access to justice will be 
structural impediments making it impossible or difficult for individuals to directly access the 
conflict resolution, rulemaking or rule enforcement processes. Barriers may, for instance, be 
created by a lack of information, a lack of expertise, a lack of money, a disability or by law.  
Expanding access to justice, defined in this way, involves taking actions that will directly 
increase the access of individuals to existing (legal, judicial, administrative, etc.) processes. 
For example, the provision of information, advice or representation to individuals who would 
otherwise not have the means to effectively engage in the judicial or electoral processes would 
contribute to access to justice defined in this way. Equally, the removal of a legal prohibition 
on certain groups of individuals from voting in elections would also contribute to access to 
justice defined in this way.  
 
Does Big Law Pro Bono contribute to access to justice in Europe, defined in this way? As noted 
above, based upon the analysis in the previous chapters we must conclude that it does not. 
Likely less than 15% of Big Law Pro Bono work involves providing legal services directly to 
individuals in Europe. Among the top 30 commercial law firms, this might amount to less than 
20 full time equivalent lawyers working on pro bono over one year. When you consider that 
there are approximately 8000 legal aid lawyers in the Netherlands, 4000 in Belgium, 25,000 in 
                                                
997 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 523. 
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France and even 139 civil legal aid lawyers in Latvia, we must conclude that Big Law Pro 
Bono makes an almost insignificant contribution to access to justice defined in this way.998     
 
This is a fact that many pro bono professionals are aware of and, particularly in London, are 
taking steps to address. Nicolas Patrick, Pro Bono Partner at DLA Piper, coming from Australia 
where he suggests that around 60% of Big Law pro bono work is undertaken for low-income 
individuals, struggles to understand the reluctance in Europe to engage in this kind of work. 
Patrick suggests that: 
 
“I do not think our pro bono practice can succeed without [individual client] work… 
when you focus on charities and non-profits, you can get people to do one pro bono 
matter, but they do not necessarily come back for another one… It is not inspirational… 
if you get them to do a matter for a person who is being held in immigration detention 
and they are able to get that person released, they come back for another one because 
they have had an impact on somebody’s life, they have got them out of detention and 
back with their families, it’s the sort of thing that makes them want to come back and 
do more… If you only offer charities work then lawyers may take the view that ‘I did 
some pro bono work this year, next year I will join the netball team and then I will try 
something else the year after that’, it doesn’t really bring them back for more.”999 
 
For Patrick, it is not just about inspiring DLA lawyers, but inspiring lawyers in general; “the 
[European pro bono] movement will not grow off the back of the current strategy rooted in 
NGOs because it simply doesn’t inspire lawyers and they do not see any real impact.”1000 At 
DLA, Patrick has done a great deal to put this philosophy into practice; setting up individual 
client “law clinics” across the UK and across Europe, i.e. collaborations with specialist NGOs 
or university law schools in which DLA lawyers can volunteer their services, working 
alongside trained specialists for individual clients with specific legal needs, such as individuals 
trying to secure disability benefits or migrants seeking reunification with their families.1001  
 
                                                
998 See Belgium, “National Report,” ILAG, Den Haag, 2013, 5.2.2 (figures for 2012–13); the Netherlands, 
“National Report: Legal Aid in the Netherlands – a broad outline – 2016,” Den Haag, 2013, 29 (figures for 
2014–15); Latvia, “National Report,” ILAG, Den Haag, 2013, 7 (figures for 2012–13).  
999 Interview number 29, Mar. 1, 2016. 
1000 Interview number 29, Mar. 1, 2016. 
1001 See, for example, http://www.dlapiperprobono.com/what-we-do/work/pro-bono/manuel-bravo.html and 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/news/2015/12/first-successes-in-our-new-uk-pro-bono-clinic/.  
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Diane Sechi, a qualified social welfare lawyer who has been employed directly by Simmons & 
Simmons to run a social welfare clinic for them in London, also supports this position. This 
Clinic receives appeals stage referrals from front-line agencies. Says Sechi:  
 
“It is a shift and I think it is a necessary shift [towards helping individuals] because of 
the way that governments are moving and removing areas of law from scope [of legal 
aid] and corporate firms have to look at the ways in which they can engage their skills. 
Yes, they are not trained to do social welfare law but there is no reason why they can’t 
use their skill set to transfer over. I don’t think you need to build up years and years of 
experience in one particular area… These lawyers have great analytical skills and 
fantastic research skills; they have got the skill set there to [adapt]. It’s no bar to them 
that they have not done social welfare law… Some of the Partners at Simmons & 
Simmons have been so engaged with a particular case that they themselves have 
become experts in an area of welfare benefits, so you have a dissemination of 
knowledge throughout Simmons & Simmons”.1002 
 
The shift that Sechi speaks of is, at least in the UK, well under way. As discussed in Chapter 
5, the UK Collaborative Plan for Pro Bono, which was launched in 2014, saw nearly 40 firms 
making a collective commitment to “ensur[e] that a proportion of their pro bono work [was] 
directed to promoting access to justice for low income individuals”.1003 The Plan commits the 
firms to an aspirational pro bono target of 25 hours per lawyer per year across the firms’ UK 
offices and requires them to “ensuring that a proportion of their pro bono work is directed to 
promoting access to justice for low income individuals”.  
 
Interview subjects, including Nicolas Patrick, who have been directly involved in promoting 
the push, in London, towards more pro bono work for low-income individuals, all refer to legal 
aid cuts as the justification for such work although they are very careful to caveat that Big Law 
Pro Bono cannot and should not replace the existing legal aid system. Based on the historical 
fears of Big Law in London (explored in Chapter 4) of being saddled with legal aid work and 
the sheer volume of legal aid lawyers and legal aid work relative to the volume of Big Law pro 
bono work, it seems highly unlikely that Big Law could ever be a viable substitute to state-
                                                
1002 Interview number 44, June 17, 2016. 
1003 See http://news.trust.org/spotlight/Collaborative-Plan-for-Pro-Bono-uk/?tab=background. 
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funded legal aid short of every single Big Law lawyer being required to work part-time in legal 
aid cases all year-round.  
 
Is it feasible, however, that legal aid cuts across the rest of Europe could have a similar effect 
on Big Law Pro Bono there, i.e. triggering a shift towards individual access to justice work. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, this seems unlikely. Despite cuts and restrictions placed on legal aid in 
several other European countries (as discussed in Chapter 5) and the much lower spending on 
legal aid across much of Central and Eastern Europe (and consequently significant gaps in 
access to justice for low-income individuals), there are as yet no similar developments across 
the rest of Europe (either in terms of firm commitments or a compelling call from the 
government or organized bar for firms to make such commitments). 
As discussed in Chapter 5, between 2008 and 2010, the decline in the economies of Europe 
had a negative impact on multiple legal aid systems. Several state-funded legal aid schemes 
came under attack and entered a period of decline (vis-à-vis both eligibility and budget) 
resulting in a trend of increasing contributions expected from the legal aid clients 
themselves.1004 However, even though this period was exactly the period when Big Law Pro 
Bono was taking root across Europe, there seems to have been virtually no impact on the way 
that lawyers engaged in Big Law Pro Bono, legal aid lawyers, governments or European bars 
think of it as a resource. Even full-time pro bono professionals haven’t made any meaningful 
attempts to reorient Big Law Pro Bono (in Continental Europe) towards promoting legal aid 
for the poor.  
The reason for this is likely that virtually all the Big Law Pro Bono professionals (full-time pro 
bono managers) with a mandate for Europe are based in London or in the US (as explored in 
Chapter 4). There are just six such professionals in Continental Europe and the first was 
appointed only in 2014. Given that, as explored in the previous chapters, Big Law Pro Bono 
has been a significantly top-down phenomenon, largely led by Americans and Brits, there is 
very limited penetration of Big Law Pro Bono in Continental European legal culture and 
practice. It might be fair to say that, at present, there is virtually no link at all between 
developments within national legal markets in mainland Europe and developments in Big Law 
Pro Bono.  
                                                
1004 Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe,” 81. 
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Even if firms decide, as a policy, to promote one approach to pro bono (e.g. oriented towards 
the provision of civil legal aid) in every single office, without having full-time pro bono 
managers on the ground, qualified in the relevant jurisdiction and able to lobby local bars and 
other stakeholders to institutionalize such a model (beyond the firm), it is highly doubtful that 
firms would be able to implement such a policy. Getting commercial lawyers to work directly 
for low-income individuals where they have no practice of doing so and limited inclination to 
do so is easier said than done. Such work requires an entire infrastructure, as now exists in the 
US, of supportive civil society organizations and organized bars. At present this does not exist 
in Europe and, to the contrary, the current ecosystem is hostile to the idea. Short of a locally 
led movement among lawyers and other stakeholders within relevant jurisdictions (as is 
happening in London where there is now a large body of pro bono professionals), it is hard to 
see how this could happen. Consequently, we should not expect a greater engagement of Big 
Law Pro Bono with access to justice, defined in this way, unless a significantly greater 
penetration of national European legal markets is achieved by Big Law Pro Bono on the 
Continent, (as has been achieved in London).      
 
2! Narrow definition  
 
The narrow definition of access to justice, includes the PBL definition but is broader. Like the 
PBL definition, the narrow definition also poses the question, ‘what structural impediments 
exist that render it difficult or impossible for individuals to access the conflict resolution, 
rulemaking or rule enforcement processes?’ This still relates broadly to what Cunmmings 
refers to as the “access” dimension of public interest law i.e. insofar as it relates to market-
based inequality in the access of legal services. However, unlike the PBL definition, 
contributions to access to justice may also be indirect and may also be targeted at groups or 
civil society organizations, rather than solely at individuals. So, this might include pro bono 
work that simply expands the access to law for civil society organizations (that otherwise would 
struggle to access legal services) for their corporate legal needs i.e. contracts, governance, data 
protection, employment advice, etc. However, it might also include pro bono work that 
indirectly contributes to access to justice for individuals. For example, conducting research into 
difficulties experienced by persons with disabilities when making use of the court system or 
participating in the electoral process may contribute to access to justice but will not, without 
further action, do so directly. Therefore, while such research would not contribute to access to 
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justice in the PBL definition, it would do so in the narrow definition. Similarly, a test case that 
sought to establish the requirement of law enforcement officers to make reasonable 
accommodations when questioning criminal suspects with disabilities or an advocacy 
campaign promoting the right of children to be heard during the course of criminal or civil 
proceedings affecting them or promoting the right of civil society organizations to participate 
in the policy process, would not qualify as promoting access to justice defined along the PBL 
lines, but would come within the narrow definition.      
 
The argument I wish to make here, is that a large bulk of Big Law Pro Bono work carried out 
in Europe contributes to access to justice in the narrow definition (but not the PBL definition). 
This is because, a great deal of Big Law Pro Bono facilitates non-profits: a) to simply be more 
robust and more compliant as legal entities; and b) to more effectively engage in the policy, 
judicial and legislative processes. The purpose of such work might be described in procedural 
terms, similar to how lawyers spearheading the early public interest law movement in the US 
described their own objectives, i.e. “to provide legal representation to interests that [are] 
unrepresented and underrepresented in the legal process.”1005 
 
Dealing first briefly with the former, a significant amount of Big Law Pro Bono work in Europe 
involves the provision of “corporate support” i.e. legal assistance provided to non-profits as 
incorporated legal entities, relating to their legal structure and governance, employment 
practices, tax obligations, financing, intellectual and real property rights, commercial 
transactions and so on. Although there are no reliable statistics, it is likely that such work makes 
up a significant proportion of the pro bono work being carried out by large firms across Europe. 
The Legal Needs survey I carried out among EU policy NGOs revealed that 63% of the 
surveyed organizations expressed a need for pro bono support in relation to governance and 
corporate legal issues, while 61% expressed a need for support with employment issues, 53% 
with tax and 43% each with respect to data protection and intellectual property issues.1006 
Beyond such indication of demand, anecdotal evidence, based on discussion with pro bono 
managers, indicates that possibly up to half of all pro bono work carried out by Big Law in 
Europe might consist of this kind of work, both for international and domestic NGOs.  
 
                                                
1005 Council for Public Interest Law, Scales of Justice. 
1006 Khadar, Good Lobby Legal Needs Survey. 
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In recent years, such work has taken on new significance with the so-called “closing space for 
civil society”. In recent years, there has been a wave of government-sponsored efforts to 
undermine NGOs through propaganda efforts, regulatory controls and coercive measures in 
what has been called a “global war on NGOs.”1007 Governments have shut down a large number 
of groups, and violent attacks against individual human rights defenders are on the rise.1008 In 
2015 and 2016 alone, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) tracked the 
adoption of 64 laws that restrict the ability of CSOs to register, protest or receive international 
financial support (16 of which in Europe).1009 Such measures have included the imposition of 
burdensome bureaucracy and fees, denial of registration, imposing requirements related to 
property ownership, limiting permissible activities, concocting grounds for dissolution, 
carrying out raids and lock-outs, applying sanctions, placing restrictions on foreign funding, 
limiting interaction with foreign entities, limiting freedom of assembly and freedom of 
expression online and offline (to provide just a few examples).1010 One consequence of this has 
been a number of NGOs increasingly demand pro bono support with respect to ensuring, 
compliance with rapidly changing national regulatory frameworks, seeking to challenge 
restrictive measures imposed on them or seeking to completely relocate to more favorable 
jurisdictions (Amsterdam, Berlin, Vienna, London etc.). One example of this trend is the 
collaboration between the European Center for Not-for-Profit-Law and law firms, DLA Piper 
and Dentons to prepare a multi-jurisdictional guide for NGOs on corporate legal structure 
(what to consider when relocating from one jurisdiction to another).1011 Undoubtedly such 
work should be construed as contributing to access to justice if we construe access to justice in 
terms of expanding access to lawyers and legal services.  
 
Dealing now with the second way in which Big Law Pro Bono contributes to access to justice 
defined narrowly, several interrelated trends, not least the emergence of supranational and 
international institutions, jurisdictions and tribunals, have made it simultaneously harder and 
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more important for civil society actors to participate in the legislative, judicial and policy 
processes and to effectively influence decision makers in Europe.1012  
 
Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, there has been a 
mushrooming of international and supranational courts. There are now more than 20 permanent 
international courts and tribunals dedicated to resolving disputes between States and 
international organizations.1013 Beyond this, there are scores of international institutions with 
various judicial, legislative and policy-making functions. In Europe, these trends are 
exemplified by the emergence of the EU legal and institutional order, characterized by a 
plurality of sources, judicial authorities, and the introduction of new, increasingly technocratic, 
modes of governance that have profoundly shaped the nature and practice of the law and 
policy.1014 Not yet a fully-fledged federation but more than simply a means of international 
collaboration, the EU infrastructure has come to be a centrifugal force acting on an ever-
increasing range of issues both within Europe and beyond. The supranational EU governance 
structure and its major institutions have become immensely powerful. They now play a big role 
in shaping the everyday experience of living in Europe. The rising power and importance of 
the EU institutions have also given rise to an expansion of financed lobbying activity in 
Brussels, which increasingly begins to resemble DC. From tobacco companies and food 
manufactures to airlines and banks, Big Business is now very keen to have the ear of the EU 
institutions and is not afraid to invest vast sums of money to ensure favorable policy 
outcomes.1015 In Europe, the EU legal and institutional order is made all the more complex by 
its coexistence with other international bodies and institutions emerging out of agreements both 
among EU member states and other governments and between the EU and third countries as 
well as international organizations. Such institutions, for example, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and Council of Europe (CoE) have their own dispute resolution 
mechanisms, generating overlapping norms.   
 
This relentless growth and complexification within the international judicial and policy sectors 
have been accompanied by a second and related trend: the internationalization and 
Europeanization of the European legal fields. By "internationalization" and "Europeanization", 
                                                
1012 Part of the following passages appear in Alemanno and Khadar, Reinventing Legal Education, 1–26. 
1013 See, for example, Romano, Alter, and Shany, Handbook of International Adjudication. 
1014 Scott and Trubek, “Mind the gap,” 1–18. 
1015 Coen, “Business lobbying in the European Union,” 145–69. 
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I imply both the intrusion of international and European law into an increasing array of 
substantive legal fields and the convergence of domestic legal systems. For instance, as 
European Union law has come to affect virtually all areas of the national legal systems, 
including constitutional and administrative law, immigration law, private law, as well as 
criminal law, this has simultaneously had the effect of harmonizing national legal systems. As 
a direct consequence, legal problems are no longer neatly confined to national jurisdictions, 
exclusively governed by domestic law. International and European law increasingly controls 
what might have been previously labeled as purely internal or domestic situations. In this way, 
state sovereignty is continually undermined.  
 
Furthermore,  principles, norms and rules emanating from diverse sources and operationalized 
by a panoply of public and private actors at local, national, regional and global levels populate 
a complex and globalized legal world. In addition, these processes of internationalization and 
Europeanization occur – although to a different extent – within and across legal fields, such as 
commercial, environmental, human rights, financial, criminal and labor law.1016  
 
Ultimately then, we are left with a legislative, judicial and policy landscape in Europe 
characterized by vertical plurality (i.e. the overlap and interaction between local, national, 
European and international norms and norm-generating bodies), horizontal plurality (i.e. the 
growing relevance of norms generated in all parts of European rights across Europe: so that 
norms generated in Hungary or Sweden can be significant in Latvia or Italy) and intense 
complexity, such that there are simultaneously multiple avenues for engaging in the legislative, 
judicial and policy processes (litigation, administrative actions, consultations, petitions, etc.) 
and significant specialization within various fields (environmental law, asylum law, 
discrimination, labor and social law, free movement law, etc.).  
 
For non-profits and civil society organizations this landscape makes it all the more important 
to engage. Firstly, such powerful institutions can have dramatic effects on society, for better or 
worse. Secondly, reforms and policy changes in one part of the system can have an impact 
across the whole system, making the stakes of engagement much higher. However, engagement 
is also rendered much more difficult. Significant sophistication is required to engage 
effectively both in terms of access to comparative legal and policy knowledge and in terms of 
                                                
1016 Snyder, “Economic globalization and the law,” 627. 
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specialized knowledge or expertise in relation to the various avenues of participation and 
substantive bodies of law and policy.  
 
In this context, Big Law Pro Bono plays an important role by facilitating non-profits to 
effectively engage in the legislative, judicial and policy processes. Without access to 
specialized and comparative legal expertise and knowledge, non-profits simply cannot 
effectively engage and with limited budgets, they often simply do not have access to such 
resources. Moreover, European non-profits rarely have sufficient legal staff in-house. The 
survey among 100 EU policy NGOs revealed that just 32% of them had lawyers on-staff (50% 
of those with just 1 lawyer) and several of those lawyers were either exclusively or additionally 
handling compliance and operational or corporate matters rather than contributing to advocacy 
campaigns and programmatic work.1017 Meanwhile, in comparison, a 2004 survey among 
around 300 public interest NGOs in the US revealed that over 50% of them had more than 5 
lawyers on staff  (40% having ten or more lawyers on staff).1018  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, as discussed in Chapter 4, the interviews undertaken for this thesis 
suggest that legal research - typically comparative legal research - forms a very large part of 
the pro bono work that goes on across Europe. Lending support to this anecdotal evidence was 
a survey carried out among 100 NGOs listed in the European Transparency Register which 
revealed that just under 80% of them were interested in receiving (or had received) pro bono 
“legal research” assistance.1019 This made legal research the most popular form of pro bono 
legal assistance by a margin of over 15% (followed by “governance/corporate”).1020 The need 
for comparative research is perhaps also unsurprising given the above descried normative 
plurality which is reinforced by several legal doctrines originating in both the European Union 
and the Council of Europe (via the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights) 
designed to retain a flexible degree of national sovereignty within Europe, such as “consistent 
interpretation,” “consensus,” “margin of appreciation” and “subsidiarity.” Each of these 
doctrines requires the lawyer and the judge to continuously jump back and forth vertically and 
horizontally between various overlapping jurisdictions. In addition, there is interplay between 
European-level and national norms through a general process of harmonization of law within 
                                                
1017 Khadar, Good Lobby Legal Needs Survey. 
1018 Nielsen and Albiston, “Organization of Public Interest Practice,” 1591. 
1019 Khadar, Good Lobby Legal Needs Survey. 
1020 Ibid.   
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the EU, the incorporation of European human rights law and other international law 
jurisprudence into EU jurisprudence and vice versa, and the EU policy process, which is 
informed by constant surveying of national legal systems in various policy areas. As a result, 
European lawyers (judges, academics, policy makers, legislators, public interest lawyers etc.) 
need to have strong grounding in comparative law (for both horizontal and vertical 
comparisons).   
 
The research work that Big Law is undertaking for non-profits typically involves comparing 
specific laws and legal and administrative practices across multiple jurisdictions. A classic 
example was provided in Chapter 4, i.e. the work of Clifford Chance with Fair Trials 
International. Multi-jurisdictional research was carried out by 28 lawyers across 18 of Clifford 
Chance’s European offices into breaches of Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR, which contributed 
to the development of three EU directives on the right to translation and interpretation, the right 
to information during criminal proceedings, and the right to access to a lawyer and 
communication with a consular official or nominated person. Other examples include those 
mentioned in Chapter 4, taken from the PILnet global clearinghouse:1021 
 
•" “A group of pro bono lawyers gathered research on laws governing squatting in 
a number of European countries. This information was used to bolster the 
campaign of an arts NGO advocating for a law permitting the use of derelict 
buildings for community arts space in Hungary.” 
•" “In order to strengthen gender equality in Croatia, a human rights NGO 
partnered up with two leading law firms to look into the implementation of the 
E.U. Equal Treatment Directive. By examining the approach of other E.U. 
countries in transposing the directive, the NGO was better equipped to make 
concrete proposals for improving the gender equality framework in Croatia.”  
•" “A disability rights organization received an analysis of Swedish laws on 
guardianship (a model of best practice) from a team of pro bono lawyers. This 
analysis was used to inform proposals for legislative amendments in Hungary, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.” 




•" “When the existing legal framework proved insufficient to protect victims of 
domestic slavery in France, one NGO looked to pro bono lawyers to help draft 
proposals to amend the law. These proposals were ultimately used to strengthen 
the protection available.”  
 
To these examples we might add the Guide on EU Trade Law, prepared for non-profits by 
Mayer Brown,1022 the EU Lobbying Toolkits prepared for The Good Lobby by DLA Piper and 
Dentons.1023 More recently, in the context of the closing space for civil society and Brexit, we 
have seen law firms preparing comparative guides advising NGOs wishing to relocate from 
jurisdictions like Hungary, Poland or the UK to the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.1024   
 
It would seem, therefore, that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe may significantly contribute to 
access to justice, defined narrowly, insofar as a great deal of the pro bono work is oriented 
around facilitating non-profits to more effectively engage in or navigate policy, judicial and 
legislative processes.1025  However, despite the clear utility of legal research to non-profits, it 
is also clear that there are pockets of dissatisfaction with services that Big Law provide. 
Interviews with directors of leading NGOs and IGOs for the purpose of this thesis reveal that 
some (particularly those with the most experience of making use of law firm pro bono) 
sometimes “find it difficult to rely on law firms for research as opposed to operational [i.e. 
corporate] work [as] law firms may lack expertise” 1026 where they are “new to a particular 
legal area or policy area”1027 and so it “can be difficult for NGOs to find projects that match up 
well with what the law firms can produce”.1028 Where commercial law firms are doing complex 
research on topics that fall well beyond their core areas of expertise, there does seem to be 
genuine concern from non-profits. In the words of one interviewee at a leading international 
organization: 
                                                
1022 See: http://www.a4id.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/A4ID-EU-Trade-Guide-FINAL.pdf.  
1023 On file with author.  
1024 See the ECNL Handbook on Registering a Civil Society Organization prepared by Dentons and DLA 
Piper: http://ecnl.org/publications/handbook-on-registering-a-civil-society-organization/.   
1025 Of course, the research undertaken for this thesis is not able to conclusively demonstrate that the non-
profits being serviced by Big Law Pro Bono in Europe are primarily advocacy or policy oriented, as opposed to 
service oriented. However, it stands to reason that advocacy and policy oriented non-profits are more likely to 
require legal research and given that research makes up a large part of Big Law Pro Bono work, it is likely that 
advocacy and policy non-profits do make up a significant proportion of the non-profit recipients of Big Law Pro 
Bono in Europe. Another big part of the work, as discussed in Chapter 2, is made of so-called “corporate” work.   
1026 Interview number 48, June 23, 2016. 
1027 Interview number 36, June 13, 2016. 
1028 Interview number 45, June 21, 2016. 
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“[One] problem is where law firms engage in areas of work where they do not have the 
expertise built up to take on that work [and] so they are not able to deliver in the way 
they would have hoped. They may take projects that are particularly interesting or 
inspiring, and may secure greater engagement from their lawyers but where they do not 
have expertise in those fields of law, the project will quickly encounter problems and 
may not be resolved satisfactorily… It may be better to have law firms reviewing 
contracts, etc. That is what we need and that is what they can do well.”1029   
 
A particular problem seems to exist in relation to comparative multi-jurisdictional research 
projects which can prove challenging for firms to coordinate and deliver on. In the words of a 
non-profit Director with a great deal of experience in making use of pro bono for such projects: 
 
“[Comparative] research projects may require from the law firm a set of skills and a 
manner of coordinating work that the law firm does not have [or] is not used to. Law 
firms are not always so successful at coordinating people [and] some law firms should 
refrain from such projects if they are not able to treat them as fee-earning projects… 
Law firms may even push for multi-jurisdictional, comparative projects simply to get 
as many lawyers and offices involved as possible. But this does not mean lawyers are 
used to working in this manner especially on a pro bono project.”1030 
 
The challenging nature of such projects is likely to be exacerbated where the question and 
purpose of the research has not been very clearly defined at the outset. However, of course, 
when done well, such research can be highly influential particularly in a litigation setting: 
 
“Comparative multi-jurisdictional research projects may only work when the question 
is very specific. [For example] comparative law can be very powerful at European 
courts. But there must be a specific question in mind and a specific purpose such as 
convincing a court or body of x, y or z. Comparative research should not be pursued 
out of curiosity. For instance securing a preliminary reference is much easier if you can 
show differing interpretations of EU law across the Member States… Such projects are 
                                                
1029 Interview number 47, June 22, 2016.  
1030 Interview number 48, June 23, 2016. 
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especially important in [the EU] where you have 28 jurisdictions… How can NGOs 
find out what the practice is in other jurisdictions? …NGOs have a crucial role to play 
in holding Member States to account … and such projects can play a key role in that 
respect.”1031 
 
To recap, it was suggested in Chapter 2 that, taking just the top 30 firms, approximately 
170,000 pro bono hours and almost €70 million worth of work per year is carried out for 
somewhere in the region of 1500 non-profits (perhaps the equivalent of a 100-lawyer firm 
working full-time on pro bono for non-profits). If we note that, as of 2014, there were 
approximately 1800 non-profits registered in the EU transparency register, then the 
contribution of Big Law Pro Bono is not insignificant.1032 Of course, we must also recall that 
there are likely millions of non-profits active across Europe. However, only a fraction of these 
will be policy or advocacy organizations.  
 
There remains of course the question of whether increasing or enhancing access to law and 
lawyers and to the judicial, policy and legislative processes for non-profits is an end in itself 
or should rather contribute ultimately to the betterment of the lives of real people (the 
constituents of the relevant non-profits). Again, this is a dilemma that pro bono professionals 
are aware of. DLA Piper is so concerned about the possible limited social impact of research 
work that they are undertaking a review of some of the comparative research they have 
produced in recent years. Stas Kuzmierkiewicz, the Pro Bono Associate responsible for the 
review, explained that the aim was to explore to what extent large research reports were being 
used by the non-profit clients who had requested them and actually achieving law or policy 
reform. The question, Kuzmierkiewicz explained, is “do lawyers give up hundreds of hours to 
produce reports that sit on shelves? If that is the case, why?”1033 
 
3! Wide definition 
 
The central question for the wide definition of access to justice is, ‘is the administration of 
justice fair, consistent, impartial, reasonable?’ This is what Cummings refers to as the “policy” 
                                                
1031 Interview number 45, June 21, 2016. 
1032 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-542170-European-Transparency-Register-
FINAL.pdf. 
1033 Interview number 33, May 17, 2016. 
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dimension of public interest law and relates to political inequality or “structural disadvantage” 
and obstacles or hindrances that prevent certain groups from “advancing collective interests 
through political channels”.1034 The focus shifts from the “ease of entry to legal institutions” 
towards “the nature of the justice they provide”.1035 Under this definition, we are concerned 
primarily with making the processes and outcomes more just, fair, equitable. Barriers to access 
to justice, defined in this way, will be systemic or structural defects in the administration of 
justice that prevent the conflict resolution, rulemaking or rule enforcement processes from 
treating certain individuals or groups fairly and from delivering justice to such individuals 
and/or groups. Such barriers could include, for example, systemic racism, sexism, classism, 
political bias, authoritarianism or corruption in the rulemaking, rule enforcement or conflict 
resolution processes. As discussed in Chapter 2, securing access to justice, defined in this way, 
requires norm change. It requires that the assumed legitimacy underpinning the administration 
of justice in a relevant political community is questioned or suspended and then reconstituted. 
Actions promoting access to justice can be both internal (working within the existing process 
to bring about change) or external (working beyond those processes). Moreover, all such 
actions must be characterized as indirect (possibly contributing to norm change, in time). This 
is because norm change is unstructured and happens gradually (over years, decades or even 
centuries) throughout the whole body of the institutionalized rulemaking, rule enforcement and 
conflict resolution processes, and consequently such actions cannot be said, by themselves, to 
conclusively contribute to access to justice. For example, a law reform campaign or impact 
litigation with the intention of promoting greater equality under the law for same sex couples 
or non-citizens would constitute internal actions seeking to promote access to justice under this 
definition. Boycotting an election, or organizing a street protest to the same ends would 
constitute external actions seeking to promote access to justice.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, out of the evolving European legal and institutional context 
described in the previous section, specific models of public interest advocacy emerged: models 
epitomized by organizations like INTERIGHTS and the ERRC, models premised on deploying 
international and comparative law (and increasingly also policy) to exert pressure on national 
decision makers via regional and international norms and norm generators. This entire model 
of legal advocacy is oriented around achieving norm change both at the national and 
                                                
1034 Cummings, “Pursuit of Legal Rights,” 524. 
1035 Sarat, “Book Review,” 1912. 
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international levels.  In so far as Big Law Pro Bono supports non-profits that engage in this 
model of advocacy, it may contribute to access to justice defined more widely. For example, 
as noted in Chapter 4, law firms worked alongside Georgian civil rights NGO, Identoba, which 
was involved in litigation and advocacy to remove a prohibition on gay men donating blood in 
Georgia. The law firms undertook extensive pro bono legal research into case law from other 
jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to supplement the legal 
argumentation for the litigation and provide a comparative perspective. The litigation to which 
the research gave support was successful, resulting in the striking down of the ban by Georgia’s 
Constitutional Court in 2014.1036 The examples set out earlier from PILnet’s global 
clearinghouse are also illustrative; often comparative legal research is used to exert pressure 
either up (on European policy makers and judicial bodies who will, in turn, apply pressure on 
national administrations) or down, by using comparative jurisprudence (and the principles of 
supremacy and coherence of European law along with direct effect) to exert pressure on local 
administrations to comply with EU and ECHR norms.  Another recent example in this vein 
relates to the Coman case recently decided by the Court of Justice.1037 The Romanian LGBTi 
advocacy group Accept teamed up with White & Case to achieve an important legal judgment 
at the European Court of Justice in 2017. In Coman v. Romania, a team comprised of 
experienced corporate commercial litigators and Romanian human rights lawyers persuaded 
the Grand Chamber of the Courts of Justice to hold that the term “spouse” includes same sex 
spouses of EU citizens for the purpose of freedom of movement and residency rights in the 
EU.  
 
Of course, we should note that, so far as norm change is concerned, Big Law is significantly 
limited in relation to the issues that it can engage with due to the possibility for potential and 
actual, perceived and real conflicts of interest arising (as discussed in Chapter 1). In Europe (as 
in the US) conflicts become particularly problematic for law firms where NGOs are engaged 
in fields of advocacy that encroach upon the terrain of traditional commercial clients; 
environmental justice, consumer protection, financial and economic justice, for example.  
Additionally, any pro bono work that is likely to bring firms into direct confrontation with 
states and supranational institutions may also be problematic. There are those within the pro 
                                                
1036 Londa Beria, “Constitutional Court in Georgia lifts ban on homosexuals giving blood,” Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, July 19, 2014. See http://dfwatch.net/constitutional-court-in-georgia-lifts-ban-on-homosexuals-
giving-blood-10117-26435. 
1037 Relu Adrian Coman and Others v. Romania (C-673/16).  
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bono community who are skeptical of the reasoning behind commercial conflicts. Garth 
Meintjes, PILnet President suggests that: 
 
“What firms [sometimes] mean when they say [there is a] conflict is a conflict of a business 
interest. ‘My well-paying clients won’t like it if I do this’. Well, too bad! There are well-
paying clients who would not like it if we represent people in Guantanamo, does that mean 
we should not represent people in Guantanamo because some wealthy corporate client does 
not want you to? If that is what you are saying then pro bono really is as vacuous as some 
seem to think it is and is not a potential source of social change. I do not think it is that 
vacuous, but people who espouse this kind of view, make it so. [We must look for] lawyers 
who have the courage to stand up for their convictions…”1038 
 
Another interesting point of view that chimes with the opinion of Meintjes was expressed by 
Özgür Kahale, Pro Bono Director for Europe at DLA Piper. She believes that firms should 
“start from the law” rather than from a commercial or political risk perspective. Speaking of 
DLA’s work with refugees and asylum seekers, she said that DLA leadership had been quick 
to rubbish ideas that law firms could not get involved in such cases because they were too 
“political”, “these are people with an international right to claim asylum and we are helping 
them to claim their rights and it is in [states’] interests to take care of these claims as opposed 
to trying to resist and ignore [them]” she said. “[At DLA] we question everything… we don’t 
think restrictively, we always think why not and how. Our starting point is everything is 
doable… our starting point is human rights law and ethical responsibility”, she continued.1039    
 
However, the survey of 21 leading pro bono counsel revealed that just under half of those 
surveyed agreed (moderately or strongly) with the statement: “Conflicts checks related to pro 
bono should ideally be strictly legal and not commercial…” and just over half disagreed. It is 
clear from the interviews conducted that there are many firms which avoid pro bono matters 
that might in any way be perceived negatively by existing clients and/or prevent the firm from 
acting for clients in the future. 
 
                                                
1038 Interview number 31, May 12, 2016. 
1039 Interview number 30, Mar. 25, 2016. 
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We may conclude therefore, as above, that Big Law Pro Bono can potentially make a very 
small but perhaps not insignificant contribution to access to justice defined in this way, in so 
far as Big Law works through non-profits to indirectly engage in impact litigation and law 
reform targeted at norm change. However, the range of issues that firms will be willing to 
engage on may be significantly circumscribed due to the reluctance of firms to openly promote 
norm change where commercial clients might perceive this negatively.    
 
4! Other contributions of Big Law Pro Bono?  
 
The suggestion I wish to make here is that a large contribution of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
may relate to objectives that lie beyond access to justice. All the pro bono work that Big Law 
carries out for non-profits in Europe can be construed as achieving two other objectives: 
 
1." Redistributing resources from Big Law (and the private sector more broadly) towards 
the non-profit sector (and therefore, ultimately, towards the pursuit of public goods 
such as healthcare and education); and  
2." Providing moral/sentimental education to legal and social elites, sensitizing them to 
various social and political issues and causes, and therefore possibly, over time, 
contributing to norm change among such elites.     
 
Ultimately, it could be argued, that all of the 200,000 hours or €85 million worth of pro bono 
work carried out per year across Europe (among just the top 30 firms), whether related to 
corporate work for non-profits (contracts, governance, employment advice, etc.), to legal 
research, training, drafting, fact-finding or lobbying, constitutes a transfer of valuable resources 
(time/expertise/knowledge) away from the private sector and towards the public sector (non-
profits, law clinics, public benefit institutions and even, to some extent, social enterprises). In 
the same way that certain philanthropic activity, even where donations are primarily made to 
non-profits, could arguably be characterized as a form of wealth distribution, we might argue 
that, where the non-profit pro bono recipients are running programs or pursing agendas 
promoting social and economic equality, Big Law Pro Bono could be construed as 
redistributive, whether in terms of expertise and know-how or wealth (although, of course, 
significant data would be needed to empirically demonstrate this).1040 Indeed, some in the 
                                                
1040 Wolpert, “America’s private foundations,” 123–49.  
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European Big Law Pro Bono community do think of pro bono as a democratization or 
redistribution of specialist legal expertise. Meintjes’ central concern is that pro bono should 
have, as its core aim, transformative social change, by which he means change in the way that 
law works in society and the results it produces for those with power as compared to those 
without power:  
 
“Pro bono gives you access to expertise within the legal profession that you would not 
otherwise have; know-how about tax, trade, extractives, mining and environmental 
codes. [Law firms] have been developing that expertise on behalf of very well-paying 
clients and now you [can make] that available to civil society who can [consequently] 
engage in high-level policy discussions that they would otherwise be excluded 
from.”1041 
 
He continues:  
 
“The mainstream legal profession has grown and benefited from free market thinking 
at a global level. This has made them fantastically wealthy and encouraged them to 
open offices all around the world and to add staff and to grow. [However, sometimes] 
the way in which law is being practiced, is skewing outcomes in ways that further the 
interests of [the] rich and powerful… rather than a broader community and public… 
we cannot deny that the way law is practiced globally does not produce results that 
benefit everyone equally.  It’s not nearly helping everyone and may be part of the rapid 
acceleration of inequality. It may be fueling disruptive consumption and resource 
depletion, which would happen less if law were more evenly available as a social 
process.  If you could get equal levels of policy expertise on all sides of a policy issue, 
you could likely produce outcomes that were much more equitable, responsible and 
sustainable.”1042 
 
Meintjes argues that by placing commercial law firms at the service of the public (both civil 
society, public benefit institutions, and even the state), not merely as a source of “man power” 
                                                
1041 Interview number 31, May 12, 2016. 
1042 Ibid. 
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but as a source of expertise, law firms can radically alter the distribution of law and thus power 
in society.  
 
A second alternative objective Big Law Pro Bono could be construed as advancing is moral or 
sentimental education of social and professional elites. Commercial law firms in Europe are 
packed full of social and cultural elites. The largest firms have intensely competitive 
recruitment processes that are geared towards the filtering out of non-elites and the 
identification of young lawyers with “compatible” social and cultural capital.1043 All young 
recruits in continental Europe will have graduated towards the top of their class, will speak at 
least two languages fluently, will have at least one LLM (and very often more than one), and 
will most likely have spent time studying abroad.1044 International law firms are increasingly 
identifying a set of common characteristics and credentials that define the ideal recruit; a 
‘global lawyer’, multilingual, internationalized, cosmopolitan and thoroughly polished. In the 
UK, consortiums of large law firms, each taking on up to 100 trainee lawyers a year, have come 
together to develop their own “accelerated” legal practice course (the accelerated LPC) which 
all of their recruits are required to undertake.1045 Similarly, in the Netherlands, 14 large firms 
came together to create the “Law Firm School” in 2009 to provide vocational training to their 
recruits.1046 These training programs have been devised to provide, in tandem with the 
apprenticeship period they are linked to, an extensive socialization period for young 
commercial lawyers. The sponsoring firms also seek to make the vocational stage of legal 
education (for their recruits) more relevant to commercial law practice.  
 
The selective recruitment process combined with the extended socialization process will most 
likely result, without further intervention, in a very narrow and elite class of individuals 
occupying the glass tower European offices of the globe’s largest law firms.    
 
Richard Rorty has argued in favor of “sentimental education”, to create a “planetary 
community” dominated by a culture of human rights.1047 Such education is rooted in an 
understanding of moral progress as a “progress of sentiments”; a progress that “consists in an 
                                                
1043 Cook, Faulconbridge, and Muzio, “London’s legal elite,” 1744–62. 
1044 Maduro, “Legal Education,” editorial note. 
1045 See, for example, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Herbert Smith Freehills, Hogan Lovells, Norton Rose 
or Slaughter and May; http://www.bpp.com/accelerated-lpc (25/11/2015). 
1046 Wilson, “Practical Training in Law,” 178–79; see also http://thelawfirmschool.nl/. 
1047 Rorty, “Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality,” 178. 
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increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us as 
outweighing the differences”1048. Rorty suggests that, to get “whites to be nicer to blacks, males 
to females, Serbs to Muslims, or straights to gays”, we must appeal to people’s sentiments and 
encourage them to “think about what things might be like for people with whom [they] do not 
immediately identify”.1049 The purpose of sentimental education is to answer the question: 
“Why should I care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person whose habits I find 
disgusting?”1050 
 
However, Rorty notes that sentimental education renders liberal elites the engine of moral 
progress. It means that our “hope for a decent society consists in softening the self-satisfied 
hearts of a leisure class”. He notes that: 
 
 “[…] if we hand our hopes for moral progress over to sentiment, we are in effect handing 
them over to condescension. For we shall be relying on those who have the power to change 
things — people like the rich New England abolitionists or rich bleeding hearts like Robert 
Owen and Friedrich Engels — rather than relying on something that has power over them. 
We shall have to accept the fact that the fate of the women of Bosnia depends on whether 
television journalists manage to do for them what Harriet Beecher Stowe did for black 
slaves - whether these journalists can make us, the audience back in the safe countries, feel 
that these women are more like us, more like real human beings, than we had realized.”1051  
  
Rorty suggests that, however uncomfortable we may be with this idea, this is how moral 
enlightenment is achieved; moral progress is, after all, a story of “powerful people gradually 
ceasing to oppress others, or to countenance the oppression of others”.1052  
 
It could be argued that Big Law Pro Bono, even where pro bono work is carried out exclusively 
for non-profits, is a form of sentimental education. It is an education that consists in sensitizing 
European elites to a range of public interest causes largely rooted in human rights values. 
Europe’s advocacy, human rights and public interest NGOs deal in a broad array of 
substantives issues. The survey of 100 policy NGOs in the transparency register revealed a 
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1050 Ibid., 185. 
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diverse range of focuses: health (14%); the environment (14%); education and children (14%); 
migration and asylum (9%); economic and social justice (7%); civic engagement (6%).1053 
Through working directly with non-profits across Europe, the elites that make up the rank and 
file of Big Law are exposed to individuals and ideas that challenge them to identify with causes 
with which they might not otherwise identify (Roma rights, migrant rights, gay rights, etc.). Of 
course, as suggested by Nicolas Patrick above, were pro bono practice to bring lawyers directly 
into contact with asylum seekers, victims of abuse and discrimination and so on, it would no 
doubt increase the power of this moral education significantly. However, this is already 
happening in innovative ways that do not involve direct legal representation. For example, 
DLA Piper established a legal education program for asylum seekers and refugees, which is 
being run across its European offices. The program engages lawyers in providing legal training 
to participants on areas of law relevant for integration, (small business law, health law, housing 
law, etc.).1054     
 
In any event, in this way, Big Law Pro Bono perhaps operates as a corrective against the 
tendency towards a closed and elitist culture among Europe’s richest and most powerful 
lawyers. Particularly if we assume an average participation rate (in pro bono work), at the top 
firms, of 50% (as discussed in Chapter 4), the impact of this kind of education on the culture 




In this final Chapter of the thesis, we have set out to evaluate the extent to which Big Law Pro 
Bono contributes to access to justice in Europe, where “access to justice” is defined along the 
lines set out in Chapter 2, in three different (but overlapping) ways.  
 
The problem that we have had to grapple with in this thesis is that, if we embrace the definition 
of access to justice that has been embedded within much of the existing literature on pro bono 
(i.e. access to justice as the provision of (civil) legal aid to low-income individuals), then we 
must conclude that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe does not contribute to access to justice and 
possibly is not even worthy of academic attention. Therefore, we have developed a broader 
                                                




definition of access to justice in the hope that this will help us to critically evaluate Big Law 
Pro Bono and its empirical contributions to access to justice beyond the provision of civil legal 
aid and that it might allow us to expand the normative agenda for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
beyond the provision of civil legal aid.  
 
In this Chapter, it has been suggested that in relation to the definition of access to justice 
currently embraced by the US pro bono literature (the PBL definition), Big Law Pro Bono does 
not contribute to access to justice insofar as possibly less than 15% of Big Law Pro Bono work 
involves providing legal services directly to low-income individuals.  
 
In relation to what has been termed the “narrow definition” of access to justice (i.e. directly or 
indirectly facilitating access to the conflict resolution, rulemaking or rule enforcement 
processes) much of the work that firms do in Europe for non-profits falls under this definition. 
This is because several developments within European law and governance, since the Second 
World War and more recently, have made it increasingly complicated and resource-intensive 
for civil society organizations to effectively engage with European policy and adjudicatory 
bodies and have threatened their very existence by undermining core civil liberties, and Big 
Law Pro Bono facilitates non-profits to cope with both of these challenges.  
 
In relation to the “wide definition” of access to justice, it has been suggested that Big Law Pro 
Bono makes (or can make) a small but significant impact. The models of social change 
lawyering that emerged from the civil liberties, human rights and public interest law movement 
in Europe have become significantly institutionalized in contemporary European civil society 
organizations (particularly those operating transnationally). These models of legal advocacy 
promote law reform and policy change and rely on deploying European and international norms 
domestically to promote progressive norm change or applying progressive national norms 
comparatively to promote norm change in specific jurisdictions. In either case, actors engaged 
in this kind of advocacy (i.e. non-profits across Europe) have been effectively making use of 
Big Law Pro Bono to increase their capacity for research and advocacy (in particular, 
comparative, multi-jurisdictional legal research). In this way, Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
also contributes to, and stands to contribute to, access to justice in this definition.     
 
Finally, beyond access to justice, it has been suggested that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe might 
also stand to make a contribution. This insofar as all the Big Law Pro Bono work carried out 
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in Europe could be characterized as a redistribution of resources away from wealthy private 
sector clients and towards public interests and public goods. Moreover, through Big Law Pro 
Bono, the increasingly large number of elite lawyers that are engaged in pro bono through their 
firms are also receiving a form of moral education by being exposed to various public interest 





The central objective of this thesis has been to explore whether “Big Law Pro Bono” 
contributes to access to justice in Europe and, if not, whether normatively, it could. The central 
argument has been that Big Law Pro Bono, as a practice and institution, has taken a unique 
shape in Europe, which is markedly different from the shape of its American predecessor. 
Chiefly, this distinction can be observed in the nature of the clients (typically NGOs rather than 
low-income individuals) and in the objectives pursued (often law reform or policy change 
rather than promoting individual access to justice). The result is that Big Law Pro Bono in 
Europe does not contribute to access to justice as this phrase has been classically understood 
in the literature. In order to fully perceive the way in which Big Law Pro Bono, as a resource, 
has been deployed in Europe, we need to adopt a much broader and more nuanced definition 
of access to justice (essentially redefining the objectives of pro bono and the criteria for 
evaluation of success). When evaluated on the basis of such a (broader) definition, we can 
perceive that Big Law Pro Bono might contribute to access to justice in Europe by promoting 
the legal and policy work of NGOs, by enabling them to better access legal services and by 
exposing otherwise quite elitist and insulated European commercial lawyers to the important 
public interest causes pursued by those organizations.   
 
To recap, in Chapter 1 we established that Big Law Pro Bono could trace its origins to the 
United States and to progressive legal movements of the 1960s and 1970s and we suggested 
that, as such, it must be understood as a fundamentally American construct.  I suggested that it 
was only by the internationalization of large and elite law firms that Big Law Pro Bono came 
to be practiced in Continental Europe at all. We also suggested that Big Law Pro Bono, unlike 
other forms of progressive lawyering was, at least before significant institutionalization, 
ideologically indeterminate and rooted in conventional professional services norms. An 
exploration of how Big Law Pro Bono was institutionalized in the US between the 1970s and 
the early 2000s revealed that Big Law Pro Bono may also be historically and politically 
contingent, taking shape against the prevailing social and political climate. Several important 
consequences and implications of these findings were suggested. Firstly, just because Big Law 
Pro Bono took a certain shape in the United States and was oriented functionally towards the 
provision of civil legal aid in that context, we cannot take for granted, without further 
exploration, that it will take the same shape when transplanted beyond the United States. 
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Secondly, the shape that Big Law Pro Bono has taken in the US, has influenced the orientation 
of the literature which empirically and normatively conceives of Big Law Pro Bono as a 
solution to the justice gap (meaning civil legal aid). This presents further gaps in the existing 
literature, in terms of exploring how else Big Law Pro Bono is and might be constructed, i.e. 
which ends it might serve, beyond providing civil legal aid.  
 
In Chapter 2, in addition to setting out the methodological approach adopted throughout the 
thesis research period (i.e. interviews, desk-based research, archival research, participant 
observation and surveys), we developed a definition of access to justice that aimed to serve a 
handful of different purposes. Firstly, it incorporated and moved beyond the narrow definition 
of access to justice typically employed in the pro bono literature which revolves around 
increasing the availability of civil legal aid. Secondly, it responded to criticisms of such narrow 
conceptions of access to justice by including both procedural and substantive elements and by 
looking beyond the legal system to embrace broader political notions of distributive justice. 
Thirdly, it provided an evaluative framework for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and thus 
facilitated an assessment of the extent to which this practice contributes to access to justice. 
Fourthly, it provided an expanded normative project for Big Law Pro Bono in Europe and 
elsewhere. The definition commenced from the work of John Rawls and everyday or intuitive 
understandings of access to justice. The objective was to create a number of broad overlapping 
definitions that could accommodate a multi-layered evaluation of the Big Law Pro Bono work 
being carried out in Europe.  
  
In Chapter 3, based on a broad and loose definition of “pro bono” developed in Chapter 2 (i.e. 
“legal work undertaken for the public good, at below market rates, for recipients who: 
cannot afford to pay; due to the scarcity of financial resources or the limited value placed on 
the relevant legal services relative to other goods and services, would not pay; or  
would otherwise not be able to source such services elsewhere on the open market.”), we 
explored the historical background context of pro bono lawyering in Europe. In doing so, we 
concluded that the factors that play a role in shaping and re-shaping the legal profession and 
the provision of legal services, were also likely to play a role in shaping the practice of pro 
bono. We suggested that the degree of sophistication of pro bono practice likely corresponded 
to the degree of complexity of the practice of law, the number of practice sites and areas of 
social life upon which it is applied and consequently the variety of ways in which law impacts 
the average citizen. We noted that the rationales for pro bono had changed throughout the ages, 
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from communal solidarity, civic duty, kinship and patronage and aristocratic honor in Ancient 
Athens and Republican Rome, to charitable and professional duty and social contract theory in 
the Middles Ages, Early Modern Era and 20th Century. Nevertheless, we observed that there 
has been a consistent and growing concern with access to justice, defined narrowly as the 
access of the poor and the needy to legal services and to procedures for administering justice. 
We suggested that access to justice, defined in this way, had been the major objective of pro 
bono practice throughout the ages in Europe.  It was noted that, with the emergence of nation 
states and then the European social welfare state, the obligation of ensuring access to justice 
gradually shifted from a charitable or professional duty of lawyers and the organized bar, 
towards a constitutionalized civic right, institutionalized in the form of state-funded legal aid 
systems.  Finally, we explored how novel models of social justice lawyering emerged in the 
late 20th Century, which both embraced and transcended conventional public service norms 
(neutrality, impartiality) that were implicit in much of the pro bono lawyering practice 
throughout European history, and fused them with both human rights frames and political and 
transgressive ideologies that had been cultivated in Soviet-era Central and Eastern Europe. 
Broadly, they pursued the wide conception of access to justice (as defined in Chapter 2) insofar 
as they sought norm change, altering both the processes and outcomes of existing judicial 
mechanisms, and so redefining “justice” in favor of marginalized and underrepresented groups 
and social and political pariahs. 
 
In Chapter 4, we explored the process by which Big Law Pro Bono began to emerge in Europe, 
by way of its institutionalization in the US and London and the emergence of a global corporate 
bar and a professional class of pro bono managers with mandates to spread pro bono culture 
across the increasing number of international offices of their respective firms. We also sketched 
the shape of Big Law Pro Bono in Europe, which was one of weak institutionalization 
mimicking many of the features of pro bono in the US, however, with at least one major 
difference, the virtually exclusive non-profit client base both from the point of view of the 
firms and the clearinghouses/intermediaries. We noted that, taking just the top 30 law firms, 
the European Big Law Pro Bono industry likely involves more than 5000 lawyers (perhaps 120 
full-time equivalents) doing some €85 million worth of pro bono work per year spanning the 
entire continent from Moscow to London. While some 1500 non-profit clients may benefit 
from this work, likely less than 15% of this work (possibly much less) is focused on access to 
justice, as defined in the existing pro bono literature and within US pro bono circles (i.e. direct 
access to justice for individual clients). Moreover, we observed that an entire infrastructure has 
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emerged, operating both internationally and nationally, to connect Big Law with non-profits 
spread across the Continent, with virtually no focus on the provision of legal services to low-
income individuals. We noted that, at first glance, this seemed odd, given that, as explored in 
Chapter 2, the singular objective that tied together the various models of pro bono engaged in 
by the European legal professions over the centuries, has been, precisely securing access to 
justice for individuals.  
 
In Chapter 5, we explored why this was the case. The analysis pointed to several possible 
answers, including: barriers to market access experienced by the initial Big Law Pro Bono 
entrepreneurs in Europe (i.e. full-time pro bono manages based in New York, DC and London); 
the unique profile and networks of those actors who initially developed the market for Big Law 
Pro Bono in Europe (especially PILnet); the legacies of the European civil liberties, human 
rights and public interest law movements; the resistance of local bars to Big Law engaging in 
individual client work; the specificities of the type of law firms and lawyers that make up the 
European Corporate Bar; the relative ease of dealing with non-profit clients as opposed to 
individual clients; the functional distribution of labor between the Social Bars of Europe and 
the rest of the legal profession (and the Corporate Bar in particular); and the fact that the 
problem of individual access to justice (in Central and Eastern Europe) had, in the minds of 
many of the relevant stakeholders, already been largely solved by the time the market for Big 
Law Pro Bono was really taking shape on the Continent (settling on a UK/Dutch inspired state-
funded model rather than the US pro bono dependent model). Nevertheless, it was also 
conceded that recent developments in the United Kingdom in particular, and across the rest of 
Europe more broadly, related to both legal aid systems and Big Law Pro Bono practice, leave 
open the possibility that the current status quo may be revised in the coming years. That is to 
say that we might, in time, witness a reorientation of Big Law Pro Bono practice in Continental 
Europe towards the provision of legal services for low-income individuals. It was suggested 
that, in spite of the strong orientation of the US model of Big Law Pro Bono towards promoting 
a narrow vision of access to justice, as a globalized resource, there is no reason to think that it 
should necessarily maintain this functional orientation when transplanted into new legal and 
political contexts.  We concluded that the process of localization had the power to transform 
and re-purpose Big Law Pro Bono. While the internal organization remains broadly the same 
as in the US (involving the development of pro bono policies, the setting of pro bono targets, 
the establishment of pro bono committees and the appointment of full-time pro bono 
professionals engaging fee-earning lawyers in working for free), the ends to which the resource 
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is deployed may differ. Big Law Pro Bono in Europe primarily involves the provision of free 
legal services (chiefly research and operational support) to non-profit organizations that are 
broadly pursuing norm change via law reform and policy advocacy work. This is an altogether 
different objective to promoting access to justice for low-income individuals. Also in light of 
the recent changes underway in the UK, we concluded that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe 
appeared to be an ideologically indeterminate and historically contingent resource that was 
taking shape against the evolving political and legal landscape. As in the US, the prevailing 
legal and political context and the key actors in the pro bono ecosystem (internal and external 
to the firm) are playing a decisive role in determining how Big Law Pro Bono is being 
institutionalized in Europe. In particular, intermediary organizations, the organized bar 
(although through resistance rather than support), the legacy of the civil liberties, human rights 
and public interest law movements, the prevailing systems of state-funded legal aid and the 
large population of non-profit organizations engaging in law reform and policy advocacy work 
targeted at the European Union and Council of Europe institutions, have all played a role in 
giving a unique shape to Big Law Pro Bono in Europe.   
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we set out to evaluate the extent to which Big Law Pro Bono contributes 
to access to justice in Europe, where “access to justice” was defined along the lines set out in 
Chapter 2, i.e. in four different (but overlapping) ways. It was suggested that in relation to the 
definition of access to justice currently embraced by the US pro bono literature, Big Law Pro 
Bono does not contribute to access to justice insofar as possibly less than 15% of Big Law Pro 
Bono work involves providing legal services directly to low-income individuals. In relation to 
what was defined as the “narrow definition” of access to justice (i.e. directly or indirectly 
facilitating access to the conflict resolution, rulemaking or rule enforcement processes), it was 
suggested that much of the work that firms do in Europe for non-profits falls under this 
definition. It was posited that this was because several developments within European law and 
governance, since the Second World War and more recently, have made it increasingly 
complicated and resource-intensive for civil society organizations to effectively engage with 
European policy and adjudicatory bodies (in other words, as noted in Chapter 3, increased 
complexity of the practice of law will create new pro bono needs within society - unmet legal 
need) and have threatened their very existence by undermining core civil liberties, and Big Law 
Pro Bono facilitates non-profits to cope with both of these challenges.  
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In relation to the “wide definition” of access to justice, it was suggested that Big Law Pro Bono 
makes (or could make) a small but significant impact. It was noted that the models of social 
change lawyering that emerged from the civil liberties, human rights and public interest law 
movement in Europe have become significantly institutionalized in contemporary European 
civil society organizations (particularly those operating transnationally). These models of legal 
advocacy, I argued, promoted law reform and policy change and rely on deploying European 
and international norms domestically to promote progressive norm change or on applying 
progressive national norms comparatively to promote norm change in specific jurisdictions. In 
either case, actors engaged in this kind of advocacy (i.e. non-profits across Europe) have been 
effectively making use of Big Law Pro Bono to increase their capacity for research and 
advocacy (in particular, comparative, multi-jurisdictional legal research). In this way, Big Law 
Pro Bono in Europe also contributes to, and stands to contribute to, access to justice within this 
definition.     
 
Finally, beyond access to justice, it has been suggested that Big Law Pro Bono in Europe might 
stand to make a significant contribution. This insofar as all the Big Law Pro Bono work carried 
out in Europe could be characterized as a redistribution of resources away from wealthy private 
sector clients and towards public interests and public goods. Moreover, through Big Law Pro 
Bono, the increasingly large number of elite lawyers who are engaged in pro bono through 
their firms are also receiving a form of moral education by being exposed to various public 
interest and human rights related causes that they might otherwise have been insulated from 
(e.g. environmental protection, minority rights, poverty eradication, migrant rights, etc.).  
 
Ultimately, it is hoped that this thesis has shed light on the study of progressive lawyering in 
Europe and specifically large firm pro bono practice, its globalization and localization and the 
role of various stakeholders in this process. As noted in the introduction, between 1980 and the 
early 2000s, McDonalds was opening its first branches in most European countries. This was 
exactly the period when global (mainly US) law firms were doing the same. McDonalds was 
not only exporting hamburgers and fries, it was exporting Americana: American culture and 
practices (fast food, fancy packaging and drive-thrus, just like in the movies). Similarly, as law 
firms were seeking to provide legal services around the globe, they were also spreading 
American practices and ideals, such as large firm pro bono. While the success of McDonalds 
is often attributed to its consistency, the success of Big Law Pro Bono may in fact depend on 
its adaptability to the local context. Even McDonalds now serves a “McKroket” in the 
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Netherlands, the “McNürnburger” in Germany and the “Croque McDo” in France. The 
questions that remain open are what impact this process of localization will have, over the long 
run, on the overall practice and its sustainability. Working for NGOs can be repetitive and not 
necessarily rewarding in the same way as working for real people. It is often very similar to 
the work that commercial lawyers do in their fee-earing practice. While some find this 
comforting, others find it mundane. In addition, NGOs have the tendency to make “would be 
nice to have” pro bono requests rather than “absolutely necessary” pro bono requests 
(especially where these relate to law and policy advocacy and research to support this work). 
Lawyers become disengaged with such work that sometimes feels contrived, like “busy work”. 
This combined with the fact that lawyers sometimes work in areas where they have no expertise 
(international human rights, for example) results in low quality output, which has the tendency 
to erode trust in pro bono over the long run. In addition, without significant penetration of local 
legal markets (a critical mass of local lawyers managing pro bono on a full-time basis across 
Europe and fee-earners looking to do such work) it is questionable how sustainable this legal 
transplant will actually be. To this end, future research might investigate the factors 
contributing to success or failure in law firm-NGO relationships/partnerships, factors affecting 
lawyer motivation and satisfaction in working for NGO clients, perhaps in comparison to work 
for non-profit clients.   
 
Other leads that could be followed up on include: comparative empirical research into the links 
between declining legal aid budgets and pressures on legal aid systems (and the political 
discourse that surrounds that) and steps taken by commercial law firms to increase their pro 
bono work; the extent to which pro bono practices may incentivize elite law students (beyond 
the US) to seek out job opportunities at specific law firms; the link (if any) between threats to 
the legal profession as a whole (especially in terms of competition from non-legal service 
providers) and the pro bono activity of large firms outside of the US; what is leading firms to 
appoint full-time pro bono managers beyond the US, and why some firms adopt such a strategy 
while others refrain from doing so and what impact such persons are making/can make (both 
within the firm and beyond the firm) where they may be the only full-time professional in an 
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